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ABSTRACT
New technology has received increased attention in the literature over the past two decades. Information technology's profound economic, social, political, organisational, and psychological effects have been the subject matter of numerous studies. The wide-spread use of computers in manufacturing industry is an important area for research into what may look superficially as a purely technical change but turns out to be, in effect, as much about organisational adaptation as it is about the introduction of a technology system per se. The latter needs to fit the host organisational setting in order to operate and deliver 
and the former needs to fit the technology being introduced in order to make an effective use of it. Among other important computer technology applications in manufacturing industry (e.g. robotics, CAT and MRP-I), CAD was the subject matter of numerous research efforts during the 1970s and 80s. So was CAM but to a lesser degree. For the 1990s and beyond, however, the focus of research has shifted to concentrate on integrating technologies (e.g. MRP-II and 
CADCAM) used in manufacturing companies and often symbolised by the 
generic concept of CIM Such technologies are more technically advanced in their own right but they also have greater implications for job design and work organisation. This thesis addresses the gap between precept and practice in CADCAM implementation as a technology-induced organisational integration process.
The aim of the present research is to develop a better empirically-informed understanding of integration as an organisational change process by researching and comparing ten selected UK-based manufacturing companies' experiences. 
The emphasis in this study is on the discovery and development, rather than testing, of theory. Therefore, the underlying theory here is grounded in the data gathered through an oriented field research, rather than tested for verification purposes following a logic-deductive literature review. A qualitative, "grounded theory" methodological approach is used to meet the set objective on the basis of a defined link between the study's theoretical and methodological frameworks. The research strategy is designed to include a longitudinal case study approach which traces the companies' historical experiences of introducing CAD and CAM systems since the early 1970s (in the ten companies) and cunent experiences of interfacing them to create integrated CADCAM (in five of them - termed primary cases), as well as the lack of 
integration initiatives (in the other five companies - termed secondary cases).
Seven tentative research questions are used to orient the field research initially. A conceptual model is then developed as a framework for the generation of 
theory: 20 substantive theoretical propositions on CAD/CAM and integration and, subsequently, 20 corresponding formal theoretical propositions on 
organisational change in general, of which 14 are presented in a hypothesis form.
The findings have implications for directing the efforts of future organisational change, particularly in the area of CADCAM integration. They should be of interest to different individuals and groups who are involved in organisational change in one way or another. Senior and technical managers in particular may find them to be of importance in managing the organisational aspects of a 
strategic technological change process.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
1 .1  Overview
The history of industrialisation in the modern world has been through three phases of 
development: craft production, mass production and competition age. Associated with 
each of these eras are distinctive types of production settings. Organisation of 
manufacturing has changed from one era to another, both at an enterprise and industry 
levels as well as within and across national boundaries, but variations have also existed 
within each era (see Bumes, 1996; Hoffman, 1994; Piore and Sabel, 1984).
The craft production era originated in Britain, the pioneer industrial country. As Pollard 
(1965: 1) points out, the British Industrial Revolution is often viewed as the "prototype 
of the industrialisation process which many countries have undergone since, and others 
are undergoing, or about to undergo, at present". In 1850 Great Britain was known as 
the "workshop of the world" and was the model that the USA and other European 
countries sought to emulate in their attempts to transform traditional agrarian societies 
into urban societies based on science and technology (Bessant, 1991; Kemp, 1979). A 
low-cost mass production era then followed. It began in the USA and was symbolised 
by the factory operated by Henry Ford in the 1920s, the River Rouge plant (Bessant, 
1991). The current competition age has succeeded the mass production era since mass 
production could no longer offer the right conditions for the kind of industrial flexibility 
needed (Piore and Sabel, 1984). It emphasises product differentiation, quality, and 
customer satisfaction as patterns of demand become increasingly fragmented and 
emphasis shifts to non-price factors, such as variety, frequency of product innovation 
and high-quality customer service. Globalisation of markets is another characteristic of 
service-oriented economies of the current competition age (see, for example, Coates, 
1992; Dodgson, 1988; Hoffman, 1994). "Post-Fordism" succeeded an era of
“......  mass consumption through standardised markets premised on mass production
bureaucracies organised around low-trust relations, with changes which began to occur in the
late 1970s [due to] a conjuncture of several factors [including] the continuing post-1974
recession and the increased competition from Japan and other NICs." (Clegg, 1990: 209).
In a relatively recent article published in Dundee and Tayside, the journal of The 
Dundee and Tayside Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Michael Hesseltine (1995: 
76), Britain’s former Deputy Prime Minister typifies the central theme of
entrepreneurial thinking in the current age, one that, in his case, is fortified by strong 
capitalist free-market convictions of the Conservative Paity. He writes:
“Competitiveness has become a key concept of our time, pervading the thinking of
governments, industry and individuals alike Competitiveness matters to nations. If they
are incompetitive, their living standards drop. They cannot sustain high standards of education, 
health, infrastructure or preserve their culturW heritage.”
I
Manufacturing industry entered the decade of the 1980s in a mood of technological 
optimism with sophisticated advanced manufacturing technologies (AMTs)i to meet the j
challenges of changing strategic environment by virtue of enhanced competitiveness. |
The belief in technology as a significant element determining corporate and sectoral |
strategic competitiveness dominated the background to this optimism (see, for example, j
Dodgson, 1988; Porter, 1993; Schroeder et al., 1995; Voss, 1986). Yet over a decade i
and a half has passed and caution about AMTs seems to be on the increase; "although 
many firms found improved competitive performance, the road is littered with less i
fortunate examples of failure and disappointed expectations" (Bessant, 1994: 237). |
I
The question for managers is one of deriving the potential benefits of AMTs whilst j
avoiding pitfalls which have led to much disappointment so far. The question for 
researchers is one of describing what has happened with regard to user companies' 
experiences of AMT implementation, analysing and explaining such experiences, and, 
hopefully, developing empirically-informed recommendations to assist with future 
technology projects.
This study is a contribution to developing a better understanding of technology-induced 
organisational change. It focuses on the contemporary implementation of computer- 
aided design (CAD), computer-aided engineering (CAE) and computer-aided 
manufacturing (CAM) systems and the organisational processes whereby such 
independent technology applications are integrated in selected manufacturing 
organisations in Scotland.
1.2 Defining CAD, CAM and Other Relevant Concepts
In this section the basic concepts behind the acronyms "CAD " and "CAM" and two 
other closely related concepts will be defined.
^See List of Abbreviations for acronyms. Each acronym used in this thesis consists of the initial 
letters of a corresponding group of words which appear against the acronym and thus define it.
1.2.1 CAD
A comprehensive definition of CAD is needed for the purpose of this study, one that 
addresses it both in terms of its functions and constituent components. Groover and 
Zimmers's (1984: 1-2) provide a suitable one. It is:
“.... the use of computer systems to assist in the creation, modification, analysis or 
optimisation of a design. The computer systems consist of the hardware and software to 
perform the specialised design functions required by the particular user firm. The CAD 
hardware typically includes the computer, one or more graphics display terminals, keyboards, 
and other peripheral equipment. The CAD software consists of the computer programs to 
implement computer graphics on the system plus application programs to facilitate the 
engineering functions of die user company. Examples of these application programs include 
stress-strain analysis of components, dynamic response of mechanisms, heat transfer 
calculation, and numerical control part programming.”
Therefore, the term CAD is used to refer to those design activities that involve the use 
of the computer to create or modify an engineering design throughout conceptual 
design, analysis, information handling, detailing and modification. Such activities 
include graphics design, functional analysis, stress-strain analysis, heat and material 
balances, simulation and modelling, data analysis and cost estimating of proposed 
products to determine fitness of purpose and economically optimised production 
(Bessant et a l, 1985).
1.2.2 CAE
CAE is sometimes used to refer to CAD/CAM by "extending the link beyond the 'pure' 
design area into the latter stages of the manufacturing process." (Bessant, 1991: 164). 
It involves the utilisation of a CAD system for purposes beyond basic drafting and 
design into the various types of analysis activities involved in the formulation of nearly 
any engineering design project. The significance of CAD is further highlighted in the 
role it can play in developing computerised integration via CAE, and thus creating the 
base for a company-wide flexible automation project (Kaplinsky, 1984).
CAE helps designers simplify sophisticated design analyses through the use of 
engineering analysis techniques such as finite element analysis (FEA) and analysis of 
mass properties (Adler, 1889; Groover and Zimmers, 1984). An analysis of mass 
properties helps a designer assess properties of a solid object being analysed, such as 
the surface area, weight, volume, centre of gravity and moment of inertia. An FEA 
involves dividing the object into a larger number of finite elements with a view to 
evaluating its stress-strain, heat transfer and other characteristics. Consequently, 
undesirable object behaviour could be changed by modifying the design under 
evaluation.
1.2.3 CAPP
Computer-aided process planning (CAPP) allows the free flow of information from 
design to manufacturing through a computer network with the advantage of planned 
manufacturing process for product components. It is defined as:
“A computer application which supports the development and creation of tlie technological 
plan required to produce a given part. It is an important application from a CIM perspective 
since it is a key interface between ... CAD and ... CAM. The resulting process plan consists 
of a statement of the sequence of operations necessary to manufacture the part, the 
identification of the machines on which these operations should be carried out, as well as the 
operation times.” (Browne et al., 1988: 22).
1.2.4 CAM
As Adler (1989) points out, a buy-out policy is more feasible in CAD than in CAM due 
to the greater degree of firm specificity of the manufacturing process as compared to 
design. CAM may also cover a much wider range of activities that are normally carried 
out on the production side of a manufacturing organisation. Since these might vary 
widely from one company to another a single definition of CAM tends to be less 
universally acceptable.
Nevertheless, the role of computers in manufacture is to help management monitor and 
control various production activities through high speed computation, mass data storage 
and fast retrieval, and systematic detection of errors. A consensus can be established 
thus far. In general, CAM involves the utilisation of computer technology in the 
management and control of shop floor production operations of a manufacturing 
company through either direct or indirect computer interfaces with the physical or 
human resources of a company.
CAM can be defined comprehensively as "the use of computer systems to plan, manage 
and control the operations of a manufacturing plant through either direct or indirect 
computer interface with the plant's production resources."(Groover and Zimmers, 
1984: 2). CAM may cover a wide range of applications. These can be classified broadly 
into two categories (see Groover and Zimmers, 1984):
1) Computer monitoring and control applications:
These are direct applications in which the computer is connected directly to a 
manufacturing process for the purpose of monitoring or controlling the process.
2) Manufacturing support applications:
These are indirect applications in which the computer is used in support of the 
production operations in a factory, without it being interfaced with the manufacturing 
process.
In the first category the computer is used as a tool for performing human-controlled 
operations on the basis of the information feedback it provides through monitoring a
particular productive process. In the second the computer is not physically linked to a 
manufacturing process but used "off-line" to play one or more support roles. These 
might include the provision of plans, schedules, forecasts, instructions and information 
for the manufacturing operations of a user company. The most widely recognised areas 
of CAM applications in this category include (see Groover and Zimmers, 1984: 3):
1) Computer numerical control part programming whereby control programs are 
prepared for use on automated machine tools.
2) Computer-automated process planning whereby the computer is used to prepare a 
listing of the operation sequence needed to process a given product or component.
3) Shop floor control where by the computer is used to collect factory data to establish 
progress of production shop orders.
It can be noted from the above exposition that defining CAM is not as straightforward a 
task as that of defining CAD. For a start, CAM is a less established, more complicated, 
and much more costly technology. Traditionally, in manufacturing industry MIS 
(Management Information Systems) or DP (Data Processing) departments have 
resumed responsibility for indirect information technology (IT) applications at a plant 
level, whereas engineering groups, both associated with product design and 
manufacturing, have had responsibility for application areas which are more directly 
related to the core of the manufacturing process (Browne et al„ 1988). Thus the term 
"CAM" is often used by engineers to imply only those manufacturing areas in which 
their core technical skills are applied^.
Having defined the basic acronymie concepts in the technology area of concern to the 
present study, the chapter now proceeds to present the research problem in the 
following section.
1 .3  Presenting the Research Problem
The assimilation of major technological innovations into organisations has been studied 
extensively in recent years from economic, social, political, organisational, and
^Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the acronym "CAM" throughout the thesis reflects an 
inherently engineering concept of CAM, for two main reasons: (1) the researcher's engineering training 
background and (2) the study's central focus on the flow of information and material processing in a 
product design-engineering-manufacturing (DEM) context, rather than broadening the research 
boundaries to include other aspects such as production planning and control management systems. As a 
result, the notion of integration utilised is concerned with integration within the boundaries of a 
manufacturing company, rather than cross-organisational integration.
Different writers on the subject use these acronyms in slightly different ways to indicate specific 
versions of the basic concepts by combining their elements. To clarify the position of this thesis a 
clarification note will probably be helpful to avoid possible confusion: when used with "CAD" in the 
"CADCAM" format "CAM" is to refer to an integrated system in which both elements are interfaced; 
when used in the "CAD/CAM" format it means that either or each of the two separately is implied but 
not both of them together.
strategic points of view (Forrester et al., 1995; Markus and Robey, 1988; Plonski, 
1989). Arguably it has become more challenging, as a phenomenon, to research in 
recent years because of the more dynamic nature of the organisational contexts under 
profound and rapid change in the manufacturing business environment of the 1990s 
(see, for example, Boaden and Dale, 1990; Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993; 
Hoffman, 1994; Kovacs et al., 1994; Mac Conaill, 1993; Scott-Morton, 1995). Such is 
the scope of current change that it involves structures of national economies, structures 
of individual companies, and the lives of individuals at the work place and in larger 
society (Hoffman, 1994).
A random survey of both academic and managerial literatures would reveal that the need 
for change is now almost taken for granted; "it is seen as the hallmark of the late 
twentieth century" (Stacey, 1993: 2). Organisation theory, for example, has long 
considered the topic of change to be a significant sub-discipline in its own right 
(Wilson, 1992). The vast majority of the literature and theorising on change, however, 
can be located within a "modernist" perspective (Clegg, 1990). Such a perspective is 
founded upon the power of reason, the search for essentials, the machine metaphor of 
organisation and a faith in progress and universal design (Gergen, 1992).
It is important to make it clear from the outset that concerns about the "health" of 
present change theory are by no means confined to researchers preoccupied with "post- 
modemity" as a real or imagined phenomenon, whose entire existence, after all, could 
be rightly questioned as an attempt to interpret current history's cultural, social, 
economic and political trends by (still human) experts in the imaginative field of 
organisation theory. Many other researchers of various academic interests and research 
traditions (e.g. Frost and Egri, 1991; Pettigrew, 1985; Robey and Azevedo, 1995; 
Wilson, 1992; Winch and Twigg, 1993) agree on the need for a more realistic theory of 
change. The central concern of such researchers is that idealistic assumptions of 
linearity and rationality often deform the reality of change in organisations as reflected 
in much of the literature on present change theory.
A technology is more than "simply equipment"; it is "not just pieces of hai'dware and 
software, but also [a] system based on engineering principles and composed of 
elements which are functionally arranged (configured) in certain specific ways" (Clark 
et al., 1988: 13). The relevance of change theory to this study is obvious. The 
introduction of a "new" technology^ can be viewed as a process of change, defined
3The term "new technology" deserves some clarification from the outset to avoid otherwise possible 
confusion arising from shared meanings ascribed to it. Most observers agree that the most significant 
"new" technologies are: (1) information technology (including AMT), (2) bio-technology, (3) 
materials technology, (4) space technology, and (5) nuclear technology (OECD, 1988). Special =
broadly as "the alteration from one state to another" (Peppard, 1993: 274). Hence the 
relevance may begin to crystallise. Furthermore, the realisation of any possible strategic 
potential of such technology is dependent on successful implementation. This in turn 
will be affected to a considerable extent by the quality of the decisions that constitute the 
implementation process within a given set of contextual constraints. Thus the relevance 
crystallises further.
One can happily share strategy scholars' (e.g. Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993; 
Porter, 1983; Schroeder et al., 1995) enthusiastic argument that a successful strategy 
for change is vital. Nonetheless, one has to qualify this position by adding that a 
"good" strategy per se is insufficient for a successful implementation of a change 
process because the success of the former is contingent upon how the latter has been 
managed in practice within the constraints of a given situation; "the secret of success is 
to create success" (Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993: 261). Of course, a strategy- 
formulating process is necessary for an effective management of technological change. 
It is argued, however, that that should be managed simultaneously with a careful 
consideration of the social relations elements, particularly the "distribution of power" 
within it and "the political tactics that can be employed in shifting the balance in favour 
of change" (Nutley, 1991: 223). Parallel organisational change and development to 
enable effective implementation of new technology is crucial (Bessant, 1994). Again, 
therefore, the relevance of change theory to the implementation of technological change 
is further consolidated.
When it comes to integration of CAD and CAM systems the organisational implications 
of change become much more profound than when single applications are introduced. 
As Arcelus and Wright (1994), for example, point out, the implementation of a 
computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) strategy is partly dictated by characteristics 
that are unique to each adopting firm. Social scientists’ perspectives on organisational 
design, particularly after the "socio-technical systems" design tradition (Emery and
= programs designed to advance R&D and facilitate new applications of such technologies are promoted 
in many countries around the world.
In tlieir distinguished article 'Management in the 1980s', Harold Leavitt and Thomas Whisler 
(1958:42) called information technology "new" because "one did not see much of it until World War II, 
and it did not become clearly visible in industry until a decade later. It was also "new" because it could 
be differentiated from the then dominant managerial philosophies such as Frederick W. Taylor’s (1911) 
scientific management. As Clark (1989: 5) points out, however, the term "new technology" can be 
confusing in the literature. It is used in two different ways: first, to describe a technology that is 
relatively newer than established one (e.g. "An electronic typewriter is a new technology to an 
organisation or individual if it replaces a mechanical typewriter"), and/or to denote the most advanced 
level of mechanisation or automation at a certain moment in time with reference to a particular task or 
set of tasks.
In this thesis the term is mainly used to imply the second meaning but the first will be resorted 
to on a few occasions, in which case this should be clear from the appropriate context in which the 
term appears.
Trist, 1960; Rice, 1963; Trist and Bamforth, 1951), suggest that organisational issues 
should be managed in parallel with technical issues (Bessant, 1994; Bessant et al., 
1985; Susman and Chase, 1986; Symon and Clegg, 1991). In terms of an integrating 
technology such as CADCAM, technical integration should be mirrored by 
organisational integration if its full potential benefit is to be realised (Child, 1987).
However, what makes strategy formulation, and more significantly its implementation, 
exceptionally challenging at present is that such change is evolving within 
manufacturing organisations which are themselves changing in at least four ways (see 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1975; Browne et al., 1988; Coates, 1992; Hoffman, 1994; 
Schoeder er a/., 1995):
1) Competition has become more intense due to globalisation of markets.
2) Emphasis on cost reduction and efficiency improvements has lost ground to 
flexibility, responsiveness, niche markets and customer satisfaction, particularly in 
high-growth industries such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and medical equipment. In 
these areas competitive advantages often manifest themselves in accumulated 
knowledge more than in the physical marketed products.
3) Technological advancements have changed many work methods in business conduct 
terms.
4) Conventional hierarchical organisation structures ruled by command and control 
corporate cultures have come to be questioned more seriously than at any time before 
by a generation of "computer-literate" managers aspiring for initiative, creativity, and 
empowerment (Hoffman, 1994).
Various IT applications provide an opportunity for businesses to improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness (Thong and Yap, 1995). IT may potentially help 
manufacturing companies improve their flexibility and responsiveness to customers 
through computerising their product design, engineering and manufacture functions, 
which are the key activities of many manufacturing companies. Computerising such 
functions, through the application of technologies such as CAD, CAE and CAM 
systems, is widely believed to be useful to a manufacturing business but integrating 
such systems can be much more rewarding - both technically and economically.
Over the past twenty years or so, computers have become widely employed in all 
phases of a product design-engineering-manufacturing (DEM) cycle. A substantial 
growth in the use of computer systems has been witnessed during the 1980s and 1990s 
throughout a wide section of the manufactuiing industry (see Scott-Morton, 1995).
Despite a phenomenal growth in the utilisation of such "stand alone" technology 
systems, however, DEM (Design-Engineering-Manufacturing) processes in the
8
majority of manufacturing companies are still exchanging data and design decisions 
much as they did a century ago, with paper drawings and reports (see Boaden and 
Dale, 1990: 305; Gunson and Boddy, 1989: 41). Integrating a DEM process through 
the interfacing of CAD, CAE, and CAM systems is much more challenging, from an 
organisational point of view, than introducing a single stand alone system (Bessant et 
al., 1985). At the same time, organisational challenges to integration appear to be much 
more difficult to overcome than financial and technical problems.
Although a somewhat "idealistic strategic perspective" on integrated CADCAM or CIM 
would promise a "competitive edge" through reducing costs, improving quality, 
enabling variety production, reducing product introduction times, and improving 
delivery reliability, the reality in many manufacturing companies is different (Forrester 
et al., 1995). Against this background it is quite reasonable to expect an important 
question to arise concerning the gap between the "potential" and "real" impacts of such 
advanced integrating technology (or what Bessant [1991] terms its "promise" and 
"reality") for manufacturing industry which has become as much a processor of 
information as it is of materials.
The role of social sciences research in describing, explaining and guiding technological 
and organisational change is crucial, especially in the present phase of the history of 
manufacturing industry. The present phase is one of unparalleled interconnectivity 
between systems, with interactive effects that are not only system-wide but have an 
impact on matters of organisation form and configuration. Contemporary technological 
mutation is a phenomenon that deserves to be studied from an organisational 
perspective because it influences organisational stiuctures, cultures and values, just as 
much as it is itself influenced by such organisational characteristics.
It is important to investigate technological change from perspectives other than "pure" 
rational economics. While the argument about adoption may often be couched in 
economically rational terms, the decision to change and the implications of so doing are 
rarely, if ever, as tightly prescribed. Hence, a broader and more subtle lens is required, 
one that looks closely into the interior life of the organisation in question. The need to 
better understand the organisational, and thus social, implications of integrating CAD 
and CAM necessitates further research into the type of work organisation that is 
inherited from the previous era and whether or not it is suitable for the present one. To 
what extent can CADCAM changes enter into an organisational form that predates 
them? What aspects do they tend to have the most impact upon, and why?
“It is now apparent that technological change is closely associated with not only economic,
but also social, legal and cultural changes whose interactions is complex In this sense,
technology can be defined as a social process which by meeting real or imagined needs changes
the needs just as it is changed by them. Society is changed by technical change, and technical 
change is shaped by society.” (OECD, 1988: 117).
Therefore, the present research is a contribution to addressing the gap between theories 
of change and the practical reality of technology-induced change in organisations 
adopting and integrating CAD and CAM technologies in their operations.
Technology promises made by salesmen and found in the technical literature will be 
investigated in the light of selected companies' experiences of implementation and 
integration. In the present thesis the starting point arises from a concern that, despite 
obtaining the most sophisticated technology available to support its DEM process, a 
manufacturing company may fail to deliver its anticipated benefits. So an organisational 
solution has to be found whereby the technology should meet exactly the technical 
requirements of the production system into which it is incorporated. At the same time, 
the organisation should be developed in such away that allows the technology to be 
used in such a way such that its potential pitfalls are avoided and negative 
organisational side effects minimised. Technology-organisation interrelationships and 
the managerial challenges of understanding and addressing them are central to the 
present research question.
In short, it is argued that for a better understanding of technology-induced 
organisational mutation it is crucial to utilise a research design that is as longitudinal and 
grounded in the social "fabric" of the organisational settings concerned as possible in 
order to build a thorough understanding of the interaction between the causes and 
effects of change. The research seeks to develop an empirically-informed set of 
theoretical propositions and hypotheses that derive their validity from an understanding 
of the process of organisational change accompanying technical change. Central to 
defining the research problem within the context of this approach is a desire to identify 
the technical, organisational, political, and economic factors at play in the acquisition of 
organised knowledge and techniques, rather than superficially on how it is managed as 
a purely linear, rational managerial task.
1 .4  Purpose of the Study
As Gres well (1994) points out, a focus for a study could emerge through a literature 
review, be suggested by colleagues, researchers or supervisors, or be developed 
through practical experiences. The focus for the present research emerged during a 
postgraduate course in Manufacturing Systems Engineering attended by the researcher. 
The course was broadly designed for practising and recently graduated engineers to 
develop skills in optimising the application of various computer-controlled systems in 
manufacturing processes. The researcher developed considerable interest in the human
10
and organisational issues associated with automation as it appeared that these, rather 
than technical issues, were behind numerous disappointing experiences - some might 
say failures - of new technology projects in industry.
The utilisation of AMT, it seemed, necessarily required a more thorough understanding 
of these issues than the average engineer-by-training would possess. Ideally, technical 
knowledge, it appeared, would stand a much greater chance of successful diffusion in a 
manufacturing organisation when complemented by sociological knowledge. Thus the 
idea for this study was born.
The study started by synthesising a set of questions regarding the implementation and 
integration of CAD and CAM systems. Seven tentative research questions were 
identified as important in providing an orienting conceptual framework for the 
investigation in the selected sites prior to approaching field work in these sites. These 
are:
1) Why do manufacturing companies acquire CAD and CAM systems?
2) How do manufactuiing companies design/use CAD and CAM systems?
3) How do manufacturing companies introduce, maintain and develop CAD 
and CAM systems?
4) What are the outcomes of the implementation of CAD and CAM systems in 
terms of pre-identified objectives ?
5) What are the impacts of the implementation of CAD and CAM systems on 
manufacturing organisations?
6) Why does a manufacturing company seek (or decline) to integrate CAD and 
CAM systems?
7) Where applicable, how does a manufacturing company manage the 
integration of CAD and CAM systems in the context of its accumulative 
experiences in this area of technical change?
These are not "research questions" in the conventional sense of the word. In a way, 
their significance to the research process is provisional, as will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 3. Answering them per se will be one of the basic objectives of the research. 
The ultimate purpose of the research, though, is to contribute to the generation of 
empirically-informed theoretical propositions and hypotheses on the implementation 
and integration of CAD and CAM. The aim is one of theory creation by virtue of an 
inquiry that is deeply embedded in the organisational settings concerned, rather than a 
literature-premised formulation of "logico-deductive" theory.
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Chapter 3 will explain in detail how these questions are used in the methodological 
framework of the present study in the light of a carefully defined relationship between 
theory and methodology. It will also clarify the terms relevant to the methodological 
approach chosen and the rationale behind it in relation to the objectives of the present 
research.
1.5 Relevant Literatures
One challenge that faces researchers in any study which ranges across different areas of 
knowledge, like the present one, is to isolate the relevant literature. There is a wide 
range of available theoretical and empirical work that could be used in a number of 
direct and indirect ways. The study focuses on a specific type of change process that 
concerns a well-defined area of technology application. Yet, the fields of academic 
interest which the study touches upon are multiple indeed.
Therefore, various literatures will be relevant to varying degrees, some of which 
become more relevant than others at various stages of the thesis. These can be grouped 
as shown below, starting with the most relevant literature area concerning CAD, CAM, 
CADCAM, CIE andCIM:
* The specific literature on CAD. CAE. CADCAM. CIE. and CIM application management in industrv and implications for work organisation (e.g. Adler,1989; Dean and Snell, 1991; Kovacs e ta l, 1994; Lee, 1989; 1991;McLoughlin, 1990; Patankar and Adiga, 1995; Winch et al, 1991).
* The engineering literature on AMT. automation and computers in 
manufacture (e.g. Bessant, 1991; Boubekri etal., 1995; Browne et a l, 1988; Groover and Zimmers, 1984).
* The engineering and management consultancy literatures addressing practising managers (e.g. Boaden and Dale, 1990; Peppard, 1993; Plant,1995; Scott-Morton, 1995).
* The literature on innovation, technical change, and management of change (e.g. Beatty and Gordon, 1991; Beatty and Lee, 1992; Bessant et a l ,1985; Frost and Egri, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990; Stacey, 1993; Tapscott and Catson, 1993; Van de Yen and Poole, 1995; Winch and Twigg, 1993).
* The literature on technoloav strateev (e.g. Arcelus and Wright, 1994;
Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993; Mueller, 1993; Porter, 1983;
Schroeder et a l, 1995).
* The work and organisation studies literature (e.g. Child, 1977; 1987;
Clegg, 1990; 1994; Perrow, 1984; 1986).
* The literature on research methodologv (e.g. Creswell, 1994; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Yin, 1984, 1987).
Whilst the thesis is concerned narrowly with CAD, CAE, CADCAM and CIM, it 
would not seem to be appropriate methodologically to restrict it to the first group of
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literature. Neither is it helpful, theoretically and empirically, to neglect the huge body of 
knowledge which addresses, in different ways, matters pertaining not only to 
technology, organisation and technical change, independently, but also to the 
complexity of relationships between them. These are themselves subject to multiple 
perspectives. For example, organisation theory offers several perspectives in analysing 
an enterprise in conjunction with its environment, size, structure, hierarchy and control, 
power dynamics, strategies and performance, among other things.
The literature is “vast” (Winch and Twigg, 1993). It can only be considered here as it 
enters into the main focus of this study. Nevertheless, some key studies on integrated 
CADCAM implementation will be selected and discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This 
will identify where the present research stands vis-a-vis the specific relevant literature.
1.6 Delimitations and Limitations
The study narrowed in scope as it progressed. Delimitations have to be acknowledged. 
The potential disadvantages of the study should be recognised as limitations caused 
mainly by time and resource constraints. The limitations can be summarised in six 
points as follows:
1) From the outset, the scope of the research had to be narrowed from one which could 
potentially address new technology as such in a broad sense of the word, through to 
one which was confined to IT as a particular area of new technology, albeit of a vital 
importance, and, eventually, to its present CADCAM-delimited form.
2) As the study progressed into its later stages it identified three major axes around 
which to conceptualise the change process of CADCAM integration (Chapter 6). These 
revolved around the technical, economic (or business) and organisational aspects of 
change. The study began with a very broad-based perspective; it developed by 
identifying these and then concentrating mainly on the organisational and technical 
aspects. It could thus be classified as a socio-technical study. Although the business 
aspects were consistently recognised, they did not gain the same degree of attention as 
the other two. It would have been beyond the scope of an organisational study to have 
done so. The focus was narrowed so that the organisational element would become the 
study's central focus of attention. Thus it ended up with the highest degree of 
emphasis. The technical and economic issues associated with CADCAM change were 
no less important theoretically but this was another delimitation of the study. To 
research the technical and economic elements thoroughly as well would have required 
another study - not a better one or a worse one, not more or less important, but one 
equally as valid while totally different in its approach, perspectives, methods and 
literature.
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3) Priority was given to work organisation rather than job design issues in developing 
the theoretical propositions because the research focused on CADCAM as an essentially 
integrating, cross-functional technology. It was not possible to proceed evenly in both 
directions. Whenever a conflict appeared to occur priority was given to organisational 
analysis. One should not imply through such prioritisation that concerns about job 
design were less important theoretically; it was a matter of deciding on priorities, whilst 
not neglecting the organic interrelationship assumed between the two areas of 
theoretical interest. One could think of their interrelationship as in terms of a huge tree 
representing organisation theory, in whose branches were rich materials for research 
into job design issues.
4) The empirical aspect of the study was based only on ten in-depth case studies. The 
sampled companies included a rather broad range of companies within Scotland's 
electronic/electrical industry. Therefore, the scope for hypothetically-based 
generalisation was limited in the light of the qualitative research approach used. 
Initially, a quantitative dimension was intended to supplement the study towards the 
end of the research period on the basis of the qualitative data analysis resulting from the 
case studies. Quantitative measures would have been constructed. This, however, 
proved to be too ambitious; it was undoubtedly too much to attempt within the confines 
of a single doctorate. It was rather unrealistic given the time and resource constraints; 
the qualitative analysis was, indeed, an extremely time-consuming process. Had it been 
a research team's effort this would have stood a much greater chance of being achieved. 
It should be said, nonetheless, that for the future a combined research design would 
create a greater scope for generalisation of the findings and the theory generated" .^
5) The research design excluded industrial sectors other than manufacturing. There 
were three reasons for these exclusions: first, CADCAM, in essence, is a 
manufacturing technology to be found predominantly in manufacturing organisations. 
Second, the constraints of the local economy suggested the electronics industry because 
it was a recently emergent industry, one that replaced ship-building, coal-mining, heavy 
engineering and other older industries in Scotland. The third reason was a 
methodological choice whereby the study's theory generation objective required a case 
study research design anchored in concrete organisational settings. This requirement 
restricted, to a considerable extent, the researcher's freedom of movement to and from 
the research sites due to the relatively high frequency of visits conducted. This should 
be recognised as another delimitation of the study: qualitative reseaich is more labour- 
intensive, time-consuming and demanding than survey work - but it also develops far
^This point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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more insight, especially important for research into a relatively recently observed 
phenomenon.
6) The study was confined to Scottish-based sites. Although these varied in terms of 
ownership (e.g. some of them being British and others American-owned), they were all 
Scottish-based. This deprived the study of any broader scope of analysis whereby the 
roles of other national and cultural influences could be assessed in a comparative 
context.
1.7 Significance of the Study
The study has significance at both the theoretical and the practical levels. Firstly, its 
theoretical importance can be summarised in the following points:
1) The structured methodology which the study developed facilitates a systematic 
investigation of technology-led organisational change and a deeper understanding of the 
varied effects and outcomes of such a process. Such methodology is designed to 
constitute a step forward towards an impartial assessment of both the existing and the 
potential effects of a certain application area of new technology in the face of a plethora 
of marketing-oriented literature, newspaper articles, television programs, and 
consultant writings on the subject, much of which is of speculative nature and based on 
little or no empirical evidence or unexplained methodologies.
2) Combining a grounded theory (GT) methodology with a longitudinal research 
process enables the study to offer an in-depth interpretation of the process of 
implementing and integrating CADCAM systems. Such an inquiry (and, thus, 
interpretation) draws its stiength from the ways in which its insights are embedded in 
the organisational settings researched. The development of theory that relates to 
integrating technologies, such as CADCAM and manufacturing resources planning 
(MRP -II), will benefit from contributions that bring new qualitative elements capable 
of addressing the cross-functional impacts of such technologies. Unlike stand alone 
technologies such as CAD or robotics, integrating technologies create a greater need for 
embedded theorisation that relates to organisational, not just job, design skills. 
Generation, rather than verification, of appropriate theory aims to improve visualisation 
of how real integration processes influence work organisation at present, and in what 
possible ways they can affect companies in the future. A better understanding of 
integration, through the study’s conceptual model, will deepen our understanding of the 
nature of the host of factors involved (e.g. environment and market forces), which the 
model accounts for, as well as the linkages between them.
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3) Further theory development can be guided by the answers provided to the seven 
tentative questions of the research. Such development can be taken far beyond the 
substantive limitations of the grounded theory and formalised by virtue of theoretically- 
oriented, generalised abstraction. The theoretical implications that derive from the 
research cover a relatively wide range of issues of concern to current sociology and 
organisation theory. The research aids the future development of hypotheses that can 
further more structured empirical research. In this respect, the present study seeks to 
create a space in which other forms of theoretical cultivation might subsequently 
flourish. Vital questions can be devised and hypotheses formulated to this effect. For 
example, why do organisations acquire new technology? How and why do different 
organisations set about implementing it? How is the implementation process managed 
under different contextual conditions? What are the possible various impacts of such 
technology (i.e. its "implications", "consequences" and "effects" [Ang and Pavri, 
1994])? And what are the dynamics of the processes and interactions whereby it comes 
to be integrated into a host organisation and how, consequently, the host organisation's 
structure, operation, and culture come to be affected? The emphasis will be on 
conceptualising integration as an advanced stage of a technological (and organisational) 
change process whose roots can be traced to the earlier implementation of constituent 
sub-systems (e.g. CAD and CAM). One of the main concerns of this study is the issue 
of how a specific company’s approach to integration is contingent upon its past 
experiences relating the above questions.
4) The conceptual model developed to analyse the research data (Chapter 7) can be 
utilised, with appropriate modifications, in other studies focusing on other technology 
applications or under different contextual circumstances.
5) The study contributes, to a limited extent and in an indirect manner, to current 
debates concerning the potential effects of technology on employment in the current 
competition age and also concerning the nature of future work at a time of heated 
debates on the future possibilities of totally computerised or "unmanned" factories of 
the future. It also touches on the nature of management, work and organisations under 
"post-Taylorist", "post-Fordist" conditions; on skilling, reskilling, up skilling and/or 
deskilling of working labour under such conditions; on flexible specialisation in 
employment; and on power and control issues in organisations. The thesis, thus, 
contributes, in broad terms, to the debate on the social benefits and costs of 
technological developments in the contemporary competition age.
6) The study addresses the role of change agents in CADCAM integration by focusing 
specifically on the effect of functionally-defined managerial specialisms (i.e. 
engineering vs. manufacturing), on how key change leaders’ missions are defined.
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assumed, constrained and also politicised (due to departmentalisation as a property of 
formal structure) vis-a-vis the organisational changes associated with integration.
7) The study addresses the relationship between integration as a presumably 
problematic change process and organisational learning, particularly in terms of the 
opportunities available to change leaders to learn from past experiences both of success 
and failure with stand alone technologies and act upon learned lessons in the 
implementation of CADCAM.
8) The study contributes to filling a gap in current knowledge in this area of academic 
interest, namely the question of why CADCAM integration appears to be inapplicable to 
non-integrating companies despite the fact that some of these are technically capable of 
achieving it.
Secondly, the practical importance of the study can be summarised in terms of the 
following points:
1) The research was beneficial for the companies that took part in it. The main practical 
benefit to these companies occurxed through feedback reports on the study’s findings. 
While the reports were addressed to senior and technical managers, a wide range of 
managers and employees could benefit practically from their contents because 
integration involved cross-functional, organisation-wide, and cross-organisation 
relationships. Feedback contained basic data analysis and practical recommendations to 
managers who played key roles in managing the introduction of CAD and the 
integration of CADCAM in their respective companies. They received insight not only 
into their own situation but also were able to contextualise that situation in terms of 
information derived from the literature review and the comparative analysis of 
organisations in the same region, against which they could compare their progress. The 
aim of the applied aspect of the research was to promote improved management of 
technology projects in the future. The benefit could be extended to companies that 
shared similar characteristics to those studied. Useful guidance can be derived from the 
recommendations concerning the factors that make for successful policy and strategy 
decisions. These include, for example, training requirements for technical as well as 
interpersonal integrational skills, industrial relations management, cost-benefit analysis 
and justification procedures, and the human and organisational dimensions of change.
2) The study should help technology consultants in the future to better understand the 
socio-political nature of organisational change; thus, it should enable them avoid 
assumptions of rationality and linearity that often characterise the innovation literature. 
Central to this will be a deeper understanding of the networks of ideological, structural
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and power factors behind planning, selecting, designing, and using a proposed 
technology.
3) Trade unionists also have the potential to benefit from the study. Organisation-wide 
implications arise from integrating technologies, which give rise to new challenges in 
the way in which industrial relations and conflicts will be managed under changing 
power relations due to technical, structural, and cultural changes in the work place. The 
study may be practically useful to union members in reconsidering their role in 
technology-led organisational change, resistance to it, and the conditions under which 
they might rationally support it.
1 .8  Layout of the Thesis
The thesis consists of nine chapters. The present chapter has introduced an overview of 
the study, presented the research problem, defined the overall objective of the 
investigation, discussed the various literatures that will be used throughout the 
remaining seven chapters, and identified both the strengths and limitations of the study. 
The remainder of this chapter will summarise the layout of the thesis in terms of the 
constituent chapters and their contents.
Chapter 2 will introduce the subject of CAD and CADCAM. It begins with justifying 
the importance of further research on the organisational implications of CADCAM 
implementation and integration. It will discuss the diffusion of IT in society but 
concentrates on the application of computers in manufacturing industry, in particular in 
the context of concurrent product design and manufacture. It will define CIM and seek 
to establish the organisational impacts of integration in general terms. Integration of 
CAD/CAM technologies and its implications for a manufacturing organisation will 
constitute the central theme of the chapter. In this connection, eight selected studies on 
CADCAM will be summarised and critically reviewed in the concluding part of the 
chapter with a view to assessing the state of current knowledge in relation to the 
research problem and, thereby putting the present study’s contribution in context.
Chapter 3 is about the theoretical and methodological issues of concern to the study. It 
aims to define a specific kind of link between theory and methodology as two of the 
most vital areas of significance in any research. The chapter then proceeds to discuss 
the influential factors in choosing an appropriate methodological framework for the 
study. It compares quantitative and qualitative paradigms and explains why a qualitative 
approach is more suited to the purpose of this research in the light of its ontological, 
epistemological and axiological assumptions. Details of the qualitative research design 
will be illustrated in terms of its basic distinguishing features: GT, case study and 
longitudinality. Each of these features will be discussed critically to assess the
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suitability of the reseaich design. The chapter also links the tentative research questions 
and their underlying assumptions with data. Finally, it concludes by showing and 
defending the validity, reliability and credibility measures of the present study.
Chapter 4 will addiess details of the filed work. It covers issues related to the decisions 
made and choices taken before, during and after the filed work. Choice of the sites to 
be researched and the criteria guiding such a choice will be outlined. Key details of the 
companies in the study and individual informants will be given. An explanation of the 
progress of the overall research process will also be provided, from initial sampling to 
data collection through a three-phase research strategy. In addition, one of this 
chapter's major contributions to theory development is that it will link the main 
interview schedule used in data collection to the seven tentative questions of the 
research. Another important feature of the chapter is that it spells out the details of data 
collection, recording, and coding. This chapter will also outline the lessons learned 
from the filed work as a learning process from the researcher's point of view.
Chapter 5 introduces the cases in the study and discusses each of them separately in 
terms of their distinguishing features in relation to the issues under consideration in this 
study. The cases will be divided into two groups on the basis of their respective 
positions vis-a-vis CADCAM integration. Each company will be discussed in terms of 
its DEM process and the CAD / CAM applications it uses in its design, engineering and I
manufacturing activities. Also, the history of technological change in each company 
will be briefly addressed in temis of CADCAM, with an emphasis on the organisational 
effects of the 1970s/8 Os investments in CAD and CAM systems and the consequent |
organisational context for further investment in integrating such systems. The chapter j
concludes with a comparison between the integrating and the non-integrating 
approaches to the utilisation of CAD /  CAM as the basis on which the companies were 
grouped into two categories. !
The case write-ups which Chapter 5 provides will serve as a background reading before |
further data analysis and discussion in next two chapters. In this sense. Chapter 5 is the i
first of three chapters reporting on the findings of the study and, at the same time, i
providing analysis and discussion on the collected data. !
Chapter 6 provides analytical answers to the tentative research questions by comparing 
the case studies with each other and in relation to the study’s theoretical orienting 
issues. A conceptual dividing line will be ever present throughout this chapter between ]
two areas of theoretical concern, namely CAD / CAM implementation in the ten cases, j
on the one hand, and the integration of already implemented CAD and CAM systems in j
five of these cases, on the other. Theory on integration will be given priority whenever 1
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a conflict appears to happen throughout the analysis and discussion of the findings, 
both in this and the following chapters, because of its greater theoretical relevance to the 
purpose of the study.
Building on Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 uses a conceptual model especially devised for 
further data analysis and interpretation. The model will show how integration is 
visualised as a dynamic change process, one that is engulfed by an “internal context” of 
change, which is itself influenced by an “external context” of change. Both contexts are 
capable of producing forces for and forces against change and thus affecting a 
company’s decision whether to adopt an integration approach or not. The model 
conceptualises the role of contingency variations across the integrating companies in the 
study, which create various conditions under which different companies' experiences 
of change are encountered. The external and internal factors behind such variations will 
be classified as either facilitating or impeding, depending on their respective effects on 
integration, and will be analysed in the light of the model. The outcomes of an 
integration process are also included in the model. Using the model as an explanatory 
instrument, particular attention will be given to addressing the outstanding obstacles to 
CADCAM integration in the experiences of the companies concerned.
Chapter 7 will also apply the conceptual model to two examples from the cases: a 
critical incident from a non-integrating company and another from an integrating 
company. It will explain some of the crucial forces and factors that prohibit and inhibit 
integration on the one hand and those that cause and stimulate it on the other. In so 
doing, it will focus on the social processes involved in CADCAM integration as an 
essentially organisational change.
Chapter 8 presents the theoretical conclusions of the study in the form of substantive 
and formal propositions as well as hypotheses. These follow from the data analyses 
and discussions in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In fact, they could have been incorporated into 
these chapters, which would have illustrated each of them in its respective contextual 
position vis-a-vis the corresponding data. This would have shown each of them in 
relation to the particular area of analysis from which it was derived. However, the 
decision to set up a separate chapter for the theoretical results of the study was 
motivated purely by a layout consideration aiming to consolidate the resultant theory by 
summarising it in a single, very concise chapter, rather than to disperse it over two or 
three chapters. Therefore, it will not make sense to read Chapter 8 without a prior 
reference to Chapters 3-7; in this respect. Chapter 8 could not be regarded as a totally 
independent chapter. That is. Chapters 3 and 4 will be essential prerequisite reading in 
terms of explaining how the theory was generated, whereas Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will be 
essential in terms of identifying the sections of data from which the theory derived.
20
Finally, Chapter 9 provides a concluding summary of the study and its implications. It 
summarises the nature of CADCAM integration as a change process in the light of the 
study’s findings. It also reviews the tentative questions which the empirical research 
process began by asking, and assesses the difficulties that were encountered in 
answering them. The study's conceptual model will be discussed and evaluated. The 
roles of change leaders, senior managers, technical managers, and supeiwisors in the 
transition towards integrated CADCAM will also be addressed in this chapter in the 
light of the study's conclusions. The thesis has several implications for managers, 
consultants, trade union leaders, and researchers. These will be outlined in the 
concluding part of the final chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Implementation and Integration of CAD, CAM, CIM, CIE: 
Implications for Manufacturing Organisations
2.1 Introduction
CAD and CAM technologies played a key role in manufacturing industry during the 
1980s. Integrated CADCAM promises even greater potential benefits for manufacturing 
companies. This chapter introduces such technologies and discusses their integration 
potential and the implications for manufacturing organisations.
It begins by justifying the selection of these technologies for the present research. It 
then moves to highlight IT's profound impact in general and the role of computers in 
particular in manufacturing industry.
The next point to be examined is product design and manufacture as the main activities 
of a manufacturing concern. The chapter then discusses the evolution of CAD and 
CAM technologies and the logic of technical rationality that lies behind their diffusion. 
Organisational issues that are contingent upon the use of such technologies will form a 
most important part of this chapter, particularly in relation to CADCAM as an 
integrating technology. The subject of integration will be addressed in terms of its 
implications for technology-led organisational change.
This chapter concludes by critically reviewing some of the most relevant studies on 
CADCAM integration.
2.2 Why CADCAM?
The magnitude of the relevant academic literature is indicative of a massive multi­
perspective interest in researching CAD (e.g. Cooley, 1981; Currie, 1989; Lee, 1989; 
Manske and Wolf, 1989; McLouglin, 1990; Schmidt, 1991) and CAM (e.g. 
Edosomwan, 1987; Gerwin, 1988; Gobeski, 1991). The literature on integrated 
CADCAM (e.g. Adler, 1889; 1990; Lee, 1991, Winch and Twigg, 1993) and CIM 
(e.g. Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993; Kovacs etal., 1994; Voss etal., 1991) has 
also been substantial, though to a lesser extent.
CAD and to a lesser extent CAM have been studied from different perspectives and for 
different purposes. This is because they both have implications for, among other 
things, job design, work organisation, skilling, quality of working life, industrial 
relations, managerial work, strategy formulation and investment appraisal practices, as
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will become clear during the course of this thesis (Chapters 2, 5 and 6), CADCAM has 
also been researched in recent years (e.g. Lee, 1991; Winch and Twigg, 1993; Winch, 
Voss and Twigg, 1991). Yet CADCAM has been chosen as the technology area for 
investigation in this study for the following reasons:
1) Design, almost universally, occupies a key position in the operations of any 
manufacturing company because it is where the end product is conceptualised and 
fundamental decisions are made which influence the choice of manufacturing operations 
and the consequent production and assembly processes. For these reasons the position 
held by the design office is highly likely to be of key importance for the entire 
functioning of the company (e.g. Baldry and Connolly, 1986; Bessant, 1991; 
Schmidit, 1991; Teicholz and Orr, 1987).
2) Since design functions occupy an exceptionally important position in manufacturing 
organisations, CAD gains a distinctive significance from among a wide range of 
enabling technologies used by the various functional departments of a typical 
manufacturing company. This provides design staff with an influential bargaining 
power, which could imply that management would be willing to respect their interests 
and wishes (e.g. Schmidt, 1991; Teicholz and Orr, 1987).
3) Whereas stand-alone applications have been researched reasonably extensively from 
an organisational analysis point of view, the integration of CADCAM has not yet 
gained the same degree of attention despite its greater cost and the fact that it is 
potentially more radical in terms of its impact (e.g. Winch and Twigg, 1993).
4) The significance of CADCAM, as an integrating technology, lies in its potential 
ability to force reorganisation not only within the functional boundaries of design and 
manufacturing but also in terms of the flow of work between them.
5) The scope of an integrated CADCAM will not be limited to design and 
manufacturing in the future. Other functions will be affected in terms of how individual 
jobs will be designed (or redesigned) and departmental work organised (or 
reorganised), both locally and in terms of their respective work relationships with other 
functional departments.
6) In addition to inward-looking considerations, the breadth of CADCAM implications 
is such that it is also likely to be viewed in terms that are external to an integrating 
company. As multiple customer and supplier firms become more involved in 
integration, because of technical and business reasons, the importance of CADCAM is 
likely to increase in the future, not only as an internal company-wide issue but also as a 
cross-organisational concern.
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2.3 IT and its Profound Implications
"Diffusion" is a word often used in the literature to describe the spread of an innovation 
or technology (see Attewell, 1992). The diffusion of CAD and CAM has been assisted 
largely by the considerable advances in computer technology over the last three 
decades. The appearance of the "personal computer" (PC), as a direct consequence of 
changing cost and capability relationships between microcomputers and mainframe 
computers, was perhaps the most significant milestone aiding this diffusion (Krouse et I
a/., 1990). I
The revolution in the microprocessor market since the late 1970s has resulted in a I
greater information processing power and capacity being available than ever before and j
at a reasonable cost to many smaller businesses. Computer-based technologies have |
therefore found a wider scope of application, and the question for management is no I
longer one of whether or not to adopt the technology, but which system to use j
(Bessant, 1991) . I
IAccording to the "Dictionary of Computing" (Illingworth et al., 1983) the term 
"information technology" was coined in the late 1970s to refer to a combination of 
modern microelectronics, telecommunication technologies as well as major parts of 
consumer electronics and broadcasting. It is:
“.... an all inclusive term that encompasses computers and telecommunications in all their 
forms, whatever their use. It includes mainframe computers, supercomputers, microcomputers
 It includes the public telephone network, television and radio broadcasting, credit cards
...., radio paging systems, facsimile machines, and cellular telephones, as well as the software 
that controls them all.” (Hoffman, 1994: 11).
Back in the late 1950s Leavitt and Whisler (1958) predicted in their seminal article 
"Management in the 1980s" that IT would spread rapidly. It has (see, for example, Ang 
and Pavri, 1994; Attewell, 1992; Coates, 1992; Scott-Morton, 1991; Tapscott and 
Catson, 1993). Over the last twenty five years innumerable articles and books have 
been published on tomorrow's work place in the light of the wide-spread applications 
of microelectronics in industry and offices (Saifati and Cove, 1986). The potential of 
computing and related technologies to affect society at large underlies recent more 
futuristic visions, often given attractive names (e.g. "the information age" [Coates, 
1992]). In these technology is introduced progressively as a means of supporting faster 
and more accurate flows of information by overcoming constraints of time and place 
(Scott-Morton, 1991; Tapscott and Catson, 1993). IT’s impact on society, 
organisations and individuals, particularly in industrially advanced countries, can be felt 
nowadays in daily life and in every sector of society (see, for example, Kling, 1980; 
Sarfati and Cove: 1986). Its effects are "complex and defy any straightforward 
interpretation" because they are "more complicated and convoluted than has been
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traditionally assumed, and much more research is needed before a clear picture is likely 
to emerge" (Ang and Pavri, 1994: 125 and 132).
Indeed, paradoxes of the "information age" are recognised (Coates, 1992). For 
example, IT is potentially capable of encouraging political democracy by virtue of 
widely dispersed information but, at the same time, creating economic elitism because 
access to such infomiation is less widely shared. This situation can be understood, in 
general, in the broader context of contrasting views on the social and economic 
advantages and disadvantages of scientific and technological development. In general, 
three basic reactions can be identified in society vis-a-vis the spread of IT: the 
pessimists, the optimists and the relativists or pluralists (see Hirschheim, 1985; Sarfati 
and Cove, 1986).
The optimists assert that IT increases productivity, creates as many jobs as it destroys, 
improves organisational efficiency, enhances communication, improves the quality of 
working life, and allows for more varied leisure and medical facilities. The pessimists 
associate IT with mass unemployment, deskilled jobs, reduced job satisfaction, 
centralisation of power, and lessening of personal privacy and freedom. The pluralist 
view is non-deterministic; it lies somewhere in the middle by stressing that the results 
of IT assimilation depend on the way the technology is put to use. As Frost and Egri 
(1991: 274) put it: "adopting a philosophy of technological determinism denies the 
critical human role of social choice in innovation". This view reflects an established 
theoretical current in the literature, which argues against technological determinism 
(see, for example, Durand, 1990; Sorge etal., 1983; Buchanan, 1984).
Researchers such as Ang and Pavri (1994: 133) realise the implications of such 
diversity of perspectives for the present and future research agenda. They rightly argue 
that:
“.... the important thing is to know that while each perspective has its merits, it also has its 
restrictions. Researchers have to be aware of the restilctions of llic various perspectives so that 
conclusions drawn arc less likely to be challenged on grounds of validity.” (Ang and Pavri, 
1994: 133).
The universal applicability of IT has encouraged its use for so many different purposes. i
In this respect, IT differs from most technologies which offer benefit within a narrower |
range of possibilities. This, in turn, supports the view held by many that IT is: 1
i".... much more than a single technology: like steam power or electricity before, it is a I
generic technology. And it is this property that - the potential to offer a wide range of 
competitiveness-enhancing benefits right across the industrial spectrum - which really 
explains the claims for its revolutionary status.” (Bessant, 1991: 49).
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2.4 The Role of Computers in Manufacturing: An Overview
In general, computers play a significant role in manufacturing in, for example, assisting 
process monitoring and control, CAPP, numerical control data, line balancing, and 
inventory control (Boubekri et a i, 1955). The potential advantages include allowing 
better use of skilled time, speed of computation, mass data storage and fast retrieval, 
rare production of errors and systematic detection of problems through the formal 
organisation of infomiation.
As Browne and his colleagues (1988) point out, the computer is used in "direct" and 
"indirect" manners. Direct applications serve the purposes of monitoring and 
controlling manufacturing operations at a "plant level" (e.g. flexible manufacturing 
systems [FMS] and computer-aided warehousing [CAW]) and at an "operational level" 
(e.g. computer numerical control [CNC] and computer-aided testing [CAT]). Indirect 
applications include, for example, CAD and production management systems at a plant 
level; they also include applications such as CAPP and computer-aided NC (Numerical 
Control) programming at an operational level.
The next section discusses product design and manufacture as the main activities 
conducted in the context of a manufacturing organisation’s operations.
2.5 Concurrency in Product Design and Manufacture
A design process involves a range of activities that are essential for the creation of a 
new or improved product. Product ideas, customer specifications, safety and regulatory 
standards, and materials tire acquired and converted into drawings containing detailed 
information about a product (Bessant, 1991).
Various engineering skills are often incorporated into design processes in 
manufacturing engineering industries where products can be extremely intricate in 
technical terms. Engineering design involves its own version of engineering synthesis, 
analysis, optimisation, evaluation and presentation (Groover and Zimmers, 1984). In 
the particular case of the electronics engineering manufacturing industry^ which is the 
subject of investigation in this study, the activities typically carried out by designers 
include printed circuit board (PCB) layout, integrated circuit design, drawing and 
blueprints for mechanical parts, engineering calculations, structural analyses as well as 
responding to customer-specific requests (Bessant, 1991).
 ^Large and varied amounts of data are processed in this industry where the final deliverable product 
typically incorporates complex assemblies of tens or hundreds of components and probably thousands 
of subcomponents, including resistors, capacitors, inductors, transformers, transistors, connectors and 
integrated circuits.
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The significance of design activities in any enterprise is that they determine, to a large 
extent, the quality and cost of manufacturing a proposed product since they establish 
the initial data base for production (Teicholz and Orr, 1987). Information produced by 
design provides vital input to other functions such as production planning and control, 
and shop floor production as well as to engineers responsible for developing new 
processes or improving existing ones.
This helps one explain the unique importance of CAD as "a core technology" in the 
development of flexible automation (McLoughlin, 1990). As indicated in reports such 
as those by NEDC (1984) and ACARD (1983), AMTs, in general, are considered of 
crucial strategic importance to the competitiveness of the UK manufacturing industry 
(see also Bessant and Buckingham, 1993). CAD, in particular, is deemed essential for 
the "design-led" regeneration of British industry (ACARD, 1983). The competitive 
importance of design has grown further recently in line with increased demand for 
product innovation, greater response to customers and rapid new product development 
cycles (Bessant, 1991).
Whereas design results in the presentation of a synthesised conceptual image of a 
product, manufacturing results in the physical realisation of this image. Manufacturing 
is essentially a productive activity which involves "the collection of physical and 
intellectual activities associated with designing and making tangible, movable items of 
value, either by hand or through the use of machinery" (Bedworth, et al., 1991: 600). 
A manufacturing process is carried out jointly through the collaborative efforts of many 
individuals organised for the purpose. The above definition is particularly useful 
because, by deduction, it identifies product "designing" and "making" as the core 
functions of a manufacturing organisation. These are associated directly with CAD and 
CAM. They involve the application of computers in, respectively, designing and 
making a given product.
Product design and manufacture could be done in parallel (i.e. simultaneously or 
concurrently) or series (i.e. design followed by manufacture). However, a DEM 
process would benefit greatly from concurrency. The role of computers in a 
manufacturing enterprise environment could, potentially, be maximised through 
"incorporating various life cycle values into the early stages of design. These values 
include not only the product's primary functions but also its aesthetics, 
maufactiirability, assembly, serviceability, and even disposability" (Ishii, 1990: 217). 
This is the crux of what is widely known both in industry and in the technical literature 
as "concurrent engineering" (CE) or "simultaneous engineering" (SE).
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Current roles of the computer in CE include: (1) CAD environment, (2) simulation 
programs of the production process, (3) design assessment programs, (4) on-line 
advisory programs, and (5) Concurrent design programs for products and processes. 
Potential computer-aids in the CE area include: (1) software to help in design for value 
(DEV), (2) design for injection moulding and die casting, (3) design for seiviceability 
and reliability, and (4) integration of simulation programs with CAD (Ishii, 1990: 223).
2 .6  Evolution of CAD / CAM Technologies
Historically, the roots of CAD technology could be traced to the invention of interactive 
computer graphics which were used as early as 1959 to generate pictorial 
representations. CADD systems were then developed to generate two-dimensional 
representations of parts and basic manufacturing information (Bedworth et a i, 1991; 
Bessant, 1991). Experimentation in mainframe-based graphics CAD technology began 
with a view to commercial application in the mid-1960s by giant US manufacturers. 
Major technological breakthroughs in the computer industiy during the 1970s resulted 
in the development of "turnkey systems" which became widely available on a 
commercial basis. The US military played a crucial role in developing CAD (Senker, 
1985). British industry's interest in CAD began in the 1960s. A major factor which 
stimulated the proliferation of CAD technology was the commercial availability of 
turnkey interactive graphics systems since 1977 (see Senker and Arnold, 1980; 1982). 
By the end of the 1960s, Elliott Automation, Ferranti, ICL and Marconi were offering 
mainframe-based CAD systems and services (Senker, 1985).
The emergence of PC-standard computers in the early 1980s was a turning point in the 
history of CAD (Krouse et a i, 1990). The CAD market originated in some of the most 
resourceful companies in the defence, aerospace, and aeronautical industries with the 
collaboration of major mainframe computer manufacturers (Kaplinsky, 1983). The 
scope of CAD application is expected to grow even further (see, for example. Mac 
Conaill, 1993; Newton, 1989).
New, smaller firms spun-off from larger, older firms and entered into the CAD supply 
market, penetrating a wider user base by selling limited capability dedicated CAD 
systems. Consequently, prices dropped considerably (Kaplinsky, 1983). This made 
possible the availability of some features which were previously only confined to larger 
and more complex systems, such as 3-dimensional and simple CAD/CAM. More user- 
friendly PC-based CAD systems also reduced installation and training costs. Therefore, 
it was not surprising that CAD technology was destined to attract many more users with 
less money to spend. Such developments help explain the rapid growth in the CAD
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market through the 1980s and the proliferation of CAD suppliers (see Bessant, 1991; 
Hoffman, 1994; Kaplinsky, 1983):
the personal computer revolution is a direct consequence of changing cost and capability
relationships between microcomputers and main frame computers the PC has generated
profound business and organisational changes, as well as major changes in the way many 
people do their work.” (Hoffman, 1994:11-12).
The diffusion of CAD technology has taken place mainly in industries with major 
design requirements (e.g. aerospace, electronics, automobile, and construction). It is 
in these fields that the majority of users work, either as designers employed by 
companies or by independent design houses. Coding and classification systems are, 
therefore, essential for managing part and assembly manufacture more efficiently. 
Hence, CAD gives designers more opportunities to experiment with alternative designs 
and offers a potentially vast improvement over, for example, manual PCB design for 
both managers and engineers (Salzman, 1989). This is why it is viewed by some as a 
labour saving technology (Newton, 1989).
CAD can potentially help the standardisation of product parts, thereby minimising the 
variety of fittings and reducing design time (Salzman, 1989), manufacturing complexity 
(Adler, 1989) and increasing productivity (Newton, 1989). However, it should be 
stressed that, as researchers such as Liker and Fleischer (1989) and Adler (1989) note, 
this is conditional on user companies taking greater advantage of more advanced CAD 
features and changing their design and manufacturing organisations in order to realise 
the full potential of computers in the design process. Significantly, the importance of 
the organisational adjustments required to accommodate CAD is seldom recognised.
The evolution of CAM could be understood in the context of the history of automation 
in manufacturing. The roots for automation of discrete-part production, which is the 
focus of attention of the study (i.e. as opposed to continuous or process type of 
manufacture), could be traced to the mass production concepts developed by Henry 
Ford early in the twentieth century. Since then the evolution of CAM systems has come 
from progressive developments in manufacturing technology concepts such as NC, 
CNC, CM (Cellular Manufacturing) and FMS since the 1950s through to the present 
day (Bedworth etal., 1991).
2 .7  Technical Rationality, the Diffusion of CAD / CAM and
Issues of Concern
The value of CAD in is widely seen in terms of how useful it is as a tool for supporting 
a traditional manual design process. Long lead-times, errors, lack of connection to 
manufacturing, lack of simultaneous working, and storage and retrieval problems are
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typical characteristics of a traditional manual design process (Bessant, 1991). The use 
of CAD is often justified on the basis of resolving one or more of such problems.
From a technical rationality perspective, the growing utilisation of CAD technology is 
presented as a progressive trend towards further rationalisation of design (see Forrester 
et al., 1995). For example, the potential advantages of using CAD over a manual 
design system include decreased lead-time and reduced errors. In this respect, CAD 
advocates tend to look at its implementation as an essentially technical issue involving 
selecting a suitable system to improve efficiency, quality and reduce cost or increase 
flexibility and competitiveness (Lowstdt, 1988). The emphasis is on justifying CAD in 
terms of desired technical advantages. The critics of CAD, nonetheless, disagree 
fundamentally with this view, as will be discussed below.
Much of what can be said of CAD in this respect can be said of CAM too, although the 
latter is in many ways more associated with the "shop floor", the base of "blue-collar", 
"direct" workers than the former which is more associated with "indirect", "white- 
collar" office employees. From the same technical rationality perspective, the attraction 
of CAM technology can be largely explained in terms of how widely it is believed to 
increase accuracy, reliability, and efficiency of production processes and improve 
ancillary tasks such as materials handling (Adler, 1989). In PCB assembly, for 
example, researchers such as Edosomwan (1987) have demonstrated that it increases 
total and labour productivities^. CAM also offers greater efficiency and quality (Adler,
1989).
Technical rationality is characteristic of the engineering literature on CAD/CAM and 
CIM (and, to a certain extent, of some consultancy literature on the management of 
technical change), whose discourse is dominated by a "technocentric" logic (Brodner,
1990). This logic tends to emphasise a problem-solving orientation and typically 
concludes with practical recommendations for practising mangers and/or engineers. 
However, there are some doubts about the practicality of this rationality. For example, 
it tends not to pay too much attention to important aspects of change such as 
organisational politics (e.g. Frost and Egri, 1991; Pettigrew, 1973), symbolism (e.g. 
Pfeffer, 1981; Brown, 1995) and legitimacy (e.g. Brown, 1995, Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Insufficient attention is given to "anthropocentric" considerations of technology 
design in frames of reference dominated by technical rationality (e.g. Brodner, 1990;
^Nonetheless, CAM is responsible for decreasing the productivities related to capital, energy, computer 
operating expenses and administrative expenses and have no significant impact on material 
productivity, according to a controlled experimental study carried out by Edosomwan (1987) to 
investigate the impacts of CAM on a range of productivities of concern to practising manufacturing 
managers in the US PCB industry.
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Uden, 1995). An organisation is, implicitly at least, assumed to be essentially a 
"technical system" rather than also a "political system" within which "political
behaviour is defined by individuals or, in collective terms, sub-units which make
claim against the resource sharing system of the organisation" since "power resources 
... must not only be possessed by an actor, they must also be controlled by him” 
(Pettigrew, 1975: 192 and 195).
Technical rationality discourses do not concern themselves with assumptions embedded 
in the nature of organisations as seen from the sociological perspective; they tend to be 
rather didactic in a manner uncharacteristic of the social sciences literatures. They 
assume authority on the basis of specialist technical know-how in problem-solving. 
Some sociologists would call this a technocratic attitude. Technocracy, like other 
competing ideologies of organisational control, often alleges objectivity, meritocracy 
and an apolitical perspective (Dillard and Burris, 1993). As Clegg (1991: 3) puts it:
“The 'engineering' argument would say that technology equalled progress; it is natural, neutral 
and inevitable and needs only to be managed in its introduction to minimise irrational 
problems of social adaptation to it. Technological development is inherently good and to be 
welcomed; any opposition is illegitimate.”
In this respect, the current resurgence of the Tavistock Human Relations Institute socio- 
technical system perspective in researching technology issues in organisations is 
justifiable (see, for example, Newton, 1989; Plonski, 1989; Susman and Chase, 1986; 
Winfield, 1991). The pioneers of the open socio-technical system approach (see Emery 
and Trist, I960; Rice, 1963), who, following the famous Durham mines' study (Trist 
and Bamforth, 1951) which soon extended beyond the UK, succeeded in developing a 
balanced discourse that incorporated a technical rationality element. They were able to 
do this without detriment to the human and social relations elements as had been the 
case with earlier highly influential "scientific management" approaches, such as the 
work of Frederick W. Taylor (1911). The latter's "model of man" implied that people 
were inherently "lazy". As Clegg and Dunkerley (1980: 91 and 96) proposed: 
"Taylorism offered management a path to the dehumanisation of work under 
capitalism" and added: "In just the same way that management task is to maximise 
output from capital equipment, under the principles of scientific management it is also 
part of the managerial task to maximise the output of the human component". "Labour 
process" theorists after Henry Braverman (1974), such as Littler (1983), Storey (1983) 
and Thompson (1983) launched a passionate Marxian attack against management as an 
institution (or, more accurately perhaps, as an enterprise) whose entire culture, they 
insisted, was being legitimised by capitalist forces in society and used as a means for an 
"explicit verbalisation of the capitalist mode of production" (Braverman, 1974: 86).
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Whatever the historic background to the technical rationality discourses underlying the 
managerial ideologies which have been so influential during the current century, it 
remains clear that CAD is capable, upon sound implementation, of enabling 
management to standardise product parts and thus minimise the variety of fittings 
required and reduce design time (Adler, 1989; Salzman, 1989), reduce manufacturing 
complexity (Adler, 1989), and increase design productivity (Newton, 1989). It also 
gives designers more opportunities to experiment with various designs (Salzman,
1989) and simplify sophisticated design analyses (Adler, 1989). However, one has to 
stress an important point in this respect, namely that, contrary to prevailing beliefs of 
many executives and professionals, investment in CAD does not guarantee a successful 
innovation (Plonski, 1989). Introducing a new technology does not necessarily involve 
the "initiation, adoption and implementation of new ideas in an organisation" (Howell 
and Higgins, 1990: 40). Often, the technology fails to deliver its full potential for 
reasons that are more explicitly organisational and social than they are technical and 
neutral
Issues of concern regarding CAD are worthy of consideration because of their 
contribution to the wider debate on the present and future impacts of technological 
development, whose practical and theoretical significance should not be in question. 
CAD critics take a rather pessimistic view of it as a technology-based work method that 
threatens to reduce professional skills, increase worker alienation and decrease staffing 
levels (Lowstdt, 1989). Historically, such concerns are not uncommon in societies 
which have had a "Tayloristic" managerial heritage, such as the USA and the UK (see, 
for example, Browne et al., 1988; Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991). The human cost 
of technology has often been expressed in terms of downsized work force as less 
people were required to perform a certain job after computerisation, increased job 
dissatisfaction, decreased job autonomy, and increased employee alienation.
2 .8  Organisational Implications of CAD / CAM Implementation
Implementation of a technology involves a change of some kind; it brings with it a new 
element into the status quo of the accommodating organisation, affecting people’s jobs, 
relationships and ability to carry out their jobs. Different degrees of organisational 
change could reasonably be expected in relation to different technology applications. 
For example, as Voss's model (1992) suggests, the magnitude of organisational change 
brought about by the implementation of CIM will be invariably much higher than that 
associated with CAD, CAM or CADCAM (see Exhibit 2.1).
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Exhibit 2.1
Aligning technology and organisation change
low Degree of 
O rganisation Change
high
CIM
Degree
Technology
Change CAD/CAM
CA Design
Draughtinglow
high
Source: Voss (1992: 39)
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It can be said that people differ considerably in assessing the impact of a given change, 
some of which might have been predicted by certain people but not by others. Indeed, 
some consequences of a change might not be predictable at all. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find both advocates and critics of CAD/CAM and CIM.
As the diffusion of CAD/CAM technology grew and some user companies not only 
failed to make optimum use but also experienced negative results, serious and legitimate 
questions began to emerge regarding the promised competitive advantages of 
CAD/CAM. How achievable are they upon implementation, and how guaranteed are 
they just by using the technology without changing work organisation practices? (e.g. 
McLoughlin, 1988; Plonski, 1989; Senker, 1985). Many companies complained that 
the promised CAD/CAM gains remained modest (Beatty and Gordon, 1988).
Bessant (1991) discusses a few studies focusing on problematic implementation, one of 
which will hopefully help solidify the point. In 1989 the UK was reported to be 
investing in CIM at a rate of nearly £2 billion per year (i.e. approximately 20% of all 
capital expenditure in manufacturing). Up to a third of that money, however, was 
potentially being wasted because integration occurred only at a technical level, not at an
overall business level. Therefore, "benefits on the whole have been disappointing....
CIM has not resolved the problems of quality and performance to schedules as 
anticipated" (Kearny, 1989) .^
Signals sent by studies such as this suggest clearly that the implementation of such 
technologies per se is by no means guaranteed to deliver their potential advantages (see 
Forrester et al., 1995). It often fails to live up to expectations (Gunson and Boddy,
1989). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the question of the gap between the 
"promise" and "reality" of such technologies is unavoidable, given the reported 
problems companies experienced in implementation.
Many managers have to face the consequences of lack of planning for, or even 
recognition of, the organisational changes required to accommodate the introduction of 
CAD and CADCAM systems. Thus the full potential of such technologies could hardly 
be achieved, nor could they, upon introduction, be used as a catalyst for larger 
organisational developments. It can be argued that this is one of their less recognisable
^Bessani (1991) also rcporis a study on AMT users conducted on behalf of the UK National Economic 
Developineni Office, which concludes that:
of ihc 21 sysLcms observed, 12 were operating satisfactorily but tlic other 9 were performing 
considerably below expectations. Indeed, the performance o f one system  was so bad that the 
com pany eventually scrapped it altogether ... even in the 12 instances where satisfactory  
performance was achieved, in four cases there were major problems and long delays had to be 
experienced in bringing the systems to expectations.” (Burns [1988] quoted in Bessant [1991]).
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but important "intangible" characteristics (see Brooks and Wells, 1989; McLoughlin,
1990).
If CAD/CAM tools are to be used to assist the achievement of a business mission, then 
management's responsibility for turning potential advantages of these technologies into 
measurable technical and financial gains comes into question. Where exactly the 
responsibility for CAD/CAM lies within a given management set-up depends highly on 
the specific nature of individual organisations and cannot be generalised. Nevertheless, 
there are several questions of high practical significance, whose clear and accurate 
answering could help managers address issues of technology-organisation alignment. 
Who is to blame when the potential of a CAD/CAM system could not be achieved in a 
certain organisation? What should be done if organisational changes were not planned 
or even recognised prior to, or during, implementation? What opportunities can the 
introduction of CAD/CAM create for facilitating changes in work organisation and 
procedures in ways which may in their turn be as effective for further rationalisation? 
Are such opportunity used effectively? And what new horizons of planning may result 
from the introduction of CAD/CAM to facilitate the integration of technical and social 
objectives for the benefit of business goals?
In short, it is insufficient for management to rely totally on technical problem-solving 
logic in introducing CAD/CAM without a careful consideration of the organisational 
context in question and its psycho-social specifities. The implementation of CAD/CAM 
is highly likely to present management with challenges of reorganisation of work and 
rearrangement of supervisory and managerial work, particularly against a background 
of dynamic change, both in the broader business environment and inside organisations 
(e.g. Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993; Voss, 1989). Hence, in the face of an 
increased emphasis on competitiveness as a distinguishing feature of the current age, 
managers in charge are advised to be conscious of the implications of moving from "a 
condition of relative stability to one of continual change" for the task they are entrusted 
with (Hoffman, 1994: 3). According to this perspective, senior managers in particular 
are required to think critically about existing practices and work closely with middle and 
lower-level managers to develop creative ways for reorganising work in line with the 
new environment. To do so, those managers who could be described as change leaders 
would need to assume new roles not only in designing systems but also in getting more 
involved in the business process and how to organise work in order to support it best.
2 ,9  CADCAM Integration, CIM and CIE
This section will introduce the concept of integration in the context of the technology 
applications that are utilised in manufacture. It begins with a discussion of the general
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background to the concept of integration. It then discusses the rationale for it, the 
definitional problems surrounding it, and concludes by indicating the significance of 
managerial and organisational challenges encountered in its implementation.
2. 9.1 General Background
Integration of stand-alone computerised systems, and CIM in particular, can be viewed 
as a most advanced stage of technical progress in manufacturing industry's pursuit of 
automation in an evolutionary process comprising four stages: mechanisation, point 
automation, integrated islands of automation and CIM (see, for example, Browne et al, 
1988; Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1993; Forrester er a/., 1995). Mechanisation in the 
1770s and beyond (e.g. in the metal-working engineering industry) was concerned 
with the replacement of human labour with machines (e.g. lathe power); point 
automation in the 1960s and 70s with the replacement of human control of machines by 
automatic control (e.g. CNC and material requirements planning [MRP]); integrated 
islands of automation in the 1970, 80s and 90s with the integration of points of 
automation within their local environments (e.g. CADCAM, MRP II and FMS); and the 
more futuristic CIM stage is concerned with the application of computer-based 
automation and decision support systems to manage the total operation of a 
manufacturing system (see Browne et ai, 1988).
This subject of this thesis is concerned with the latter two stages, particularly the third 
(i.e. CADCAM integration) which, arguably, represents the current phase of 
development not only in terms of the companies that were studied during the course of 
this research but also in the majority of manufacturing enterprises the world over. For 
example, Patricia Mac Conaill (1993) of the Commission of the European Community, 
Brussels, provides an insider's explanation of the state of integration in member 
countries: less than 10% of systems used in European production industries are 
integrated, a further 20% capable of integration, and 70% considered to be extremely 
difficult to integrate due to technical, financial or organisational reasons. According to 
her, Europe suffers a trade deficit in the CIM market; whilst accounting for 27% of 
world markets, it supplies only 21% of these markets.
The main challenge of CIM is to implement the appropriate level of technological 
sophistication to achieve competitive advantage without over-investment of capital and 
time (Fjermestad and Chakrabarti, 1992). CIM will probably attract an increased 
governmental support within and across national economies, particuhuly in industrially- 
advanced countries, to support a more competitive manufacturing performance. For
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example, Mac Conaill (1993: 9) outlines the strategic significance of CIM to the 
European Community by declaring that the:
“..... overall strategic goal of the European Community R&D programme ESPRIT is to
provide the European IT industry with the technology base it needs to become and stay 
competitive, CIM is an important part of this programme and has an additional objective to 
accelerate the modernisation process in a wide range of manufacturing and engineering 
industries.”
2 . 9 . 2  Rationale and Justification
Bessant (1991: 52) discusses the rationale for integration in manufacture in a broad 
sense. His description is particularly relevant because it is supported by a historic 
background and it also summarises the whole philosophy of CADCAM integration. He 
states:
“Although IT has undoubtedly been a powerful force for change, it would be wrong to see this 
as the only factor which has innucnced the emergence of advanced manufacturing technology 
in the form available to us today. Perhaps the most significant trend - which IT has
accelerated, but which it predated by many years - is that towards inlegration Innovation
in manufacturing has been taking place since the Stone Age, as new and better things have 
been discovered and developed. But there is a qualitative difference between innovations which 
are primarily associated with 'doing what we have always done, but a little better’ and those
which fundamentally change the nature of the proeess to which they are applied The
distinction is one of integration. Through a synthesis of different elements the whole becomes 
gretiter than the sum of the its parts. As we move from substitution towards more integrated 
forms, so we bring together more of the previously separate functions in the manufacturing 
process. At the same time, the benefits which the technology offers increase with higher
levels of integratio In terms of systems theory, more integrated systems have 'emergent
properties', appearing only at the higher levels of integration of subsystems.”
Mac Conaill (1993: 53-54) expresses the importance of the principle of integration in 
her own words so as to highlight its potential advantages from a narrower, task-centred 
point of view:
“.... even allowing for the very powerful contribution of computer-aided design to the 
draughting and design process, its real significance emerges as IT facilitates integration with 
the manufacturing process itself. Since CAD systems make use of information coded in
electronic form, it follows that other systems -  which also use such information - can be
linked via some form of network. This is the basis of CAD/CAM  in which not only can
the product be designed on a computer screen but, when the design is finally refined, the 
necessary instructions can be generated and sent to the machine tools and other devices which
will actually manufacture it The advantages of this kind of integration are enormous, and
extend beyond the generation of designs and the relevant information necessary for controlling 
the manufacturing process to those for other activities such as the planning of material 
requirements and capacity planning, and quality control. Benefits arising from this include 
significantly reduced lead times, imp-roved quality, better machine utilisation and much 
improved customer service.”
In system terms, justification of integration finds expression in optimised flows of 
information between systems and subsystems which possess different data base 
fomiats, by means of a communication link and the physical interfacing of stand-alone 
hardware elements through some form of a network. Data translation is often needed
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since different computer languages are typically used to describe the same algorithm or 
graphical object throughout computerised systems in an enterprise.
An integrated CADCAM system can help management simplify a complex 
administrative and control system for cost estimation, lot release, shop orders, 
materials, and performance tracking (Adler, 1989). In PCB production CADCAM 
integration facilitates the designers' task of assessing manufacturing cost, quality 
considerations and avoiding expensive engineering changes. More accurate artwork, 
profiling, and drilling programs as well as connectivity test programs can be produced 
with less effort using CADCAM. Assembly can benefit from a CIM database in 
generating automatic component insertion programs and functional tests. Cost and 
quality objectives can be considerably assisted by improving the criteria for 
manufacturability in a CIM system (Venkatachalama, 1990). Less recognisable benefits 
of a CIM system would include its potential ability to facilitate and decentralise a 
decision-making mechanism through the use of an enterprise-wide distributed AI 
architecture in which simulation techniques would play a major role (Lucas-Smith,
1990).
2.9.3 Problems of Definition and Managerial and Organisational
Challenges
Although manufacturing industry is increasingly being asked to move towards 
integration, little has been given to defining integration or to the management challenges 
involved in making it happen (Bessant and Buckingham, 1993; Bessant et al., 1985; 
Voss, 1989).
As could be deduced from what has been discussed in this chapter so far, defining CIM 
is more difficult than defining CAD or CAM because:
1) the words "integration" and "manufacturing" mean different things to different 
people (Bedworth et al., 1991: 600); and
2) it is much more complex and radical (Possum, 1986). Consequently, interpretations 
regarding the nature, scope, and implications of CIM are bound to vary considerably 
between individuals, different departments’ perspectives within an organisation, and 
across organisations as well as between researchers from various backgrounds 
(Forrester er <3/., 1995).
Numerous definitions can be found in the literature but none of them is universally 
accepted, although a consensus could be found on CIM as a networked information 
system which encompasses various computerised subsystems of a manufacturing 
concern. Typically, constituent component technologies of CIM will include, among 
other subsystems, CAD, CAE, CAFP, CAM. They also include other "islands of
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technology" that have, historically, met the needs of specific business areas but also 
resulted in the fragmentation of systems applications and the organisational functions 
responsible for them. This was because their limited and specialised purposes "had 
nothing to do with the overall business objectives and strategies of the corporation"
(Tapscott and Catson, 1993: 61).
It can be said, nonetheless, that an integrated CADCAM system forms the core of the I
technical (or "product definition") component of a total CIM arrangement (See Teicholz |
and Orr, 1987: 58). Until the early 1980s defining CIM in the USA and Japan was j
narrowly restricted to product development and manufacturing through CADCAM. j
Later definitions, however, broadened to include, for example, MRP systems as a |
major part of the production planning and control component (Scheer, 1991). i
Scheer (1991: 2) defines CIM as "the integrated information processing requirements j
for the technical and operational tasks of an industrial enterprise. Bessant (1991: 54) 1
defines it as "the integration of computer based monitoring and control of all aspects of I
the manufacturing process, drawing on a common database and communicating via |
some form of computer network". However, Bedwoith et al.'s (1991: 600) definition j
Ibetter serves the purpose of this study because it emphasises the central role of design j
and manufacturing activities, and hence CAD and CAM, in the operations of a j
manufacturing enterprise. According to them, CIM is "a management philosophy in ,
which the functions of design and manufacturing are rationalised and co-ordinated I
using computer, communications and infonnation technologies". '
Interest in CIM as an enterprise-wide technical issue can be found in the work of i
researchers such as Patankar and Adiga (1995) and Kovacs et al. (1994) who attempt to !
model CIM and CIE using computer simulation techniques. Their aim is one of ,
developing conceptual tools to observe and create an abstraction of an enterprise with a ;
view to supporting decision-making across functional boundaries. Integration at an j
enterprise level is conceptualised at three levels: the physical systems level, the i
applications level, and the functional level (it is at this third level where enterprise- j
integrated modelling (EIM)^ features as a means of high-level functional modelling and |
integration, giving rise to the broader notion of CIE [see Hunt, 1991; Patankar and I
Adiga, 1995]). A fourth level, business, may be added^ (Mac Conaill, 1993). CIM, by i
contrast, is generally restricted to integration at the two previous levels. !
'^Enterprise Integration Modelling can be defined as: "an activity that produces models which address 
enterprise-wide integration issues" (Paiankiir and Adiga, 1995)
^Based, for example, on the European Community's CIM-OSA project launched with a view to 
defining a framework within which all CIM components in an enterprise could be integrated at the
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More encompassing forms of integration which go beyond a DEM domain within a 
manufacturing company are possible. These are conceptualised as a more advanced, 
more futuristic stage of integration and termed "CIM" in a "factory of the future" 
context at the technical level, and "CIB" (Computer-Aided Business) at the business 
level. According to Browne et al., (1988: 29-30), the likely characteristics of the 
"factory of the future" include: "round the clock operation, very small lot sizes, greatly 
reduced lead-times, little or no human labour at the point of production". CIB 
incorporates a high level of integration among the different functions of an enterprise, 
including administration and financial systems, engineering support systems (e.g. CAD 
and CAPP), production management, and manufacturing monitoring and control 
functions; "CIB is concerned with reducing the cost and time taken to transfer 
information between the factory and the external systems with which it must interface" 
(Browne et al., 1988: 35). A higher level of integration is still achievable beyond CIB 
as a "four walls activity", (Browne et al., 1988: 37). Outward-looking integration via 
the inclusion of suppliers and customers or other external parties concerned into an 
integration process can be highly rewarding in business terms since the integration of 
supply and demand is itself an issue of strategic concern (MacDonald, 1995).
A broader notion of integration, which encompasses but goes beyond purely technical 
definitions arising from system concepts, is needed for the purpose of the present 
study. Researchers more tuned to the organisational issues of integration (e.g. Bessant, 
1991, Voss, 1989; Winch and Twigg, 1993) are concerned with conceptualising CIM 
from a perspective which is more directly comparable to the one adopted in this study. 
For example, Voss (1989) identifies five dimensions of integration, whose own 
integration into a single vision through an appropriate formula remains an outstanding 
managerial challenge. The dimensions are:
1) strategv integration whereby decisions in manufacturing are integrated with 
marketing strategy (see also Porter, 1983);
2) material flow integration whereby efficient flow through the supply chain is achieved 
for maximum flexibility;
3) technical integration whereby strategy integration is linked to the technical choices 
made by ensuring that production process choices are consistent with the strategy and 
all technical choices made are consistent with each other;
4) information integration whereby different functional information sub-systems are 
integrated with market requirement infonnation sub-systems; and
physical, application, and business levels, using MAP {Manufacturing Automation Protocol) and TOP 
(Technical Office Protocol) and other standards (see Mac Conaill, 1993).
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5) organisation integration whereby new forms of organisation and job design are 
developed in line with the other four dimensions across the organisation in concern.
One important point to stress in this chapter is that integration involves a long-term, 
necessarily problematic process of change, because it goes deep into the core of a 
manufacturing organisation.
“Moving towards total integrated manufacturing is not simply a matter of a short-term 
investment in one or two discrete items of equipment, but rather a long-term philosophy 
involving technological and organisational components which need to be carefully linked to 
provide support for the overall business.” (Bessant, 1991: 333).
Throughout this thesis, however, the emphasis will be on CAD and CAM primarily but 
other application areas, such as CAE, CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) 
and CAPP, will also be discussed as appropriate. At a product DEM level, therefore, it 
is assumed that an integration process proceeds in a direction whereby CAD and CAM 
systems are interfaced physically and integrated technically and organisationally, based 
on a careful redesign of what is technically known as the "design-manufacturing 
interface" (Badham, 1991).
2. 10  Selected Studies on CADCAM Integration
This section discusses eight selected studies on CADCAM integration, which, from the 
extensive literature, can function as research exemplars. The studies have been selected 
on the grounds of their relevance to the subject matter of this research. They include 
outstanding research efforts by Adler (1989); Lee (1989; 1991); Winch and Twigg 
(1990; 1993); Winch, Voss and Twigg (1991); Dean and Snell (1991); and Beatty and 
Gordon (1988; 1991). Such studies have contributed considerably to knowledge in the 
chosen topic. Thus they warrant a critical consideration. In what follows each of the 
mentioned studies will be considered individually in terms of summarised accounts of 
its aims and methodology, findings and conclusions, and strengths and weaknesses.
* Adler Study (1989)
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
Paul Adler studied 13 US finns: nine in electronics and four in aircraft industries with a 
view to investigating the managerial challenges involved in CADCAM integration. This 
was an exploratory study which focused on specific areas of production in these 
industries: PCB (engineering, design, fabrication, and test) and hydraulic tubing 
(design and fabrication), respectively. The study did not target a statistically 
representative sample; exploration of issues and development of propositions and 
hypotheses for further research was the guiding objective.
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Using an inductive method, Adler aimed to synthesise elements of "best practice" in 
leading organisations; he devised a conceptual framework of possible challenges at five 
key levels of "organisational learning": skills, procedures, structure, strategy and 
culture.
A total of 120 managers and engineers were interviewed over a period of four months. 
Data was gathered during site visits by two researchers using semi-structured 
interviews and company tours.
* Summary o f Findings and Conclusions
1) Whilst PCB manufacture using CAM required less manual dexterity on the part of 
operators, AIMs demanded a greater formal training to operate effectively, as well as a 
broader knowledge of the variety of components being inserted.
2) Although CAD/CAM reduced labour requirements per unit output, it created an 
upgrading trend in the overall skill requirements of personnel both in individual 
occupational categories and in the balance between occupations. CAD and CAD/CAM 
increased the sophistication of design analysis in PCB manufacture.
3) The use of CAE drove the skill profile upwards and CAM increased workers' skill 
requirements in PCB manufacture.
4) Deskilling was not feasible for drafting technicians due to the limitations of these 
systems and the emergence of other higher level drafting tasks.
5) A company's specific product and the intensity of "environmental pressures" 
influenced the choice of strategic pathways that companies had followed on 
CAD/CAM.
6) Different companies used CAD/CAM in different ways. Three kinds of CAD/CAM 
strategies were adopted: (a) energetic anarchy, (whereby departments were encouraged 
to develop their own islands of automation independently, ending up with many 
different incompatible systems); (b) minimal government (whereby senior management 
intervened only to a limited degree in system management); and (c) integrated planning 
(by senior management for the entire organisation).
7) Technological change encouraged organisations to develop more differentiated and 
specialised subunits which needed structural co-ordination mechanisms to ensure the 
consistency of their efforts.
8) The companies were under pressure to find mechanisms for co-ordinating CAD and 
CAM development efforts as well as design and manufacturing activities. The question
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was: who would fund the development of the parts data base which related directly to 
the activities of design but paid off in manufacturing efficiency? Five various kinds of 
integrating mechanisms were found: a) fomriing liaison roles and task forces, b) setting 
up cross-functional CAD/CAM committees, c) creating a product definition data base,
d) nominating a CAD/CAM manager, and e) creating a central CAD/CAM organisation.
9) The technical potential for integration was found to be insufficiently exploited in the 
most advanced segments of US industry.
10) The overall benefits of integration could only be achieved when organisational 
changes in procedures, structure, strategy, culture, and skill training were made 
together with the technical changes involved.
11) Three cultural challenges arose because of integration: first, manager-worker co­
operation as they were asked to play a more active problem-solving role; second, co­
operation between lower and higher level management in participative strategy 
processes; and third, co-operation between design and manufacturing personnel. 
Finding a proper linkage mechanism to accommodate a shared functioning of these 
groups arose as a major challenge.
12) The lack of technical expertise and top management commitment to CADCAM for 
competitive advantage were the two main factors in the lack of further progress towards 
integration.
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
Adler's study was relevant to this dissertation because it was conducted mainly in PCB 
manufacturing environments. Also, it was exploratory in nature, with a view to 
discover all plausible organisational issues associated with CADCAM integration. It 
provided a realistic description of the state of CAD/CAM in the late 1980s and surveyed 
all kinds of organisational obstacles to integration in the US industr y. A fact-finding 
investigation like Adler's facilitates a critical assessment of the theoretical literature 
concerning CIM on the basis of an empirical account of practice in some of the most 
advanced US electronic and mechanical engineering firms, which were chosen for 
research because they were the "leaders of CADCAM integration" (p. 203).
The comprehensiveness of the five organisational domains he developed from "first 
principles" in a sequential logic running from the simpler, objective, non-reflexive to 
more complex, subjective and reflexive levels facilitated his broader exploratory 
objectives. Conceptualising them in terms of organisational learning was a fundamental 
contribution to theory building in relation to the organisational aspects of CADCAM 
integration.
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Nonetheless, some of the findings were not interpreted in terms of their likely 
implications for the firms in the study. For example, the results did not reveal whether 
the closer co-ordination required by CADCAM had, or could have, a positive impact on 
corporate performance or profitability in the researched companies. The study touched 
upon the issue from a purely theoretical point of view but did not discuss it in the light 
of the findings.
Methodologically, a relatively short period of four months was not sufficient 
longitudinality for an inductive research in this area of change where things develop 
continuously over long time frames. Also, the companies were deliberately chosen 
from a technically advanced class of manufacturers; this unfortunately denied the study 
an opportunity to learn about non-integrating companies as well and why the issue of 
integration appeared to be irrelevant to them from a socio-technical, rather than purely 
technical, point of view.
* Lee Study (1989)
* Summary o f  Aims and Methodology
Gloria Lee studied how companies in Britain managed change with CAD and 
CADCAM. The study aimed to analyse key contextual and organisational factors in the 
implementation of CAD, CAM, and their linking into CADCAM arrangements. Of 
particular interest to the present research were issues related to the organisation of work 
around such arrangements.
Seven British engineering companies were chosen from a wider range of research 
sample, six of which were in manufacturing and one was an engineering services 
organisation. Four were of small to medium size (under 500 employees) involved in the 
manufacture of machine tools, pneumatics, industrial valves and engineering services 
for the automobile industry. The other three were large multi-site organisations: two 
were in aerospace and the other was a vehicle manufacturer.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with executives, trade union 
representatives, and professional engineering institution and training board officers 
during the course of a two-year long field work.
* Summary o f  Findings and Conclusions
1) The motive for a company's adoption decision (i.e. market- or technology-driven) 
affected the episode of change implementation.
2) The "sociopolitical context of change" served to promote a successful change 
process in companies which enjoyed an atmosphere of "high-trust" relationships whilst 
hindering it in firms with a history of confrontational management-union relationships.
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3) Managerial strategies for implementation and control were found to be one of two 
types: "Taylorist-oriented" direct control approach or a "responsible autonomy" 
approach.
4) Direct control strategies resulted in selective training and a traditional work 
organisation, whereas autonomy resulted in general training leading to flexibility in 
work organisation.
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
A  wide range of concerned actor groups were interviewed, which must have facilitated 
a balanced analysis of responses by virtue of comparing and contrasting the different 
accounts presented. This was an obvious methodological strength of the study. The 
inclusion of companies of various sizes and lines of business provided another strength 
to the theoretical representativeness and generalisability of the study.
The duration of the field work makes this virtually a longitudinal study. The number of 
people who had been interviewed was not stated. Theoretically, the study narrowed 
down managerial control strategies into a polarity of either Taylorist or non-Taylorist 
approaches; another alternative would have been to present them in terms of a 
continuum showing degrees of control instead of reducing them to a dichotomy. The 
advantage of the dichotomy used, however, was that it was one with considerable 
previous application in the field of industrial sociology.
* Lee Study (1991)
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
Gloria Lee expanded her previous study of British firms (1989) to include North 
American companies, with more focused attention on CADCAM integration. The 
overall objective was to identify the factors that influenced the readiness of management 
to associate organisational with technical change within various contextual specifities.
Semi structured interview schedules were used to collect data from senior and middle 
technical and other managers in six British and six Canadian companies. The British 
companies included two aerospace, one automotive, one machine tool, and two 
component manufacturers. Three of these were large (over 1,000 employees), one 
medium (500-999), and two small (less than 500). The Canadian companies included 
the following manufacturers: one aerospace, one automotive, two electrical, one 
domestic appliance, and one component. Of these four were large, one medium and one 
small.
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* Summary o f  Findings and Conclusions
1) Societal and organisational cultural contexts had played a significant role in the 
change process and its outcome.
2) Market pressures and a determination to keep at the forefront of technological 
innovation were major factors for innovation, despite the many uncertainties that were 
associated with new technologies.
3) Differences in culture and traditions were found to be significantly influential factors 
in change "even in countries like these [i.e. Britain and Canada] with strong historical 
links" (p. 109) due to significant contrasts in the positions of engineers in the two 
countries and the way they were trained and educated.
“ there arc other aspects relating to the wider cultural context and traditions, which it has
been argued impact in different ways upon approaches to technological change.” (p. 109)
4) The engineering profession developed along two different lines historically in terms 
of its professionalisation process, education and training. Unlike in Britain, Canadian 
engineers were not concerned about their professional identity, status and prestige; "the 
position of Canadian professional engineers is institutionally distinct from that of other 
technical occupations" (p. 109). This was reflected in the social organisation of 
technical work in design: there was more vertical segregation between professional 
engineers carrying out design work and technicians who undertook doing the 
draughting.
5) Canadian managers deliberately left design and draughting as separately organised 
activities, whereas British managers saw the introduction of CADCAM as an 
opportunity for higher integration of activities within design as well as between design 
and manufacture.
6) Unionisation and the notion of collective action amongst Canadian engineers was 
very rare and did not exist in the companies studied, but it was the norm amongst 
British engineers.
7) The professional status of Canadian engineers supported their authority in senior 
positions with strategic decision-making powers. This made them
“ more confident than British engineers, in their ability to further their case for investment
within management hierarchies and they were less inhibited by the implications of accounting 
rules than their British counterparts ” (p. 110)
8) Professionalisation in Canada produced a social organisation distinguishing between 
engineers and technicians, which was a factor impeding functional flexibility in 
implementation. It caused a slowing down in progress toward organisational change, in 
terms of the integrative potential of CAD/CAM, particularly in larger companies.
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9) Canadian engineers had a very strong sense of their personal worth and value to their 
respective companies; "they expected their performance to be individually evaluated" 
(p. 110). They did not perceive management as causing any serious threat to them as a 
group. This situation resulted in both engineers and managers being "reluctant to move 
ahead quickly with any form of radical restructuring" (p. 110). Neither of them were 
ready to break down traditional barriers to achieve horizontal integration within design 
or between design and manufacture.
* Summary o f  Strengths and Weaknesses
The international dimension of the study strengthened its theoretical premises 
considerably. The role of national cultures in affecting the shaping, functioning and 
psycho-social characteristics of organisations across countries and continents was 
investigated. Also, a wide range of concerned actor groups were interviewed and 
companies of various sizes and lines of business were included, providing another 
strength to the study’s findings in terms of their theoretical robustness.
However, the duration of the field work was shorter than in the 1989 study. One 
should not be surprised - to gain synchronic width in research usually involves a trade­
off in terms of diachronic depth, for simple reasons of economy of effort. Only large 
research teams can attempt to do both simultaneously, through specialisation of the 
research roles within the team. Despite providing a valid platform for a cross-national 
analysis, the scope for theoretical generalisation from the study remained limited due to 
the number of industrial sectors in the study, their uneven representation, and the 
differences in the distribution of company sizes between the British and the Canadian 
samples. It should be said, however, that it was not intended to be a strictly matched 
hypothetico-deductive study, but a more grounded and exploratory piece of work. In 
this respect, it stands as a model for the modest endeavours of this thesis.
* Winch and Twiee (1990 : 1993) Study
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
Graham Winch and David Twigg aimed to construct a model of the process of 
technological change, which would be particularly suitable to CADCAM integration. 
They studied 16 British metalworking firms. Structured interview schedules were used 
to collect information from senior managers and engineers from the two functions 
concerned. Interviews were written up in a case study format and returned to the 
participtmts for validation.
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* Summary o f  Findings and Conclusions
1) All the companies studied had compared systems and prepared justifications before 
choosing a system. Some companies had been through this process more than once 
before embarking on a final choice.
2) None of the firms they studied had an integrated link for the whole of their 
production information flow.
3) Some companies had unpleasant experiences of system incompatibilities; they had 
CAD systems that worked satisfactorily in the drawing office but their output was not 
suitable for part programming or they did not have a suitable and compatible part 
programming software. Thus operational and information flow problems in 
manufacture were encountered.
4) Product quality assurance efforts were negatively affected because of the lack of 
cross-functional flows of information.
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
The theoretical strength of the study manifested itself in its systematic, literature- 
supported modelling effort which preceded the empirical investigation. The proposed 
model was reappraised after it was applied to data collection because it failed to show 
incremental processes within the stages of change, and, hence, achieved greater validity 
as a result of this refining. The methodological significance of this study lay in its 
longitudinal research design. It took account of the passing of time as an essential 
element in modelling CADCAM as a change process.
Nonetheless, the research utilised a rather "rigid" sti'uctured interview schedule. Its 
margin for flexibility in data collection and analysis must have been unduly constrained 
prior to data gathering. Unlike Adler's (1989) exploratory study, for example, this 
research narrowed its scope unnecessarily. For example, it interviewed only senior 
managers and engineers and while it focused on work organisation issues in a broader 
sense, it excluded job design issues. It was impossible, therefore, to discover or 
develop a link between the two important and complementary areas of theoretical 
concern.
* Winch, Voss and Twig^ Study (1991)
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
Graham Winch, Christopher Voss and David Twigg assumed that the implementation 
of an integrating technology, such as CADCAM, would lead to organisational 
integration. Their study aimed to identify the organisational design issues specifically 
relevant to the integration of design and manufacturing functions. The main question of
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the study was: what different integrating mechanisms would be found in different 
organisations?
The study was financed by both SERC (The Science and Engineering Research 
Council) and ESRC (The Economic and Social Research Council) in Britain. It 
involved 15 firms from the metalworking industry, which produced various building, 
hydraulic, vehicle and aerospace components.
* Summary o f  Findings and Conclusions
1) Integration became an issue only under the conditions of differentiation between the 
engineering and manufacturing functions which dominated the British metalworking 
industry.
2) Merger between engineering and manufacturing functions was not viable because of 
various sources of differentiation. These included differences in: (a) capital intensity, 
(b) organisation design and structuring, (c) levels of task uncertainty, and (e) the nature 
of processed functional input and output.
3) Mechanisms used for integrating Design and Manufacturing varied from one 
company to another and included:
a) Direct Contact (the simplest and easiest form of engineering manufacturing liaison 
found).
b) Liaison Roles (i.e. two-way communications whereby a manufacturing person had 
an identified opposite number in engineering or a certain group within one function 
reported also to another function).
c) Secondment (the most common mechanism in the volume manufacturing companies, 
whereby a representative from manufacturing engineering would be transferred for one 
or two years to the product development team in engineering).
d) Task Forces (widely used techniques for solving specific finite problems, whereby a 
task force was distinguished from a committee in that its role was one of policy 
implementation rather than formation).
e) Project Teams (different from task forces since these had a full-time long-term 
status).
f) Cells (i.e. multi-disciplined groups working as teams in an open plan office to 
facilitate maximum feedback among the individuals, bring together all the functions 
involved in the early stage of design and thus achieve paperless design).
g) Integrator Functions (i.e. specialist integrating departments set up to bring together 
the various issues and tasks in engineering for the development of CADCAM in liaison 
with manufacturing.
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h) Matrix Organisations (these were increasingly popular; they involved functional 
managers being responsible for recruiting, retaining and developing engineering skills 
which project managers deployed in product-oriented project teams).
4) Emerging CIM technology provided a potential for greater organisational integration, 
but was inadequate for facilitating shorter lead-times, lower costs and improved quality 
due to current market pressures.
5) Fully Integrated CIM was not a real possibility in the foreseeable future because the 
CAD and CAM systems that were found in use still required interpersonal co-ordination 
among users.
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
The strength of the study lay in the theoretical richness of its detailed explanation of : 
(1) why design and manufacturing functions were found to be differentiated in the 
context of the companies studied and (2) the various forms of inter-functional 
integrating mechanisms found. This suggested that variation amongst organisations in a 
single industry was sufficiently worthy of investigation due to the unique specifities of 
such organisations.
The study, however, did not sufficiently explain the data-gathering methods and 
procedures that were used. Knowledge of these would have helped a more informed 
assessment of the study.
* Dean and Snell Study (1991)
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
James Dean and Scott Snell studied, quantitatively, the relationship between an 
integrated manufacturing model and job characteristics in the US metalworking sector. 
They focused on the implications of integrated manufacturing (IM) for job design, 
particularly in terms of the possible demands of integration on task uncertainty and 
interdependence.
The concept of IM was used by the researchers to refer to a newly emerging, complex 
paradigm of AMT (including CAD, CAE, CAM, and CAPP), just-in-time (JIT) 
inventory control, and total quality management (TQM). The primary objective of the 
research was to construct a conceptual framework to characterise the emergence of the 
paradigm and to develop theory about its impact on jobs.
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Dean and Snell hypothesised that performance, size and external control would 
moderate the relationship between IM and organisational redesign. The study 
formulated and tested three hypotheses:
1) "The relationship between integrated manufacturing and job characteristics will be 
stronger in organisations with low performance than in those with high performance" 
(p.786);
2) "The relationship between integrated manufacturing and job characteristics will be 
stronger in small organisations than in large ones" (p.786); and
3) "The relationship between integrated manufacturing and job characteristics will be 
stronger in independent organisations than in dependent ones" (p.787).
A total of 123 firms in Pennsylvania participated in the study. The range of products 
manufactured by these fimis included primary and fabricated metal products, industrial 
machinery, transportation equipment and precision instruments. Structured 
questionnaires were used to gather data from 123 plant managers, functional managers: 
101 in operations, 109 in quality assurance and 97 in production control. Non- 
managerial employees in these functions also participated: 74, 79 and 77, respectively.
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. The three IM variables 
were first entered into the equation simultaneously. Secondly, each moderator was 
entered. Thirdly, the cross-products of the variables were entered with the moderator 
variables (e.g. AMT by performance) to develop a complete statistical explanation,
* Summary o f  Findings and Conclusions
1) Generally, the results showed no major effects of IM on job design among 
employees in the functional areas which were studied; the relationships were found to 
be contingent on organisational context (i.e. the conditions under which a technology 
was introduced).
2) Contrary to their initial expectations, it was found that high perfomiance could either 
accelerate or impede changes in jobs as a response to IM.
3) The moderating effect of size on the focal relationship was found to be confined to 
production control.
4) Only partial support was provided for the third hypothesis. This, consequently, gave 
way to a greater emphasis on the contingency element in their interpretation of the 
results.
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
The study was relevant to this thesis because it addressed AMT as one of the three most 
essential factors which contributed to shaping, changing and developing the kind of
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work organisation required to facilitate efficient and effective operations. 
Comprehensiveness of approach was an obvious theoretical strength of the study. It 
combined AMT with JIT and TQM in its theoretical framework. Conventional 
manufacturing was compared with IM, in terms of job features, under a new condition 
where the effects of each of these were considered. Methodologically, the richness of 
quantitative analysis of the study succeeded in showing as high a level of rigour as one 
could look for in any classic research based on "science" as its normative ideal. The 
greatest emphasis was on devising a "water-tight" quantitative research design whose 
credibility lay in the statistical validity of the data and its analysis.
However, the true value of such accuracy should be assessed in terms of how 
embedded the data was in the socio-technical contexts that were researched. This would 
appear to be particularly important in a study whose basic unit of analysis was the 
individual employee, which would probably suggest the need for supporting such 
methodology with a qualitative analysis of individuals' experiences as suggested by 
their own respective cognitive processes and perceptions. The researchers' own 
interpretation of the statistical results was in the end subjected to a contextual frame of 
reference since the quantitative results appeared not to be meaningful enough to deduce 
any conclusions worthy of generalisation. The relationships, which were investigated 
quantitatively, were found to be contingent on organisational context.
This study showed that a quantitative approach, with all the rigor it could depict, might 
still be limited in its ability to provide results to explain variations between different 
organisations' behaviour vis-a-vis CADCAM integration. Therefore, "organisational 
inertia", whereby specific sources of variation (both internal and external to an 
organisation) not assumed in generic theoretical hypotheses would be likely to override 
the variables that were set up for testing. As the researchers confirmed in their
conclusion: " our findings indicate that organisational contexts can simultaneously
facilitate and inhibit alignment the role of organisational context as a provider of
resources should be examined" (p. 799). Another theoretical shortcoming of the study 
was that it analysed IM job requirements at the level of the individual (using a 
"microscopic view") without linking that, if only by way of a recognised theoretical 
relationship, with the wider context of work organisation (using a "macroscopic view") 
where individuals' jobs' were assumed to be affected by the overall organisational 
arrangements of division of labour, control and co-ordination of work tasks and power 
relationships. The study's conclusive emphasis on the significance of organisational 
inertia could perhaps be interpreted as indicative of this missing link. The total absence 
of this link from the study's theoretical framework left a gap which, eventually, found 
expression in the rather vague concept of organisational inertia. It appeared clearly that
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a "part" could not be studied by isolating it completely from the "whole" without 
theoretical assumptions linking both of them in order to comprehend the fomier in the 
context of the latter. In the same way the latter could not have been isolated from its 
environment completely for investigation purposes without taking into account, 
theoretically at least, the organic relations of interaction between the two.
* Beatty and Gordon Study (1988)
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
Carol Beatty and John Gordon studied the implementation of CAD/CAM systems. In 
the course of their research, they interviewed and surveyed Canadian managers and 
employees with a view to identifying barriers to successful adoption. The study 
resulted in sorting the identified barriers into three groups, offered an explanation of 
their underlying causes, and proposed remedies to help managers overcome them.
* Summary o f Findings and conclusions
The barriers the study identified were classified into three categories: structural, human 
and technical.
The problems included in each category, their causes and proposed remedies are 
summarised as follows:
* Structural barriers:
a) An excessive focus on direct labour and ratios, caused by the use of obsolete 
decision criteria; a careful analysis of the real costs incurred and benefits gained was 
proposed.
b) A failure to perceive true benefits, caused by the lack of measures of intangible 
benefits in use; an analysis of total productivity and "intangibles" was proposed.
c) A high risk for managers, caused by reward systems that discouraged risk taking; 
development of different reward systems for managers was proposed.
d) A lack of co-ordination and co-operation within companies, caused by profound 
organisational fragmentation; devices to integrate and co-ordinate efforts at a company 
level were proposed.
e) High hopes and hidden costs, caused by an overselling of CAD/CAM; a careful 
planning and presentation of the technology’s strategic objectives was proposed.
* Human barriers:
a) Uncertainty avoidance, caused by fear of uncertainty associated with change; a 
higher degree of involvement and communication was proposed.
b) Resistance to change, caused by fear of loss of power and status; careful 
implementation and a capable and highly skilled champion were required.
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c) Hasty decisions and chronic "fire fighting", caused by a short-term, action-oriented 
management work style characterised by impatience with planning and waiting; a 
greater emphasis on objective setting and pre-implementation planning was needed.
* Technical barrier:
Incompatibility of systems, caused by purchase of a variety of hardware and software 
without considering long-term integration requirements; purchasing integrated systems 
and writing own software and neutral files were proposed.
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
Beatty and Gordon's study's main achievement was in devising a conceptually useful 
framework for classifying obstacles to the implementation of CAD/CAM systems. The 
framework would contribute to the development of clearer future conceptualisations in 
this field of research. Another theoretical strength of the research was the ability it 
demonstrated to diagnose the problems that prevented successful implementation and 
trace these to their, at least perceived, root causes. Further, the study provided a 
complete diagnosis and a treatment plan by recommending a remedy to each of the root 
causes and moulding these effectively into a well-presented study report which would 
be of practical benefit to concerned managers. I
Nevertheless, the study did not clearly orient itself towards integration theory; it only ;
presented "CAD/CAM" per se and seldom made mention of "integration". It appears i
that the issue was of a relatively marginal significance to the study. This was I
particuhuiy so given the fact the acronym "CAD/CAM" is often used in the literature to !
imply no more than a CAD system that is slightly more sophisticated than "simple" I
drafting CAD without "CAE" and/or "CAPP" capacities for engineering analysis and/or i
process or production planning and control purposes. The authors did not use the more I
comprehensive "CAD/CAM", or even more accurately, "CADCAM"^ acronym which 1
encompasses such implications but goes much further to integrate shop floor |
manufacturing technology with CAD. :
However, the study was vague about the methodology that it used. As to whether such ;
vagueness corresponded, proportionally, to any weakness in methodology could not be 
judged with certainty because of the lack of information provided. The study said 
nothing more about methodology than a single sentence: "In the course of our research !
into the implementation, we have interviewed or surveyed more than two hundred |
^Throughout this thesis the acronym "CADCAM" will be used to refer to integrated CAD and CAM 
systems, "CAD/CAM" is used to imply either of the two; it will also appear as such in quotations 
from other authors who use the acronym to imply either integrated CADCAM or cither a CAD or 
CAM system.
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managers and operating-level employees" (p. 25). This raised more questions about the 
methodology followed in the research than it answered. For example, what was the 
duration of the research? What kind of organisations were researched? What were the 
positions and functional backgrounds of the interviewees in their respective 
organisations? What precisely was meant by "operating-level employees"? How many 
of them were interviewed and how many surveyed? And what surveying instruments, 
if any, were used? It could be said, therefore, that the absence of answers to such 
significant questions put in doubt the methodological credibility of the entire study, and 
hence the reliability of its findings. Nonetheless, it was selected here because of: (I) its 
direct relevance to the subject matter of the present research and (2) the profound issues 
that it raised, particularly with regard to the barriers to CADCAM integration.
Beatty and Gordon Study (1991)
* Summary o f Aims and Methodology
Another study by Carol Beatty and John Gordon was published three years after their 
1988 study. Ten Canadian companies were researched over a 3-year period whilst in 
the process of implementing CADCAM. The companies were selected with the help of 
CAD/CAM vendors on the grounds that they had recently purchased either new CAD or 
new CAM equipment and planned to integrate CAD with CAM.
The researchers aimed to study the process of implementation itself using a structured 
interview method with managers at various levels in various departments. A cross 
section of operators were also interviewed at each site. Case histories of the projects 
concerned were, finally, written and their content analysed.
* Summary o f  Findings and Conclusions
1) Full integration was the target of all the companies studied but only two achieved it 
by the end of the three-year research period. In four others integration was only 
partially or largely forged but needed more time for completion.
2) Many of the problems resulted from insufficient attention paid to implementation.
3) Implementation resembled more a kind of religious conversion than a rational one.
4) Firms did not take seriously the crucial role of an enthusiastic mid-level champion in 
the implementation process.
5) The role of an "evangelist" was crucial to the continuity of new technology projects 
since a "patriarch" would typically pass on the responsibility to the former.
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6) Patriarchs, who were persons or corporate bodies representing senior management, 
often left the firm or had a diminished interest in the project after an adoption decision 
had been made.
7) An evangelist might not necessaiily drive a project in the right direction.
8) Certain personal traits were found to be crucial for leading integration projects. 
Successful evangelists were found to fulfil three crucial roles: pathfinding, problem- 
solving and implementing. They were rare individuals who combined skills in 
transformational leadership, interpersonal sophistication, and technical knowledge. 
They used their
“vision, cictcrminaiion, technical expertise, and interpersonal and political sk ills  to build
power and influence at multiple levels of the organisation, crossing departmental boundaries to 
build alliances, to preach the gospel of AMT and to win enough converts so that new 
technology was espoused by a critical mass of believers.” (p. 93).
* Summary o f Strengths and Weaknesses
The study provided a rich description of the processual dynamics of the change 
process. Its most significant theoretical contribution was that it stressed the effective 
role of interpersonal relations as a politically sensitive issue in the division of labour in 
the change process and, thus refuted the notions of rationality and linearity often 
associated with innovation. The differentiation between the respective contributions of 
senior and middle managers to the process was another theoretical insight in that it 
stressed the differences between decision-making processes on adoption and 
implementation. Three years was a reasonably sufficient period to capture several 
"snapshots" of the process and thus provide "a moving picture of it" (p. 80). The 
credibility of such a strong methodological feature of the study was further supported 
by the wide range of actors who were interviewed at various levels of the ten 
companies. The structured interview schedules used for data collection would have 
facilitated a comparative analysis of the various rationalities that could be found within 
an organisation, which could be attributed to differences in position, status, 
specialisation and decision making capacity.
Nonetheless, the study classified the cases into four grades according to the degree of 
success, or lack of it, with integration but did not explain the criteria utilised for such 
classification. Furthermore, it failed to define what "full integration" meant in terms of 
the progress achieved at the organisational adaptation level.
2 .11 Summary
This chapter presented the chosen technology applications in the context of a 
manufacturing company organisation. The emphasis is more on the implementation of
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CADCAM integration and the organisational change process that goes with it than on 
the introduction of stand alone CAD or CAM systems as specific IT application areas.
The chapter began by justifying the importance of CADCAM and discussed its wide 
diffusion and integration potential. It pointed to the practical value of integrated 
manufacturing via CADCAM from a technical rationality perspective. It also discussed 
the theoretical issues relating to the organisational processes involved in achieving 
integrated CADCAM.
Some of the most relevant studies were critically reviewed and their theoretical and 
methodological strengths and weaknesses assessed. This chapter has demonstrated 
some important points regarding the state of current knowledge about CADCAM, 
namely that;
1) Both CAD and CAM technology applications have implications for job design and 
work organisation.
2) Different companies use these technologies in different ways to meet different 
requirements.
3) The technical potential for integration is being insufficiently exploited in the most 
advanced segments of today’s manufacturing industry.
4) CADCAM integration is problematic because of a variety of structural, human, and 
technical barriers.
5) Integrated CADCAM will have implications for procedures, structure, strategy, 
culture, and training , and should not be treated as a purely a technical issue.
6) Differences of national culture and traditions have an impact on change and its 
outcomes.
7) Historically, the development of the engineering profession in a country (in ternis of 
the professionalisation process, education and training) and the consequences of such 
development for professional engineers’ sense of identity, status and prestige affect 
their behaviour as a distinguished group (e.g. in terms of their leadership assumptions, 
working relations with management, and unionisation) and thus influence the role they 
play in CADCAM integration.
It can be said that CADCAM is arguably a subject of increasing importance, given its 
future importance for the manufacturing industry due to the anticipated growth in the 
diffusion of CADCAM. Therefore, further research into it is justifiable on such basis, 
as can be deduced from some of the reviewed studies (e.g. Adler’s, 1989, and Winch 
and Twigg’s, 1993). A grounded analysis of the phenomenon will arguably contribute 
to a better understanding of it; an analysis that focuses on implementation, since, as 
Beatty and Gordon (1991) point out, many of the problems in CADCAM seem to be 
caused by an insufficient attention being paid to the processual dynamics of
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implementation. Hence, the present study aims to contribute to a developing research 
process in this area of knowledge.
In conclusion, six points can be made in summarising the limitations of cuiTent 
knowledge in this area, which will be addressed in the present study:
1) The significant role of environmental and market factors in CADCAM integration as 
a seemingly in-company change process is addressed only in three of the above studies 
(Adler’s, 1989; Lee’s, 1989; 1991; and - to a certain extent - Dean and Snell’s, 1991). 
The present research will take such factors into account with a view to understanding 
how they influence integration in the chosen companies.
2) A number of crucial groups of factors affecting CADCAM integration are identified 
in the literature (e.g. sociopolitical context, managerial strategies, [Lee, 1989] national 
culture and professional status [Lee, 1991], size, performance and external control 
[Dean and Snell, 1991], structural, human and technical barriers [Beatty and Gordon, 
1988]). By adopting an exploratory approach, this research will seek to establish how 
these and other factors interact and influence CADCAM by accounting for them in a 
single conceptual model.
3) Apart from Beatty and Gordon’s (1991), very few studies are concerned with the 
role of change agents in the process of change towards CADCAM. The present study 
will investigate the leadership role of change agents by assessing the effect of 
departmentalised functional structures (i.e. engineering vs. manufacturing) on key 
individual change leaders’ attitudes, assumptions, views and actions regarding 
integration.
4) With the exception of Adler’s (1989) study, no explicit attempt is made to explore a 
plausible link between integration and learning. This research aims to establish to what 
extent integration, as an organisational change process can offer organisations, and, 
among others, key individual change agents in them, opportunities to learn from past 
experiences of success and failure in implementing an integrating technology.
5) The notion of CADCAM integration as an advanced stage of a longitudinal process 
of technological (and also organisational) change is not addressed sufficiently in much 
of the literature. The idea that integrated CADCAM can be conceptualised in terms of a 
process of change whose historic roots in any integrating company go back to the times 
when its basic constituent sub-system components (e.g. CAD, CAE, CAM) were 
initially introduced is almost missing. This study aims to address this point. For 
example, it will concentrate on how a specific company’s approach to integration is 
contingent upon its past experiences relating to why and how sub-systems were
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introduced in the first place, how these were used or customised, how they were 
maintained and developed, what their technical and financial rewards were, and what 
types of effect they had on work and organisation in general (e.g. employment and 
training implications, user and manager job design, industrial relations, and 
organisation of work within and across functional boundaries).
6) Current knowledge addresses issues relating to CADCAM integration in as far as its 
application in integrating fimis is concerned. This research aims to address the question 
of why integration seems to be inapplicable to non-integrating firms.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theoretical and Methodological Concerns
3 .1  Introduction
The design of any study begins with the selection of a topic and a research 
methodology. Chapter 1 introduced the topic of this research. Having identified an 
interesting phenomenon to investigate, a researcher's next major task is to observe, 
discover, or in some way stumble across empirical examples of it with a view to 
exploring, describing, explaining, and interpreting the topic through a suitable 
methodology (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). For every research project a focus 
emerges gradually and guides the process of study design towards fulfilling the 
purposes intended by the researcher; this is what is termed methodology (Creswell, 
1994).
Although it is generally accepted that theoretically oriented research deals with either 
theory building, theory testing or a combination of both (Brewer and Hunter, 1989), 
the place of theory in research can still be controversial. Theory is used at one extreme 
to imply a faithful commitment to an established school of thought, such as Marxism, 
or, at the other extreme, it is assumed to serve a strictly descriptive, exploratory 
purpose pertaining to a specific social problem (Silverman, 1985). This study seeks to 
avoid both extremes and to devise a middle approach guided by:
1) The tentative research questions presented in Chapter 1.
2) The basic theoretical insights that resulted from an extensive review of the literature 
(summarised in Chapter 2, section 2.11) and informed the development of the research 
instruments for field work.
3) The use of a research methodology that allows a considerable scope for flexibility, 
reflexivity, and incrementality in order to assist the researcher in exploring human 
interaction and political processes associated with technological change.
4) The theoretical issues that emerged from the data itself during the process of data 
collection and analysis.
As will become clearer from this chapter onwards, the theoretical and methodological 
approaches adopted in this study are in some ways unconventional. It can be said that 
his chapter discusses what Pettigrew (1990) terms the "theory of methodology". A 
detailed explanation of the field work methods utilised in the present study will be given 
in the following chapter. Having outlined, in broad terms, the study’s overall approach, 
this chapter begins by defining certain key terms that are going to be used frequently
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throughout the thesis. An important part of this chapter then follows; it discusses the 
relationship between theory and methodology in a way that is appropriate to the nature 
of this research. The discussion will serve as a basis for formulating a research strategy 
accordingly. The ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of the 
study will be explained and a choice of a qualitative paradigm justified. The chapter 
goes on to discuss grounded theory, case study approaches and their relevance to the 
present study. Finally, it concludes by showing the measures devised in defence for the 
reliability, validity and credibility of the methodological and theoretical choices made in 
the study.
3 .2  Clarification of terms
Addressing methodological issues means, essentially, clarifying, explaining, and 
justifying ways of studying topics of interest to a researcher. In so doing, several terms 
are likely to be used to refer to specific meanings. Although achieving terminological 
precision in the area of methodology is rather challenging, yet it is important to try to 
clarify the researcher's position vis-a-vis key methodological terms that are widely used 
to imply different things in the methodology literature. This is particularly important as 
they may have different meanings depending on how they are used.
The following four points will help clarify the terms that will come up frequently during 
the course of this chapter in terms of how they are going to be used and their intended 
meanings in the context of this thesis:
1) To begin with, some basic terms will be used interchangeably. These include 
"research design", "research approach", "research strategy" and "research 
methodology". The temi "research methods" is not considered synonymous with these, 
as will be shown below.
2) The terms "case study" and "qualitative research" are often used interchangeably in 
the methodology literature. This, however, should not be so since a case study need not 
always be qualitative; it could also be quantitative (Bryman, 1989). Nevertheless, this 
distinction should not be problematic for this study since it utilises a case study 
approach in a qualitative research design context, as will become clearer in this chapter.
3) A "research design" is regarded as the overall structure and orientation of a given 
academic inquiry. It is, therefore, to be distinguished from "research methods" which 
refer to mechanisms or instruments for data collection and analysis within a design 
framework. Hence, the distinction between a "method" and "methodology" is 
important.
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4) “Methodology” is considered to be a more encompassing concept that subsumes one 
or more “methods” within it. It follows from the previous point that, within the 
methodology adopted for this research, various methods for gathering and analysing 
data were utilised to guide data collection in line with the project objectives.
5) Central to the adopted methodological stance are: (a) the use of integrated methods 
and (b) the deployment of less formal and conventional methods than those of survey 
research in order to help the researcher achieve a faster and stronger rapport with 
participants in the field (see, for example, Whyte, 1984; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Hence, the project uses a general qualitative, composite-method research methodology 
(see Brewer and Hunter, 1989). As used in this study, the combination of multiple 
methods, empirical materials, and perspectives in a multi-method research implies the 
use of various techniques within a qualitative paradigm.
3 .3  Theory - Methodology: What Kind of a Relationship?
The link between theory and methodology has always been an important issue in social 
sciences. As Greer (1969:160) puts it:
“The link between observation and formulation is one of the most difficult and crucial of the 
scientific enterprises. It is the process of interpreting out theory or, as some say, of 
‘operationalising our concepts’. Our creations in the world of possibility must be fitted in the 
world of probability; in Kant's epigram, ‘Concepts without percepts are empty’. It is also the 
process of relating our observations to theory; to finish the epigram, ‘Percepts without 
concepts are blind’."
It could be said that theory, in general, has two basic functions in research: (1) solving 
research problems by accounting for unexplained phenomena and superseding 
imperfect existing theories and (2) guiding researchers in shaping research problems for 
further investigation (Brewer and Hunter, 1989). Therefore, emerging new theories can 
be regarded as ".... nets to catch what we call 'the world': to rationalise, to explain and 
to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer" (Popper, 1959: 59). 
Yet, of course, there is far more than a single stitch for making tighter nets; similarly, 
there is far more than one best way of conducting research. Research strategies should 
be designed on a contingency basis: by making the methods adequate and appropriate to 
the types of data best available, in the context of a range of other contingencies. 
Amongst these will be factors such as: the time and resources available to conduct the 
reseai'ch; the structure of any possible population from which one might sample; the 
relative degree of ease and difficulty in gaining research access; the nature and design of 
other programs of research which one knows about at the design stage of one's own 
work. Additional contingencies may suggest themselves in the context of particular 
projects.
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Competing theories of society, contesting philosophies of science, and varying 
assumptions about the very nature of sociology are among a number of different 
interfering factors that affect how the relationship between theory and methodology is 
perceived in the minds of those concerned about it. As will be discussed later on in this 
chapter, different ontological, epistemological and methodological positions taken by 
different analysts create differences in how this relationship is defined (see, for 
example, Burrell and Morgan, 1979). As Markus and Robey (1988: 595) put it, "social 
theories embody researchers' conceptions of causality". This is true for the degrees of 
difference in the claims for generalisability of theory, for example, which broadly 
quantitative and broadly qualitative paradigms assume.
Although this chapter is about methodology, it is essential that it also addresses theory. 
In a way, designating a relationship between theory and methodology is the starting 
point of this thesis. Theory concerning the organisational aspects of integrating 
technologies needs to be developed further in line with the fast and far-reaching 
technological changes being experienced in industry today. This is particularly 
important when viewed against the background of confused, and thus confusing, 
theory concerning the relationship between IT and organisational change in general (see 
Markus and Robey, 1988; Robey and Azevedo, 1995). As Steinfield and Fulk (1990) 
argue, the huge body of empirical data that has accumulated over the past two decades 
on the impacts of new technology - IT in particular - on organisation has not 
significantly increased knowledge in this area of research. This field of knowledge 
remains "data rich but theory poor", because it still lacks a "theoretical infrastructure - a 
tree to which individual findings can be grafted to generate the synthesis and integration 
needed to support knowledge claims" (Steinfield and Fulk, 1990: 13).
A theoretical infrastructure for organisation theory needs to be promoted and 
continuously developed to cope with changing organisational contexts and, thus, 
support theory development, rather than testing, in this area. The aim of this is to 
enable organisation theory to be better equipped to provide meaningful interpretations 
by virtue of theory development and integration. That is, the need for serious attempts 
in the late 1990s and beyond to contribute to the development of theoretical structures, 
the synthesis and integration of which will hopefully provide a basis for a sound 
theoretical infrastructure with integrative characteristics. These will hopefully provide 
researchers in this area with directions as to what patterns to look for in the data, point 
them towards such patterns, help them explain them, assist them to interpret and 
resolve inconsistencies across studies, support them in accounting for anomalous 
findings, and provide them with guidance as to when to direct and how to incorporate 
future studies (see Steinfield and Fulk, 1990).
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In general, the future of the theory-methodology debate is as significant for the 1990s 
and beyond as it has always been, if not more so (see Markus and Robey, 1988; Robey 
and Azevedo, 1995). The emergence of new theoretical currents in sociological theory, 
such as "post-structuralism", "post-positivism" and "post-modernism" (see, for 
example, Clegg, 1990; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Gergen, 1992; Guba and Lincoln, 
1994; Quantz, 1992), promises to reactivate old debates and add new dimensions. Just 
as the radical humanist school did before, some newer theories seek to give explanatory 
weight to human intention and the political and power interaction processes that people 
initiate in social settings, which the radical structuralist school tended to deny (see 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Introducing such dimensions into the theory-methodology 
debate may appear to challenge the very foundations of well established research 
traditions. It is, nonetheless, necessary for the development of theory that it recognises 
people's positive interaction with, rather than mere submission to, social structures. 
Human action within an established structure, its interaction within it, and interaction 
among different actors may cause established structures to change. A stress on the role 
of human agency necessarily entails stressing the symbolic and constructionist role of 
culture - even when discussing seemingly "material" aspects of the social world such as 
technology.
The role of culture in analysing modern technology's consequences for organisations, 
by investigating the former's "instrumental and symbolic roles", has emerged as yet 
another significant axis for research enterprises tending to move towards less 
deterministic explanations (e.g. Robey and Azevedo, 1995: 25). According to Meek 
(1988), the concept of culture was imported from the field of anthropology, where it 
forms part of a well established research tradition, to be used alongside or in place of 
the more conventional concepts used in the study of organisations (e.g. structure, 
leadership behaviour and group norms) whenever these seemed inadequate for 
explaining the qualitative differences that even casual observations revealed across 
organisations (Schein, 1990).
It can be said that rapid technological change in increasingly uncertain environments is 
likely to be a stimulating factor in encouraging theorisation about organisational change 
in the future (Scott-Morton, 1995). Another factor is, as supported by the growing 
acceptance among social scientists of, a shift in the dominant techno-economic, 
"Fordist" paradigm towards an emerging "post-Fordist" (or "neo-Fordist" from a neo- 
Marxian perspective [Clegg, 1990: 211]) paradigm, despite the vagueness surrounding 
its definition. The main features of the emerging paradigm include a greater emphasis 
on: non-price factors, flexibility in technology, flexibility in organisational structure,
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and the changing relationships within and among organisations in the context of 
changing national and global political economies (Bessant, 1991).
It is important for a researcher in an exploratory or explanatory research, particularly in 
an emergent area of interest, not to impose a particular theoretical scheme on reality, 
because this would reduce the chances for achieving intended objectives of exploration 
or interpretation of the investigated reality.
The endeavour to devise a link between theory and methodology, which serves the 
purpose of this study, is supported by three factors concerning: first, the impact of a 
quantitative or qualitative research design on a theory process; second, the dual 
theoretical and methodological role of a tentative conceptual framework in research 
design; and third, the question of whether theory should be tested or generated in a 
research. Each of these aspects will be discussed in what follows.
First, the perceived nature of the theory-methodology link can vary greatly depending 
on whether a quantitative or a qualitative research research design is chosen. In a 
quantitative study a "theory base", "theoretical rationale", or "theoretical perspective" is 
often placed toward the beginning of the plan of study. The objective is to verify a 
logically-deduced theory in the form of hypotheses or propositions. In a qualitative 
study, on the other hand, a "pattern", "generalisation", or "holistic picture" are 
alternative terms used to describe theory depending on the chosen research design. 
Inductive reasoning in qualitative design allows a researcher to collect, code, and 
analyse data while capturing the emergence of theory. Therefore, theory here is often 
placed towards the end of the research process (Creswell, 1994). Most qualitative 
researchers avoid generalising, to any considerable extent, the theoretical implications 
that they see resulting from their work (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This contrasts 
fundamentally with the quantitative-positivist view of theory (or “theoretical law”), 
particularly what may be regarded by some as "scientific" theory consisting of “sets of 
highly general universal statements, whose truth or falsity can be assessed by means of 
systematic obseivation and experiment” (Keat and Uriy, 1982: 13-14).
Second, a methodological assumption informed by Miles and Huberman's (1984) 
proposition is considered, namely that the evolving nature of a theory requires a 
"tentative conceptual framework" to begin with for data collection, coding, and analysis 
before theory generation can reach its maturity. The purpose of such a framework is to 
show:
simply the current version of the researcher's map of the territory being investigated.
Without such a map the research is slipshod   As the explorer's knowledge of the terrain
improves the map becomes correspondingly more differentiated and integrated.” (Miles and 
Hubcrman, 1984: 33).
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The tentative conceptual framework used in this study, which will be used to organise 
the analysis of the data emergent from the field, will be explained in Chapter 7.
Third, a radical endeavour by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in addressing the gap between 
theory and research in the social sciences. They challenged the overwhelming emphasis 
revolving around the verification of theory as the "chief mandate for excellent research" 
(p. 2) and argued for "grounding theory in social research itself - for generating it from 
the data" (p. viii). Glaser and Strauss's (1967) methodological approach is appropriate 
for this study because it offers two propositions that are directly relevant to serving its 
purpose. These are: (1) theory at different levels of generality is vital for deeper 
knowledge of social phenomena, and (2) researchers should be fully aware of 
themselves as instruments for developing theory closely with the sets of data they 
gather and analyse.
In short, this section concludes by proposing that a contribution to the development of a 
more solid theoretical infrastructure on the phenomenon of technology-induced 
organisational change is far more relevant to the central objective of this research than a 
verification of a set of theoretical hypotheses.
3 .4  Choice of Methodology: Influential Factors
Choice of methodology for the present study is based on the link identified above 
between theory and methodology. The research strategy should be guided by its central 
objective. In this regard, about half a century ago Homans (1949: 330) speculated 
about the importance of strategy for industrial sociology in general. He wrote:
“People who write about methodology often forget that it is a matter of strategy, not of 
morals. There are neither good nor bad methods but only methods that are more or less 
effective under particular circumstances in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal.”
One does not have to accept Homans's suggestion in its entirety in order to agree with 
him on a single aspect of his reasoning, namely that the choice of methodology for any 
research is influenced, necessarily, by a number of factors (e.g. Creswell, 1994; Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Marshall and Rossman, 1989; Nelson et al., 1992: Whyte, 1984; 
Yin, 1987). The nature and purpose of the research problem, the state of development 
of the relevant body of knowledge and budget and time constraints are particularly 
important in methodological choices (e.g. Marshall and Rossman, 1989; Pettigrew, 
1990). Also, the suitability of a given strategy should be determined by the extent of 
control a researcher has over behavioural events, and the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin, 1987). It is also influenced by the 
audience before whom a study is conducted (Creswell, 1994).
66
The philosophical, ontological and epistemological assumptions that ground a study 
should be recognised and made clear. These influence the researcher as part of the 
research process, particularly in a social sciences or humanities context, and the 
individual attributes that the researcher carries can have serious implications for the 
entire process. In this connection, a distinction can be made between "researcher- 
related" and "reseai'ch-related" sets of factors (Creswell, 1994) where the former 
include one's: (1) world view, (2) training and experience, and (3) psychological 
attributes. Therefore, the primacy of emphasis in a specific research situation depends 
on the ch'cumstances of the research, the interests and training of the researcher, and the 
materials required for one to build one's theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
One of the very basic decisions a researcher has to make in formulating a research 
strategy is whether to follow a quantitative or qualitative mode of investigation. This 
helps a researcher crystallise the direction of his/her study in the light of such influential 
factors. This issue will be discussed in the following section.
3 .5  Justifying a Qualitative Research Strategy
The present research requires a methodology that helps the researcher focus on 
CADCAM integration as a process of change, the context in which it unfolds and its 
outcomes. To achieve this, the methodology chosen should enable the researcher to:
1) Begin the investigation with as much of an open agenda as possible. The reason for 
this is simple: it is in order to be flexible enough to design the research in the light of 
the issues of concern to those who play a key role in real integration processes and, 
thus, be informant-biased, rather than researcher-biased, in setting out a framework for 
the study.
2) Embed the investigation in day-to-day reality wherein behaviour patterns manifest 
themselves, more so than in formal interviews.
3) Extract as much data about the organisations under investigation as possible and for 
as long as possible with a view to establishing a comprehensive picture of integration 
experiences.
4) Study organisations in their entirety as much as possible in terms of their formal and 
informal structures, social relations, cultures, power politics as well as their 
information systems, work patterns, engineering and manufacturing production cycles.
Creation of theory is needed to support our understanding of CADCAM-induced 
integration as an organisational process worthy of analysis due to the practical and 
theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 1 (section 1.7) and Chapter 2 (section 
2.2). Since the aim of this study is to develop a thorough understanding of a process as 
it unfolds over a considerable period of time, it thus requires what Glaser and Strauss
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(1967: 9) describe as a "work-in-process" approach or "discovering theory as a 
process", and explanation in terms of "theory as an ever-developing entity, not as a 
perfected product" (p. 32). Therefore, a qualitative research approach is justified on the 
grounds that it will better meet the overall objective of this research than a quantitative 
onek
This choice is justifiable on the grounds that this study’s purpose is to understand how 
specific companies and key figures in them account for their attitudes towards, and 
actions on, CADCAM integration and its wider organisational implications - rather than 
to measure the degree to which integration exists as a phenomenon across a wide 
domain of industrial firms or sectors. Qualitative research on organisational 
functioning, change, and interactional relationships (between groups and individuals) 
is, essentially, about producing findings that are difficult to achieve statistically through 
a quantitative research design^. Therefore, an underlying interpretative or constructivist 
mode of thinking is more appropriate; in order to understand the world of meaning one 
must interpret it (Schwandt, 1994)^.
^Creswell (1994: 7) summarises the essential difference between a quantitative methodology and a 
qualitative one as follows:
“One approaches a quantitative m ethodology by using a deductive form o f  logic wherein theories 
and hypotheses are tested in a cause-and-effect order. Concepts, variables, and hypotheses are 
clioscn before the study begins and remain fixed throughout the study (in a static design). One does 
not venture beyond these predetermined hypotheses (the research is context free). The intent o f the 
study is to develop generalisations that contribute to the theory and that enables one to better
predict, explain and understand som e phenom enon Alternatively, in a qualitative m ethodology
inductive logic prevails. Categories emerge from informants, rather than are identified a p rio ri  by 
the researcher. This em ergence provides rich ‘context-bound’ information leading to patterns or 
tlreorics that help explain a phenomenon.”
^Advocates of qualitative research stress its ability to provide researchers with advantages unachievable 
quantitatively. That is, it is best in terms of revealing the crucial elements of sociological theory via 
data on structural conditions, consequences, norms, processes, pattern deviances, and systems (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967), because it concentrates on "situational and structural contexts" (Strauss, 1987: 2). 
This could not be achieved easily with quantitative strategies since they implicitly predefine and 
preconstitute social reality, and thus tend to be "weak on context" (Strauss, 1987: 2).
A published version of a "scientific" research would reflect a reconstructed logic, necessarily with 
relevant methodological and conceptual problems, subject to human limitations (Silverman, 1985).
Organisations are more abstract in nature and more difficult to comprehend with certainty 
(Winfield, 1991). Studying them, therefore, can be problematic because they are not naturally a 
tangible object that could be examined "scientifically" under laboratory-controlled conditions, although 
it is possible to create an approximation to these conditions. But much of what is "natural" to them 
can be lost in making them suitable objects for scientifically conceived work, reproducing their rich 
symbolic life to numeric scores. Sometimes it may be more appropriate to develop these research 
strategies, where a field is very precise in its focus and mature in its definition of the subject matter. 
Other times, where the field is emergent because the phenomenon under study is still emergent, a more 
qualitative and grounded approach will be appropriate - as was for this research.
^Recent attempts by researchers such as Robey and Azevedo (1995) to introduce culture as a centre line 
for analysing technology-induced organisational change are justifiable; "knowledge of technology's 
social meaning may help to explain its social consequences" through "social interpretations of cultural 
artefacts, such as information technology" (Robey and Azevedo, 1995: 25). The distinguishing feature 
of cultural analyses, which are arguably more naturally and effectively linked with the qualitative 
paradigm, is that they are reluctant to attribute organisational changes to any single cause since =
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The justification of a qualitative strategy is based on an informed understanding of the 
essential differences between the two approaches and the historical contexts in which 
each of them have thrived. To summarise, this study fits into a qualitative 
methodology, because of four reasons:
1) Organisational integration induced by an integrating technology is such a complex 
and multi-faceted issue. As used in the context of this study, it involves integration at 
the levels of machinery hardware interfacing, inter-software communication, work 
procedures, and organisational structure and culture. It is thus prone to confusion due 
to the wide variety of overlapping considerations involved. A qualitative approach is 
much more likely than a quantitative one to come into direct contact with the social 
world and thus embed its findings in it through intimate familiarity with field conditions 
and the social processes it witnesses directly. It is essential that the theory generated in 
this research springs from the field of investigation. This is in order to reflect, 
realistically, the circumstances as found in the field since the overall aim of the study is 
one of building a better understanding of change as a process unfolding in the field of 
investigation. Hence, qualitative data are required for exploring, describing and 
analysing CADCAM integration as a specific area of organisational change.
2) Integration is an evolving phenomenon in terms of its emergence in present-day 
manufacturing industry. It is also relatively new in terms of how it is reported and 
analysed as an organisational issue in the literature. Its beginnings were as late as the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Its relative novelty, therefore, has contributed further to the 
lack of theoretical vision and relevant variables being identified that can help us 
understand and explain this phenomenon, particularly in terms of the far-reaching 
organisational implications involved. Therefore, a qualitative approach is preferred 
because the concept is relatively immature due to a conspicuous lack of theory.
3) The lack of empirically-informed academic literature on the subject in relative terms, 
particularly on the theory of integration from an organisational perspective. Stand alone
= changes are assumed to emerge slowly out of a web of interdependent elements (Kling, 1987). In this 
respect, it could be argued that the crux of the qualitative approach is a commitment to "naturalistic" 
and "interpretative" or "constructivist" (Schwandt, 1994) modes of analysis as well as an organised 
critique of the principles of positivism (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). These 
principles can be identified in terms of: (1) "phenominalism" - i.e. the notion that there is no real 
difference between "essence" and "phenomenon" and (2) "nominalism" - i.e. the rejection of value 
judgement under an assumption of the unity of scientific method (see Kolakowski, 1993):
“Positivism  stands for a certain philosophical attitude to human knowledge it is a collection of
rules and evaluative criteria referring to human knowledge: it tells us what kind o f  contents in our 
statements about the world deserves the name o f  knowledge and supplies us with norms that make it 
possible to distinguish between that which may not reasonably be asked. Thus positivism  is a 
normative attitude, regulating how we are to use such terms as ‘know ledge’, ‘science’, ‘cognition’, 
and ‘information’." (Kolakowski, 1993: 2)
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computer applications in industry (e.g. CAD) gained considerable academic attention 
throughout the 1980s, particularly from researchers in the engineering, operations 
management, industrial relations, and sociology fields of interest. Integration of such 
applications, however, has not gained a fraction of that attention yet. Rich qualitative 
data are, therefore, needed because the relevant variables are largely unknown with any 
considerable degi'ee of certainty.
4) Most of the information available on the practical applications of CADCAM 
integration in industry in the Anglo-American literature is largely based on reports 
published in manufacturing periodicals or articles written by consultants or practising 
managers. A considerable descriptive literature exists, often with conflicting definitions 
and measures of IT (Bakopoulos, 1985), blurring of distinctions between levels of 
analysis (Ang and Pavri, 1994), and contradicting conclusions. Little theoretical back­
up also contributed to the lack of a solid theoretical base for the notion of technology- 
induced integration. A qualitative approach is, therefore, justifiable in the case of this 
study because the little relevant theory that is available is liable to be inaccurate or 
methodologically biased.
Furthermore, the relevance of a qualitative mode of analysis is much greater for the 
present research. This is because it:
1) could not be done experimentally;
2) seeks to capture individuals’ points of view, of both those who take part in change 
and those affected by it;
3) aims to look for informal and unstructured linkages and processes in organisations;
4) strives to understand real, as opposed to stated, organisational goals and realities and 
explain why organisations behave the way they do; and
5) avoids the use of positivism and perceived certainties, which would have been 
implied by statistical techniques, in interpreting various meanings of reality as they are 
found.
Qualitative data are more suited because they are a source of well-grounded 
explanations of processes occurring in their local contexts and, thus they will hopefully 
help preserve chronological flows, evaluate local causality, develop new explanations 
in order to deduct qualitatively-informed theoretical integrations (see Miles and 
Hubemian, 1984). Qualitative strategies are by far more capable of exhibiting action 
and reaction in sociological studies and, thus could be considered better for showing 
the dynamic nature of any substantive organisational change that becomes the subject 
matter for an investigation.
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The challenge of devising a cleaiiy defined methodological vision based on the above 
criteria is such that it involves defining minute details of the organisations to be studied, 
making decisions on what constitutes their environments, and making decisions on 
priorities which are by no means universally accepted. As Scott (1995: 55) puts it,
“given the complexity of social phenomena, any particular set of distinctions will be 
somewhat arbitrary".
In short, in the light of the above considerations, it is obvious that the present study |
warrants a qualitative mode of investigation, one that must be flexible enough to help it j
meet its identified purpose. A positivist-quantitative paradigm would have been |
inadequate for explaining the phenomena under investigation. However, the question of I
what constitutes knowledge outside a conventional positivist framework becomes |
perhaps more important when a constuctivist-qualitative strategy is adopted. The |
following section addresses this point in the context of this study. i
3 .6  Defining Sociological Knowledge for the Purpose of the
Research Methodology?
Since research is, essentially, a knowledge-bearing exercise, a researcher should clearly 
define what knowledge is before deciding on the type of methodology to be used to that 
end. The researcher's "ontological" and "epistemological" positions play a decisive role 
in his/her choice of methodology because he/she expresses their definition of 
knowledge therein (Guba and Lincoln, 1994); "axiological" positions are also 
significant as a prerequisite for deciding what methodology to choose (Creswell, 
1994). Such assumptions aie subject to the type of research approach adopted in any 
given study. It is crucial to clarify a researcher's assumptions that, in their totality, give 
a specific, context-dependent meaning to sociological knowledge. Therefore, the 
researcher's knowledge-defining assumptions in this study will be discussed in the 
following three subsections before the methodology chosen is addressed in detail.
3.6.1 Ontological Assumptions
An ontological position is an expression of the question: "what is the form and nature 
of reality, and therefore what is there that can be known about it?" (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994; 108). Two contrasting perspectives are identified in this connection: the 
objectivist and the subjectivist approaches. The objectivist approach assumes "realism" 
whereas the subjectivist assumes "nominalism"(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Kolakowski, 1993).
Framing the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research in terms of two 
ontological approaches is an important indicator of the competing claims concerning
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what constitutes warrantable knowledge. In a quantitative research reality is viewed as 
"objective", "out there" independent of the researcher who can measure it using a 
research instrument (Creswell, 1994). The qualitative paradigm, on the other hand, 
recognises the existence of more than a single reality: that constructed by the researcher, 
that constructed by those being investigated and the readers’ own reality. This is based 
on the assumption that participants' perceptions and experiences play an influential role 
in shaping the way they make sense of their lives (Merriam, 1988). The researcher, 
therefore, has to admit such realities and use his/her interpretative or constructivist 
capacity in this context. In doing so, the researcher should attempt to understand not a 
single but multiple realities (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
This study is based on qualitative ontological assumptions; the researcher believes the 
existence of various realities. The researcher's admission of this assumption will be 
reflected in presenting some of the case findings (see Chapter 5) as "observed facts", 
starting with an objectivist presentation of the actors' reality and then moving towards 
the main part of data analysis assuming a constructivist interpretative researcher role 
(see Chapters 6 and 7).
3 .6 . 2  Epistemological Assumptions
An epistemological position is a response to the question: "what is the nature of the 
relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?" (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994: 108) or " how one might begin to understand the world and 
communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings" (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979:1). In addressing this question, objectivist social scientists would assume 
positivist criteria whereas the subjectivists would adopt anti- or non- positivist criteria. 
In a quantitative study the researcher usually attempts to maintain distance and 
independence from what is being researched through surveys or experiments. On the 
other hand, in a qualitative study the researcher interacts with those being studied over a 
period of time by means of participation, observation, or collaboration (Creswell, 
1994). According to Hamilton (1994), the qualitative paradigm's historic 
epistemological roots in the collection of data on the human condition could help us 
understand such interaction between the researcher and the researched, which is 
characteristic of qualitative studies.
Actors' viewpoints must be grasped, analysed and comprehended in the present 
research which aims to understand interaction, process and social change as these relate 
to the implementation and integration of CAD/CAM. Therefore, qualitative 
epistemological assumptions are adopted for this study.
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3.6.3 Axiological Assumptions
The axiological question involves "the role of values" (Creswell, 1994: 5). The 
quantitative paradigm aspires to produce value-free research. The qualitative paradigm, 
on the other hand, recognises a researcher's own value-biased judgements as long as 
they are acknowledged.
The position of the present study is one that is more inclined to qualitative axiological 
assumptions. However, the present research design should be such that it allows the 
researcher to develop reasoning gradually from a starting point of attempted "absolute" 
objectivity to the more subjective, reflexive, and value-laden stage of data analysis. As 
could be deduced from the researcher's ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
value judgements are recognised and should be acknowledged in this study.
3.6.4 Methodological Assumptions
Ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions have important consequences 
for the methodological nature of a given research enterprise, because of their 
implications for addressing the question of methodology, namely "how can the inquirer 
(would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known?" 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994; 108).
Whatever world view a researcher takes, he/she should attain a sufficient degree of 
consistency that justifies and gives credibility to the particular quantitative or qualitative 
paradigm he/she chooses. A researcher's ontological assumptions help him/her decide 
on certain criteria forjudging consistency. Similarly, analysis and interpretation should 
be guided by criteria derived from his/her epistemological position. Therefore, the 
question of meaning attribution should be presented in such a relative context that 
admits the conditionality of his/her work. Also, the selection of data collection and 
analysis methods for any reseaich is dependent on whether the methodology adopted is 
quantitative, qualitative or both^.
In short, as explained above (in section 3.5), a qualitative methodology is chosen for 
the present research for the reasons which have been given. Details of the present study 
design in the light of the adopted qualitative methodology will be explained in the 
following section.
Whilst this chapter's main purpose is to address methodological issues in a broad sense, the 
following chapter will discuss the finite details of the methods chosen for data collection and analysis 
procedures in ill is study.
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3 .7  Research Design
The present research design is in some ways unconventional in terms of its theoretical 
and methodological approaches. As shown in Exhibit 3.1, the main components of the 
present research's design are threefold:
1) It draws largely on the methodological underpinnings of the GT approach (see 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
2) It utilises a multiple-case study approach as a means of initial data presentation and 
analysis.
3) It stresses time as an important factor in the research process and adopts a 
longitudinal, time-series type of study.
Before discussing each of the above components in more detail, three important 
methodological clarifications are necessary for defining the relationships among them. 
First, GT was not used in a restrictive sense (i.e. excluding other useful qualitative 
procedures of data collection, indexing and analysis) because of an underlying 
assumption that qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus (Brewer and 
Hunter, 1989). This assumption is consistent with Strauss and Corbin's (1994) 
contention that all the sources of data normally utilised in other qualitative 
methodologies could be utilised in a GT research. Flexibility in approach is crucial for 
providing the study with the distinctive benefits of GT, case studying and 
longitudinality. As Layder (1992) points out, GT must be viewed flexibly as a 
methodology open to the influence of other approaches, particularly to the advantages 
that could be gained from combining important features of both "humanism" and 
"scientific realism" in social analysis. Therefore, in designing this research a multiple- 
case study approach was incorporated within a GT context without neglecting the 
wealth of other useful qualitative approaches.
Second, a comparison between GT and case study approaches would reveal at least 
three basic differences which can potentially cause a conflict when both approaches are 
used simultaneously. These were observed carefully during the course of data gathering 
and analysis:
1) Data collection in GT would be as unstructured as possible whereas in a case study 
approach it would better be reported in a detailed protocol so that the procedure of a 
qualitative case study could be replicated in other settings (see Yin, 1989).
2) Data analysis procedures in GT would involve the use of specific coding techniques 
without a predefined commitment to a specific theory. In a case study research, 
however, data analysis would be likely to involve searching for emerging "patterns" 
and comparing them with others predicted from theory using causal links to establish 
plausible or rival explanations (see Yin, 1989). The mode of causal analysis in a
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naturalistic GT research would assume that the researcher would observe directly the 
causal process which would produce the phenomenon under investigation in particular 
instances (Brewer and Hunter, 1989). As Glaser and Strauss (1967: 40) put it, ".... 
general relations are often discovered in vivo; that is, the field worker literally sees them 
occur".
3) The narrative in GT would proceed from "open coding" and use more advanced 
coding techniques to develop a story that would relate the open and "axial" coding to 
one category through "selective coding" or, alternatively, to draw a visual exhibit to 
explain propositions or hypotheses (see Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In a conventional 
case study approach, however, only a single case (for a single unit of analysis), multi­
case, or illustrative structures such as linear-analytic, comparative, or chronological 
structures would be considered sufficient (see Yin, 1989).
In this thesis, the case study component of the overall research design was not used as 
an independent qualitative methodology in its own right as, arguably, could be done in 
a qualitative study, but rather as a method subsumed in a GT framework. Whenever a 
conflict seemed to appear, GT’s canons were given priority over those of case study.
Third, it is essential to stress an important assumption underlying the present research 
design, namely that the individual's own personality and background should not be 
ignored when one is acting the role of a researcher. Research would constitute "an 
interactive process shaped by his or her personal history, biography, gender, social 
class, race, and ethnicity, and those of the people in the setting" (Denzin and 
Lincoln:3). This, in turn, is consistent with the ontological, epistemological and 
axiological assumptions underlying the present study (explained above in sub-sections
3.6.1 - 3.6.4). The question of the researcher’s background’s implications for the 
research design will be addressed further later on in this chapter (see sub-sections
3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2 as well as section 3.9 for the implications of the researcher’s 
assumptions for the study’s validity, reliability, and credibility measures).
The following three subsections will deal with each of the constituent components 
individually.
75
mm.
• So
s.I
si•a  CD00 o c —5±"
v> 3
l i
■ <u “
ill-a co «3
76
3 . 7 . 1  Grounded Theory
This subsection will deal with GT. It begins by presenting a brief account of its origins, 
historical development, and critique. It then discusses theoretical sampling and 
sensitivity as two of its main characteristics. It also introduces the notion of the constant 
analysis method in a GT context. Finally, it explains the levels of theory as applicable 
to the construction of theory in a GT context.
3 . 7 .1 . 1  Background, Developments and Critique: A Summary
GT was developed by two American sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss 
in the early 1960s during an observational field study of hospital staffs handling of 
dying patients (Glaser and Strauss, 1965; 1965a). The GT approach called for 
strengthening the mandate for gathering theory, defending against doctrinaire 
approaches to verification. The two pioneers of GT were adamant that GT would be 
more successful than theory logically deducted from apriori assumptions, because they 
viewed the latter as a framework for static and artificial variables inappropriate for 
sociological sciences. They also questioned the validity of such theory on the grounds 
that it would not fit the real world.
GT has been used in studies of diverse phenomena because of its high adaptability 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1994). It could be argued that its theoretical base has been 
strengthened and refined because of what has been published exclusively on the 
methodology and its procedures (see, for example, Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 
1990; 1994). Its application has varied with the specifities of the particular area being 
studied, the aims and focus of a given research, the contingencies encountered during 
the study, and the gifts and temperament or weaknesses of the researcher concerned 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1994).
In this respect it is relevant to note Strauss's divergence, in his recent writings, from 
the original line of thought he had taken with Glaser, namely that a researcher should 
approach the field without any pre-developed theoretical assumptions, that the actors 
should set the agenda for research, and that the researcher should merely present their, 
rather than his/her own, interpretation of reality. Strauss argues that broad questions 
should already be present in the researcher's mind on approaching the field, that the 
researcher should be the one who sets the agenda, although it should be flexible, and 
that the researcher should not give up his/her interpretative role or surrender it to the 
actors. Unlike Strauss in his co-authorship with Juliet Corbin (1990; 1994), Glaser 
(1992) has recently insisted that the crux of GT lies in allowing theory to emerge 
without any "forcing" whatsoever by virtue of prestructured orienting framework on 
the part of the researcher. This stance has taken him away from the position adopted by
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his former colleague and co-founder of the GT methodology^. For reasons which will 
be explained further on in this chapter, Strauss's perspective will form a more 
appropriate framework for the present study than Glaser's.
The researcher's coincidental inclination towards Strauss's line in this study is based on 
the following grounds:
1) The researcher happened to have a reasonably defined set of theoretical issues before 
embarking on this study, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (section 1.4).
2) The researcher had to design the invitation questionnaire, the first basic interview 
schedule for the exploratory first round of data collection, and the more detailed 
schedule as a way of instrumentalising the data collection and analysis process. There 
was no rigid research design to start with and the research process became gradually 
shaped by the emerging data.
3) The researcher had to choose a more structured style because of the time and 
resource constraints that surrounded this study.
According to its advocates, GT is more than a research strategy; it is "a way of thinking 
about and conceptualising data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 275). Generation of formal 
theory from substantive material by means of comparative analysis will ensure that the 
concepts and categories so produced will be appropriate and relevant since such 
analysis is grounded in empirical reality. This gives a theory developed through a 
grounded analysis a distinguished place among other types of theory, which, according 
to Glaser and Strauss, are generated from speculations and assumptions about what 
"should be" the case rather than what, really, "is" the case in factual terms.
Nevertheless, GT has been criticised on the basis that theoretical reflection cannot be 
put off until so late in the research process (Bulmer, 1979). That is, the researcher 
should not approach the field with a "blank mind" because research cannot keep its 
consistency without an existing theory. However, it can be argued that the essence of 
GT is not to "freeze up" theoretical reflection completely until after data collection, but 
rather to free the researcher from being "imprisoned" in a "theoretical cage" prededucted 
without any experience whatsoever of the field work or environment chosen for 
investigation. Theoretical reflection would remain flexible initially and then get 
formulated by the interactive process of joint data collection, coding, analysis and
should be stressed, nonetheless, that the two leading GT theorists' differences remain to be a matter 
of degree since they still agree that the core of GT is the generation of relevant theory from research, 
that the researcher should be inductive in generating theory from data, and that both the actors' and the 
reseitrcher's own interpretations are invaluable in any study. They are both of the opinion that an 
emerging theory should provide categories and hypotheses that could be utilised in future research.
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interpretation in a cyclic fashion, rather than sequentially as Bulmer's (1979) criticism 
would implicitly suggest.
GT has been also criticised as a methodology that advocates a form of "inductivist 
positivism" (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 152). Glaser and Strauss (1967: 3) would 
disagree; they stated clearly that " the researcher does not approach reality as a tabula 
rasa". Emergent theoretical accounts could be regarded as the product of a continuous 
interaction between data and conceptualisation or the research experience and the 
researcher's ideas. Therefore, no claim for positivism should follow an inductivist 
research which involves such an interaction in the light of qualitative, anti-positivist 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. This position would be supported by GT 
assumptions regarding the obscurity of the relationship between data and theory 
initially, the declared need for tolerance and innovativeness in exploring the less 
obvious aspects of this relationship, and the need for being sensitive to insights that 
would arise during the research process.
According to Layder (1992: 69-70), GT assumptions have a tendency towards 
undervaluing the importance of "macro structural" features and emphasising theories 
which are limited, rather than guided, by empirical data analyses. Therefore, field 
researchers are advised to search carefully for the influence of structural features on the 
apparent behaviour of the individuals being observed. It could be said that this 
criticism is worthwhile in the sense that GT could be used, or abused perhaps, in a 
short-sighted manner which focuses only on micro structures, isolated events and local 
interaction contexts without analysing these in their macro-structural environments. 
This is because GT grants a researcher such a degree of flexibility and a wide margin 
for manoeuvring in directing his/her research process, collecting data and interpreting 
it. Any theory resulting from a grounded analysis, however, should be assessed on its 
own merits. Gross generalisations can be misguiding. In this study sufficient account is 
taken of the influence of macro-structural characteristics on the behaviour of individuals 
and groups alike. Indeed, the conceptual model developed in the study (Chapter 7) 
acknowledges the role of such characteristics not only at functional department and 
whole company levels but also at industrial sector market, state and national culture 
levels.
3 . 7 . 1 . 2  Theoretical Sampling and Theoretical Sensitivity
Theoretical sampling is an important feature of GT. It has important implications for the 
present research. It is defined as:
“.... the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, 
codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 45).
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Theoretical sampling differs profoundly from statistical sampling. The former involves 
selecting units of investigation on the basis of how widely and diversely they could 
saturate the categories of the theory a researcher would wish to develop. The latter, on 
the other hand, involves the development of adequate samples using techniques of 
random or representative sampling in reference with the social structure of the groups 
sampled. The logic of comparative analysis concentrates on accurate evidence for the 
purposes of description and verification. In such cases, the mles of comparability may 
hinder the formulation of theory due to the possible non-comparability of groups on 
some occasions. Another difference is that in theoretical sampling the researcher must 
learn when to stop by reaching "theoretical saturation". By contrast, statistical sampling 
requires continuous data collection regardless of how much saturation has been 
achieved.
A theory that emerges from a GT type of research points the researcher to the next step 
in a developing research process. As Marshall and Rossman (1989: 112) put it, 
"qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements about relationships among 
categories of data; it builds grounded theory”. Essential and evolving questions before a 
researcher concern the selection of multiple comparison groups. Therefore, the central 
question is: "what groups or sub-groups does one turn to in data collection? And for 
what theoretical purpose?" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 47). The ongoing inclusion of 
groups must be determined principally by the researcher's basic goal guiding the 
resemch towards comparison groups on the basis of their theoretical relevance. How 
many groups could be considered sufficient? And to what extent should a researcher 
gather data on a single group? Answering such questions will be guided by the 
emerging research process. It depends on when the point of theoretical saturation is 
reached.
Fomiulating a theory from a set of data requires a great deal of theoretical sensitivity on 
the part of the reseai’cher, which he/she derives from the literature, his/her professional 
and personal experiences, and the increased interaction he/she will have with the data 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Any process of data collection, coding, analysis and 
further guided collection demands a certain degree of awareness about how to formulate 
theory by conceptualising data through categories and their constituent properties. 
Therefore, theoretical sensitivity is an essentially accumulative phenomenon; it is part of 
the research process in so far as it represents a learning opportunity for the researcher in 
terms of his/her field, topic and personal development (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Whyte, 1984). The argument is that theoretical sensitivity is 
best promoted by the amount of freedom it gives a researcher to approach and 
investigate his/her field without committing him/herself exclusively to one preconceived
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theory. In essence, it could be viewed as a call for liberating research from those forms 
of prior indoctrination that cause a researcher to become insensitive to "other" theory 
and defensive towards challenging questions and proposals or, in Glaser and Strauss's 
(1967: 46) words "preoccupied with testing, modifying and seeing everything from this 
one angle".
3 . 7 . 1 . 3  The Constant Comparative Analysis Method
When comparative analysis is used in a GT context it should not be restricted to 
comparisons between formal social units but it should be used in comparing smaller 
social units as well (e.g. individuals and their roles). The comparative method helps a 
researcher develop his/lier discussional and prepositional theory during the research 
process. In the present research it is used, for theory generation purposes, at various 
levels corresponding to different units of analysis, including companies, integration 
processes, integration project leaders.
The constant comparative analysis method is important for data analysis (Chapters 5, 6 
and 7). The procedure followed comprises four stages: (1) comparing incidents 
applicable to each category, (2) integrating categories and their properties, (3) refining 
the theory, and (4) writing the theory.
3.7.1.4 Orienting, Substantive and Formal Levels of Theory
In a GT research two types or levels of theory are recognised: "substantive" and 
"formal". These are derived from data at different levels of generalisation. A 
substantive theory is "developed for a substantive, or empirical, area of sociological 
inquiry" whereas a formal theory is "developed for a formal, or conceptual, area of 
sociological inquiry, such as ... formal organisations .... authority and power" (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967: 32). Generation of formal theory from substantive theory grounded 
in the data involves a progiessive transition from concrete to abstract thinking.
As Whyte (1984) points out, however, a researcher is likely to approach his/her study 
with some kind of theory, albeit in the form of a guiding frame of reference, a rough 
theoretical framework or a horizon of expectations. Before reaching substantive and 
formal levels of theory, a researcher should begin theorising at a more basic level. An 
"orienting theory" is thus proposed initially. It precedes more advanced theorisation and 
helps a researcher organise his/her data gathering and analysis effort^. Miles and 
Huberman (1984: 28) also argue the need for a "tentative conceptual framework" that
^Orienting theory would guide a researcher indexing in two areas: (1) actors and their relationships and 
(2) events and references to problems of importance to or mentioned by informants (Whyte, 1984; 
118).
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"explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main dimensions to be studied - 
the key factors, or variables - and the presumed relationships among them". As will be 
shown in Chapter 7, this research develops a conceptual framework for modelling 
CADCAM as a change process and, in this sense, makes use of an orienting theory 
based on the answers to the tentative research questions to be discussed in Chapter 6.
A generated theory consists of "conceptual categories" which, in turn, consist of 
"conceptual properties". During the course of a research "lower level categories" 
emerge rather early whereas "higher level, overriding and integrating 
conceptualisations" emerge later as joint data collection, coding and analysis reaches 
maturity. Theoretical proposals or hypotheses will develop as this process progresses. 
As Glaser and Strauss (1967: 40) comment:
“In the beginning, one's hypotheses may seem unrelated, but as categories and properties 
emerge, develop in absuaction, and become related, their accumulating interrelations form an 
integrated central theoretical framework - the core of the emerging theory. The core becomes a 
theoretical guide to the further collection and analysis of data.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:40).
Joint data collection, coding and analysis is the core activity in GT. During the research 
process "integration" of the emergent theory, gradually, becomes more important than 
the emerging categories and properties themselves. This is crucial for developing a 
consistently cohesive theoretical framework capable of encompassing the fullest 
diversity of conceptual elements indicated by data. Integration of theory is important for 
correcting inaccuracies of hypothetical inferences and data.
Having discussed GT as the first component of the research design, this chapter now 
turns to address the second component.
3 .7 . 2  Case Study
This subsection will intioduce the case study approach, discuss it critically in terms of 
its advantages and limitations, and justify its addition to a GT methodology. It also 
explains design issues and analysis units associated with the adopted approach.
3 . 7 .2 . 1  Background
A case study approach gives the researcher an opportunity for an intensive observation 
of one or more individual units, rather than a total population or a sample of it, with a 
view to answering one or more research questions. This approach is particularly 
preferred in examining contemporary events (Yin, 1987). Hence, it is relevant to this 
study because it aims to investigate processes of CADCAM integration as they occur in 
their natural organisational settings. In this study the case study approach is chosen in 
order to allow the researcher a considerable degree of flexibility, scope and freedom 
regarding the quantity of data to be collected, the collection procedure, and the sources
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of infomiation to be used. An intensive case approach is suited to exploratory research, 
since it is capable of stimulating insights in studying unformulated areas, revealing 
more information for understanding relationships between real life variables, and 
suggesting hypotheses for further research (Yin, 1987).
It is hoped that detailed case descriptions (Chapter 5) and analyses (Chapters 6 and 7) 
help counteract a simplistic and discipline-biased analysis. Like any other method of 
research, however, this approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. These will 
be discussed in the following subsection before proceeding further to talk about the 
need for it in the present research design.
3,7.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses
A researcher must be sufficiently aware of both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
research methods he/she utilises.
In short, the strengths of this approach can be summarised in the following points:
1) Case studies enable the researcher to observe events of the study in its natural 
setting'^.
2) In a case study situation a researcher can utilise various methods for data collection, 
as is the case in this research. For example, interview data can be combined with the 
researcher's observations for improved reliability.
3) The case study technique permits interdependent reactions and mutual perceptions to 
be obtained from different individuals whose behaviours are interrelated in a single 
social organisation. Discrepancies in information given by different informants will 
warrant additional exploration, which is possible in case study, to establish whether 
such discrepancies resulted from differences in perceptions and personal experiences or 
a reflection of group membership and role dissimilarities.
4) Case studies tend, particularly in a longitudinal research context as is the case in this 
research, to continue over a period of time, allowing the researcher to maintain 
continuous observation. A longer involvement allows interconnections and events to be 
traced over time, so that processes can be inferred. Also, data and emerging findings 
can be continuously cross-checked and refined to increase reliability.
^The case study approach allows a researcher to establish a direct contact with the studied reality and, 
arguably, provide more reliable knowledge in answering difficult questions than he/she can by 
statistical generalisations due to a more grounded basis for personal understanding. It could also be 
contended that it would provide a more solid ground for considering action in applied research 
situations. The case study approach is strong in realism, significance, theory orientation, and heuristic 
quality (Kerlinger, 1973). Therefore, the value of case study lies in the adequacy of the theoretical 
inferences that are generated (Yin, 1987).
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Weaknesses of the case study approach should be carefully taken into account. These 
can be summarised in the following points:
1) Biased views and dubiousness of evidence would influence the degree of rigour 
applicable in a case study situation. This could negatively affect the credibility of 
findings and conclusions.
2) Data collection procedures are not routinised. Therefore, they require extra skills on 
the part of the researcher than in experimental and survey approaches.
3) Some respondents might not be prepared to co-operate sufficiently such that all data 
requirements could be met. They might avoid an explicit rejection with excuses of being 
busy with their work.
4) Findings and conclusions from a single case study cannot be generalised for a 
population. However, the use of multiple case studies, as has been done in this study, 
is a conscious attempt to increase the level of generalisation^.
3.7.2.3 Case Study As Well: Why?
The need for case study besides GT in the context of the present research design is 
clearly defined. It is used in the earlier stages of the research process as a means for the 
following:
1) Creating conceptual "boxes" for the collection of data with respect to each of the 
companies researched in order to keep filling them with data as the field work 
progresses.
2) Organising the accumulative data with a view to building more structured data 
collections which are organised in such a way as to show classified information about 
the companies, individual actors and their relationships, events and references to 
problems of importance affecting or mentioned by informants.
3) Analysing data categories and properties common to all cases as these emerge from 
cross-company comparisons.
4) Helping the researcher answer the tentative research questions in terms of the cases 
in the study (Chapter 6), each of which with its unique history and operating as a 
complex organisational entity within its environment.
The case study approach is theoretically important for the study in three ways:
1 ) Unless a technological change process is explained through a case study approach, 
with a view to tracing the decisions and actions involved in it through to their
^Also, by choosing to study the "typical", the "common" and the "ordinary" a researcher can maximise 
generalisability from the outset when a multi-site reseaich design is adopted deliberately on the grounds 
that the chosen sites are typical representatives of the social institutions or phenomena under 
investigation (see Schofield, 1993).
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outcomes, the experience of the process itself and its consequent outcomes will remain 
to be the best route to knowledge about it. Case histories can show what actions in 
what circumstances will lead to what outcomes. Theoretical relationships can be 
synthesised with a view to explaining what exactly happens in organisations .
2) The experience of conducting a systematic and rigorous case study brings home the 
complexities of the technological change process. In conducting a detailed study of 
selected cases the complex social and political web in which technological change is 
undertaken becomes salient with positive implications for theory generation.
3) A process of technological change and its successful or failed outcomes cannot be 
understood thoroughly with superficial data-gathering methods that yield face value 
information. The case study approach will hopefully unveil what is problematic in the 
chosen field of investigation; it helps generate ideas about cause-effect chains and 
stimulates the researcher's thinking about practical solutions in constrained 
organisational contexts. This is because case study is an effective approach for 
answering "how", "why", and "what" research questions when asked in an exploratory 
context (see Yin, 1987: 17).
3.7.2.4 The Case Study Design
Different researchers have different purposes for studying cases. Designing a case 
study should be guided by the purpose one sets out to achieve. Depending on a single 
case study can be unreliable in a study founded on a non-statistical logic. A multiple of 
cases will provide confidence in claiming a higher degree of representativeness. 
Therefore, this study utilises a case study style involving a multiple of cases with a 
view to developing theory on the chosen subject matter.
Case study is a useful way for inducing and directing further research, because it helps 
a researcher develop an informed account about the case(s) being studied and enables 
him/her to pursue missing or unclear points that may emerge with a view to further 
theoretical development.
A replication, as opposed to a sampling, logic is suggested for studies involving more 
than a single case. Each case resembles a single experiment. Analysis follows a cross­
experiment, rather than a within experiment, design logic. Replication is relevant to the 
case study design adopted because of the multiplicity of cases studied (see Yin, 1987). 
Case history details forms an important part of the case study design in this research. 
Through a case history the researcher aims to establish a historical account of the 
companies involved and their experiences with stand alone DEM systems such as CAD 
and CAM (see Chapter 5). This is needed to study the issue of integration against a
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realistic background knowledge of each of the companies, not only as they are 
researched in their present form, but also in terms of how their respective technical, 
commercial and organisational developments have shaped them historically. Assessing 
the experiences of key individuals involved in such developments will be important in 
order to establish historical accounts of how stand alone computer applications have 
evolved. The aim is to develop as comprehensive an account as possible of the cases 
through a longitudinal case study design^.
Three considerations are important in the design of the present case study element of the 
research strategy. In other words, for a case study approach to be useful for this study 
it has to fulfil the following three conditions:
1) encompass enough of the facts about the company in question, the engineering work 
flow process that essentially characterised its DEM activities, the stand alone 
technology systems in applications, their formal technical and financial objectives and 
outcomes, the implementation process, the organisational implications of 
implementation, and the status quo of the issue of integration in the light of such 
particular specifities. Hence, the length of case write-ups should be decided on the 
basis of a calculated estimation of the minimum sufficient details required to give an in- 
depth appreciation of all the factors involved in the studied processes.
2) Be conducted consistently and rigorously. A well researched case study should not 
risk being biased by giving an account based on a single source of information. Data of 
all types and from all the sources available to the researcher will be used.
3) Establish what is common and what is paiticular about each case to unveil the degree 
of uniqueness available, by defining: (a) the nature of the case, (b) its historical 
background, (c) the physical setting, (d) other relevant contexts and (e) those 
infomiants through whom the case can be recognised. Case specifities such as these are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 to justify the claim that the uniqueness of cases is likely 
to be pervasive through such particulars.
Deciding on the unit(s) of analysis is an important step to be taken in any research 
design since it helps define the research's boundaries. In this sense it can be viewed as 
part of a case study research design. The units of analysis used in the study will, 
therefore, be discussed in the following subsection.
9As Layder (1992) points out, incorporating a historical dimension into a study should be taken 
seriously because it offers an enriched analysis. Whyte (1984) also argues that any study of an 
organisation should be built on a firm historical base whereby historical data should be integrated into 
any analysis of present structural and social process data.
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3.7.2.5 Units of Analysis
The present study is more interested in understanding the ebb and flow of the processes 
of CAD CAM integration in the cases studied than in isolating static factors affecting 
these processes and their organisational outcomes. Therefore, its unit of analysis must 
be the project incorporating the whole CADCAM (or CIM) process from initiation to 
termination and the implications of this process for integration at a manufacturing 
organisation level, particularly in so far as the DEM interfaces are concerned. 
Therefore, the design, engineering, and manufacturing functional departments of the 
cases studied will represent the core of the cross-site comparative analysis. The 
companies will be investigated firstly in their entireties as organisational settings (see 
Chapter 5). Consequently, as the research process progresses the emphasis will shift 
towards the mentioned functions specifically as the more immediate functional 
environments involved in change.
In short, the central unit of analysis in this research is a manufacturing company's 
project for implementing CADCAM integration and the leadership of the integration 
process. To begin with, however, five tentative units of analysis will be utilised in the 
initial stages of case data analysis. These are the: (1) organisational setting, (2) 
engineering and manufacturing activities within such settings, (3) elements of 
integrating technologies in application, (4) historical background to technological 
change in the CAD and CAM areas, and (5) background to the organisational contexts 
for integration (see Chapter 5).
The next section will discuss the third component of the research design: 
longitudinality.
3.7.3 Longitudinality
The present research is exploratory and explanatory in that it aims to explore CADCAM 
integration as a process of technological (and organisational) change and, thus develop 
a deeper understanding of it, rather than one that seeks accurate measurement of an 
instantaneous kind. Therefore, the decision to adopt a longitudinal, rather than cross- 
sectional, research design is a dimension of strategic importance to this research 
process.
A crucial advantage of a longitudinal research design, in the light of the methodological 
assumptions adopted in this study, is that it will allow the researcher an opportunity to
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analyse the dynamic background against which technology-induced organisational 
change has to be managed in the light of continuous and accumulative action
Also, longitudinality will facilitate the cause of a realistic analysis of the true nature of 
innovation as a political, rather than a totally rational and unproblematic, process. That 
is, since innovation involves organised human beings of various subjectivities, then it 
is not unreasonable to suggest that it must have a subjective dimension involving 
values. Therefore, differences amongst different actors due to value, perspective and 
self-interest differences should be taken into account when studying their behaviours 
concerning the ways they acquire and control resources. The idea is that such 
differences, among other factors, are likely to cause disputes, contests and power 
struggles - instead of collaboration - as the different actors (both individuals and 
groups) set about conducting their organisational work.
Perhaps it may often be the case that a technological innovation begins as a purely 
rational initiative, but it is likely to become a politically sensitive issue, particularly at 
the stage of implementation where partial or complete failure becomes public 
knowledge. Therefore, a longitudinal research design offers the researcher an 
opportunity to monitor change as it develops and assess to what extent it involves 
elements of objective rationality and to what extent it is a problematic political process 
driven by competing self-interests, contests and power struggles. Without this “extra 
time” advantage that a longitudinal approach gives, the researcher’s task of establishing 
an independent assessment based upon evidence that survives the test of time would be 
much more difficult. The strength of such evidence lies in the fact that it has its roots 
embedded in the historical contexts of the realities in concern, in which the present 
CADCAM processes being investigated are unfolding with actors’ contributions - both 
positive and negative, legitimate and illegitimate, formal and informal, or/and invited 
and voluntai7  as far as a given technical rationality logic is concerned.
Additionally, such research evidence, it can be argued, is more reliable for predicting 
future trends of development concerning integration than other “ungrounded” evidence 
which is obtained at a single point in time and used, by virtue of cross-sectional 
quantification, to draw somewhat “static” and “instantaneous” conclusions concerning 
something which is dynamic by definition. The chances are that a researcher is likely to 
end up with a theoretically sound model of change based on a linear rationality logic, 
but one that fails to explain some of the “irrational” aspects of actors’ behaviour, those
IRAs Pettigrew (1990: 271) contends, "for the practitioner of longitudinal research, issues of time are 
crucial and pervasive" because of the fundamental assumption about time as a prerequisite for 
constructing an accumulative account of "reality" of what is being researched, and thus the expression 
that "truth is the daughter of time"(p. 271).
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aspects which could easily be missed if a questionnaire is used or a single interview 
conducted as a “one-off’ data collection effort. Indeed, the problem is more 
complicated than that since the actors themselves may tend to justify many of those 
seemingly “irrational” aspects in a different rationality’s frame of reference, or - as may 
be often the case - present them as aspects that are motivated and justified in the name 
of pragmatism and self-interest alone without necessarily a coherent rational logic 
underlying them. This is particularly so in a logico-deductive reseai'ch strategy where 
the researcher predefines the “reality” being investigated in his/her mind prior to data 
collection and then goes on to gather only the data which fits into his/her theoretical 
model or, alternatively, imposes the model on other data which cannot be incorporated 
and probably interprets the emerging data surplus or deficit in error terms. 
Unfortunately, when left to manifest itself freely, in a longitudinal research design, 
such “other data” may suggest important clues to important issues not taken into 
account by the model.
Many researchers will agree with the position adopted in this study, namely that a 
distorted picture of innovation is often presented in much of the relevant literature 
where exaggerated assumptions of rationality and linearity often deform the reality of 
messy change processes in organisations (see, for example, Frost and Egri, 1991; 
Pettigrew, 1985; Robey and Azevedo, 1995; Winch and Twigg, 1993). Conflicts over 
economic, political, and ideological inequities in social arrangements are bound to 
challenge the idealism inherent in simple notions of shared organisational goals and 
effectiveness of organisational change (Robey and Azevedo, 1995). This supports the 
line of thinking adopted in this study, namely that a longitudinal research is more likely 
to yield a valid and realistic picture than a cross-sectional research or one with simplistic 
assumptions about innovation as a purely objective process.
The relevance of a longitudinal research design to CADCAM integration is perhaps 
obvious since integration involves a long-term change process. The period of time 
during which a manufacturing company experiences the implementation of stand alone 
computer applications is conceptualised in terms of an accumulative organisational 
learning process that terminates at integration (see Bessant et al., 1996; Jones and 
Hendry, 1994; Kim, 1993). This is particularly so when integration is a set and 
pursued objective.
Different kinds of data are important for this type of research because they will give the 
researcher different vantage points from which to understand a theoretical category and 
to develop its properties. This justifies the utilisation of different devices for gathering 
data and presenting the research findings, which, when taken together in an integrated 
manner, will hopefully enable the researcher to place individuals in a group context and
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gain a realistic picture of the dynamics of individual and group behaviours in the 
context of a longitudinal research design. Such devices will include quotations from 
interviews and informal conversations, segments of the researcher's "on the spot" field 
notes and case writings to help the researcher organise and summarise information 
about events, actions, and actors and the roles they play in their respective 
organisations.
To summarise, a longitudinal, process-oriented research is believed to be crucial for 
theory generation on technology-induced organisational integration. This argument is 
based on the grounds that:
1) Integration theory is currently at a phase of infancy in an expectedly extended life 
cycle towards maturation due to profound anticipated technological and organisational 
changes yet to occur in the future. Further diffusion of integrating technologies, such as 
CADCAM and MRP II is likely to increase the demand for further theorisation in this 
area of interest.
2) A theory generated on CADCAM integration will benefit from a realistic assessment 
of the problematic nature of the kinds of organisational change often associated with 
integration. For the reasons discussed above, such a realistic assessment may be, 
justifiably, sought thiough a longitudinal research design since it is more likely to serve 
this purpose than other research designs which do not study the subject for the same 
length of time.
3) Leading technologists and managers learn from their past experiences of 
implementing stand alone technology applications; they learn important lessons that 
they will find useful in future when managing more complex technology projects with 
greater organisational challenges such as CADCAM integration, A manufacturing 
company will encompass a skill base enriched by practical experience over the years. 
Such a base comprises the total sum of the skills and experiences of its leading 
technologists, professionals and managers and, hence will play a vital role in how 
CADCAM integration is approached. The experiences of such key individuals in 
implementing, managing, developing and maintaining stand alone project applications 
will be an important learning asset for future investment in integration. This is based on 
the assumption that learning represents the "capacity or processes within an 
organisation to maintain or improve performance based on experiences" (Nevis et al, 
1995: 73). Thus, the significance of a longitudinal study design can be defended; a 
relatively long time is needed to establish to what extent companies make use of their 
learning experiences in ways that serve the interests of CADCAM integration.
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Finally, it should be noted that a sense of measure of the time involved in a longitudinal 
study is important in addressing longitudinality with a view to defining it. For example, 
researchers such as Van de Yen and Astley (1981) argue for the need to combine micro 
and macro perspectives on organisational change. At one extreme, the former focuses 
on part of a changing organisation over a short period of time (e.g. 6-12 months). At 
the other extreme, the latter focuses on the whole organisation within the context of its 
environment over a considerably longer time (e.g. over 80 years). The present study 
avoids both extremes, as will be explained in Chapter 4.
The tentative research questions initially used in the research process will be discussed 
in the following section in the context of the subject matter of the present chapter.
3 .8  Linking Tentative Research Questions and Underlying
Assumptions with Data Collection
This study takes a rather unconventional approach to defining the role and capacity of 
research questions. It does not approve of formulating clearly defined and fixed 
research questions before approaching the field of investigation. However, the 
researcher found that his thoughts needed to be arranged somehow prior to field 
investigation. Therefore, tentative research questions were used temporarily during the 
first stages of the research process (as mentioned in Chapter 1), but not with a view to 
deriving testable logico-deductive theoretical propositions nor with the aim of 
answering such tentative questions as the main “formal” objective of the investigation, 
as would have been suggested by more conventional research methodologies (see, for 
example, Creswell, 1994; Silveiman; 1985; Yin, 1987). Rather, these questions were 
used (see Chapter 6) only in order to: (1) synthesise a case history for each company, 
(2) appreciate the types of production systems, technical tasks, products and industry 
sector environments relevant to the companies; and (3) orient the process of identifying 
the issues that were regarded to be of vital concern to the people involved in each of the 
studied organisations.
The study's main data collection instrument (see Appendix D) was designed so as to 
facilitate answering these questions in a case study format. It was designed on the basis 
of a series of assumptions as part of the research's tentative conceptual framework. 
These assumptions took the form of sets of “raw” questions and were deliberately left 
without further development along logico-deductive lines in order to address them in a 
GT methodological framework. These sets of questions or vague queries could be 
summarised as follows:
* What are the motives for integration? What circumstances precede and probably 
trigger off a process of change? How does a company become exposed to the
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technology concerned? What possible processes of initiation, adoption, implementation 
and adaptation are involved in each case?
* Who is/are responsible for the process of change in terms of authorisation, 
championship, evaluation, implementation, management and maintenance? What are the 
positions, professional expertise, and levels of authority of such people in their 
respective organisations?
* Which categories of employees are affected by the change, how significantly, and in 
what ways? What are the different possible meanings attributed to integration held by 
different agents and interests? Which of them becomes dominant? How does it do so?
* How do companies come to adopt stand alone systems? How do they go about 
implementing them? To what extent and how is the adoption also a process of 
adaptation (design and use) of these technologies to fit their respective organisational 
settings?
* To what extent does the implemented technology meet its predefined technical and 
financial objectives and why? To what extent does it serve and support business 
objectives and how? What are its implications for work organisation and job design?
* Where applicable, how do those companies seeking to implement CADCAM or CIM 
systems go about realising integration? How does a company's past experience of stand 
alone systems affect the way it goes about defining and implementing integration?
These queries eventually were expressed in the form of the research’s seven tentative 
questions stated in Chapter 1 (section 1.4). It is worthwhile to present them again here 
so as to explain them further in terms of the underlying assumptions that gave rise to 
their formulation:
1) Why do manufacturing companies acquire CAD and CAM systems?
2) How do manufacturing companies design/use CAD and CAM systems?
3) How do manufacturing companies introduce, maintain and develop CAD
and CAM systems?
4) What are the outcomes of the implementation of CAD and CAM systems in 
terms of pre-identified objectives ?
5) What are the impacts of the implementation of CAD and CAM systems on 
manufacturing organisations?
6) Why does a manufacturing company seek (or decline) to integrate CAD and 
CAM systems?
7) Where applicable, how does a manufacturing company manage the 
integration of CAD and CAM systems in the context of its accumulative 
experiences in this area of technical change?
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The assumptions underlying, and reflected in the questions, are summarised as follows;
A) A manufacturing company would initially begin its experience of advanced 
technology systems in the engineering and manufacturing functions by introducing a 
stand alone computer system, typically but not necessarily CAD, motivated by its 
potential technical and business benefits. This assumption is reflected in question (1).
B) Work organisation and job design issues that would arise due to integration would 
be far more serious than those raised by stand alone systems. The potential impacts of 
integration in this area would be much greater. This assumption is reflected in questions 
(4) and (5).
C) Integration would be much more difficult to manage than stand alone applications. It 
would necessarily place new challenges on managers at various levels. Managers 
would face difficulties as they attempt to implement integration. These would, 
however, present them with learning opportunities. Individual managers' roles, inter- 
managerial relations, and, consequently, the nature of the management function as a 
collectivity would therefore be affected. This assumption is reflected in question (7).
D) A manufacturing company would encompass a skill base comprising the total sum 
of the skills and experiences of its technologists and managers. This would play a vital 
role in how it approached integration. The experiences of leading technologists and 
managers with stand alone project applications could be an important learning asset for 
success in integration. This assumption is reflected in questions (2), (3) and (7).
E) Integration would be an organisational, rather than, technical problem in essence. It 
would have implications for machinery, material flow, information systems, strategy, 
fonnal and informal organisation, and culture. It would have political implications at the 
individual, group, departmental, corporate and cross-organisational levels, because 
integration projects would tend to be cross-functional, organisation-wide, or/and cross- 
organisational. This assumption is reflected in questions (6) and (7).
F) Different manufacturing companies would approach integration differently due to a 
complicated interplay of interfering, overlapping sets of factors that this research would 
aim to investigate longitudinally by embedding its findings in companies' natural 
organisational settings. Obstacles to integration should also be researched in their 
natural settings. This assumption is reflected in questions (4), (5) and (7).
G) Integration would be a long-term, costly project involving a gradual, piecemeal 
addition and upgrading of stand alone applications. Hence, it would require to be 
studied as a process of change. Therefore, it would be crucial to study it in an historical 
context in order to trace a host company's experiences in this area and its learning
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process. Also it would require a caieful consideration of the implications of such a 
project for sti’ategy in order to avoid decoupling the study of technological innovation 
from that of competitive strategy as is too often the case. This assumption is reflected in 
questions (1) to (7).
H) The attribution of various meanings to integration by different agencies and interests 
would be likely. Different individuals, groups, and departments would react to 
integration in different ways due to perceived gains and losses arising from change and, 
hence resistance would be likely. This assumption is reflected in questions (1), (2), (3) 
and (7).
I) Technical, business and organisational development processes should be managed 
simultaneously. Integiation would support profitability when it would be likely to meet 
a manufacturing system's technical requirements in the light of long-term business 
objectives on the condition that the company would deliberately develop its organisation 
so as to accommodate integration. This assumption is reflected in questions (2), (4), (6) 
and (7).
J) Two major conditions would be necessary, but not sufficient, for the success of an 
integration project. If and when the design and specification of constituent systems, 
databases, and linking mechanisms were carried out to facilitate: (i) business strategic 
objectives through a strategy-technology alignment process and (ii) organisational 
change and development so that technical integration would be accompanied by 
organisational integration. This assumption is reflected in questions (6) and (7).
The theoretical links between the above ten assumptions, the seven tentative research 
questions and the questions used in the data-gathering instruments (see Appendices B, 
C and D) are of a profound methodological importance. They will be explained in detail 
in the next chapter in the context of a three-phase research strategy devised for the field 
work.
Consistent with the ontological assumption stated in subsection 3.6.1 and the 
epistemological assumptions stated in subsection 3.6.2, it is assumed that behaviour 
patterns will manifest themselves more in day-to-day reality than in formal interviews 
or through survey methods. Therefore, the need for a field study type of research 
design, rather than a survey, is established. The view taken in this study is that the 
researcher is the primary instrument in data collection, rather than other insentient 
mechanisms. Data-gathering in this research targets as much data, of as many types, by
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as many means as the researcher can afford within the constraints surrounding the 
study^L
Choosing data collection methods for the present study is considered to be an 
"operational" or "tactical" decision made within the framework of its research strategy 
and, therefore, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. In the meantime, the 
theoretical and methodological choices adopted in the concluding part of this chapter 
will be upheld in reliability, validity and credibility terms.
3 .9  Validity, Reliability, and Credibility
It is justifiable to argue that truthfulness and objectivity are critical to any research, but 
it is not justifiable to claim that the criteria for judging them will be universally 
acceptable; these will be subject to disagreements among various methodological 
ideologies and schools of thought. Ontological and epistemological assumptions are 
important detemiinants of the criteria forjudging credibility, reliability, and validity of 
any research. Subject matter choice, research design, data presentation and 
interpretation and practical implications will be amongst a range of factors contributing 
to such disagreements. Whatever these may be, however, a researcher should pursue 
believability on the basis of coherence, insight and instrumental utility (Eisner, 1991). 
In a study such as the present he/she should aim for "trustworthiness" (see Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985) through a process of verification rather than through validity and 
reliability limits applied in a conventional positivist paradigm^^.
Four criteria against which the truthfulness of the study can be assessed are 
p r o p o s e d  These match, and are alternatives to those criteria to those applied in the
11 As Marshall and Rossman (1989) notes, most qualitative studies utilise several data collection 
methods over the course of the research. This depends on the researcher's assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each technique and how these relate to the research questions. It also highlights a 
widely held belief that data collection methods are both imperfect and not mutually exclusive (Brewer 
and Hunter, 1989).
I3jn general, it can be said that validity and reliability verification is more problematic in qualitative 
than in quantitative research, because of the lack of "consensus" on addressing such issues (Creswell, 
1994). Quantifiable measures in a quantitative study are likely to make these a less controversial issue. 
On the other hand, the likelihood of multiplicity of meanings and interpretations in a qualitative 
research is a question that deserves to be addressed from different perspectives because of the recognition 
that these are negotiated with human data sources since it is the subjects' reality or realities that the 
researcher attempts to reconstruct (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988).
^^Corresponding to four questions to be addressed in establishing "trustworthiness" (See Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985: 290):
1) How trutliful ai e the particular findings of the study? By what criteria can we judge them?
2) How applicable are these findings to another setting or group of people?
3) How can we be reasonably sure that the findings would be replicated if the study were conducted with 
the same participants in the same context?
4) How can we be sure that the findings are reflective of the subjects and the inquiry itself rather than 
the product of the researcher's biases or prejudices?
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quantitative paradigm, and pertain to a research’s: (1) "truth value" instead of "internal 
validity", (2) "applicability" instead of "external validity", (3) "consistency" instead of 
"reliability", and (4) "neutrality" instead of "objectivity".
It must be admitted that the question of objectivity imposes a greater degree of 
awareness on a researcher in a study premised on the assumption that totally objective 
reality may well be attempted by a researcher but is very difficult to achieve in absolute 
terms. However, maximising the right conditions for siding with objectivity should be 
attempted through the rigour, breadth and depth of the investigation as well as the 
study’s reliability measures.
Interpretation forms an important part of the study. Its credibility, therefore, has to be 
maximised via appropriate controls for bias. This is based on a fundamental concern 
that a respectable place in interpretation should be guaranteed for both the researcher's 
own version and those of the actors.
This chapter is meant to support the present research’s credibility by explaining its 
theoretical and methodological approaches. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will build upon this 
basis and proceed further to describe the data of the social reality under investigation. 
Various techniques will be used for presenting and analysing the findings and 
developing the theoretical propositions of the study (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Such 
measures, when taken together in an integrated manner, aie meant to strengthen the 
credibility of the theoiy to be developed. In addition, the use of codified procedures for 
analysing data, as will be explained in the following chapter, will help clarify how 
theory is developed from the data.
In short, to ensure maximum possible reliability, validity and credibility of the present 
research, a number of measures were deployed. Twelve measures were deployed to 
maximise the reliability and validity of the study in general. In addition, five extra 
measures were also taken in order to maximise the researcher's interpretation 
credibility. Firstly, the reliability and validity measures could be summarised in the 
following points:
1) Data was collected using various methods. Combining multiple sources of data to 
bear on a single point was sought in order to strengthen the reliability of data collection. 
This was used not merely as a tool for, but an alternative to, validation^'^. Its aim was 
to minimise misinterpretation of meanings inferred from the collected data.
l^Sce Denzin (1989); Flick (1992)
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2) Continuous data collection, assessment and analysis throughout the course of the 
research was meant to provide an on-going evaluation mechanism. A continuous 
dialogue with informants regarding the researcher's interpretations of the their realities 
and meanings was sought to ensure the true value of the data.
3) Four specific controls to increase the reliability of the case study component of the 
research design were incorporated into it in the form of a protocoF^ which included: (a) 
an overview of the project, including a statement of the research issues; (b) field and 
data collection procedures, including the specification of sources of information; (c) 
case study questions; and (d) a guide for the case study report, including its outline and 
format.
4) Representativeness would raise an important question for any case study research. 
The present research did not adopt a statistical logic and, thus did not propose a 
reliability assessment against quantitative criteria. However, it was important for it not 
to rely on a single case study. A multiple-case study approach was pursued to provide 
more confidence in claiming a degree of representativeness proportional to the quantity 
of cases studied but without claiming universality of the research’s overall conclusions.
5) Regular and repeated on-site obseiwations of similar phenomena occurred over a 
long period of time and were compared across the cases studied.
6) Negative instances of the findings were shown and accounted for.
7) Theoretical significance and generalisability were made explicit wherever applicable.
8) Data collection strategies and methods were explained explicitly in this chapter and 
the following one.
9) Three academic members of staff (excluding the research supervisors) and three 
doctoral students were requested to play the roles of an interviewee and peer examiner 
and provide a critical feedback.
10) The researcher's biases and assumptions were articulated in writing in this chapter.
11) Participants' truthfulness was assessed. The aim was to try to explore and detect 
any implausibility that might have been present in a given participant’s account. This 
involved a special attention paid by the researcher - accumulatively over a period of time 
- to learn about and take into consideration individual informants’ (a) values, attitudes, 
sentiments and patterns of behaviour and (b) current emotional state whilst providing
l^See Yin (1987: 21-22; 1989).
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information and reactions to the subject under discussion. Learned knowledge in this 
area was used in: (i) cross-checking an informant’s account with what other participants 
told the researcher about the same events^^, (ii) looking for consistency in an 
informant’s earlier and later statements.
12) Tape-recorded data was reserved.
Secondly, the interpretation credibility measures^^could be summarised as follows:
1 ) A person was asked to play the role of a "devil’s advocate" in critically questioning 
the researcher's analysis on a continuous basis.
2) Data was checked and rival hypotheses assessed continuously.
3) Reports of analysis of findings were sent to the companies in the study and feedback 
on the researcher's interpretation sought^^.
4) The guidance of experienced researchers to control the quality of the data was 
followed.
5) An audit of the data collection and analysis strategies was conducted.
3.10 Summary
This chapter discussed theoretical and methodological issues of concern to the present 
study. It identified a relationship between theory and methodology with a view to 
meeting the objectives of the research in the light of the researcher's ontological, 
epistemological and axiological assumptions. A qualitative research methodology was 
chosen. The methodology was based on the following assumptions:
1) Since social reality is interpreted by various human beings through their cognitive 
capacities, therefore various perceptions will be available to the researcher. These 
should be investigated so that a reasonably realistic picture of an organisational setting 
can be developed, one that will reflect the wealth of variation likely to be found at a 
perceptional level.
l^This resembles weighing and balancing the testimony of different witnesses, appraising their 
motives, comparing their reliability and considering circumstantial evidence in a courtroom setting.
l^Based largely on measures derived from the methodology literature (e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Mtirshall and Rossman, 1989).
I^Based on the assumption that feedback prior to publication would süengthen the credibility basis for 
any research. It was necessary to have a continuous feedback during the course of the field work to 
check the researcher’s understanding of the field against those involved in it.
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2) Different accounts of reality, which are likely to emerge from data, will be indicative 
of such variation.
3) The researcher must cross-check such accounts through the research methods 
utilised to establish his/her own independent account.
4) During the course of the field work, the researcher should distinguish, by means of 
cross-checking, between planned tactical or strategic action and unplanned or accidental 
action or that imposed upon an organisation by its environment. Also, it will be 
important to distinguish between innovation and imitation behaviours an individual and 
organisational levels.
5) The researcher should utilise multi-factor analyses because of the inherent 
complexity of social reality. These will be likely to guide the criteria to be developed for 
theory development.
6) An organisation can be conceptualised as an homogeneous entity in terms of its 
technological infrastructure but not so in terms of the individuals and groups that 
constitute its social system.
The chosen methodology blended GT and case study approaches with a longitudinal 
research design outlook. This combination was designed such that the overall objective 
of the study could best be met. Data collection, analysis, and theory are meant to stand 
in a complementary relationship with each other by virtue of such research design.
The methodological outlines described in this chapter will facilitate theory development 
by means of induction through the utilisation of raw data to construct thematic 
categories of investigational concern. The aim is to outline the guidelines needed by the 
researcher to make sense of a situation in which several actors play their respective 
roles in CADCAM integration. This approach gives flexibility in the way further data 
will be collected as earlier analysis can be used to modify the tentative research 
questions, assess and test competing working hypotheses and continuously develop 
theory in a dynamic manner.
Finally, this chapter has, hopefully, succeeded in demonstrating that the researcher is 
aware of the advantages and limitations of the present research design, his role in the 
research process vis-a-vis the data sources in concern, the devised measures for 
supporting the reliability and validity of the study in general and the credibility of his 
interpretation in particular. This chapter has discussed the measures specifically taken 
for these purposes.
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Details of the research process, methods, and the case study conduct and analysis will 
be described in the following chapter. In this sense Chapter 4 is an extension of this 
chapter. The substantive and formal theoretical propositions and hypotheses resulting 
from the grounded research described in this thesis will be presented in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Field Work
4 .1  Introduction
Chapter 3 established that a field work type of study was the most appropriate 
methodology for this study because of the kind of data and theory it set out to collect 
and derive. This chapter spells out the details of the filed work followed in this 
research.
It begins by describing the decisions taken on organisation sample size, the type of 
organisational settings suited, and how the sites in the study were chosen. It then 
distinguishes between the chosen companies on the basis of how integrated their DEM 
processes are in CADCAM terms. Details of the ten researched companies will be 
given. This will be followed by a description of the progress of the research process. 
The chapter will then proceed to describe the details of the methods and procedures 
followed in data collection, coding, analysis and interpretation. The lessons learned 
from the field research will also be outlined in the final sections of this chapter.
4 .2  Deciding on the Sample Size?
How many companies should be studied in this research? This was an important 
question which had to be addressed right from the outset. Two guiding concerns were 
used in this connection, namely that:
1) A quantitatively large sample would not be applicable since generalisability through 
hypothesis-testing was not targeted.
2) A single company would provide too narrow a "window" through which to view the 
real world of technology-led change in manufacturing industry, with all the diversity it 
contains.
The latter consideration aimed to avoid partial, biased, and unbalanced inferences from 
a single case; it sought to go as far as possible towards selecting a representative 
sample, though not in a strict statistical frame of reference.
The following considerations guided the decision on the size of the sample of 
companies to be studied:
1) It was assumed that the larger the sample, the greater the chances would be of 
finding the contexts underlying the study’s tentative questions and addressing the
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questions on the basis of a greater diversity in conditions, which would, thus, be made 
available.
2) Although multiple cases would not make the study a quantitative one, it would 
facilitate a compaiative framework and, thus, give the study a limited quantitative 
dimension in cross-case comparisons.
3) Multiple evidence would allow a more robust generalisation which would be likely to 
assist the foimulation of the theoretical proposals.
As will be explained later on in this chapter, a total of ten companies were chosen and 
researched. Another equally important question had to be addressed together with the 
above one. This was: what kind of organisations should be selected in order to provide 
the right socio-technical contexts for the fieldwork? The following section addresses 
this issue.
4 .3  What Kind of Organisational Settings?
The ten organisations were chosen according to the following four criteria:
1) Sector:
All organisations had to be chosen from the manufacturing sector of the economy 
where CADCAM technologies could be found in application.
2) Categorv of Industrv:
All organisations had to be involved in (electrical, electronics or/and mechanical) 
manufacturing engineering-related operations.
3) Computer Technology in Design. Engineering, and Manufacturing:
All organisations had to be CAD or/and CAM users and to have used such technologies 
for at least five years in order to utilise their extended respective experiences in 
enriching the data for the present longitudinal research design.
4) Integration of Computer Technologies :
All organisations had to have DEM systems that were capable of being integrated, even 
if they were not yet integrated in practice, or had embarked on some kind of integrated 
CADCAM configuration.
4.4 Choice of Sites
The first step in the field work involved a search for companies meeting the above 
criteria. An important question arose in the beginning with regard to what 
organisational level of analysis should be adopted. Researching complete, multiple-site 
companies was thought to be advantageous in that it would facilitate a comprehensive
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assessment of production processes in their entirety as well as the work organisation 
arrangements set up around them. Nonetheless, business units which were part of 
larger business entities, were identified as sufficiently appropriate for the purpose of 
this study. Subsidiaries or plants, rather than whole businesses, were also considered. 
In fact, the vast majority of the researched companies were linked to larger 
organisations in one way or another^ Such a decision was justified on the grounds that 
the emphasis in this study had to be on business units as places of work. Plants, even 
those in the same company, might have different levels of IM, so aggregating data to 
the company level would have been problematic, mainly because of the scattered 
geographical layout of the companies whose local sites were sampled initially. As will 
be explained further in the foregoing section, out of a total of 47 companies that 
responded to an invitation questionnaire to indicate whether they would agree to take 
part in the research, 30 (i.e. 63.83%) were subsidiaries of larger companies that had 
other sites in Britain or/and elsewhere in the world, 14 (i.e. 29.79%) were parent 
companies, and 3 (i.e. 6.38%) did not reveal their legal status.
The decision was also justified on the basis that the emphasis of this study was on the 
plant as a socio-technical system^. Scotland's entire discrete part manufacturing 
engineering industry was surveyed initially, if ambitiously, to identify appropriate 
companies for the study. Later, however, the search was narrowed down to target 
companies which were closer to St. Andrews for purely logistical reasons.
The "new" electronics industry in Scotland presented itself as favourite for the field 
work. The electronics industry is a major nominee for progress towards CIM since 
CAD/CAM techniques began in it and diffused successfully into chemicals, 
construction and mechanical engineering industries (see Bessant et al., 1985; Susman 
and Chase, 1986). Traditional, long-established industries in Scotland (e.g. ship­
building, heavy engineering and mining industries) had declined to make way for this 
"replacement" industry. Growth of the service and financial industries is another aspect
1 Companies 6 and 7 wore the exception in that they were independent small family businesses.
^Had the study conceptualised the plant as a purely technical production process or economic entity or 
been concerned, for example, with analysing total assets of a company, supply chains of a homogenous 
sample of a population or global marketing strategies of multinational firms, it would have required a 
strict choice of units such that uniformity at a corporate level was met. This would have been 
applicable as a crucial criterion of selection in order to establish a complete picture of the company or 
companies under investigation. A similar position to the one taken in this study was adopted by 
researchers such as Dean and Snell (1991), for example, in tlieir study of CIM job design requirements 
in US plants. Currie (1988) also took up a resembling stance in studying management perceptions of 
CAD in British companies.
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of such replacement in Scotland's economic life^. Both replacement industries in the 
manufacturing and service sectors are major users of computer technologies in their 
operations. The electronics manufacturing industry sector, as opposed to the service 
sector, appealed, as a potential area of field work, one that was readily within the 
researcher's reach, both physically and in terms of the researcher's training 
background.
Initially, SelVs Scottish Directory (1991/92) was used for Sampling‘S. A nationwide list 
of 274 firms resulted. This was too large a sample for the purpose of this study and had 
to be reduced. Eventually, it was whittled down to 90. The elimination process was 
governed by two criteria: applicability (according to the criteria outlined in section 4.3) 
and location.
Each of the 90 companies was invited to participate in the study. In total, 70 companies 
(i.e. 78%) declined participation either actively or passively. The response rate was 
52%; 47 companies replied by completing and returning a purpose-developed invitation 
form (see Appendix B) in a prepaid stamped envelope. Out of these 27 companies (i.e. 
30% of the total of 90 companies) declined the invitation but a total of 20 companies 
(i.e. 22%) agreed to take pait in the study.
Exhibit 4.1 shows a flow chart illustrating the procedure followed in company 
selection. Only 10 companies, including eight subsidiaries and two parent firms, out of 
these 20 (i.e. 11% of the original sample of 90 and 50% of the "accepting" 
respondents) eventually collaborated in the study^.
^One of the people who were interviewed repetitively during the course of this research lived and 
worked for over thirty years in Scotland. He described this situation in the following words:
“.....  you only have to look back over 20 years. W e've been before - Fife used to be - a heavy
engineering and coal mining area ... Heavy engineering died W hen coal started to be phased
out and oil came in coal m ines in the Fife area all started to be closed down .... the district o f  
Kirkcaldy, M ethil, Cowdenbeath ... all these kinds o f areas. Then these kinds o f  companies came 
along and were set up here because there was a wealtli o f skilled p e o p le  ” (Case 8).
^Manufacturers under the following industry headings were listed, studied and then classified: 
"computers", "microcomputers", "electrodes", "electronic components", "electronic equipment", 
"electronic instruments", "electronic systems", "electronics", "electronic medical apparatus" and 
"medical equipment".
^Two companies closed down, six were located in the extreme north, west and south of Scotland, one 
was not suitable for the purpose of the study because it was not a user of the technology in concern, 
and one company changed their mind after initially agreeing to participate.
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Exhibit 4.1 
Company selection procedure
r
I n i t i a l  S a m p l i n g
1 r
2 7 4  
C o m p a n i e s
F u r t h e r  ( S c r e e n )  S a m p l u i g
C o m p a n i e s
I d e n t i f y i n g  C o n t a c t  P e r s o n  
( U s i n g  T e l e p h o n e )
S e n d i n g  I n v i t a t i o n  F o r m s
C o m p a n y
D e c i s i o n ?
4 7  R e s p o n d i n g  
C o m p a n i e s  ( 5 2 % )
Y e s  / C o m p a n y  
D e c i s i o n ?
2 7  C o m p a n i e s  
D e c l i n i n g  
I n v i t a t i o n  ( 3 0 % )
2 0  C o m p a n i e s  
A c c e p t i n g  
i n v i t a t i o n  ( 2 2 % )
4 3  N o n ~ r e s p o n d in g  
C o m p a n i e s  ( 4 8 % )M o s t  i m i t a o l e  1 0  
C o m p a n i e s  C h o s e n  
f o r  t h e  F i e l d  W o r k
E N D  S a m p l i n g  
&  S T A R T  F i e l d  W o r k  
( G o t o  E x h i b i t  4 . 4 )
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Three out of the 90 companies sampled could not withstand the early 1990s economic 
recession and thus closed down. It was not an easy time either for businesses or their 
researchers^.
Fife companies were given priority because of their proximity to St. Andrews since the 
nature of the data-gathering mechanism deployed in this study required frequent visits 
and, at times, the continuous presence of the researcher on the researched companies’ 
sites^, Fife Regional Council's publication "The Fife Business Directory"(l9S9Ÿ was 
consulted for further information about these companies. Eventually, seven of these 
turned out to be among the 10 cases in the study.
The next step involved extending the geographical scope of the field and, hence the 
addition of two Tayside and one Lothian sites to have what was considered to be a 
reasonably sufficient number of cases for an intensive and exploratory study,
4.5 Primary Vs. Secondary Cases
The ten companies that were selected for investigation could be divided into two broad 
categories according to the content of CADCAM integration in their respective 
technological strategies. From this point onwards in the thesis the terms "primary" and 
"secondary" cases (or companies, interchangeably) will be used to refer to the two 
equally-represented groups of companies.
The five primary companies met all the criteria outlined in section 4.3 more readily and 
fully than the secondary companies did. Hence, they were chosen for much closer
Two "accepting" and one declining respondents closed down. This was a total of three out of 47 
businesses (i.e. approximately one out of every 15 businesses collapsed). These statistics were 
indicative of the kind of environmental pressures companies were subjected to during the time of the 
research. For example, a Personnel Director of one of the 90 companies sent a reply letter in which he
said: " I regret to inform you that [naming the company] closed down last year and therefore are
unable to assist you with your project The gravity of these circumstances became even clearer as
the field work progressed. Indeed, one of the collaborating companies (Case 8) themselves went out of 
business in 1993. About two years earlier the company’s Senior Production Manager and General 
Manager, respectively, stated:
“Our demand's dropped by at least 50% over the last year. Some o f that is because the defence 
industry's suffered a recession and som e is due to the fact that nationally we are suffering a 
recession very, very severe recession ......” (Case 8).
“It's that crossroads in a sense; we w ill not get any more money invested until w e get more profit 
but perhaps we won't make more profit till we get more money invested. It's a very difficult lim e .... 
it's a vicious circle!” (Case 8).
^All the chosen sites wore located within a 60-mile radius around St. Andrews. If only questionnaires 
or single interviews were used this condition would not have been considered significant.
^Ils section titled "Engineering in Fife", published in 1990, provided an up-to-date population listing 
with useful information about the region's electronic engineering companies.
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attention^. These companies were already undergoing transformation. Thus, they had 
direct relevance to the theme of integration. However, the five secondaries, despite 
using one or more of DEM computer technologies, had not embarked on integration, 
had not taken it seriously as an issue of immediate concern, and/or had have no 
intention to do so in the foreseeable future. It was thought that these seemingly negative 
cases should not be discarded; their inclusion would be useful for comparing and 
contrasting purposes (i.e. in addressing the "why nots" of integration, represented by 
these organisations, alongside the "whys" of it). The assumption was that investigating 
dissimilar states of affairs would facilitate the emergence of a clearer and fuller picture. i
Given the objectives of the study, this was a more significant methodological concern I
than uniformity of the selected sample since all of the ten cases provided a form of 
socio-technical settings where the application of CADCAM integiation would have been '
technically achievable in an “ideal” world.
The following section displays information about all the companies which participated '
in the study, as summarised in Exhibits 4.2 (a) and 4.2 (b). I
4.6 The Companies in the Study
The names of the companies are not be revealed anywhere in the thesis, nor are the 
names of those individuals who took part in the study. Instead, each company was 
given a serial number to identify it and each individual participant's name was coded 
anonymously for data analysis puiposes (i.e. in theoretical sampling, open, axial and 
selective coding). Confidentiality was promised at the request of the informants due to 
the commercial sensitivity of the information given, which was coupled with strategic 
sensitivity in the case of defence companies. Confidentiality was discussed as a main 
issue during access negotiations and the promise had to be kept^^' Coding of data, 
actors, and companies as well as the interrelationships amongst these will discussed in 
detail in section 4.14.3.
9Researchers such as Winch, Voss and Twigg (1991), for example, adopted a similar position by 
isolating two of the 15 firms they studied for a more in-depth analysis.
l^ln the case of Company 9 the gate-keeper requested that the company's product should also be 
omitted because that would make the company identifiable since it was the only one of its kind in
Scotland: "  Naming products will be difficult as w e ll  the product is also sensitive for us".
Therefore, a more generic name was used to refer to it: computer hardware.
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Exhibit 4.2 (a)The primary companies in the study: summary of information
Company Size  (No. of employees)
Location Nature of B usiness/ Product(s)
1 95 Glenrothes Photomasks (supplied to semiconductor industry)
2 210 Kirkcaldy Stage, studio lighting & control equipment
3 400 Edinburgh Electronic security products
4 500 Dunfermline Test systems (for defence avionics industry)
5 1,400 Dundee Self-service systems & cash machines
Exhibit 4.2 (b)The secondary companies in the study: summary of information
Company Size  (No. of employees)
Location Nature ofB usiness/Product(s)
6 35 Auchtermuchty Electrochemicalsensrors
7 50 Dunfermline Electronic & other weighing equipment
8 73 Hillend Printed circuit boards (for defence industry)
9 150 Glenrothes Computerhardware components
10 370 Dundee Electronicmeasurement equipment
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Exhibit 4.3 (a)The primary companies in the study: summary of field work information
C o m p a n y NumberofInterviewees
Number
ofInterviews
TotalHours TapeHours
1 6 7 10.50 04.97
2 3 3 08.25 03.86
3 3 4 09.10 05.86
4 3 9 13.45 05.40
5 4 4 09.40 04.65
T O T A L S : 19 27 50.70 24.74
AVERAQESf. 3 .8 5 .4 10.14 04.95
C o m p a n y NumberofInterviewees
Number
ofInterviews
TotalHours TapeHours
6 5 5 05.20 02.97
7 3 4 03.55 01.07
8 3 5 10.20 05.16
9 2 2 04.05 02.44
1 0 3 4 10.15 06.47
TOTALS; 16 20 33.15 18.11
A V E R A G E S /
C O M P A N Y : 3.2 4 06.63 03.62
Exhibit 4.3 (b)The primary companies in the study: summary of field work information
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The serial number given to each conripany indicates its size relative to the other 
companies in its respective group. Size, measured in terms of the total number of 
employees, was assumed to be an important organisational contingency in selecting the 
companies. Other measures of size (e.g. financial or technological resource measures) 
were considered to be less appropriate in the case of this study whose focus lay on the 
organisational aspects of change. The smallest company comprised of a total of 35 
employees whereas the largest of 1,400.
The studied companies represented rather diverse aspects of the Scottish electronics 
manufacturing industry. They included a service company in the form of an industrial 
tool supplier (Company 1); component suppliers to other manufacturers (Companies 8, 
9 and 10); finished consumer/industrial product manufacturers (Companies 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 and 7). Companies 4 and 8 were defence market suppliers; the rest provided products 
and services for civilian mai’kets. Such variations were important to provide as wide a 
basis for comparison as was possible.
Product range diversity varied widely among these companies; they had different 
product mix structures. Some of the companies chosen were single-product suppliers, 
though such a product received a wide range of applications and was sold to different 
customers for different purposes (e.g. Companies 3 and 6); some still supplied a single 
product but with narrowly specified uses (e.g. Companies 1 ,4 ,5 , 8, and 9); and some 
were multi-product suppliers with a wider customer base (e.g. Companies 2, 3, 7, and 
10).
4 .7  Company Individuality Vs. Sample Uniformity
The details of data-gathering were distinctive in each organisation, within the 
methodological framework developed for the study. On the one hand, in dealing with 
the companies (as units of analysis) a systematic, structured set of procedures had to be 
followed, as much as possible, in order to satisfy the uniformity requirements of the 
comparative aspects of data analysis. However, the practicalities of further access 
negotiation and frequent data-gathering efforts in each case were "coloured" by a 
number of factors, including the preparedness, responses and style of a particular 
company's gate-keeper(s); the size and hierarchical structure of the company; the 
interpersonal relations among some of the managers concerned, and the management 
control mechanisms of the company in concern.
As shown in Exhibit 4.3 (a) and (b), a total of 19 and 16 interviewees in primary and 
secondary companies, respectively, were interviewed. Field work for the entire study
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entailed a total of 83.85 hours of planned investigation and real-time data-gathering, of 
which 42.85 hours were tape-recorded^\
4 .8  Preparing for Field Work: Establishing Contact and
Arranging Access
The first attempt to establish contact with suitable companies was made by writing to 
the Scottish Division's Director of the Institute o f Directors and asking for his 
assistance in this matter. It turned out to be a complete failure (see Appendix A for 
copies of the relevant letters of correspondence in this connection). Then, the researcher 
resorted to published business directories in order to identify suitable companies, find 
out about their addresses and telephone numbers and, thus, contact them directly.
Identifying people in leadership positions was essential for providing useful contacts 
and informal sponsorship. As Whyte (1984: 29) noted, "lack of skill in gaining entry 
may severely limit access to information". Initially, the selected companies were 
contacted, using the telephone, to identify a suitable contact person in each case, who 
might act as an "official gate-keeper" and control access. The researcher introduced 
himself, explained briefly what the study was about, and outlined, briefly, the 
information requirements to the answering company telephonist/receptionist and asked 
him/her to nominate an individual whom he/she thought would be most suitable to fulfil 
the described role.
The next substantial step involved sending each named person a letter requesting their 
participation in the research, coupled with a simply structured invitation questionnaire 
and a covering letter from the study's supervisor (see Appendix B)^ .^ The detailed field 
work began properly from that point onwards with those companies which accepted the 
invitation.
Total hours differed from tape hours in at least five ways:
a) Data-gathering methods other tlian interviewing were used (as will be explained in section 4.12).
b) Some data was not tape-recorded but notes were jotted down (e.g. during company tours and 
demonstrations).
c) Informal discussions (on the subject matter of the research) were not usually tape-recorded.
d) Sensitive comments, typically critical of top or other management groups or individuals, had to be 
kept "off tlie record"; tliey were aired on the condition that they should not be recorded on tape.
e) During interviews some time was not recorded because it involved document examination or 
visually-aided explanation of company details in general or specific information on an issue of concern.
^^The invitation questionnaire’s objectives were to:
a) Gather basic factual data about a greater number of companies than needed and, thus, identify those 
amongst them most appropriate for the data requirements of this study.
b) Identify which areas of information technology in manufacturing industry to investigate as an 
integration topic. Eventually, C ADC AM was selected but only after further data collection during the 
first visits to the researched companies.
c) Invite companies to participate in the study. The most suited companies were eventually researched.
I l l
The inlerviewecs were invited to visit the Department of Management, University o f St. Andrews. 
Three managers from Company 4 accepted the invitation; they spent a day on campus and participated 
in singular interviews and group discussions on the research. Sustaining the relationships with such 
key informants was another benefit from the experience.
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It was essential to note from the outset that an access permission would be subject to 
the condition that a company's normal business operations should not be disrupted to 
any considerable extent. Also, in negotiating access it was important to win the trust of 
the contact persons at an early stage and then build confidence gradually. With regard to 
this point, Buchanan, Boddy and Me Caiman (1988: 57) advised researchers to close 
the distance between their potential respondents and themselves by telling them what
they wanted to "learn from your experience", have a "conversation", and "write an ]account" in place of "research by interview leading to publication", because the latter |
carried "potentially threatening connotations" implying that "commercial secrets and j
personal revelations will be revealed in ‘The Guardian’ within the week". |
In one instance, for example, the gate-keeper of Company 1 arranged for the researcher !
to interview two of the company's managers. The researcher's meeting with them i
lasted for about two hours and towards the end of the interview one of them asked: I
"What are you going to do with the information that you got from us today? How J
many people are participating in this work?" (Case 1). In another instance, a gate­
keeper made sure that his concern about confidentiality was well understood. He said:
“What's the position with regard to the thesis that you write? Will it be available to .... 
university assessors and possibly external assessors .... you may, you or your colleagues, 
want to publish a paper or get a paper to a symposium or seminar? One thing that we would 
prefer obviously from an area of commercial confidentiality is that anything that you take 
from our discussions wouldn't be specified specifically against the company; you wouldn't say
[naming the company] have th is  We don't want to give our competitors the advantage of
telling them what stage of development we are a t  ” (Case 4).
As the field work progressed and the researcher got on well with the informants, formal 
reserved ness decreased and a less formal atmosphere encouraged the researcher to ask 
questions which could have seemed threatening at first^^. The progress of the field 
work gave respondents the opportunity to understand the research and the researcher 
better and appreciate more the importance of their contribution; "rich information is a 
product of close relationships of mutual trust and respect" (Buchanan, Boddy and 
McCalman (1988: 61).
4.9 Progress of the Research
To be successful, a qualitative research should analyse situations, recognise and avoid 
bias, obtain valid and reliable data, and involve imaginative abstract thinking. Hence, a 
qualitative researcher requires theoretical and social sensitivity, maintaining an
analytical distance and drawing upon past experience and theoretical knowledge to 
interpret what he/she sees. In Strauss and Corbin's (1990) words, he/she needs "power 
of observation", good "interactional skills", and an effective interaction with data to 
increase, progressively, during the course of the research his/her insight and 
understanding about the phenomenon under study and the parameters of the evolving 
theory.
In the case of this study the empirical research process began with an inquiry into the 
work organisation arrangements around CAD in the companies. That was encouraged 
by the fact that CAD systems were, invariably, a well-established technology 
application. This beginning necessitated a thorough (vertical) investigation of the 
structures, processes and work flows of the design/engineering functions of the 
respective companies. The next step involved a (horizontal) penetration of the 
companies with a view to understanding the design-manufacture interface, 
communications and organisational adjustments required to accommodate integrated 
CAD CAM into the organisational settings. The integration inquiry was launched on this 
basis; the investigation was not constrained to CAD nor was it meant to address 
integration directly, although this would have saved time and effort. It was a piecemeal 
approach aimed at building an understanding of the companies’ historical experiences 
of inU'oducing, managing, maintaining and developing CAD.
One of the major concerns of the research at the early stages was to try to find 
organisationally-explainable reasons for the differences found in companies' 
experience. For example, why did some companies have CAD only, some CAM only, 
while others had CADCAM applications? Why particular functions computerised their 
work while others did not? Could these vary due to organisational reasons? How 
significant were the organisational factors in relation to technical and business factors? 
It was through questions such as these that organisational issues could be explored. 
Therefore, extending an initially CAD investigation into production/manufacturing 
functions was unavoidable. So was tracing the organisational responses and effects of 
CAM and CAPP applications in the design office.
Before entering the field, methodology planning had already been begun but not 
completed to avoid being fixated on a readily prepared and detailed research design. 
This approach aimed to assist the researcher to capture data about problems when 
opportunities arose, which might turn out to be a source of research issues more 
worthy of investigation than pre-detemiined ones. As Whyte (1984: 35) put it:
“The initial phase of the project should be considered a social exploration  the first
requirement is to gain some initial familiarity .... establish a social base from which we can 
continue our exploration until we are able to study some parts of that territory systematically”
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END sampling & START 
field work (ftom Exhibit 4.1)
Preparinv for F ield  W ork: Contact & .A cj;ess^X W m ter-Sonn2 . 1991i
I
i
I
II
I
Acculmulative data gathering, recording, coding (indexing), andanalysis
-4 -
F ield Work..-FMASKJ.
(Sum m er. 1992) 
U sine In terview  SshSsUU&JL
< -
F ield Work - 
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U sine In terview  
Schedule II
Field Work - 
PHASE III 
(Sorine. 1992 - 
Sum m er, 1996) 
M ainlv unstructured
data collection
FIELDWORK (PHASES I-ni): preperations for next stage and/or continuous assessment of data gaps and needes(including pilot studies, scmtiny of interview schedules, and modification of schedules or addition of further questions)
Resorting to the field for filling gaps in data, checking and confirming validity of data as understood by the resracher
Final data/findings analysis, interpretation, theory development, and conclusions
Sending Reports to Participating Companies for feedback and validation
END of field work & study
Exhibit 4.4 
Field work (including interviewing) progress
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As Exhibit 4.4 shows, the entire field work comprised three major stages of 
concentrated effort in the field: Phase I (Summer, 1991), Phase II (Winter - Spring, 
1992) and phase-III (Spring, 1992 - Summer, 1996).
The researcher’s three-phase strategy can be summarised as follows:
* Phase I:
Each of the companies was visited once during phase I. Each fact-finding visit included 
an inteiwiew with the "official" gate-keeper of the company in concern. Consequently, 
frequent visits were made during the following phases. Multiple interviews were 
sometimes conducted during a single day. Other data-collection techniques were also 
applied. A semi-structured Interview Schedule I (see Appendix B) was used on-site in 
each of the cases. Its objectives were to:
1) Collect personal interviewee data to put different accounts of given infonuation into 
context.
2) Collect more general company details to fill the data gaps from the previous 
invitation questionnaire.
3) Decide on the area of integrating technologies to be investigated. Whereas the 
invitation questionnaire aimed to identify potential areas (e.g. CADCAM and MRP II), 
the aim at this stage was to make a final decision.
4) Find out what issues were encountered in the selected companies' experiences of 
introducing CADCAM. The purpose was to guide further research design via recording 
the issues that were of concern to the informants with a view to "grounding" the rest of 
the research design process in the data emerging from the field.
Up to the end of phase I methodology was not yet formalised strictly, although outlines 
of it were being synthesised gradually in the researcher's mind and research diary. 
Consolidating a firni base for open and continuous data gathering was the main priority 
at this point.
* Phase II:
Interviews in phase II were more detailed; phase II was the most systematically 
structured part of the investigation. Semi-structured Interview schedule II (see 
Appendix D) was devised to guide the most detailed stage of data collection in the 
research. It was designed on the basis of the above mentioned assumptions and 
tentative questions. Each of the interview schedule questions drew, both directly and 
indirectly, on, and was therefore theoretically linked to, more than a tentative question, 
as shown in Exhibit 4.5. It consisted of nine sections.
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Interview  
Schedule II 
(Content)
Section; Questions
Tentative Research Questions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I 01-03 /
II 04-08 /
III 09-24 / / / /
IV 25-35 / /
V 36-37 / /
VI 38-41 / /
VII 42-47 /
VIII 48-61 /
IX 62-62 /
Exhibit 4.5Linking intreview schedules II questions to the tentative questions of the research
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The objectives of each of the sections (see Exhibit 4.5 and Appendix D) could be 
summaiised as follows:
1) Section I aimed to collect detailed background information about CAD/CAM as an 
investment project in terms of time of acquisition, cost, and technical specifications. 
This section was placed in the beginning of the schedule in order to smooth the flow of 
the interview by giving the interviewee an opportunity to begin by talking about 
something well known to him without committing himself to more sensitive comments 
about himself, his colleagues or the company at large.
2) Section II aimed to achieve a description of how the DEM process was conducted in 
the interviewee's respective company and how this had been affected by the 
introduction of CAD/CAM in work flow and organisation terms.
3) Section III aimed to build an understanding of how the process of change unfolded 
in the organisation in terms of adoption, formulation of objectives, implementation, 
formal justification, upgrading and development, and inter-managerial relations.
4) Section IV aimed to explore possible organisation-wide effects of CAD/CAM on 
work organisation, employment, recruitment and training as perceived by the 
interviewee. The specific implications of CAD/CAM for the engineering and 
manufacturing functions were targeted.
5) Section V focused on the possible impacts of CAD/CAM on job design. It took a 
micro view to complement the information gained from section IV.
6) Section VI aimed to establish the effects of CAD/CAM on industrial relations.
7) Section VII aimed to build an understanding of the interviewee's own evaluation of 
CAD/CAM, as investment project areas, in terms of stated objectives and his notions of 
success and failure.
8) Section VIII was devoted to integration. It aimed to reveal how the interviewee 
conceptualised integration, establish the company's position vis-a-vis integration, leain 
how early integration thinking had begun in the company, identify the difficulties that 
were faced, and how the company approached CADCAM integration in the historical 
context of its technological evolution in this area.
9) Section IX aimed to collect personal interviewee information to put the interview in 
context. This section was placed at the end of the schedule due to the relative sensitivity 
of its questions to the inteiwiewee. As will be explained in section 4.13, towards the 
end of an interview, invariably, rapport was established and more sensitive questions
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appeared to be more happily acceptable than if asked in the beginning. The researcher 
learned this from his experience of the first few interviews. This question was designed 
to maximise informant reliability measures in terms of assessing the informant’s 
position in the social structure of his respective organisation. As Whyte (1984) pointed 
out, this would be likely to shape his/her perceptions, recollections, and descriptions as 
conditioned by his/her personality. The researcher had to be aware of subsequent 
implications for the reliability of the informant as an accurate reporter.
* Phase III:
Phase III also involved the use of Interview Schedule II but to a lesser extent. It mainly 
involved an unstructured approach to data-gathering. The data collected during this 
phase had to be supported by asking many open questions and some unstructured parts 
which did not appear on the schedule but were raised in accordance with the theoretical 
development of data sampling, coding and analysis. Four features distinguished data- 
gathering during phase III, namely that it served to:
1) Fill the gaps in the data already gathered from phases I and II.
2) Clarify the vagueness of some data details, which was discovered during data coding 
and analysis.
3) Provide an extensive period of time for monitoring the progress of the integration 
process as it unfolded in the companies; phase III was devoted totally to data collection 
on CADCAM integration.
4) Help with the more advanced stages of axial and selective coding in developing the 
substantive and formal theoretical propositions on CADCAM.
Field work was an effective learning process as far as the researcher was concerned. 
During its later stages, as interview and observation questions were capable of being 
directed by the emerging theory, the researcher became able to ask direct questions 
bearing on the categories. These could thus be answered sufficiently and fairly quickly, 
as suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967).
The field research process was supported by relevant literatures throughout its 
progress, as was discussed in Chapter 1. Other "technical and "non-technical" 
literatures, as ternied in a GT frame of reference (see Strauss and Corbin, 1990), were 
used to support the research. Technical literature comprised published books, research 
papers, and conference proceeding reports which served as background materials 
against which the research's findings were compared. It was used: 1) for stimulating 
theoretical sensitivity, 2) as a secondary source of data, 3) for stimulating questions, 4) 
for directing theoretical sampling, and 5) as a supplemental^ validation.
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Non-technical literature, on the other hand, comprised company correspondence, 
manuscripts, memos, records, reports, commercial catalogues, newsletters, technical 
product drawings and design information documents as well as other materials that 
could be used as primary data or to supplement interviews and field observations. 
Much was learned about the organisations, their structures, and how they functioned, 
that was not visible immediately in observations or interviews (see Strauss and Corbin, 
1990).
4 . 10  Testing Data Collection Instruments
Interview Schedule II was the main research instrument in this study. A critical 
examination of it was necessary to test and improve the quality of its constituent 
questions and the style of its presentation. This effort concluded a five-month period of 
its preparation, development and refinement.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, five academics (including the two co-supervisors) and 
three neutral doctoral students were requested to play the role of an interviewee and a 
peer examiner and provide a critical feedback before field work started. To begin with, 
a pilot study was carried out as a way of testing and enhancing interviewing skills; one 
company was visited and its general manager inteiviewed. Also, a mock-up interview 
situation was simulated before entering the field: one of the academics^ ^  was willing to 
spare about two hours for a test interview which was based on Interview Schedule I. 
That was followed by a critical evaluation. Criticisms were taken into account and acted 
upon. These two measures were based on the assumption that an academic and an 
industrial assessment would both be required simultaneously for a balanced evaluation 
of the content of the Schedule and the presentation style of the interviewer.
The invitation questionnaire and Interview Schedule I were much simpler, shorter and, 
by far, less vital in terms of the data they sought to target. Their credibility implications 
were much less significant in the context of the methodology followed because they 
were used to collect basic company background information which was later 
continuously completed, revised and updated whenever a need arose. Therefore, only
■^^ Thrce of llic academics were members of staff at ihe Department of Management, University o f St. 
Andrews and the other two external academics. Both groups were chosen so as to provide, collectively, 
an evaluation of content and presentation style.
^^This was among the 20 "accepting" companies but not included among the ten cases because it did 
not meet all the criteria specified in section 4.3.
member of staff at the Department of Management, University o f St. Andrews', he was not a 
supervisor but chosen as a neuü al academic.
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the study's two co-supervisors' critical feedback was sought to guide the testing and 
enhancement of the two remaining research instruments prior to full-scale application.
4.11 Data Collection and Interpretation Procedures
Data collection, analysis and interpretation procedures in any study would depend 
highly on a range of factors, including: (1) the circumstances in which the data is 
collected, (2) the nature of the data available and the researcher's own interpretations of 
such data, (3) the experience of the researcher, (4) the many contingencies that affect an 
individual researcher personally or a team of researchers, (5) the character of the 
audiences for whom research is written and published, and (6) the scope and generality 
of the theory for which the researcher aims (see Strauss, 1987: 24).
In summary, the objectives of the data collection and analysis procedures utilised in this 
research could be summarised in two points: (1) "data reduction" (i.e. bringing the 
collected data under conti'ol in the form of "manageable chunks") and (2) "data 
interpretation" (i.e. bringing "meaning and insight to the words and acts of the 
participants of the study") with a view to theory generation (see Marshall and Rossman, 
1989: 114).
It is obvious that data analysis would form a crucial part of any research process. 
Analytic procedures would fall into five modes: ".... organising the data; generating 
categories, themes and patterns; testing the emergent hypotheses against the data; 
searching for alternative explanations of the data; and writing the report" (see Marshall 
and Rossman, 1989: 114). Similar exercises were undertaken in this research, though 
not in a predefined or orderly manner involving a preconceived sequence of 
procedures, as could be recollected from Chapter 3. GT could be distinguished from 
other qualitative approaches not only by the relative unpredictability of research phases, 
which they might tend to share, but also by the "differences per stage in the 
combination and permutations of operations (theoretical sampling, comparative 
analysis, theoretical saturation )" (Strauss, 1987: 24).
Joint, cyclical data collection, analysis and inteipretation meant that resumed collection, 
at any moment, was informed by current analysis which yielded further interpretation 
opportunities. In turn, the emerging theoretical categories guided further data collection, 
causing and orienting the resumption of data using the same or a more suited data 
collection method. Interpretation was the most demanding part of the triangular cycle 
since it involved the development and attachment of meaning to data and the 
communication of such meaning as clearly and convincingly as possible.
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The following section will describe the data collection methods used in the field 
research in the context of the overall design of the study described in Chapter 3.
4.12  Data Collection Methods
In this study choice of data collection methods was made on the assumption that it was 
in day-to-day reality that behaviour patterns would manifest themselves, more so than 
in formal interviews. A longitudinal research design was, therefore, justified to capture 
such complexity; to obseiwe nomiative behaviour simultaneously with rational decision­
making and to comprehend how managers followed their own mental structures 
resulting from their training, relationships, contacts, and perceived realities. As 
explained in Chapter 3, questionnaire methods were considered inappropriate for this 
research because they could not reveal such things. Choice of research methods was 
aimed at understanding and interpreting real-life situations, which necessitated personal 
attendance on the part of the researcher in the organisational settings concerned, 
together with fonnally gathered interview data.
Ten methods were used to collect field data. Each of these methods contributed to an 
integrated data-gathering strategy. The methods could be presented around the 
researcher's main field work activities, as follows:
* Guided Tours (of company sites, offices and factories)
* Visually-aided Talks (about general company background information and 
specific projects and initiatives of interest to the study)
* Demonstrations (on computerised system software or/and shop floor 
machinery)
* Interviews
* Observations
* Examination of Companv Documents
* Formal Group Discussions
* Informal Discussions with individual Informants (including socialising)
* Telephone Conversations
* Postal and Fax Correspondences
Flexible research methods and semi-structured interview schedules enabled the 
researcher to take a careful account of variations among individual informants due to 
differences in age, personality, position, profession, qualification and former work 
experience. Without such flexibility, the subjects of the study could only have afforded 
to take a passive respondent's role. Through this approach, however, the researcher 
was able to take advantage of specific situations as they unfolded. For example, the 
researcher encouraged those informants who were especially knowledgeable and/or
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interested to become particularly active by showing keen enthusiasm to listen to what 
they had to say, without being unaware about dangers of potential biases inherent in 
relying on a single informant. By seeking an informant's active help, intensive 
collaborative relations with a few key informants were developed, which served to 
enrich the data and deepen the analysis.
Combining observation with interviewing was useful; for example, it improved 
reliability (see Bryman, 1989). Observations alone could not reveal what people were 
trying to accomplish or why they acted in the way they did; interviewing alone could 
not provide a sufficient explanation of the underlying dynamics in certain situations 
unless the researcher knew in advance the rewards people were seeking or the penalties 
they were trying to avoid. In other words, obseiwing guided the researcher to important 
questions he wanted to ask the respondents, whilst interviewing assisted him in 
interpreting the significance of what he observed.
After each interview or visit data was systematically recorded, indexed and analysed at 
that point in time, as will be explained in more detail in section 4.14. Final analysis and 
interpretation of the findings was based on an accumulative process of data-gathering, 
recording, indexing and analysis, which began from phase I. Interviewing formed a 
very important aspect of the field research process. It would thus deserve more 
clarification of the procedures followed in interviewing. The following section will 
address issues such as these.
4.13 The Interviews
Interviewees included selected managers in charge of technical functions and in 
technical support positions placed at varying senior levels in their respective 
organisations (see Exhibits 4.6 [a] and [b], 4.7 [a] and [b], and 4.8).
Informants were selected on the basis of their working relationships with the computer 
technologies concerned^Engineering and Manufacturing personnel were identified in 
phase I and interviewed systematically during phases II and III in the primary cases.
Exhibit 4.7 [a] and [b] show, only five out of the 35 informants interviewed (14%) occupied 
positions in areas other than in the two main functions in concern. These individuals had to be 
consulted or interviewed because some of them occupied official gate-keeping positions (e.g. in Cases 
1, 4 and 9) while others were approached to provide missing relevant information needed for data 
analysis.
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Exhibit 4,6 (a) Informants classified according to formal position: primary cases
Company ChiefExecutive Fun'al.Director Dept’al.Head
Technical
Manager/
SuperT.
Engineer/
Technic'n.
Total no. of 
Informants
1 *MKD *MFM*PEM *SSM*DBI *ACE 6
2 *OPD *DNM *DSM(CAD) 3
3 *OPD*TLD *PDM 3
4 *TGM *ESM*DOM 3
5 *MPM*MSM *DSM*CSE 4
TOTAL: 19
KEY TO EXHIBIT 4.6 fa) and (iû
ACE: Architectural Engineer MOD: Managing Director
CSE: Principal CAD Support Engineer MKD: Marketing Director
DBI: Data Base Inspector OPD: Operations Director
DEM: Design Engineering Manager PDM: Product Development Manager
DNM: Design Manager PEM: Production Engineering Manager
DOM: Drawing Office Manager QAM: Quality Assurance Manager
DSM: Design Services Manager TOM: Training Manager
ECE: Electronics/Electrical Engineer TLD: Technical Director
ESM: Engineering Syatems Manager TLM: Technical Manager
MFM: Manufacturing Manager
C o m p a n y ChiefExecutive Fun'al.Director Dept'al.Head
Technical
Manager/
Super'r.
Engineer/
Techni’n.
T o t a l  n o .  o f  
I n f o r m a n t s
6 *MGD *DEM*TLM*OAM *PDM 5
7 *DNM *ECE*MCE 3
8 *OPM *SPE*CME 3
9 *MGD *PDM 2
10 *TLD *TLM *ECE 3
TOTAL: 16
Exhibit 4.6 (b) Informants classified according to formal position: secondary cases
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Exhibit 4.7 (a)Informants classified according to functional specialisation: primary companies
Company Design/Engineering
Manufacturing/
Production Others
Total
Number
of
Informants
1
*  A r c h i t e c t u r a l  E n g i n e e r  
* D a t a  B a s e  I n s p e c t o r  
♦ S y a t a m e s  M a n a g e r
♦ M a n u f a c ' g ,  M a n a g e r  
♦ M a n u f a c ' g . / P r o d ' n .  
E n g i n e e r i n g  M a n a g e r ♦ M a r k e t i n g  M a n a g e r 6
2
♦ D e s i g n  M a n a g e r  
D e s i g n  S u p p o r t  
( C A D  M a n a g e r ) ♦ O p e r a t i o n s  D i r e c t o r 3
3 ♦ P r o d u c t  D e v e l o p m e n t  M a n a g e r  
♦ T e c h n i c a l  D i r e c t o r ♦ O p e r a t i o n s  D i r e c t o r 3
4 " D r a w i n g  O f f i c e  M a n a g e r  " E n g i n e e r i n g  S y s t e m s  
M a n a g e r ♦ T r a i n i n g  M a n a g e r 3
5 ♦ E n g i n e e r i n g  D e s i g n  S e r v i c e s  M a n a g e r  
♦ C A D  S u p p o r t  E n g i n e e r
♦ M a n u f a c ' g .  S y s t e m s  
M a n a g e r  
♦ M a t e r i a l s  M a n a g e r 4
T O T A L : 1 9
Company D esign/Engineering
Manufacturing/
Production Others
Total
Number
of
Informants
6 ♦ P r o d u c t  D v L  M a n a g e r  ♦ S e n i o r  D e s i g n  M g r .  
♦ T e c h n i c a l  M a n a g e r
♦ M a n a g i n g  D i r e c t o r  
♦ Q u a l i t y  A s s u r a n c e  
M a n a g e r 5
7 ♦ D e s i g n  M a n a g e r  ♦ E l e c t r o n i c s  E n g i n e e r  
♦ M e c h a n i c a l  E n g i n e e r 3
8 ♦ C A M  E n g i n e e r  ♦ O p e r a t i o n s  M a n a g e r  
♦ S e n i o r  P r d n .  E n g i n e e r 3
9 ♦ P r o d u c t  D e v e l o p m e n t  M a n a g e r ♦ M a n a g i n g  D i r e c t o r 2
10 ♦ E l e c t r o n i c s  E n g i n e e r  ♦ T e c h n i c a l  D i r e c t o r  
♦ T e c h n i c a l  M a n a g e r 3
T O T A L : 1 6
Exhibit 4.7 (b)Informants classified according to functional specialisation: primary companies
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Exhibit 4.8Informants classified according to formal management stratumin the ten companies
\H ierarchical 
N. Level
Job
Capacity
Numbero fSeniorLevelInformants
Numbero fMiddleLevelInformants
Numbero fSupervisoryLevel
Informants
MainlyManagerialExecutiveRoles
7 18 3 28
MainlyTechnincalSupportRoles 0
2 5 7
S U B - T O T A L S : 7 20 8 TOTAL. 3 5
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Formal interviews'^ required sensitivity in responding to individual informants' styles. 
The researcher aimed to strike a balance between the issues that informants felt like 
talking about because they were of vital importance to them and those which the 
researcher believed should be addressed in the best interest of the study, which 
sometimes appeared to be of little interest to some informants. Therefore, the degree of 
"directiveness" in the researcher's style of interviewing varied from one interview to 
another according to: (1) the nature and style of the informant concerned and (2) the 
progress (or lack of it) from one idea to the next. Wherever informants expressed 
strong attitudes towards other people, organisations or situations, it was important to 
probe them for reports of experience to help the researcher understand how such 
attitudes had been shaped.
Most interviewees started talking in a guarded way when they were interviewed for the 
first time. Their later remarks tended to be more frank but not necessarily more 
accurate. It should be said that rapport-building was time consuming in some cases^^.
In formal interview situations the interviewer deliberately kept the opening of the 
conversation away from evaluative topics by starting with simple conversations about 
non-provocative topics of general interest^^.
 ^^ Formal interviews were important for this research for the following reasons:
a) Acquiring firsthand information from key and high-ranking persons playing key roles in leading 
technological change in their respective organisations was facilitated.
b) Interviews were an effective way for yielding a high percentage of returns from most correspondents. 
They enabled the researcher to motivate respondents to give full and accurate answers as questions were 
directed to them as individuals.
c) Emerging questions of crucial theoretical significance to the research were directed personally to 
respondents in such a clear way as to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstandings that would 
probably be more likely to arise in research methods not involving interactive conversations. 
Interviews offered an opportunity for asking more relevant questions and, in some cases, a greater 
number of questions too.
d) The quality of interview data improved considerably with time; accumulative rapport and orientation 
of the respondents helped the securing of acceptable findings.
e) Interviews provided Ilexibility in responding to various styles of personal presentation. A researcher's 
sensitivity should facilitate a continuous observation of a respondent's reaction; accordingly, the topic 
of discussion could be changed or the research problem explained further.
^^Invariably, however, in a first interview a respondent would take a long time to become more 
oriented to the topic of investigation. Consequent interviews took less time and became more efficient 
as the respondent's orientation increased.
^^Interviewees were invited to make descriptive statements to make them feel more relaxed since their 
descriptions of certain phenomena did not always match the researcher's. For example, one interviewee
once insisted: " You might describe this as unique whereas I would describe it as flexible!" (Case
6). First questions in an interview would be about what their jobs entailed, how their jobs fitted into 
the whole production process, what their job histories were, and/or what the specifications were of the 
technology systems they managed. In so doing, the interviewee was invited to talk about things which 
were close to him personally and not "pushed" to reveal his/her inner feelings about the company or 
any other touchy topics.
126
Sensitive evaluative questions were asked later on during the course of an interview. 
However, the researcher still had to wait patiently to ask such questions until the 
respondent's confidence had grown sufficiently. In some cases this process went 
beyond a single interview but took a considerably shorter time in others.
To guard against the possibility of "cooling-off" on the part of an informant, he should 
be contacted further for a casual discussion or interview soon after the first social 
encounter. Continuous liaison was especially important with those identified as key 
informants who observed significant events and were more perceptive and reflective 
about them more than others. As the study proceeded, the researcher sought to get such 
special infomiants more involved in the research by encouraging them to learn precisely 
what the research was looking for. This was done with full consciousness about the 
dangers of relying too heavily on any single informant.
The researcher had to make sure that he understood whatever had been said by an 
informant; even by interrupting and checking him/her. The words not only had to 
understood at "face value", which might reveal the nature of a problem and its solution 
in the eyes of the informant, but also an extra effort had to be made on the interviewer's 
part in seeking enlightenment about the social processes of recognition, decision and 
choice of actions. The latter could be of more interest to the research than the problem 
itself or its proposed solution.
4 .14  Data Recording, Analysis, and Coding
The following three subsections will explain how the data gathered during the course of 
the filed work was recorded, analysed and coded.
4.14 .1  Recording: Method and Procedure
Data recording was an important consideration from the outset. Tape-recording was the 
major technique used in the field, particularly during formal interviews. Note-taking 
was also used whilst on site and after each visit, which helped in subsequent report 
writing. Which techniques to use and when depended on: (1) the nature of the data to 
be recorded, (2) the data collection method involved, (3) the degree of formality 
associated with a particular situation, and (4) the stage of development of the study. In 
certain circumstances it was more important to give full attention to the informant than 
to ttike notes; the researcher aimed to activate interviews by asking questions, clarifying 
vague points and, thus, achieve the required output of an interview.
In short, tape-recording was preferred in formal interviews because note taking 
interfered with the flow of the interview and yet could not capture its whole
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atmosphere. All the formal interviews conducted by the researcher were both tape- 
recorded and tianscribed using a transcription machine^\
4 .1 4 .2  Analysis: Method and Procedure
At the early stages of the field work the emphasis was on data collection. As the 
process progressed, however, the balance changed as more coding and analysis became 
necessary. The researcher analysed the material at various times: immediately after 
leaving the field and sometimes during the evening between successive days of data 
collection (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
In open, axial and selective coding and analysis of the data the main emphasis was on 
action and interaction of and between individuals and groups with the integration 
process as the central phenomenon in focus.
4 .1 4 . 3  Coding: Method and Procedure
Coding is considered at two levels in this section; first, at a level pertaining to how 
participant companies' and individuals' names were coded in order to maintain the 
confidentiality of such infonuation (as explained earlier on in this chapter, section 4.6); 
and second, at a level pertaining to the analytic and interpretative procedures which 
were used to fonuulate and present the findings, including the techniques for indexing 
the data collected. The former concerned the specific actors under investigation in this 
research and their respective organisations. The latter concerned the data collected for 
analysis. The latter type of coding would form an important element of any qualitative 
research (see, for example, Creswell, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) .
Firstly, the data analysis process resulted in the construction of a data bank containing 
information on actors, both informants and those who, although the researcher did not 
meet personally, played a vital role in their respective companies’ experiences of change 
and whose contributions were crucial for answering the research's questions, such as 
former key managers and company founders. Information contained in the data bank 
was obtained either directly from informants or from published and unpublished 
company documents.
In the experience of the researcher, a full interview would typically take between six to ten times of 
its actual duration to transcribe. A two hour interview, for example, would take about 12 to 20 hours 
to transcribe manually or directly word-processed, depending on: (1) the quality of recording, (2) the 
clarity of the respondent’s accent, and (3) the learning and analytical pace of the researcher. This 
confirmed Whyte's (1984: 114) description of transcribing as " an exceedingly time-consuming task, 
even for an experienced stenographer". Transcription took longer when it was combined with coding 
and analysis as the researcher attempted to do such activities simultaneously.
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Secondly, the analysis process involved coding of the data gathered. Coding involved 
those "operations by which data are broken down, conceptualised, and put back 
together in new ways. It is the central process by which theories are built from data" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 57). Coding was meant to: (1) yield theory, (2) strengthen 
the rigour of the research process, and (3) force out the biases and assumptions brought 
to the research process and those that might have developed during it. In other words, 
coding of the data served to "provide the grounding, build the density, and develop the 
sensitivity and integration needed to generate a rich, tightly woven, explanatory theory 
that closely approximates the reality it represents" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 57).
A protocol was developed for coding. It involved all transcribed interviews as well as 
archival materials. The quotations presented in this thesis could be traced to the 
documents they were extracted from^^.
Coding will be explained further in the next section in terms of its three stages of 
development: open, axial and selective.
4.15 Open, Axial and Selective Coding
Open, axial and selective coding procedures were carried out, progressively, during the 
course of the research. Open coding was associated with open sampling which aimed to 
uncover as many potentially relevant categories as possible. This included the sampling 
of persons, places and situations with a view to gathering the most relevant data during 
the early stages of Phase I.
Axial coding followed open coding. The properties and dimensions of the data which 
had been broken down into categories during open coding were reassembled in new 
ways during axial coding using relational and variational sampling procedures. The 
phenomenon under investigation, the causal conditions associated with it, and the 
particular context in which it was embedded became much clearer during this stage. 
This resulted from the uncovering and validation of relationships between 
subcategories, categories and the phenomenon. This was possible as a result of 
answering the questions repetitively raised on the data gathered and using the 
appropriate purposeful action/interaction strategies deployed in handling the data 
already available and pursuing further data.
22xhe protocol was used for data analysis purposes. Using the protocol for the purpose of presenting 
quotations in this thesis was carefully considered and tried at first. However, this was changed. It was 
thought that it would be both unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the appropriate case's serial number 
only would be cited for reference purposes at the end of a quotation.
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Action/interaction strategies were affected, however, by sets of intervening conditions,
or "the broader structural context pertaining to a phenomenon the broader and
general conditions bearing upon action and interaction strategies" (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990: 103). These were not properties of the phenomenon but, rather, conditions 
outside of the phenomenon itself that nevertheless affected the way it was handled in 
either a positive or negative manner. Therefore, the researcher had to do his best in 
contending with the intervening conditions to secure collecting the best quality of data 
in the interest of the study, particularly during the axial and selective coding phases of 
analysis.
Four distinct analytical steps were simultaneously used during axial coding. These 
were:
1) Relating subcategories to a category by hypothesising relationships between them 
and the phenomenon.
2) Verifying resultant hypotheses against actual data.
3) Resuming the search for properties and dimensions of categories and subcategories.
4) Exploring variation on a preliminary basis in preparation for selective coding.
Selective coding followed axial coding. It was concerned with integrating the categories 
uncovered to from a set of grounded theoretical propositions. Five main steps were 
involved at this stage, but not necessarily followed linearly (see Strauss and Corbin, 
1990: 117-118). These were:
1) Explicating the story line.
2) Relating subsidiary categories around the core category.
3) Relating categories at the dimensional level.
4) Validating those relationships against data.
5) Filling in categories that needed further refinement and/or development.
Once the core categoiy was identified, the next step involved determining its properties 
and dimensions and relating the other categories to it. Hence, the other categories 
would become subsidiary categories. Resultant propositions would then be checked or 
validated against the data which they fitted sometimes but not always. When they fitted 
the data they were maintained. When they failed to fit the data, however, further 
theoretical sampling was required in order to identify the reasons for the lack of fit with 
the data, with a view to validation of the resulting theory.
4 .16  Summary
This chapter described the details of how the field research was conducted. It began 
with a description of the basis on which the companies researched were selected.
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distinguished between primary and secondary companies, and explained about the 
progress of the research process and the main activities involved in it.
It also clarified important points regarding the interview schedules used and explained 
the measures taken to insure the validity and reliability of the main interview schedule.
It gave a particular attention to the methods and procedures followed in data collection, 
coding, analysis and interpretation. Coding was described both in terms of data about 
the cases (i.e. concerning companies and individual actors) and data from the cases (i.e. 
as required to answer the tentative research questions and develop theoretical 
proposition through open, axial and selective coding).
Field work activities, interviewing in particular, proved to be an extended learning 
opportunity to the researcher. A great deal was learned about the ten companies, the 
change processes concerned, the organisational structures and processes that affected 
change in positive and negative ways, and the actions and interactions involved as well 
as the contextual boundaries surrounding them. It would be difficult to imagine that 
such a rich picture could be achieved using any other methodology.
One important thing should be said, however, about the field work methodology 
followed: it was a labour-intensive approach indeed in terms of the frequency of visits, 
transcription of interview materials, and coding and analysis of the resulting data which 
was voluminous and difficult to handle. The longer the time spent on a study like this, 
the more likely that the researcher would refine his/her understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation and develop a more tested theory.
One important practical advantage of this methodology, nevertheless, became 
abundantly clear at the end. The researcher could afford to appear less intrusive than in 
the case of action research or participant observation by building trust and continuity 
into the research process progressively with time. The accumulation of such trust and 
continuity was very important in helping the researcher gain a greater degree of access 
to "protected" data that could further improve the quality of his understanding and thus 
that of the resulting theory.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Findings, Data Analysis and Discussion - I: Introducing
the Cases in the Study
5 .1  Introduction
This chapter aims to introduce the cases in the study. It paves the way for a thematic 
presentation and analysis of the data collected on the ten companies (in Chapter 6) by 
providing background information about each company separately. This will involve 
elucidating some key company details in order to lay out the foundations for the 
comparative analytical context required for the purpose of cross-case data analysis in 
Chapter 6. Each company’s engineering and manufacturing activities will be briefly 
explained in relation to the DEM technology applications they use in their operations. 
The history of technological change in each company will be addressed in terms of 
CADCAM. The emphasis will be on the organisational effects of the 1970s/80s 
investments in CAD and CAM systems and the consequent organisational context for 
further investment in integrating such systems.
The present chapter assumes a dual role pertaining to the experiences of both the 
primary and secondary cases in relation to their position vis-a-vis CADCAM integration 
under the conditions brought about by the emergent context of the 1990s. Therefore, it 
will be divided into two sections; the first (section 5.2) deals with the primary cases and 
the second (section 5.3) with the secondary cases. This chapter concludes with a 
summary comparing the key features of the integrating and non-integrating strategies.
5.2 The Prim ary Cases
This section focuses on the integration process as it is managed in the respective 
experiences of the five primary cases (Company 1 to Company 5). It covers a case-by- 
case presentation of the relevant findings relating to the above-mentioned historical and 
current aspects of the CADCAM integration process and the organisational issues 
associated with it.
* STUDY ONE: Company I
Company 1 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a giant manufacturer of speciality 
chemicalsk The company, which is the subject of investigation in this case, is one of
^The holding group was established in 1888. It is now one of the largest independent groups listed on 
the UK Stock Exchange, with operations in 27 countries. The group's marketing performance has 
improved since the early 1990s. According to the chairman, this achievement has become possible =
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several independently-managed subsidiary companies owned by the group and 
controlled through five autonomous international divisions located, geographically, 
according to global market areas.
The company was formed in 1969 to supply advanced photomasking services^. In 
1986 it acquired another photomask manufacturer and operations have since been 
carried out in the company's only factory in Glenrothes, "Scotland's Silicon Glen".
The company is the only one of its kind in Scotland:
“ I  would guess we are very untypical as a company There are only two other mask shops }
in Britain [other than in Scotland] and the number in the world is probably a few hundred.” |
The company's UK market constitutes about 30% of its business. Hence, senior ;
managers often complain of challenging "inflationary and exchange types of problems" [
encountered in international trade. i
I
With 95 employees, Company 1 is the smallest of the primary cases in work force |
terms. Although business performance has suffered a decrease in demand from its 
customers in the defence electronics market since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
company has continued to be profitable over the last few years. |
#
The company's mission is clearly defined as "providing a service to the semiconductor j
industry". Very little creative design work is carried out in the company because the i
manufacture of photomasks is invariably based on customers’ specifications. Customer I
firms in the semiconductor industry tend to be larger and more powerful than Company 
1 in terms of bargaining transactions. Therefore, the design engineers' role is basically |
concerned with coding up customers' drawings. Most of the work carried out within 
the design department consists of processing customer-supplied data by converting it i
from a given format to a suitable machine format for manufacture and inspection. j
Customer orders are quoted on an individual basis, but data processing jobs have fixed t
prices for most customers. On receiving a potential customer’s inquiry, CAD and data i
processing department staff would assess the work needed and quote a price. If the 
customer accepted the offer, then data would be sent back from the sales department to i
the CAD department so that work on the order could begin. Machine-readable i
instructions would then be sent to the manufacturing department to begin and control '
production operations according to schedule. j
= due to "the enlargement and extension of the group" during the 1980s, which "brought about a I
transformation in the scale and breadth of operations". j
^Photomasks are specialist tools used for the manufacture of PCBs. High precision patterns are printed |
on pellicles to customised PCB designs and supplied in batches to customers in the semiconductor !
industry. |
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The company utilises high-precision process technology. An intensive TQM program is 
in application with a view to involving people across and at all levels of the 
organisation. The aim of this program is to "get things right first time, because we can't 
afford non-confoimities - very expensive". The great emphasis that is placed on quality 
throughout the company can be understood in terms of the complexity of a finished 
photomask which incorporates a combination of intricate artistic input and precision 
engineering.
Seven separate but inter-linked CAD systems are deployed for 2D drafting purposes. 
They include a combination of VAX, SUN and PC hardware equipment and VMS, 
DEC, TITS', Princess, and AutoCAD software packages: "There is a sort of historical
progression here. In 1986 we got Princess. It was the first graphics ed ito r ".
Multiple software packages were needed in order to address different customers' data 
formats.
The shop floor takes the form of separate clean-room production environments, each of 
which is designed for a specific manufacturing or inspection process and 
accommodates one or more computerised machines which could be classified into six 
main categories with respect to the purpose for which they are used: 1) electron beam 
equipment, 2) optical equipment, 3) inspection equipment, 4) laser repair systems, 5) 
mask-cleaning system, and 6) pellicle attachment and repair machines.
Computerisation has played a vital role in the company's operations. The Principal 
Architectural Engineer has worked in the company since 1976 and is, therefore, in a 
good position to describe the changes that he has experienced in process technology in 
pmticular:
“Basically, the whole manufacturing has changed significantly since 76. So what was needed
at the front end is different to what we need now  Tolerance requirements are different. In
7 6  tolerances were .... + or - 50 microns and it's down to + or - 0.5 micron and even tighter.
.... So there's a big difference ”
Technological change in this case is a continuous response to continuously changing 
customer demands. This is held to be vital for maintaining established customers' 
"credibility". This attitude prevails among managers of various disciplines and at all 
levels.
It could be said that investment in CAD began in 1974 when a simple digitising system 
was introduced. The next major step was taken in 1985 as the first VAX' machine was 
introduced together with a graphics editing software. It was then the first and only 
work station.
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A unique feature of the evolution of computer-based technologies in this case is 
progress by accumulation and expansion, rather than by replacement, as is the case 
with the rest of the companies. Whenever a need for change in an existing system is 
recognised, new software or/and hardware components are added in order to satisfy an 
emerging customer's data processing requirement by using a data format that is 
compatible with the one used by the customer in concern. Such a situation is justified 
on the basis of management determination to sustain sound business relations with 
long-established customers who have the commercial power to dictate conditions or 
else turn to other photomask suppliers. Therefore, the present configuration of process 
technologies could be described as a "collection" of accumulated choices that have been 
made frequently since 1974.
However, it should be noted that the present Systems Manager, who joined the 
company in 1989, and thus was not here when his predecessor selected and managed 
the introduction of CAD in 1985, criticised the latter for the lack of "a proper evaluation 
of an attentive type" and "a comprehensive analysis of what system to go for", because 
he "wasn't intellectually strong". When a detailed explanation about the history of CAD 
development in the company was sought, the former even suggested that the latter went 
for the only system he knew about at that time because "some body tried to sell him it".
Continuous change in technology has forced redeployment and retraining of 
employees. New work groups have frequently been formed and assigned new 
responsibilities. This has been often unproblematic due to the company's relatively 
small size, relatively flexible structure, and friendly inter-personal relations.
Eight people work in design and data processing, four of whom are regular CAD users 
enjoying free, unstructured access to the system. They rotate jobs amongst them in a 
remarkably flexible and informal manner. No specified responsibilities are allocated and 
jobs are far from being standardised in terms of working times and job specifications.
Integration has been taken seriously by senior management over the last six years. 
System interfacing efforts in the company aim to develop the existing network of CAD 
systems, which is itself linked to other departments and to customers' networks. CAD 
was linked to inspection in 1990 and to manufacturing a year after:
“The problem started when data started to be too big for tapes. So that's what made us transfer
the data to make us oriented towards manufacturing requirements rather than tlie reverse.”
In this case integration could be addressed at two levels. Firstly, management have 
recognised a need for design and manufacturing engineers to work more closely 
together than ever before to consolidate a simultaneous internal communication. The
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close co-operation requirements imposed by the nature of the product development 
process were an influential factor behind this development.
“There's somelliing that makes us very weak: [it] is that our application is so specialised and 
having to manage how to manufacture is a big tiling as far as transferring data from design to 
manufacture.”
Therefore, a formal decision was made by the company's Board of Directors that 
engineers of all disciplines should meet fortnightly to " solve out any engineering- 
related issues". CE is devised as a means for consolidating communication to improve 
concurrency between design and manufacturing
Secondly, a large degree of external dependency on customers has pressed management 
to consider integration at a business level. Engineering and inspection staff now have to 
work more closely with their counterparts in customer firms to insure early involvement 
in product development. From a senior management's point of view, the company's 
business interests have necessitated this concurrency aiTangement on the part of their 
staff.
More than half of the orders received at present are channelled already via an electronic 
network that is interlinked with customers' organisations. Further integration is 
pursued.
In 1993 the company experienced a change of personality at the top following the 
resignation of its Managing Director. He was succeeded by the former Operations I
Director who found a greater favour with many engineers and middle managers. This |
was apparently because he adopted a more democratic leadership style which 1
encouraged participation in decision making. His appointment seems to have improved 
the company's chances for a faster transition towards integration. Optimism and high j
expectations of the integration process remain to be a unique characteristic of the |
leading technical managers in this case. I
* c a s e  s t u d y  TWO: Comnanv 2 |
Company 2 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a multinational industrial group quoted at j
the London Stock Exchange^. It was set up in 1915 on a green field site in a Kirkcaldy |
^The holding corporation is involved mainly in the leisure and hotel industry. However, it operates an 
industrial wing which invests in manufacturing machines for the television and film industry as well as 
measuring instrumentation for military aircraft applications. Company 2 is one of the companies 
which form this industrial wing.
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industrial estate. Still on its original site, the company produces a wide range of lighting 
and other electrical products including luminars and control desks^ .
The company's organisation is lightly structured with a five-man Board of Directors, an 
eight-man middle management team and a supervisory level. The Board of Directors is 
headed by a Managing Director and includes Finance, Marketing, R&D, and Operations 
Directors. The Operations Director is responsible for manufacturing, warehouse and 
distribution operations both in Scotland and at another plant in Rome, Italy.
The work force consists of 130 direct workers. Indirect employees in various technical 
and administrative areas add up to about 100. Most of the direct jobs, especially in 
assembly, are perfoimed by less skilled female workers, to the extent that the assembly 
section of the factory is known as the "girls’ area" or "where the girls work".
Senior management describe Company 2 as being marketing-led. The average for 
luminars' design life cycle is ten years and is slightly shorter for control systems. 
Typically, the marketing department specifies a customer-demanded product and 
engineering then writes the appropriate specifications, designs, and develops it by 
creating a prototype which it sends to manufacturing. This process is repeated on 
average once every 12 to 18 months. Redesign and modification work on existing 
designs is a routine practice and changes with almost every new order.
Production output tends to be of medium to small batches and one-off jobs at times. 
Luminars are designed and manufactured completely in the Kirkcaldy plant whereas 
control desks are designed in London but manufactured in Kirkcaldy. Major operations 
on the shop floor include CNC punch pressing, machining, welding, extrusion, and 
casing and assembly of finished products. The factory was set-up according to CM 
principles so that AMT would be operated by workers performing their tasks in small 
cells^.
The company's CAD system consists of a CIMlink software application package and 
SUN hardware. The system network comprises five 360 workstations and one Spark- 
1, The system is used only for 2-D drafting purposes^.
 ^Lumincirs are used in, for example, studios, exhibitions, and camps whereas control desks are used in 
disco, theatre and stage applications.
 ^This work arrangement is known in this case specifically as "SPUs (Special Purpose Units)".
 ^For in-house part and assembly design and for reading drawings from the company's London and Los 
Angeles design offices.
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On the manufacturing side the company has introduced automatic insertion machines 
(AIMs) for "populating" bare PCBs. AIMs form the bulk of the CAM system. Other 
aspects of CAM include CNC applications.
CAD was introduced in 1989. The then Operations Director, who is now the Managing 
Director, was "more computer-biased" than other senior managers and succeeded in 
persuading the Board of Directors to invest in CAD and CAM.
A young engineer was appointed for this purpose, who had gained CAD experience 
working for a consultancy company. Since his appointment he has been responsible for 
CAD in his formal capacity as a CAD Manager. The first task assigned to him was to 
evaluate the CAD market in the light of the company's design requirements. He went 
about his task by participating in seminars, attending demonstrations, and visiting 
various suppliers. The company then formed a small cross-functional committee to 
make a decision. The existing system was then chosen on the basis of his justification 
report.
The two main objectives in introducing CAD were defined as: ".... (1) to improve the 
speed of the design process to manufacture and (2) to improve the accuracy of the 
documentation". Both the Design Manager and the CAD Manager are satisfied that the j
first stated objective has been met. However, they admit that the company is "still i
behind" in utilising the documentation objective, because of "the lack of resources to !
work on it".
CAD was set-up such that three full-time design draughtsmen would work on it '
continuously. Two work stations were set out for engineering and administrative 
purposes and a work station is used exclusively by the production engineering /  
department for retrieving drawings from R&D. Some design drawings are passed either 
by tape or through the network to and from the company's London design office. Most ^
of the original design work is done on CAD, although traditional design methods are 
still followed in redesign and modification work on older designs which were prepared |
prior to the introduction of CAD.
The company had only seven people working in design prior to CAD: two design ;
engineers, two draughtsmen, a manager, a secretary, and a technician testing product j
quality. The number increased t o l l  with the appointment of a CAD supervisor and i
another draughtsman, engineer, and a mould-maker. This increase is not simply due to j
CAD, with the exception of the CAD supervisor who is assigned the responsibility for |
the system, but is more a response to increased demand on the design function as a j
whole. i
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The responsibility for CAM is not as clearly defined as that for CAD. It is shared by a 
team of manufacturing managers who are answerable to the Operations Director. The 
latter explained that the company's goal in introducing CAM was to "run the business 
with a customer orientation". According to him, this goal was defined in terms of 
getting greater contiol over the business, cutting cost^, improving production methods, 
reducing stock levels and thus improving liquidity performance, and improving the 
information support for manufacturing processes.
Three major unions are active in the company but industrial relations have not been 
significantly affected by the introduction of new technology. Senior management's 
simple but apparently effective philosophy on managing change with the unions 
emphasised a two-way communication style:
“It's a communications problem. It's the need to actually keep people informed of what 
actually you are doing, why you're doing it, where they figure in this, what part do they have 
to play in it, how it's going to change the way they do their jobs, the rewards for the job, the 
way they're expected to participate in the whole organisation.”
Staffing levels have not been affected as a result of introducing these technologies. 
However, the introduction of CAM caused major changes in the way work was 
designed around the machines apparently to give employees a sense of ownership of 
the new technology. Factory work was therefore reorganised along functional lines in 
place of the product layout orientation that had existed before. Assembly facilities were 
also rearranged to accommodate the operational requirements of the new automatic 
insertion machines on the shop floor.
The company moved from there to a matrix type of organisation with the introduction 
of MRP-II. More attention had to be given than ever before to ergonomics in designing 
jobs around the new technology. Most of the supervisors involved in production on the 
shop floor became essentially "sustaining engineers rather than production engineers" 
(i.e. involving mainly tasks of monitoring automated manufacturing processes).
During an interview with the Design Manager he admitted: "I don't think we are 
particularly organised well". Senior managers have attempted to relax a traditionally 
functionally-structured organisation and restructure the flow of the design- 
manufacturing process into a matiix form since the early stages of the present research. 
This has been introduced gradually in the name of CE with a view to reducing 
production lead-time. The driving force behind CE in this case is the London-based 
R&D Director who co-operates closely with the Kii*kcaldy-based Operations Director in
^In this case management is clearly aware iliat its cost-saving strategy must concentrate primarily on 
material and overhead costs (constituting 60% and 24% respectively of overall costs incurred). No effort 
was wasted in trying to justify CAM on the basis of reducing labour cost (only 16%).
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its implementation. Both are supported by the company's Chief Executive Officer who 
is enthusiastic about CE and believes strongly in its integrating and efficiency- 
improving capability.
A greater utilisation of the "downstream benefits of CAD" could be realised through 
CADCAM's potential capability of using information from drawings to automatically 
directly control machine tools on the factory floor. However, financial constraints, 
coupled with a short-term planning horizon would not facilitate a rapid transformation 
towards integration, as the company’s most senior manager contended:
“There is no question at all it [i.e. CIM] will bring considerable advantages but it also brings 
considerable cost, 'cause trying to put together that sort of package for a small manufacturer 
with a small batch work is extremely difficult.... Frankly, we can't justify very much better.”
A period of about four years has passed since these words were uttered and relatively 
little progress on CADCAM integration has been achieved. On reflection, the same 
senior manager went on to explain his views in a somehow self-critical manner:
“The captains of the UK industry look for a much shorter-term return on capital investment
.... just looking at cash flow etc., etc. It's a problem of attitude If one compares this to
the Japanese who take a longer view of investment we are typically looking for two to
three years. This is far too short .... and this, I think, is having a dampening effect on the 
ability of the manufacturing companies in the UK to be able to invest in these technologies.”
Against this background, a strong commitment to integration on the part of the CAD 
Manager could not have made a great difference. He recommended CIMlink in 1989 
because it was suitable for integration. Flis vision, however, has not materialised to any 
considerable extent. A major reason for this is the lack of senior management's support 
for his initiatives in a hierarchical command and control organisational structure where 
orders "come down from above [i.e. the Board of Directors]". In one instance he 
openly complained about senior management's manufacturing-biased orientation:
“Well, we're controlled by manufacturing. We have a manufacturing-led basis. They specify 
the product and we have to design, and from there we write the specifications. And we then 
design the product from the basics right through prototyping ”
He added that this inclination has made design inferior to manufacturing. This is a 
unique characteristic of this case and could be found in none of the other nine cases. 
Another reason could be structurally explainable. That is, the R&D Director is assigned 
the ultimate responsibility for CAD and the Operations Director for CAM. They both 
find it difficult to share responsibility for a cross-functional CADCAM project in a 
traditionally functional organisation and more difficult to contribute financially to it 
from their limited departmental budgets.
Both Design and Manufacturing Managers, however, look at integration as a priority. 
They realise the cultural and political challenges that are implied from their past
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experience of introducing another integrating technology into the company, namely 
MRP-II: " .... the whole process of moving toward this is going to actually change the 
actual way the organisation looks". In this context, the attempted matrix type of 
organisation could be described as an integrating mechanism. The long-term plan is to 
create a single data base for the entire organisation, which will be centred around the 
proposed MRP-II system. However, the existing CAD data base will form the 
reference point in designing the new data base management system which will directly 
satisfy the information requirements of engineering, design, manufacturing, and 
production. Indirectly, it will be used by all other functions in the company (e.g. 
purchasing, marketing, and quality control) as their source of information support. 
Therefore, as the integration process progresses in the future, design restrictions will be 
determined by the present CAD configuration which will form the core of an integrated 
CADCAM system.
CE was an important project launched from a design point of view to provide an 
organisational framework for integration. However, it has encountered obstructions 
from manufacturing managers who, despite of their influence in the company, could 
not have succeeded in leading it because the product-related information data base was 
controlled by design. In this respect, the Design Manager stated:
“What we have tried to do is to develop this [referring to a hand-drawn work flow chart] into a
simultaneous engineering I would say we've been trying to do it [i.e. CE] since [i.e. for]
10 years now .... to reduce the lead-time, but the problem is that the project leader has not
been given the direct responsibility or the resources to do it It will never get anywhere as
along as they continue to reject the person who [?], and that's changing ”
Continuous inter-functional struggles to control the integration project required 
strength, authority, and commitment to prove oneself and try one's best to come out 
victorious eventually:
“.... the project leader needs to be strong as well. He needs to sell himself to the team with the
sam e commitment as a department manager I think if they have comfort with the
department managers .... that over and above the other things. They would probably have a 
few victories, which would be necessary in their struggle for [i.e. to be] a leader ”
Nonetheless, recent progress on the integration process has allowed the company to 
link its London and Kirkcaldy design offices through a wide area computer network. 
This is another potential area for integration in this case, which is currently being 
investigated for further development.
* CASE STUDY THREE: Comnanv 3
Company 3 is an Edinburgh-based manufacturer of electronic security equipment with 
marketing centres in England, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and the USA. It is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a giant British corporation.
141
A relatively young business in an increasingly growing industiy, the company was set 
up in 1973 by the holding corporation in response to a declared market interest in 
security equipment.
The company's broad product range covers numerous applications from simple home 
security to specialist high-risk security applications^. Three detection techniques (i.e. 
passive, infra-red, and microwave techniques) are used in manufacture. However, the 
company is best known for being one of the world's largest manufacturer of passive 
infra-red detection devices which contribute 80% to its total business. Subject to 
fluctuating demand levels, flow production on the shop floor yields on average 2.3 
million units per year.
The company is organised in terms of seven "lines of business", each of which 
supplies a specific family of products to its respective market segment. It is led by a 
five-member Board of Directors and employs 400 people, 350 of whom work on the 
Edinburgh site.
Senior management regard cost-saving as its main "competitive edge" and, hence, cost- 
consciousness tends to dominate decision making in this case. For example, the 
Technical Director, who has been one of the key architects of the company's cost- 
control strategy since 1973, contended: " .... cost now is everything - these units, we 
worry about taking pennies off manufacturing cost". This feature of the company 
seems to have been strengthened over the last few years because of the early 1990's 
recession which was “hurting” and "left the finn totally flat" since “this is the first 
recession in my long experience in this industry that has actually hit it. Normally the 
security industry has been immune to recession".
Historically, the company has had a glorious technical reputation, one that was built on 
its engineering team patenting the pioneering of the infra-red sensing technique. The 
company was competing with a US firm to develop the technique independently and 
succeeded in winning the race. It became the first company to put its theoretical 
knowledge into practice by implementing an innovative set of production, assembly and 
packaging rules for building the technique into the appropriate product line.
Productive activities in Company 3 are essentially assembly-oriented. Products are 
designed to suit the processes deployed on the shop floor. Marketing-identified 
customer requirements are channelled through the group's top management team to 
specialist research companies which respond by designing products that appeal to
 ^ In, for example, military installations and nuclear power stations.
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targeted market segments. Fundamental R&D work is carried out at four research 
companies belonging to the holding group. Basic product components are designed in- 
house and their manufacture subcontracted for assembly. Management’s policy in this 
area is motivated by the desire to be flexible in utilising alternative vendors' state-of- 
the-art manufacturing techniques whilst not buying any of them:
“We decided very early in our life not to manufacture ..... Our philosophy is not to
manufacture anything that can be made efficiently in another plant.”
Consistent with its cost minimisation objectives, the company has introduced JIT and 
Kanban techniques for production planning and control with a view to minimising 
stock storage and handling costs. Assembly operations are performed, as in the case of 
Company 2, by less skilled female operators who form 50% of the company's work 
force. Assembly operations are designed for an automatic assembly line and include 
CNC machines for PCB population, automatic gluing of "populated" boards, and oven- 
heating of glued populated boards to cure the product at this final stage of production. 
Lastly, a 100% final inspection is carried out by "the girls" in this case as well.
This company uses a Visula CAD system run on an Apollo work station for mechanical 
and electrical drawing. The hardwai'e comprises eight work stations and the system is 
used merely as a drafting tool for mechanical and PCB drawing. Only recently did the 
company begin to utilise the system's 3D modelling capacity in response to persistent 
pressure from customers.
The company found itself under pressure to introduce CAD mainly because of its 
business environment in a growing and rapidly changing industry that is governed 
strictly by external regulatory agencies:
“We’re very regulated. There's a lot of external approval authorities who lay down rules and
say: ‘your products must comply with these rules'. They keep changing the rules so we keep
changing the products to stay compliant.”
The history of CAD implementation in this case could be summarised in terms of a 
four-phase evolutionary process. A simple PC-based CAD system was first introduced 
in 1984 with a single VDU and a drafting software package. The company moved up 
from this stage to add CADStar for electronic drafting. The third phase witnessed the 
introduction of a more complex system, Visula, which overtook the original system. 
The fourth and current phase involved the addition in 1995 of a Hewlett Packard 
modelling system in response to persistent customer requests. Within these four "big 
steps", however, there has been "a lot of evolution". For example, the company started 
with Visula version 3, is now operating version 5.1, and is preparing to upgrade this 
over the next year, which will require a more powerful hardware than the company has 
available at the moment.
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The Technical Director is the key individual in managing this incremental change 
process with his team of engineers, draughtsmen, and technicians. His experience in 
this regard was summarised as follows:
“The way we introduced it, we got a small PC. We had a simple system and we chose one 
draughtsman who was quite keen on computing, he was used to playing with home 
computers. We involved them [i.e. all draughtsmen] before we made a purchase and we said: 
‘we’re looking at CAD, we think it can do this for you’, and one of the guys was very keen, 
he thought: ‘yeah, go for it’, so we bought the machine and said: ‘here you are, see what you 
can do with it’. So he played with it, but we deliberately chose a package which was very,
very easy to run it was basic, but it allowed them to draw on the machine, just a drafting
package And there was only a little [time] passed before other draughtsmen came along
and said: ‘we want on to this machine, we see the benefits - this guy is turning fttr more work. 
than we are and he can fix mistakes and if we have them we have to start doing it again’.”
As interest in CAD grew rapidly among the draughtsmen, the Technical Director found 
that he had to regulate the tasks of an increasing number of system users in his own 
way. For example, nobody was allowed to use any computer language other than the 
purchased drafting software:
“The first rule we made when we purchased PCs was that there was no languages. It was 
forbidden to write programs, took BASIC off them. You were not allowed to write programs 
on the IBM.  You can only buy one, because the price of the software is so small by 
comparison. We can buy it [i.e. a simple software] for about £400 .1 can only get half a day's 
work from an engineer for £400 and he certainly can't write a package for [i.e. in] half a day.”
Beginning with a simple system was advantageous to the technical department in 
avoiding formal bureaucratic procedures of justification since it was "a very little risk 
for the company". The department had to demonstrate that if expensive mistakes could 
be avoided, which they could in this case, then the machine would easily pay for itself 
sooner or later. Justification became a problem later, however, when more expensive
systems were proposed: “What was difficult to justify was the big system There
was quite a battle for MRP, there was a battle even on CAD”.
The "battle" took place despite the fact that the Visula software was supplied free of 
charge by another subsidiary of the holding corporation, which specialises in software 
development. Therefore, when Company 3 decided to upgrade its CAD system it had 
no choice but to accept the parent company's software:
“The group has a cenaally deiemiined policy on which CAD systems could be used. So if
you wanted a CAD system there was no choice: this was the only one available, you had to 
use i t  ”
The company maintains a close relationship with Edinburgh University'^ Engineering 
Department for advanced CAE services, such as FEA, which are sometimes needed, 
instead of buying the technology. Management’s purchasing-oriented policy persists 
here and is echoed in so far as CAE is concerned: "if we have a problem we seek a 
service contract" to avoid high maintenance cost.
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CAM comprises a range of computerised equipment which could potentially be 
integrated into a CADCAM system. These include CNC machines, surface mount 
machines and AIMs for PCB population and a computerised oven used for curing 
finished products. On the production management and control side, the company uses 
an IBM 44MAPPICS-II for its MRP-II system to manage its production planning and 
control function from order to production and delivery. Responsibility for MRP-I is 
assigned to a Production Manager who has managed the system since it was installed in 
1981. MAPPICS-II was introduced in 1991 and it had taken about nine months for the 
company to make it fully operational.
The company's main CAM integrating equipment, surface mount machines, were 
introduced in the late 1980s. The design-manufacture link has been helped by Visula's 
ability to communicate directly with the surface mount machines. This has eliminated 
the need for repetitive programming. It has also minimised errors which were very 
common before. However, much of the technical difficulty in integrating CAD with 
CAM could be traced to the independent selection and implementation of each of these 
systems historically.
Apparently, CAD has hardly affected the work organisation in the design area. CAM's 
effect on the shop floor has been minimal in terms of staffing levels. There were a few 
"recessional layoffs" but these could hardly be causally linked to CAM. However, job 
design considerations on the shop floor generally and around surface mount machines 
particularly were treated seriously by the company's team of industrial engineers who 
introduced CM and TQM techniques.
Such changes, however, were rather difficult to justify under existing accounting 
convictions, as could be inferred from what the Operations Director once said:
“The finance guys are there. They measure, measure, and measure, and tell what you’ve done
wrong. That's it, to the point where they sttu'ted telling me where I was going wrong.......
Once you show them the measure - you know you should never give them a measure -
because they come back and kick you with i t  We call them the lancers accountants,
yeah, they are the guys that come out in the battlefield and stab the wind after the battle is
o v er  they lake a very classical approach to it - you know: return on capital investment,
short term. They aren't looking at five, six [year] payback. They want payback within two 
years. In fact sometimes they want it within a year, which is very tight ”
It is noteworthy that in senior management's experience, computerisation has affected 
users in a negative manner by making them more system-dependent, passive and 
subdued:
“It has negatively affected people, culturally, because people are system-dependent: instead of 
people driving the system, the system is driving the people and that's bad. People stopped 
thinking for themselves and just said: ‘this is silly, the machine says we must do it, we 
cannot reverse that!’ I would feel happier if people were upset about what the machine
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did, but because il happened so slowly, people have just gently shifted the position to a sort 
of dependence, not anger. I don’t think they're even aware about it. They don't question it! ”
Perhaps this could be described as a form of mental conditioning which users have 
been through as a result of working for the computer, rather than with it:
“ people just became less innovative. They aren't just driving the problems the way they
used to do. We had people who were not exposed to computer systems and used to manual 
systems for production fixing. These same people now no longer did it in [i.e. with] the same
vigour and they haven't noticed this specifically. It happened so gently They could
change the paper system very easily but the mentality, that's come from the use of computer 
systems. Inflexibility has been carried across the people's minds. They became inflexible in all 
they do [i.e. d id ] ”
CAD and CAM systems in this case were introduced in order to improve flexibility of 
the business as a whole. Formal justifications singled this out as a major objective. It is 
ironic that while this has been achieved to a degree which is satisfactory to senior 
management at least and hence improved the company's performance in its external 
market environment, it has resulted in an unanticipated internal side effect. The work 
force's flexibility level in handling their respective jobs seems to have decreased 
considerably as their work tasks became more standardised, routinised, and repetitive 
in nature. It could not be said that management is entirely responsible for this situation. 
Technology vendors' pressures upon the company are partly responsible because they 
constrained management's ability to design technology in one way or another:
“We do have rules that say when we buy software like MAPPICS we cannot change it, only 
use /BM-authorised changes, because if you start changing it yourself IBM won't maintain it 
and if you have problems willi it, you're stuck and the whole company comes to a halt. So for 
good reasons we say: ‘that is what you have to work on’."
Although CADCAM integration feasibility was taken into account when introducing 
Visula, admittedly it did not constitute an "essential component of the choice". A 
potential CAD-CAE link, however, was not contemplated in the early 1990s because "a 
need for it was not yet laid down".
The company has begun an effort to integrate CAD with the surface mount machines on 
the shop floor to "eliminate error and take out risks". The recent introduction of the 
modelling system is looked at as the CAE link between design and manufacture. The 
PCB design machines are 99% compatible with the surface placement assembly 
machines and have been made to interchange information electronically, although small 
adjustments still have to be made because the various equipment is manufactured by 
different suppliers who use different specifications. The use of interface standards 
would greatly facilitate full integration, but prohibitive cost and concerns about security 
and reliability issues still delay a decisive move forward in this direction.
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* c a s e  s t u d y  FOUR: Comnanv 4
Company 4 is a DunfermliJie-based subsidiary of a logistics systems division of a giant 
UK defence electronics group working closely with the Ministry of Defence and 
abiding by its standards. This 500-employee company is part of the group's logistics 
systems division^.
The company is a supplier of customised automatic test equipment (ATE). Its role 
within the corporation is to provide solutions to testing problems encountered by 
aircraft and missile manufacturers seeking to test theii' products for functionality prior to 
dispatch. Tests are carried out on manufactured weapon and radio communication 
systems. The company's single product takes the form of a computer test program or, 
more often, a "turn-key" ATE "solution package". Such a product is unique in that it 
tends to be singularly tailored to the needs of a specific customer and, once produced, 
the same equipment may never have to be made again. An ATE also has a relatively 
long order-to-delivery lead-time; it typically takes the company between three to four 
years before delivery.
In 1993 Company 4 expanded as a result of a take-over by the holding company of 
another corporation. It now has a large design office in Edinburgh and an additional 
production facility in G l a s g o w T h i s  subsidiary is a model example of a relatively 
small company which is entangled in a huge nationwide bureaucratic organisation. 
Middle managers' unhappiness in these plants was expressed explicitly, for example, in 
terms of their directors' inability to “make decisions themselves” because “they will be 
looking South [i.e. the Corporation's headquarters] for direction”.
The defence industry has not yet recovered from the recession of the early 1990s. A 
declining demand, due to so-called "peace dividend", has resulted in frequent 
downsizing with many redundancies since 1991. This situation raised serious issues 
concerning job security and mistrust between management and workers increased: 
"everybody is under stress, suffering from uncertainty". Such was the pressure on the 
company's Managing Director in 1992 that he had to issue a public statement to assure 
employees that "no further redundancies are budgeted". Yet, many people in the
^The group’s organisation comprises several divisional units, each of which specialises in supplying a 
specific range of high-tech electronic products to the defence industry.
^^The take-over seems to have resulted in "three different cultures" to be found simultaneously within 
the company with each of tlie three Scottish sites appearing to have its own distinguished culture.
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company find themselves “inclined to shut up and close their mouths and not to criticise 
management”  ^k
Nonetheless, the company's orientation towards defence has been subject to 
reconsideration since the early 1990s. Strategic rethinking over the last five years has 
focused on commercialising some of the company's facilities to supply civilian 
markets. The first radical change in this direction came in 1995 as the company won the 
first contract with a US leisure aircraft manufacturer.
Following the ttike-over, the company inherited a huge design facility in Edinburgh. 
The office, which is run by a manager who has worked in it for the last 28 years, 
provides essential diawing services. The bulk of creative engineering work, however, 
is carried out on the main site in Dunfermline and comprises mechanical and electronic 
hardware and software design.
Like Company 3, this is essentially a design-and-assembly enterprise. About 50% of 
the work force are classified in the company as designers. Most of the components 
used in final assembly are purchased rather than made in-house. Some assembly work 
is carried out in other factories belonging to the corporation.
Engineers start on a new project by designing specifications for their customers who 
often have insufficient time or expertise to do so themselves. This is done on the basis 
of a vague customer's description of a testing application request.
Up until 1995 an outdated, 18-work station CAD system was housed in the drawing 
office facility from where drawings were produced and sent to Dunfermline. It was 
useful because it stored some of the old designs which were still in demand until then. 
The acquired firm was resourceful enough to develop this huge CAD system 
independently. It was among the first movers towards CAD in the early 1970's. 
However, in 1995 the system was scrapped and a new one introduced in its place.
CAD and CAE are strictly separate functions in this company. A CAE system is placed 
in the main site in Dunfermline and managed by a different person. It is used for 
electronic hardware and PCB design of product components.
A CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) system is in application only in this 
company. It is used in the design and development of product software since this forms
11 Passive collective resistance to management plans, which resulted from the "big gulf” between 
management and employees, found expression in the refusal of many shop floor workers to collaborate 
in implementing a £3m TQM program which later came to be regarded as a failure by management 
themselves.
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a critical part of the company's product. Traditionally, hardware design used to form 
about 70% of the total engineering work. However, software technology has gained 
ground at the expense of the hardware development work. This shift has been in 
c a se 's favour since the ratio has now reached around 50-50. As a result, more 
hardware engineers are now being retrained to become software engineers.
The first major investments in computer technology, other than in the administrative 
area, were in CAD and CAM. The company, however, transferred its CAM facility to 
the Edinburgh plant due to reorganisation at the corporate level. Therefore, 
dimensional, test, and drawing data are communicated bilaterally between the 
Edinburgh and Dunfermline sites.
To begin with, a simple CAD system was introduced in 1987 into the drawing office 
for mechanical drafting as the company was under "a bit of pressure to go for CAD " 
from within the group. The intioduction of CAE system followed in 1990.
Formal objectives of each investment were identified in terms of satisfying business 
demand, improving product quality and reducing design cycles which have dropped 
from 42 to 15 months on average between 1991 and 1995. As confirmed by 
management, such objectives have been subject to change because of a rapidly 
changing technology maiLet:
it's the market that is in its infancy, really, it's an evolving thing. The CAE tools, CAD 
tools were here five years ago, but it's evolving and tools that we have now are quite old and 
outdated compared to the tools that you can buy n ow  ”
With a rapidly changing technology market, leading technical managers have learned 
from their past experiences of technological change, particularly in this bureaucratically 
organised enterprise where formal justification procedures have persistently constrained 
their ambitions:
“Certainly my [the Business Computer Systems Manager's] perception has changed of what 
these tools need to do and can do. It's become more complex, it's become more universal, if 
you like. These tools used to be point solutions - you know - if you needed to draw a circuit 
or a diagram or you needed to design a printed circuit board or something like that, then you 
bought up tools to do that. But the tools now are quite different. Tools now are top-down 
system design  ”
The introduction of CAD was not "a big issue" in the organisation, unlike CAE which 
found "a certain reluctance and it was a cultural change". The two main technical 
managers admitted they had to struggle "to change the culture of the work force" in the 
process and that the task of changing users' attitudes was both difficult and messy.
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In the light of this situation, it was not surprising that the Training Manager admitted 
that there was a lack of education concerning the newly introduced technology on the 
part of management:
"I should say that in the drawing office you should spend money on education, not training, 
but education to tell people what this meant to them in the long term, but we didn't. We let 
them find out! That caused a few problems "
The strategic thinking behind the integration process in this case was best summarised 
by what a high-ranking pro-integration manager said once in an interview in 1992:
"[The] objective for me is to get away from point solutions. All of these tools are point 
solutions: the CAE tool is there to draw a circuit diagram, a CAD tool is to draw a 
mechanical diagram, a simulator is to simulate an object. So all are solutions to point 
problems and I want to put solutions that are universal solutions .... You still have point 
solutions. They are still tools that you need, but there's an overlying structure that sits on top 
of that that allows open systems, if you like, free access of data, open to every one. So the 
guy on the shop floor or the guy in the storage can access the information directly from this 
design information."
In spite of all the technical, financial and political difficulties encountered in this 
company, it remains to be a distinguished case in the study as far as the issue of 
integration strategy and implementation is concerned. The dynamics of the integration 
process in this case deserves to be singled out and analysed further with a particular 
emphasis on the forces acting for and those acting against change, both from within and 
outside the organisation, whose lively interaction gives the case its distinctiveness.
The integration process as experienced in this company will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 7 (section 7.4). A conceptual model will be used to illustrate Company 
4's experience in contrast with that of Company 10 which adopts a non-integrating 
strategy. The emphasis will be on the social processes that are involved in the dynamics 
of the strategy process in both companies, the internal and external factors that 
influence a company's decision regarding whether to integrate or not to integrate, and 
on the factors that influence an on-going integration process, both positively and 
negatively.
* CASE STUDY FIVE: Comnanv 5
Company 5 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a large multinational manufacturer of 
computerised cash machines^^. The company was set up in 1946 on its current Dundee
l^This bureaucratic corporation was set up about 115 years ago in the USA and has since been in 
business. It used to be the world's leader in its respective market but lost that advantage to IBM which 
took over another firm to form a more powerful corporation. In 1993 the corporation attempted to 
strengthen its position through a merger with AT&T  (the US equivalent to BT in Britain). The 
corporation is organised in terms of autonomous subsidiary companies, each of which contains both 
design and manufacturing activities "under the same roof" and tends to supply a complete range of 
products to worldwide markets.
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site with 7,000 employees to design and manufacture teller and interactive self-service 
cash machines for the financial market. However, it suffered a series of contractions in 
its work force due to a persistent decrease in demand.
With 1,400 employees at present. Company 5 is the largest of the ten companies in the 
study and is managed by a six-member Board of Directors, presided over by a 
Managing Director who reports diiectly to the corporation's Ohio-based headquarters.
Company 5 is the sole exporter of its brand product to export markets throughout the 
world^3; it always “wants to be first in [the] industry to use technology and to reduce 
design-to-market time”. Nationally, the company dominates 65-70% of the UK market. 
This equals 25-30% of its total output.
The size of the engineering team in this case reflects a massive volume of work on the 
mechanical, electrical, electronic, and assembly aspects of product design and 
development. Such is the size that the engineering function is represented at the 
company's Board by two Directorswho are both supported by a devoted engineering 
services department consisting of 26 highly skilled technologists in charge of a diverse 
range of support activities.
The company's production activities have changed significantly since it was established 
in 1946. Then, it used to design and make all component parts independently, whereas 
now its policy is to buy as many components and sub-assemblies as possible and to 
make only the essential parts in-house. This is motivated by a desire to focus on the 
company's core manufacturing activities for the main parts of its products with a view 
to strengthening its core technical skill base.
Monthly demand forecasts are sent to the company simultaneously by the corporation's 
regional marketing organisations in North America, Latin America, Europe, and the 
Pacific. Production planning staff then work out forecasts for units to be produced and 
quote standard lead-times. Production schedules aie adjusted accordingly, subject to the 
annual financial plan concerned.
Bare PCBs are supplied regularly by a major Scotland-based vendor. About 75% of the 
boards are populated in-house using automatic insertion machines. Assembly 
operations follow in the light of information received from design.
Japan is the only exclusion in the company's export market because it has "its own totally unique 
specifications".
Mechanical & Electronics Design Director and a Software Design Director.
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Direct workers constitute only 600 people while the 800 others are classified as white- 
collar support employees and are divided equally between engineering and 
manufacturing. The company's batch production set-up yields on average 80 to 90 
units per day. As in Cases 2 and 3, most of the direct workers are involved in assembly 
lines.
The CAD system in this case is the largest and most complex in the study. It consists of 
35 VAX work stations arranged via a local area network (LAN) among five separate 
but co-ordinated departments: (1) mechanical CAD, (2) electronic CAD, (3) assembly 
design CAD, and (4) technical publications. Modelling and engineering analysis form 
an essential part of the engineering function's operations in this case. They are carried 
out on specifically-designated CAD work stations but using specialist software.
CAD softwai'e, DDM, was developed in-house. The company's top engineering team is 
planning to scrap the existing CAD system and introduce a new one that is especially 
designed for integration with CAE and CAM.
A simple CAD software was initially introduced in 1984 with six work stations which 
were increased to ten the following year as more engineers were converted to become 
CAD users. At present 25 work stations are in use: “There was resistance from the 
users who [had] never before used CAD, but there was a learning curve and they got 
on with it”.
DDM was not selected for introduction into this company but it was imposed on it by 
its holding corporation. In response to a question on what system assessment process 
preceded implementation, the Principal CAD Support Engineer replied:
“There wasn't one. We had to use DDM because it was used in the US plants and we had no 
choice but to introduce DDM  because it's compatible with the corporate choice, so that our 
system can talk to theirs and vice versa,”
Work around CAD was organised by setting up four groups: (1) CAD users group: (2) 
system administration group, (3) hardware and software support group, and (4) CAD 
development group.
The last of these groups consists of three senior professional engineers and three other 
union-oriented engineers. Three unions are active, one of which represents managers 
and professional groups. In this case they are noticeably influential. Hence, they had to 
be invited to participate in planning for CAD and CAM before their introduction and are 
currently represented by three of their active members in the new CAD development 
project. This formal group has reflected a definite political significance since its 
formation in 1985. It serves to release some of the pressure management has been
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under since it hired two experts for the task. Union activists argued that two people 
should not be left to make decisions on behalf of 60 users and insisted that the unions 
should be involved.
The Principal CAD Support Engineer has been in close contact with some senior 
managers in his capacity as the leader of the users' group. His job seems to have forced 
him to work under some computer illiterate managers, a relationship which he finds 
stressful:
“Some departments are very political Management has grown up a little bit astray, for
management to keep track of what CAD users are do in g  It would make life a little bit
easier if they were at the same level. That's what I find in all the experience I've had. It's very 
difficult for the design engineers to put one over on me because I know the system .... and I
know the design side of knowledge as w e ll The gap between management and technical
staff w idens ”
Management were also criticised for the lack of attention they gave to proper training 
for CAD:
“To them [i.e. the users] CAD was a wilderness. Just to install the system and put them on a 
two-week course and say: ‘come on, lads, get on with it!’, which, on reflection, is a very 
irresponsible th ing  ”
The company has also invested heavily in a new surface mount facility in order to be 
able to "populate" PCBs in-house instead of subcontracting this aspect of the business. 
CNC is another main part of the CAM facility which could potentially be interfaced 
with CAD. MRP was developed by the mother organisation and has been in application 
in Dundee since 1976. It has been subject to frequent upgrading operations.
In this case another “mental conditioning” phenomenon similar to that reported in Case 
3 was experienced by senior management. It concerned a negative man-machine effect 
of computer system work environments on individuals’ psychology:
“What's really happened is that, syslemwise, the people [who?] looked at the system and if it 
told to them to do something, effectively they will do it. Originally, they used to question, 
question, question. They tend not to question. They tend to say: ‘If the system says I need x, I 
need x’. So they work to the system .... I don't know! ”
A two-year program is planned in this case for a piecemeal integration process. It is 
named the "Computer-Integrated Business (CIB) program". Its aim is to “improve 
communications between all those people who are interested in the process of product 
development”.
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In the integration philosophy that dominates engineers' attitude in this case, CAD 
should be justified in terms of its "downstream" benefits to a manufacturing enterprise 
as a whole:
“People lend to justify CAD systems on how quickly they could produce drawings, but you 
don't want to produce drawings really - you want to produce information that could be used by
other people The biggest single gain we've had has to be on the manufacturing side.
We're taking the information the designers have created on the system to use for part 
information processing .... What used to take weeks we do now in a matter of hours. That's
our biggest gain CAD was a success if you look at it from a manufacturing point of
view, a big success. On the engineering side, yes but not as much as one [had] perceived ”
Senior management seem to have learned a lesson from their failure in the past to 
recognise the need for combining the design of a new technology simultaneously with 
the design of a suitable work organisation around it. They seem to be determined to 
avoid this in their CIB endeavour. From their perspective, achieving an optimum 
utilisation of technology is no longer the driving objective of change. They now realise 
the cost of neglecting to balance efficiency with organisational conversion:
“.... the pitfall of that: you can lose the overall vision and the optimum use of resources. And
also you may find that a particular Development Manager doesn't improve his process he
can be used to having done things in a way which I haven't done before. So you lose the 
appetite for change and you don't have anybody outside to say: ‘Oh, do you know actually you 
can use this or you can use that or you can do that’."
Implications for the whole organisation are incorporated into the new CIB vision and 
have been felt already among employees:
“.... one of the things is that people [need] to take a wider perspective of the job they d o ....
They've got responsibilities other than the production of a drawing or whatsoever. People need 
to be aware. OK, they might have to do a bit of extra work. However, by doing that extra 
work somebody else will get paid back many folds. I think once you go to multi-functional 
things then people will see the wider implications of what they d o  ”
The launching of a new CAD system in the near future will probably constitute a 
significant milestone in the development of the company's CIB project which is led by 
the Engineering Design Services Manager who happens to be the leader of the radical 
integrationist current in this organisation. He once criticised his opponents by saying: 
"Conservatism, traditionalism! The thing is - you see -.... [their attitude is] ‘We made 
the last product this way, what do we have to change for?’". It would be likely that 
CADCAM integration would be given a considerable boost in the next five years since 
the new system is being designed so as to incorporate CADCAM integration principles.
5.3 The Secondary Cases
In contrast with the previous section, this section focuses on the lack of integration as 
found in the five secondary cases (Company 6 to Company 10). It covers a case-by- 
case presentation of the relevant findings relating to the historical and cunent aspects of 
the stand alone CAD and CAM systems and the organisational issues associated with
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them. This will facilitate a subsequent comparison between the key features of the 
integrating and non-integrating approaches (section 5.4).
* c a s e  s t u d y  SIX: COMPANY 6
Company 6 is a family-owned manufacturer of electrodes and electrochemical 
s e n s o r s I t  was established in 1973 in Auchtermuchty, a small village in Fife. This is 
the smallest organisation in the study with a total of 35 people. The company's 
products are marketed worldwide through a London-based sales office.
Despite its relatively small size and remote physical location, this company is 
remarkably strong from a marketing performance point of view^^.
In August 1991 the company was taken over by an American firm after 18 years of 
independent existence. The owners of the business decided that a take-over of the 
company would provide it with better conditions in terms of stability, support, and 
competitiveness in a global market dominated by giants.
Subsequently, the holding company itself was acquired by another US firm in 1996 for 
similar reasons. So, this was the second take-over experience from the point of view of 
Company 6 within a period of five years.
The company's organisation is distinguished for its flexible structure and relaxed 
working atmosphere^^. Governance of the company is the responsibility of a Managing 
Director who represents the proprietary family, a Technical Director, and a Secretary. 
The work force consists of 20 people, 16 of whom are highly skilled female workers, 
unlike in Cases 2, 3 and 5.
^^Sensors arc used in a wide range of industrial and research applications and are manufactured both to 
standard and to customised specifications. Laboratory ancillaries used in association witli electrodes for 
chemical analysis purposes are also marketed by the company. Products are supplied to customers in 
the laboratory, water, pharmaceutical, power generation and industrial market sectors.
^%or instance, in 1991 it was the recipient of a special award for marketing presented by ScotBIC, the 
Scottish Business-in-the-Communliy institute. Upon nomination by the North East Fife Enterprise 
Trust, the company won the award in the face of competition from 67 entrants.
^^The advantages of a small-sized organisation on the Auchtermuchty site include job rotation among 
shop floor workers to overcome boredom and the lowest level of division of labour at all levels of 
responsibility. The Technical Director best described his company as being a small organisation 
enjoying a:
"... high level o f communications .... so it allows things to be done quickly. This hopefully m eans
higher efficiency  W e don't say: ‘you're design, you’re design’, and that's part o f  the company
culture. ... it is team work .... but there is a lot o f  individuality as w ell.”
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A typical electrode consists of a hollow pH selective glass tube filled with a specific 
chemical, depending on application, and a compact measurement instrumentation. 
Glass parts are made in-house whereas instrumentation components are purchased and 
assembled.
Manufacturing takes place in a clean environment using conventional mouth blowing 
techniques. Solutions are filled for internal and external cells to achieve equilibrium. 
Production batch sizes vary considerably from one-offs to 500 units. On average, 
orders take three days to delivery.
The design process in this company is fairly static. It induces minimal creativity. Most 
of what are called new product designs tend to be a variation of an existing design. 
CAD in this case is used essentially as a tool for manipulating stored design information 
by the only qualified design engineer who is also the only user.
Design work is largely unstructured, unlike manufacture which is increasingly being 
structured and standardised following the second take-over. Some reorganisation of the 
manufacturing function was necessary before the company could be granted British and 
international quality standards^^.
The company uses mainly AutoCAD software on a single workstation for 2D 
mechanical and electronic drafting purposes. A CAT system is also used on the shop 
floor for quality assurance purposes.
Selecting, implementing and using a CAD system was delegated completely to the only 
Design Engineer in the company. The objective was to “produce good quality drawings 
which are easy to maintain and can be reproduced fairly easily”.
The introduction of CAD in this case was a "low-key" issue and concerned virtually a 
single individual. The CAD experience in this case is closely associated with him, 
rather than with the company as a whole. How the system has been utilised is, 
therefore, highly dependent on his personal perceptions, skills, attitudes, and 
enthusiasm. Indeed, the Senior Design Engineer uses it in his drawing work and 
perceives it to be almost his personal property in a small company which lacks a design 
department of any size.
l^These are BS 5750 and IS 9002. Management had no choice but to reorganise the manufacturing 
function in order to conform to such standards which are highly valued in industry, not least from a 
public relations point of view.
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The system appears to be under-utilised in this case. Had it been a larger company it 
could have been used more productively perhaps:
“Realistically, the time it takes to assess different softwares is significant it wouldn't be
cost-effective to, in terms of the resources that we actually have. It's very tempting to try out 
softwares but you actually don't need the best; you need something that works ”
Whether a single-user's pursuit of CAD utilisation falls short of what may be regarded 
as reasonable or he manages to drive the technology successfully in line with the 
objectives of the business, the company's entire experience of CAD will be affected. It 
is evident that this situation constitutes a high degree of dependency on an individual 
manager who is authorised by the organisation to act on its behalf. This means that the 
outcome of introducing this technology in this case is subject, to a large extent, on this 
actor’s steering of the project.
This situation raised the question of whether there could be an organisationally-defined 
set of CAD objectives in this case. If such a concept existed, would it be present in this 
user's mind? If the answer was yes, how was it perceived by him? Such questions 
were asked progressively and their answers received during the course of the field 
work. In conclusion, it appeared that unless something went catastrophically wrong in 
the implementation process, which would appear highly unlikely in the case of a £5000 
CAD investment, then there was little incentive for the proprietary family to follow up 
what this person was doing on its behalf as long as they trusted his technical 
competence and moral conduct.
At a personal level, the Design Engineer's singular role with CAD has placed him in a 
position of critical responsibility in the organisation:
“If you have a computer system with a lot of data on it you automatically get problems: what 
happens if the computer doesn’t work one day and you become stuck? .... So what are you 
gonna do if the system fails? ”
From a job design point of view, his unique expertise in this area seems to have caused 
him a quantitative job overload. To him, this means he has to maximise his "discipline" 
to insure security, ease of retrieval and a continuous backing up of CAD-produced 
information. He is also conscious that he may soon become unable to cope with an 
increased workload if extra CAD users are hired:
“I have to get things pushed up to me because I know about them. I mean what could happen, 
and it, it hasn't happened yet, is that everybody could come to me with a drawing and want an 
explanation in a computer form. It could be, and I'll have to be aware of that and refuse i t .... ”
Therefore, he believes the company should train more people to supervise the system 
for him. According to him, ownership of the system should also be encouraged so that
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perspective users could be competent and confident enough to deal with their drawings 
independently.
It should be noted that CAD is much less vital to Company 6 than it is to the other nine 
companies in the study. According to the Design Engineer, the company had an 
"overrated" emphasis on CAD; it could even continue doing business without it if 
complex electronics designs were to be subcontracted.
On the manufacturing side, a major project to mechanise mouth glass-blowing 
operations on the shop floor was launched in the mid 1980s. It failed:
“We did have anther project which failed quite a while ago. It was involved in, instead of 
blowing glass, to get reproducible glass. We actually got to one of the universities, I think it 
was Dundee, to looking and actually trying to blow glass mechanically. Now what we found 
was a lot of problems in weight and weight errors .... and, eventually .... it sort of didn't work 
and we threw that out and decided to get into the testing end of the equipment ”
The company computerised its testing function in 1989. The project aimed to measure 
Hydrogen ions in electrodes and to monitor finished sensors' functionality. The results 
of this CAT system were so encouraging that the company decided to expand by 
introducing new features into the system six months after installation. It boosted morale 
and renewed confidence in technological change after the failure of the earlier project.
Integration in this case is particularly difficult because the design-manufacture link is 
organised such that there is "very little functional overlap". Hence, the amount of 
information that could be usefully shared between the two functions is limited. 
Therefore, isolationist attitudes have been adopted by managers under these conditions:
“I don't have any ownership of the kinds of products that are tested on the automatic testing
equipment I don't have any real feel for, I mean, how they are testing it out I don't
know how it [the quality testing function] relates to design ”
If one takes the usefulness of CADCAM integration for granted, it seems that the future 
of integration in this case will be rather bleak without radical structural changes in the 
manner in which the two functions are organised, particularly if such pessimism 
continues: “I feel we have a less than even chance of getting significant integration in 
the foreseeable future”.
The Design Engineer himself admitted that he did not have any experience in this area. 
Rightly, he also expressed doubt about its relevance to a company with a single CAD 
user:
“I don't have any experience with CADCAM. I mean I only see it working in exhibitions. I 
have my doubts .... - and maybe this is just being conservative .... about really whether it is
possible or desirable to really have it as a completely overflowing system I have my
doubts ... about global, more encompassing integration because I think there can be 
horrendous problems of implementation.”
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Small size is the central feature of Company 6 and progress on the integration process 
depends, to a great extent, on its ability to expand to such an extent that the potential 
technical or business benefits of integration become comprehensible.
“With our existing level of staffing I don't foresee that we can attain a reasonable level of 
staffing [for integration]. What we have to do is to employ more staff and get them familiar 
with [the] work.”
* CASE STUDY SEVEN: Company 7
Slightly larger than Company 6, this is another small family business employing 50 
people. However, this remains to be an independent, single-site company situated in a 
purpose-built building in a modern industrial estate in Dunfermline, Fife.
The company was set up in 1947 by the present MD's father to supply coal scales to the 
then active mining industry which constituted a major component of the local economy. 
Its traditional strength has always been in supplying industrial platform scales and 
weighbridges used for weighing loaded heavy vehicles and fork lift trucks weighing up 
to nine tonnes. Weighbridges are still exported to developing countries in Africa and the 
Middle and Fai’ East.
The company has moved towards light weight household scales in order to compensate 
for a declining demand from the coal mining industry. The present product range 
covers a variety of electromechanical and electronic weighing equipment such as bench, 
shop, bathroom and kitchen scales. Most of these products are marketed in the UK.
Organisationally, the senior management team consists of a Managing Director and his 
wife, who both represent the proprietary family, and a third non-relative senior 
executive. A management team is responsible before this Board for finance, sales and 
marketing, customer services, and administration.
Only 16% of the total work force can be classified as direct workers with a total of eight 
workers: six males working on metal fabrication operations to make heavy weigh­
bridges and two females performing assembly operations in a clean room environment.
Company 7's engineering team consists of four designers: one electronics, two 
mechanical, and one structural who are supervised by a more senior Design Manager. 
This group is likely to expand soon as the company is seeking to recruit one or two 
other graduate engineers.
Weighbridge orders are usually one-offs, but sometimes could be up to six units. 
Industrial platform scales are normally ordered in batches of six units. Management's
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strategic direction appears to be moving towards smaller household goods as an area 
for targeted market expansion: "we are certainly heading towards that direction".
Production of industrial platform scales and weighbridges involves metal fabrication 
techniques including welding large ferrous components to create bridge structures. 
Heavy steel contents of weighbridges are purchased on a JIT basis for assembly to 
avoid costly stock accumulation.
The shop floor is divided into two main areas: manufacturing and spraying. After sub- 
assembly a bridge gets transported to the painting area for spraying. Final assembly 
then takes place by incorporating an electromechanical scale into the manufactured 
machine. Assembly operations constitute a significant part of the production activities.
PCBs are used in the assembly of the electronic components of weighing equipment. 
Their layouts are designed in-house but their manufacture subcontracted. On arrival 
from a supplier, bare boards get populated in-house and then assembled into finished 
pieces of equipment. Outer casings of finished indoor and household equipment are 
also designed but their extruded aluminium casting components subcontracted.
Like Company 6, this company's CAD system comprises a simple AutoCAD software 
and two PC-based work stations for mechanical drafting. For PCB design a Racal 
software is used on a single work station.
The Technical Director is responsible for technology investments in the company. 
However, the Design Manager has been more instrumental in the introduction and 
management of CAD specifically. He is more informed about CAD because he has been 
in charge of the system since the purchasing decision was made. He has worked for 
this company for the last 13 years and was the first graduate design engineer to be 
appointed during the early 1980s.
In this company, as in the case of Company 6, implementation could be described as a 
process that terminated after the system was installed and made operational. The 
Technical Director was "the leader at that time [i.e. prior to installation]", but now, as 
the Design Manager put it: "well, it is not so much a project now, just running it now, 
which I do".
The CAD story in this company began in 1989. There were only two engineers then, 
who both:
“.... saw the benefit of it and then [naming a fellow engineer] came along and he had already
used CAD at the University  We went to a couple of demonstrations, but I think
AutoCAD was so ftir ahead than [i.e. of] anything e lse  ”
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The Technical Director’s personal role in authorising the selection of AutoCAD was 
influential because he was the one in a specifically-formed team of three (which was 
assigned the task of system evaluation), who could "sign the cheque" in the end. The 
team’s decision to purchase a system of its choice was taken almost instantly. No 
formal justification procedure was required.
From the team’s view point, a major advantage in selecting a popular, user-friendly 
software such as AutoCAD was the abundance of training programmes associated with 
it. These are normally offered by software suppliers as well as at local colleges. So 
popular is AutoCAD that it has become synonymous with CAD to many people.
In this case training on the system was offered at an extra cost by the supplier. 
However, the team members found the system so easy to use that they thought they 
only needed to supplement their enthusiasm for personal learning with evening classes.
CAD’s objectives in this case included improving efficiency, presentability of drawings 
and documents, increasing control over document management, and improving 
security. In the experience of users, CAD has provided a greater flexibility in 
modification and redesign work. It turned out that CAD enabled designers to design 
PCBs themselves. They used to rely on an independent external consultant for this 
purpose before. This was an unanticipated advantage of CAD. CAD also helped 
improve the exchange of information with vendors and subcontractors who happened 
to be AutoCAD users. Improved publicity was another unforeseen benefit of CAD. 
With the passage of time its value to the company seems to have become clearer:
“We gained a lot of potential customers .... by showing them around. Yes, publicity and it 
looks good [i.e. better] for the design department and the Board to use such equipment than if 
you get an old man [sitting] in the corner using a slide ruler, you think immediately that the 
company is a bit antiquated!"
In the design department the two AutoCAD  work stations are shared by three 
mechanical engineers. Flexible access to the work stations should be available to users 
whenever a need arises, "apart from fights breaking out to get onto them!".
As in the case of Company 6, the introduction of a simple CAD system increased the 
efficiency of drafting. It hardly affected work organisation to any significant degree:
“It [i.e. CAD] didn't change anything really. It was just a tool to help us in drafting. Like 
before, we just ueated CAD like using a calculator instead of a slide ruler!”
However, further increases in efficiency could not be easily achieved because of the 
constraints of being a small company with limited resources.
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Company 7 has relatively low computerisation priorities. The Design Manager insisted 
that there was "no need to invest in new technology other than CAD". The company 
follows a pragmatic philosophy in dealing with new technology in general. Ironically, 
the key individual person behind computerisation in general and CAD specifically 
stated:
"... what we tend to do is we do every thing manually until there comes a point where you're 
screaming to get somebody else to help you and then, if you weigh up the cost you think:
'yes, it's cheaper if we get this guy a software package and a PC’, and then it develops from 
there .... until there is another crisis, yeah!”
Computer applications are perceived to be "electronic solutions" to problems that may 
arise any time. In this sense computerisation is a reactive, rather than, proactive action. 
No prior planning precedes it. It could be argued that many of such problems would 
occur as a result of insufficient planning and control in the first place. It is evident that 
the companies in Cases 6 and 7 regard the issue of CADCAM integration as both 
irrelevant and inapplicable to their organisational settings.
* c a s e  s t u d y  EIGHT: Comnanv 8
Company 8 is a Dunfermline-based subsidiaiy of a UK defence electronics corporation. 
It was established in 1975 to supply PCBs to the telecommunications, data 
communications, and aerospace control divisions of the corporation. A strictly Fordist 
style mass production line was set up to supply the defence market during the cold war 
era^ .^
Since the early 1990s, nonetheless, the company suffered "horrific" effects of the 
recession as well as a general decline of the defence market worldwide. The results 
mounted to a 50% drop in demand in 1990 alone. In the summer of 1992 a senior 
Production Engineer commented that the company did not “have much future left in 
this industry". Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s the company had been "fast 
looking for commercial applications for electronics". Eventually, it ceased to exist in 
1994 in view of the considerable decline in the international amis race following the end 
of the cold war era: "it would have needed a much more lucrative market to suiwive". 
Factory equipment was sold "secondhand" to another company. The work force had 
been downsized repeatedly before the closure but some of the remaining 47 employees 
were offered alternative jobs within the corporation.
Company 8 was a manufacturing-led business with a minimum of original design work 
carried out in-house. Design information was mainly received from other sites via a
dominated about 30% of the British market at that time.
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modem on films, magnetic discs or tapes. Extended product life cycles meant that some 
of the older designs could have had up to 25 years in seiwice. Design information had 
first to be checked against design rule parameters and prepared in a format suitable for 
the machines on the shop floor.
Manufacturing began with the preparation of the appropriate phototools, CNC control 
profiling and machine tapes for a given production cycle. Multi-layer PCBs were made 
with operations including hole drilling, surface preparation, electric photoplating, 
chemical washing up, and electrical testing of finished boards.
The major technology emphasis in this company was on CAM, rather than CAD^®. 
Three work stations of a Computervision graphics manipulation system were in use 
with a Scietex 280 software for phototool production from magnetic tape design 
information. An IBM modem was used to transfer floppy disk input into and from a 
laser scanner plotter. Historically, CAD was introduced in 1980 into the Corporation 
and CAM in 1984:
“.... it came to a point where it was the case that one must invest very, very heavily or close 
down .... it was a matter of survival, because technology outside has changed dramatically.
The requirements of design have changed closely, closely enough and we would have to 
maintain tlie requirements of our customers.”
A distinguishing feature of the company was the fact that it was the first PCB 
manufacturer in Britain to utilise CAM technology in its industry. It was an innovative 
experience in an industry where CAM applications did not yet exist in the early 1980s. 
In this case the company sought to customise a technology that was developed 
originally for use in the textile industry. The purpose of this initiative was to help 
improve productivity and quality of pre-production engineering activities^k
The role of the company's founder came up strongly in this case, particularly with 
regard to his organisation's learning innovation experience. One of his contemporaries 
summarised an innovation story full of initiative and adventure:
“My previous boss, he had read an article about the newspaper industry .... and there was a
company in the States who made that particular type of machine My pervious boss asked
them if it was possible to apply the technology that they were using in that field to make 
artwork for printed circuit boards and tliey said: ‘Yeah, we don't see why not, although we 
haven't done that. Give us a year and we’ll come back to you’. They had come back to us in 
about a year. They had developed a machine:.... ‘if you like we can send test tapes over now’,
 Then started the problems! We weren't computer-generating anything we needed. How to
transfer information to their machine? What format of information? What language do they
^^The company also used a CAPP system based on a single work station to produce process routes for 
tool manufacture on the basis of CAD information. This involved phototool manufacture, CNC 
control profiling, and machine tapes.
21ln the context of manufacturing industry's culture, this is known as the "front end" function.
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require it in? All these questions had to be answered and we didn't know where we were! We 
didn't know the questions to answer, never mind what the answers were!”
That was the first outstanding innovation attempt. It was deemed a failure. The 
innovator then went on for a second attempt after an extensive literature research. This 
time he approached Scietex, a European-based vendor of CAM technology to the 
textile industi’y :
“We went down the line for about six montlis investigating whether they could do what we 
wanted done and at that time they had a resolution of a thou. Then Scietex came along and 
they guaranteed a 1/2 thou ... which is twice as accurate. We sent a test tape for Scietex. They 
copied it and we got it right first time.”
A formal “capital application” report justifying the introduction of the system had to be 
compiled as a matter of routine. It outlined the advantages of using CAM in artwork 
generation and explained the commercial implications of such advantages.
According to senior management's own estimation, such objectives had been met to a 
reasonably satisfactory level up to the end of the 1980s. CAM had assisted the 
company in this respect by improving quality, productivity and consistency due to a 
“much less operator vm iance on the product”.
The introduction of new technology had often been associated with job redundancies in 
this case. For example, the introduction of CAM caused many skilled workers to leave 
the company in protest or get redeployed elsewhere within the corporation. Older j
people were more affected as they refused to change their traditional work methods. On :
the other hand, three new employees were selected and recruited for CAM work from a ^
youth training centre attached to the corporation.
Trade unions' reaction was one of fear that technology would jeopardise workers' jobs i
but management accused them of inability to assess complex skill requirements for |
operating, supervising and managing a new technology due to their lack of knowledge. I
Nonetheless, many workers were laid off between 1990 and 1993 and those who j
survived were understandably worried about their future and blamed the Government: |
“It is unbelievable; I mean I don't think the Government has replaced anything that was j
used during the Gulf war”, *
i
Industrial relations deteriorated further as management insisted on increasing the j
pressure on workers to make them improve their performance with the technology. ’
CAM users united behind their leader, the Senior Production Engineer, and insisted on j
involving the supplier in this apparently internal conflict in order to prove to j
management that they were competent enough to "understand and tell management what |
the real operational requirements of the system really were". This move proved to be a j
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success from CAM users’ point of view in that it gave management a measurable proof 
of the union’s claims that the information which was available to management lacked 
accuracy in the first place.
Ironically, the company had to regret its innovation on CAM since it was left with an 
outdated system at a time when its critical financial position would not permit upgrading 
the system or purchasing a new one in place of it. As CAM became much more 
established in the PCB industry, many competitors introduced industry-customised 
systems which became more available at increasingly competitive prices. Such systems 
performed the same operations Scietex performed but "20, 40 , 60 times faster".
An organisational context for integration was encouraged in this case as CAM forced a 
closer link between design and manufacturing:
“I've got a closer relationship with a much wider band of management personnel What
[do] I mean by that? Well, I didn't have an awful lot of contact witli the design office managers 
prior to the CAM system coming in. I had to liaise much more closely with the design office 
managers to understand their CAD output and for them to understand my CAM input ”
Integration was an important priority of the company during the 1980s. An ideal CIM 
system was considered but had become suddenly less significant with the start of the 
1990s as the question of survival in the market place began to dominate:
“[Naming the corporation] a long time back had a blue sky vision they could link the whole 
PCB factory and serve it from the front end system. They will download all the intelligence 
required from the CAD system to the CAM system that will drive all the machines for the
plotters, bare board testers and anything else diat could be controlled from a computer.......
We’ve been talking about it since [i.e. for] ten years now Things are moving forward in
that field but very, very slowly and because at the moment there is recession, recession tends 
to slow up research and development because there is not enough money to spend for new 
equipment, and because not enough new equipment are [i.e. is] getting sold there is [i.e. are] 
less people pushing for more interfaces ”
Technically feasible integration areas included networking CAD with the Scietex 
system, the drilling machines, and the CAT system. However, that was no more than 
an ambition which appeared to confuse some senior managers:
“We haven't got that and we arc a long way away from it, ... It is a plan that we are 
considering but our growth is not such that will support that plan. So, we need a lot more
business before we can contemplate the project The only problem is that perhaps we need
to do it to get growth. It is that crossroads in a sense: that we will not get any more money 
invested until we get more profit, but perhaps we won't make more profit until we get more 
money invested!”
Organisational problems that confronted integration efforts in this company would be 
perhaps characteristic of subsidiaries of larger organisations with strict bureaucratic
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budgetary controls. For example, when a question was asked about why the conceived 
CIM vision had not been implemented to any significant degree, the answer was:
“Well, who is going to pay for it? Out of which department’s budget is it going to be 
financed? You know. Directors are people just like you and I. They have limited budgets.”
Such a situation manifested itself clearly in prevalent budgetary control practices that 
reinforced departmental independence at the expense of the notion of an integrated 
corporate personality:
i“Companies don't spend enough money for integration proper, I know what I'm talking about j
inside this building, I have no concept what the Design Engineer wants over in the other 
building .... but he doesn't have any concept of what I have to go through to produce what he
wants either ["So maybe you recognise the need surely for a closer integration?"]. Well,
we try but, within the company, that's very difficult because we each, individually, have 1
budgets to control what we do. Once he's designed that bottrd and it's left the design office, his |
budget that’s it, closed .... he's done his bit That's where integration falls apart even in |
tins size of a company which is not terribly big in world terms.” ;
iIn 1994, nevertheless, attempts to integrate CAD and CAM systems terminated with the j
closure of the company.
» CASE STUDY NINE: Company 9
Company 9 was set up in Glenrothes, Fife, in the late 1970s to design and manufacture 
computer hardware parts. Up till 1992 it had been a subsidiary of a UK public 
corporation with operations in Britain, the USA and Singapore.
This company, like Company 8, suffered a period of uncertainty due to a major change 
during the summer of 1991. The company ceased to trade in 1992 due to bankruptcy.
In this case, however, the company's creditors appointed an accounting firm to receive 
it. Through a receivership agreement the receivers had either to sell off the business as a 
"going concern" or resort to liquidation.
It turned out that the appointed receivers decided to retain some of the assets and sell the 
design function's capacity to a foreign company. Therefore, Company 9 became from 
that point in time a "new start-up" organisation. Its ownership transferred to a 
Singapore-registered 200-employee company which bought both the Glenrothes and 
the Singapore sites, but the Florida site is "completely gone". Major reorganisation of 
the company therefore became necessary^.
During the course of the field work it emerged that the progress of this organisational change was 
significant in terms of its implications for the subject matter of this study.
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Prior to 1992 the company's markets used to be mainly US-based. Marketing 
orientations, however, changed towards the Far East because of the company's new 
Singaporean nationality and its strong business connections in that part of the World.
Indeed, receivership caused many of the resources of the company to become 
redundant. Prior to 1992 the Glenrothes site was organised in terms of three separate 
sub-units with a total of 165 employees, of whom 43 were qualified engineers. The 
number of employees reduced dramatically to just 15 after 1992, including nine 
engineers, five administrative personnel, and a Managing Director who used to be 
responsible for a specialist product design quality assurance function.
Mechanical design is caiTied out completely in Glenrothes whereas PCB artwork is 
mostly subcontracted. On average, a product design cycle in this company takes about a 
year. The first step in a typical design cycle involves receiving information from sales 
and marketing before general product specifications could be determined. Design 
engineers begin by reviewing such specifications to prepare a cost estimate and work 
schedule. On approval, a proposal is then transferred to hardware and software design 
engineers for their approval before being transferred to manufacture.
The company uses a CAD S4 system for 3D mechanical design on a single work 
station, one that is supported by added storage capacity. A Viewtrack PCB system is 
also used for electronic design. 3D Modelling was necessary because customers were 
"worried about resonance .... vibration and that kind of thing in the mechanical 
structure". The need for product prototyping continued despite the use of a 3D 
modelling package on a CAE system. This was necessary from the point of view of 
manufacturing which experienced problems without prototyping in the past as resultant 
CAD infoimation could not be processed on CAM or could not be transformed into a 
physical product within its available capacity.
A single-work station with a Viewtrack PCB artwork layout package was first 
introduced in 1986. Two more work stations were added soon after that. CAD S4 was 
introduced in 1988 for mechanical design.
CAD was justified on the basis that it would increase efficiency and enable designers to 
use modelling packages for prototyping and simulation reasons. The CAD expectations 
of "speed[ing] things up, check[ing] the artworks in-house and mak[ing] modifications 
at a much faster turnaround type basis" were apparently met to a satisfactory degree. 
However, an outstanding technical problem still persisted:
“We were always disappointed at the level of verification that the system could actually carry 
out itself, because you know in generating an artwork there are a number of design rules that 
need to be followed in terms of track width, spacing, just simple connections around the PCB
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that have to be made, and we were always disappointed that the system was not 100% at j
picking up faults.” s
The introduction of CAD forced management to recruit an experienced CAD user and to !
hire an engineer for maintenance. System users had to be more independent following j
the take-over. They had to "do all of it" by themselves due to a shortage in resources j
and personnel. The new management team found that they had to redesign their i
information system, retrain their personnel, and reorganise their functional structure 
through consolidation of formerly separate functions to cope with the new i
circumstances.
Integration was considered in the past but has not been implemented to any degree in 
this case:
“We have thought twice about it. The investment is too high and to get exactly what we want |
does not seem to be possible We have taken the best of very small bits we could get and
used them. We have not tried to implement an all-embracing communication system.”
The justification given for this stance was in terms of structural instability which j
discouraged heavy investment on integration: " We are changing our structure very |
fast" and, therefore, it would be "not suitable" for the company to "go for a large |
investment". From an organisational point of view, continuous change and anticipation 
of acquisition or take-over eventualities increased doubts about the future of the 
company.
From a technical point of view, what makes interfacing the design-manufacturing link >
exceptionally challenging in this case is the nature of the product in concern: !
“I could see if our CAD system could design that base casting, if we had a vendor who could j
take a CAD tape and then produce that from a CAD tape rather that a bit of paper, then yes t
that would be an application for us too. And it’s more likely to be accurate. It doesn't rely on j
somebody else interpreting a bit of paper, it's gone directly from the CAD system to, to the 1
machine shop, if we could get a vendor that could take a CAD tape As I say, the output is I
several different vendors and then all the pieces come together at the manufacturing side, at j
assembly, so we're designing a lot of individual pieces which are later assembled.” I
* CASE STUDY TEN: Company 10
Until 1993 Company 10 had been a wholly-owned subsidiary to a Washington-based 
corporation quoted on New York Stock Exchange. As the Technical Director put it 
during an interview with him in 1992: "We know it very well: they are the bosses - '
provided we produce the required profit figures we are left alone". The company's |
name and ownership then changed in 1993 following a management buy-out; it became 
a "totally British business" as the subsidiary's Directors bought it from its American |
owners: "We are now a very, very small team indeed".
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The company supplies three product families: (1) tachographs (used for measuring 
heavy vehicles’ mileages), (2) multi-pui*pose digital system counters, and (3) petrolum |
sensors (exported to the Middle and Far East for use in underground fuel storages). !1These products differ widely in size, function and purpose. j
Tachograph customers include major vehicle manufacturers throughout Europe, such as |
Skania, Volvo, DAF, and IVECO. Western Europe, rather than the US, is now the |
company’s main export market for tachographs, rather than the USA, “because there is 1
no legislation [making the use of tachographs compulsory] in the US”. At any rate, the i
early 1990s UK economic recession seems to have had a negative effect on the 
company’s performance: '
"We've been recessed .... It wasn’t totally worldwide, but it hasn’t been certainly confined to 
the UK. We've seen a down turn in the truck market in virtually every company apart from 
Western Germany. And the Germans sold their old trucks to the Eastern Germans and then 
bought new ones themselves '' |
The company's marketing strategy process has recently focused on the tachograph 
product line with a strong orientation towards the European market and away from the 
Middle and Far East markets. Historically, this goes back to the early 1970s as Britain 
joined the then Common Market. At present tachographs must be fitted on trucks and 
heavy vehicles by legislation in Europe.
"... we came into the of ttichographs round about in 1973-74 when the UK was thinking about 
going into the Common Market.... We knew that if it went into the Common Market then 
there would be a requirement for fitting tachographs. We did go into the Common Market, 
there was a requirement, we have been making tachographs ever since "
Company 10 is a 370-employee company led by a five-member Board of Directors. It 
was set up in 1948 in Dundee, Tayside. The company's engineering design function 
consists of 15 staff, including both engineers and draughtsmen, supervised by a 
Technical Manager who reports to the Technical Director. Its role is to provide product 
design infomiation both for internal manufacture and subcontracting purposes.
Company 10 is a "do-it-yourself" enterprise by tradition, where most product 
components are manufactured in-house, deploying a wide range of operations, 
including die-casting, milling and drilling, machining, grinding and taping, plating, 
plastic moulding, and painting. Recently, however, the factory has been reorganised 
with a view to creating specialist manufacturing cells in an attempt to rationalise 
operations and reduce stock costs: “It's basically [naming the company], a do-it- 
yourself company; all the processes are made inside the company”. Production is of a 
"one-off" type with the exception of the tachograph line. Tachographs are manufactured 
at an average rate of 50,000 units annually.
169
At present the company operates AutoCAD for mechanical drafting on five IBM- 
compatible PCs. Integrating technology on the shop floor has been improved recently 
by introducing new computerised plastic moulding machines with a view to integrate 
them into the company's mainframe system.
The company's CAD experience began in 1985 by introducing a CADplus system to 
help in schematic design work. However, severe limitations of the system were 
experienced, pmticularly with respect to electronic cii'cuit drafting. It was scrapped after 
four years.
The present Technical Manager criticised both his predecessor and senior management 
for introducing CADplus:
“We had tried in 1985 to get CAD. We did it wrongly. There was £25,000 set aside in 1985 
and the Engineering Manager, my predecessor at that time, 1 don't know how he did it, but he 
basically went o u t .... and got a commercial company to have a look and say: ‘Right, this is
what we want’ We just got the ones which the distributors could supply us with and
[naming his predecessor] chose between .... CADplus and ....A utoC A D , and he chose 
CADplus because they had a lot of similar parts and he thought the parametric facilities that 
existed with CADplus would be a good thing. However, he never took a look at the training
aspects, the documentation associated with i t  The other Directors went along the MD's
suggestion that CAD was an ‘electronic drawing board’, and, in actual fact, it slowed us 
considerably because it was a struggle to make this thing work ”
After what was deemed a failed CAD experience a single work station with AutoCAD 
software was introduced. This time there was "a lot of obstruction from the finance 
department because they stomached out £25,000" for CADplus.
The Technical Director has mastered an evolutionary process of its implementation:
“It's taken us a long time to put in because we were very careful. We saw a lot of people
spend a lot of money and not get very far the thing was we had two things to do: we had
to get information up on the system relative to the products we were making, as well as put 
new products on the system and we also had a training program with the engineers involved, 
and what we couldn't afford to do was to put all the engineers off at one time and train them
on CAD and then put them on again. So, we went very carefully and we gradually built
up the system  ”
AutoCAD was proposed to the then parent corporation. There was some scepticism as 
to whether it was going to give the type of productivity promised: "people were 
promised ridiculous things". Therefore, an external consultant was hired to prepare a 
formal assessment report on the proposed system. Although this was "quite an 
expensive" task^^  ^ it was justified, from the point of view of design, to persuade the
^^A three-month feasibility study was cturied out. It resulted in a 30-page report submitted in August 
1987 on the "technical and economic case for introducing a CAD system in the design office". The 
NEL {National Engineering Laboratory) was hired in this case for the purpose. The report's conclusions 
were: (1) the company would benefit from the introduction of new technology in the form of a CAD 
system, (2) a single work station CAD system with 2D draughting software would meet the design 
requirements for the VRCS300 scries Tachograph, (3) the total cost of such a system would be =
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corporation’s senior management that further costly mistakes would be avoided. Design 
management resorted to involving a third independent party because:
“I wasn't wanting to make the mistake that my predecessor made I was wanting someone
who knew and had much more experience than myself to say: ‘That package won’t do the kind
of work you want to do’  Now, I wanted a neutral person, someone who wasn't trying to,
to sell me his own package ”
The company's objectives in introducing CAD were spelt out by the Technical Director 
who seemed content that these were met satisfactorily:
“The main thing was to try to facilitate getting liuough engineering changes when necessary 
and modifications when necessary .... we could react very quickly .... be flexible.... and there 
was one thing .... we could hopefully cut the reaction time.”
However, in the experience of the users in general, CAD improved productivity of 
redesign, but not that of original design work.
The introduction of CAD has htudly affected the organisation of work in any significant 
way since it was merely used as a "tool to help us in the design side". However, the 
Technical Director found that his methods and intensity of control over the design 
depar tment's work changed with the implementation of AutoCAD:
“As soon as you start having your drawings in an electronic format then the control of it
becomes different. I would say it becomes more d ifficult So, we've had to put some
discipline in there .... some checks into the system and a method of operation and also we've 
also got to make sure that people keep a back-up just in case somebody switches [the] 
electricity off.”
In this case there has been an increasing emphasis by integration enthusiasts on the 
potential advantages of linking CAD to the company's mainframe system:
“We have been sort of looking at an integrated set u p  I think we are getting towards the
thing [i.e. CAD] talking to other parts of the set-up .... that was the second part of the 
exercise. The first ptu t was to get better customer reaction and llien the second part which we 
are just coming to is to look at the whole of the system within the place and look for some 
integration ”
In this case, however, the integration enthusiasts are a powerless minority of relatively 
young but highly qualified engineers who happen to be employees of this organisation 
where compulsory redundancies have been the norm for a long time. In the early 1980s 
the company employed 1,400 people. Management has consistently downsized the 
organisation by firing what it regards as unneeded employees on a "last-in-first-out" 
basis. The result is that it is the younger and more adaptable people that are sacked 
every time. Age averages of the work force and of managers in this company are higher 
than averages in industry. Investment in human resources is almost an alien topic to 
senior management's thinking.
= between £29,500 and £47,600 depending on the system chosen, and (4) the system would result in an 
effective cost-saving of £40,364.
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This situation has created tension between senior management and those young 
engineers who reject such attitudes and feel threatened by them, some of whom once ;
said: if I thought they understood the first thing about the human resource j
approach to staff development I would fall off my chair, I promise you!". According to |
this younger group of employees, the personnel department has played a major role in |
Irunning the company: ".... rather than recruitment and development, they tend to be |
looking at how to monitor people and get rid of people". i
In this case there is, clearly, a generation or "mental" gap between the integration |
enthusiasts and senior management, as will be explained further in Chapter 7 (section 
7.3). In this connection, a leading integration enthusiast once talked very critically of !
senior management: i
"[It is the] lack of computer know-how: they say: 'Oh, yes, yes, we have to .... use the
computers to work smarter, other companies do do it' .... They're mttking all the right noises I
but a little of them actually know enough about it to offer any guide lin es  There is only j
one person at the board level who could actually use the computer in the slightest way  i
They say: 'Yes, yes, we want it to happen but [naming a Director] and I will do it in our own
time' They themselves are [afraid?] to even [say?]: 'Oh, it will be great if it could do that
or do this' in case they say something silly .... what a stupid thing - it's not just technically
possible! Their knowledge is at such a lev e l.... I don't think they would contribute " !
iHow wide the gap is between the two groups can be illustrated by another example of I
how the integration enthusiasts blame senior management for blocking their initiative to j
develop the company's CAD system into an integrated set-up: ;
"We've had all sorts of problems trying to integrate our AutoCAD into the company's system, |
 The only obstruction I might see are the Directors! .... again, it's top management.
They've cut [up] the organisation first so we've got all these ongoing activities for the 
computer integration to ttike place. It would require some of their people not to be doing some 
work to do tlie computer integration work." .
In particular, senior management is criticised for being traditionalist and unwilling to 
learn and adapt. It should be said that the pro-integration group of engineers look :
seriously at learning as an essential element of their career development experience. ;
Many of these engineers seem to enjoy learning "the hard way" as they put to use [
whatever theoretical and practical skills they possess: j
"You keep learning I was coming at week ends and early in the morning .... I do much of
the customisation work .... CADplus in one way was a disaster from the point of view that it 
.... didn't do the job for us. On the other hand, we learnt a lo t ... from mistakes that we made
from [i.e. with] that package if we hadn't had it I  don't think some of the benefits that ^
we've had with AutoCAD  we would be seeing these benefits now. We learnt expensively
before and we haven't made any of the same mistakes again." I
Nevertheless, in this case resistance to integration remains uncompromisingly strong at î
the top of the organisation. No positive decision has been made at the senior 
management level to adopt an integrating strategy. The forces against change in this 1
case seem to have outweighed the forces for change, so far at least. j
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The experience of this company with regard to the lack of any progress towards 
integration will be explained further in Chapter 7 (section 7.3) using the study's 
conceptual model. In this respect, the experience of Company 10 will be contrasted 
with, and analysed against, the experience of Company 4 which adopts an integrating 
strategy.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented background information on the cases in the study and, thus, 
provided the first basic account of the data that was collected on the ten companies 
during the filed research. Case presentations were divided into two groups 
corresponding to the primary companies (Company 1 to Company 5) and the secondary 
ones (Company 6 to Company 10). In essence, the difference between the two lies in 
four fundamental questions: (1) Should existing or potential CAD and CAM systems be 
interfaced for a more effective flow of information between the design/engineering and 
manufacturing functions? (2) Should these functions be integrated organisationally as 
part of the interfacing process? (3) Should company-wide organisational integration 
mechanisms be developed around CADCAM so as to extend its benefits beyond these 
functions? and (4) Should long-term business objectives be reviewed in the light of, 
and aligned with, CADCAM integration since CAD and CAM are perhaps two of the 
most important strategic technology applications for any manufacturing concern? The 
primary companies’ responses to these questions are positive; thus, they have adopted 
what can be called an integrating strategy. The secondary companies’ are negative; 
thus, theirs can be described as a non-integrating approach.
The crucial difference between the two positions lies in the fact that by adopting an 
integrating strategy the primary companies have fomially decided to develop the core of 
their technical set-ups in favour of integrated CADCAM. The integrating strategy they 
have followed for the last few years shows a positive line of accumulative action in a 
direction which is significantly dictated by the technical requirements of integration as a 
long-term project. In so doing they find that they have to introduce organisational 
changes, some of which are unpopular to some individuals and groups within their 
settings. Yet, the trend towards integration persists despite resistance. This partly 
reflects a determination on the part of the leading change agents to mobilise their 
organisations towards integration in spite of the psychological, organisational and 
political challenges involved. In contrast to this position, the secondary companies have 
not adopted CADCAM integration formally, nor have they seriously attempted to do so. 
It can be said that they have been indifferent or that they have taken a passive approach 
to integration for the foreseeable future at least.
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In conclusion, one important point should be stressed regarding the organisational 
implications of the two positions. The integrating strategy adopted in the primary cases 
is bound to induce a high degree of transformation (for better or worse) with regard to 
the manner in which working relations have been shaped historically, not only between 
different individuals and different groups but also within a single group. Ironically, if it 
is not managed skilfully, an integrating strategy may mean a greater convergence in 
technology hardware terms but exactly the opposite in organisational and social setting 
terms. The level of uncertainty associated with technical change is much higher in an 
integrating strategy as individuals and groups are expected to adapt to continuous 
change.
By comparison, the situation is different when it comes to a non-integrating approach. 
Assuming that an integrating strategy will not be adopted by the secondary companies 
in the near future and that unanticipated turbulent events will not arise, a non-integrating 
approach per se does not entail such uncertainty and, thus, can be regarded as a more 
conservative and stable strategy. It is an approach that may avoid - consciously or 
unconsciously - potential threats to the existing social order in the secondary 
companies.
The next chapter will build on the data this chapter provided, concerning the cases but 
will involve a cross-case analysis of the data in the framework of the tentative questions 
of the present research.
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CHAPTER SIX
Findings, Data Analysis and Discussion - II: Answering 
The Tentative Research Questions
6 . 1 Introduction
This chapter will compare the case studies with each other and in relation to the main 
orienting theoretical issues under discussion. It will provide answers to the seven 
tentative research questions as found grounded in the substantive contexts of both the 
primary and secondary cases.
This chapter will conclude with developing conceptual insights that will be used 
effectively in the following chapter which presents a theoretical conceptualisation of 
CADCAM integration as a process of change and illustrates the social processes 
associated with it.
6 .2  Addressing the Tentative Research Questions
This section addresses the seven tentative research questions as presented in Chapter 1 
(section 1.4). Questions 1 to 6 are equally relevant to both the primary and secondary 
cases and question 7 is relevant only to the primary cases.
1 ) Why do manufacturing companies acquire CAD and  CAM Systems?  
Not surprisingly, all the companies studied tended, formally, to justify the intioduction 
of CAD and/or CAM systems on a "techno-economic" rationality basisk As Wilkinson 
(1983) pointed out, the most commonly claimed rationale for the introduction of new 
technology was the belief that technology was intiinsically worthwhile and could not 
fail to bring economic benefits. Formally, the companies declared that they sought to 
rationalise their engineering and manufacturing operations by "equipping ourselves
with such technologies" in order to " be a) competitive, b) supply [..] goods in
time, and c) supply [..] to the required quality standards" (Case 8).
Company 5 was unique in that its justification was based centrally on maintaining its 
market reputation by being a "first mover" (see, for example, Mueller, 1993) towards
^One notion was explicitly emphasised in all the companies studied, namely that any profit-seeking 
action, or at least any that was perceived as such, would justify the existence of a profit-making 
organisation operating in an increasingly competitive market environment. The techno-economic 
rationality perspective stressed that CAD and CAM systems were introduced in this light. It could be 
inferred from this that, from a management point of view, pursuing survival and profitability through 
improved competitiveness would uphold management as a “profession”.
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such technology in its industry. Being a first mover meant being a "technology leader" 
to senior management. The company did so because it aimed to preserve its reputation 
as a subsidiary of a giant multinational corporation. This was the only exception among 
the cases. Formal justification in the other nine companies pictured such systems as 
"tools" that should be utilised to improve profitable performance.
Nonetheless, the widespread presentation of such systems as a means to desired ends 
was rarely matched to the vital question of how their true value to a manufacturing 
company could be utilised. That is, how their potential benefits could be realised 
through a successful implementation that would help improve competitiveness in the 
"current climate of increased world competition .... and the unified European market", 
given the proposition that "it is imperative that British companies continue to improve 
on all aspects of their service in order to compete both at home and overseas" (Case 6).
With time, such systems had come to be regarded by users, middle and senior 
managers alike, though to varying degrees, as essential paits of their businesses. Case 
6 excluded, all of the companies studied made it clear' that they could no longer survive 
in business without them:
“ it's generally true of CAD, CAE and manufacturing software that if you commit your
company to it there is no way back. You're committed as part of a long term development....
You can't reverse !” (Case 3).
In addition to the practical benefits anticipated, however, such systems were often
deemed necessary for maintaining or improving company image with customers: " ....
if we didn't have it we wouldn't have the credibility" (Case 1).
Each interviewee pointed out between two and four reasons why his company 
introduced CAD / CAM. Various separate, but overlapping, emphases of justification 
were given. These were what sociologists, after C. Wright Mills (1940), would call 
"vocabularies of motive" (i.e. rationalised and readily available accounts that people 
typically use to make sense of certain contexts). These ranged from inward-looking 
operational motives stressing potential technical benefits (e.g. "improving 
maintainability of design information" [Case 6]) to externally-oriented sti'ategic motives 
emphasising potential economic gains (e.g. "improving business flexibility" [Case 4]). 
Formal justifications consisted of a combination of both in most cases.
Two important observations should be stressed here, namely: (1) a respondent's 
position and (2) their functional specialisation influenced the way they answered 
questions pertaining to justification. Whereas technical managers stressed operational 
and control motives, more senior managers insisted that their motives could not be 
isolated from the strategic business aspirations of the companies they directed. As
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Currie (1989) pointed out, engineering managers could not always perceive 
technological change as part of a strategy plan drawn by top management. Design 
managers focused on how CAD would, for example, "shorten design cycles" (Case 7). 
Manufacturing managers highlighted CAM's potential for improving "production 
methods" (Case 8) through: (1) increased efficiency, (2) higher speed of prototyping, 
(3) cost-saving^, and (4) enhanced quality and reliability.
The question of cognitive processes of individuals and groups involved in decisions 
about introducing CAD /CAM was borne out. Variuos meanings existed in a single 
organisation. The significance of subjective meaning in designing technology and 
organisation could not therefore be ignored^ (see Scarbrough and Corbett [1992], 
Weick [1990] and Brown [1995]).
Some of the engineers who were interviewed during the course of the research 
confirmed explicitly that an individual's professional background would have 
implications for their approach to conducting their work tasks: “I wouldn't be an 
engineer if I wasn't optimistic; you can't be a pessimist and be an engineer, nothing 
works then” (Case 10). It would seem reasonable to suggest that the influence of 
various occupational cultures^ within an organisation would contribute to the 
multiplicity of meanings that could be found in it:
** in the engineering technical magazines that you get, people who are at the top le v e l....
engineers, by and large, are aware of state-of-the-art. They also go to exhibitions and they see
these things: you can use that, you can use that. So you get a lot of ideas ” (Case 10).
By the same token, the idea that an organisation would have a single homogeneous 
culture would be invalidated by the more realistic proposition that a dominant sub­
culture, or a set of "publicly and collectively accepted meanings" (Pettigrew, 1979: 
574), would prevail from amongst various competing sub-cultures. The roots of these 
sub-cultures could be traced to the various formal and informal groups which make up 
the social composition of the organisation. Such groups could be classified according to 
professional as well as other less verifiable and more politically-explainable criteria. 
Indeed, Brown (1995) noted that legitimacy for information technology systems,dn 
general, was often sought through political processes whereby symbolism was used to
^For example, a CAD feasibility study in case 10 stated: "The system will result in an effective cost 
saving of £40, 360".
^See Porter (1983) for the argument that strategic vision and direction (as influenced by a particular 
meaning or set of meanings) are vital in the management of technology as a strategic resource.
'^See Gregory (1983).
177
manipulate actors’ understandings of proposed systems by feeding radically different 
information to each group of actors regarding investment motivations and implications.
The implications of comprehending a multiplicity of meanings in an organisation for 
answering the present question on why CAD / CAM systems were found to be acquired 
were important in that they highlighted the fact that formal justifications were only 
publicly and collectively accepted but by no means universally agreed upon. Exhibit 6.1 
shows the formal justifications in the ten cases. Formal justification statements were 
formulated and developed by the researcher over a period of time on the basis of the 
various respondents’ replies recorded during interviews with a view to defining public 
and collective meanings. In some cases these echoed written justification reports which 
were prepared and submitted to senior managements in all companies except in Cases 6 
and 7. No collective justification decisions were made in these two cases, but, instead, 
delegated individual managers made purchases on behalf of their companies.
It was rather surprising that the reason given formally for computerisation in Case 5 
was because such technologies were "the future". The Company, however, did not 
appear to have investigated or questioned how to maintain its worldwide reputation by 
securing "the future" through being a "first mover" towards CAD and CAM. Those 
responsible for initiating the purchase of such technologies appeared to have decided 
that such technologies were required first and then to have justified them in terms of 
their superiority over existing equipment and work methods.
The relevance of the institutional literature in organisation theory (e.g. Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; 1995; Zucker, 1977) to the notions of rationality found to 
be dominant in the cases revolves around the suggestion that "rationality" is often 
culturally induced by and through "mimesis". That is, for institutional theorists (e.g. 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; 1995; Zucker, 1977), rationality is a function of 
the common understanding of social reality which is constructed in such a way that 
ingrains, and is reflected in, rationalised formal structures. Technology, to begin with, 
is socially constructed by actions of designers, technologists, investors and other 
interested parties but, once developed, it will tend to become institutionalised 
(Orlikowski, 1992).
It should be noted that system interfacing was an important element of the justification 
process in Cases 4 and 5 but not so in the rest of the companies, including the other 
integrating cases in which concerns about integration emerged later after the systems 
had been introduced separately. In Cases 4 and 5 integration was incorporated into the 
original system designs since in these two cases in-house design was carried out, as 
will be explained in the following section.
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Exhibit 6.1 
Formai System Justifications
Primary Cases
Company
Size  
(No. of 
employees) Industry
Reasons Given for the 
Acquisition of 
CAD, CAE and CAM Systems
1 95 Photomasks *  Improving business responsiveness*  Maintaining credibility with customers
2 210 Lighting &cotrolequipment
*  Improving production methods* Improving quality* Reducing cost /  stock level with CAM
3 400 Elctronicsecurityproducts
*  Improving business responsivess
*  Shortening design-to-marketthroughput with CAD
4 500 Testsystems(defence)
* Improving quality &  reliability
*  Shortening design-to-market throughput with CAD
5 1,400 Self-service systems &  machines
* Maintaining reputation &  credibility* Shortening design-to-marketthroughput with CAD
Secondary Cases
â 35 Electro­chemicalsensors
* Improving design maintainability* Improving business responsiveness
* Improving information exchange
7 50 Weighingequipment * Improving business responsiveness* Improving design efficiency and security
8 73 Printedcircuitboards
*  Improving quality & reliability
* Reducing cost
*  Shortening throughput time
9 150 Computerhardwarecomponents
*  Improving management practice
*  Improving modelling in design
* Shortening design-to-market time
10 370 Electronicmeasurmentequipment * Increasing productivity in design* Improvingbusiness responsivess
179
2 ) How do manufacturing companies designluse CAD and CAM  
system s?
Three levels of data analysis were found to be needed for examining the issue of the 
design / use of CAD and CAM systems. These corresponded to the following 
questions:
1) What were the technical specifications of each of the CAD and CAM systems in use 
in each of the cases?
2) What were their respective purposes of utilisation?
3) to what extent was their implementation a process of "tailored" design/development 
and/or "packaged" purchasing?
Each of these questions will be represented as a level of analysis with respect to the 
cases in the following four subsections.
* Technical specifications
Technical specifications of CAD and CAM systems were investigated in each of the 
studied companies. In this connection, the data gathered for cross-case comparative 
analysis aimed to establish a sense of appreciation of the capacities, processing powers 
and hardware configurations of the systems in use. The investigation also aimed to 
identify software and hardware similarities and dissimilarities across the cases.
With regard to CAD, AutoCAD was found to be the most commonly used drafting 
package, particularly by smaller companies and those looking for low-cost, user- 
friendly systems for basic drafting (Cases 1, 6,7 and 10):
“The accessibility to training. It's very user-friendly It's a well-established package.
AutoCAD  can be customised quite considerably by the end user. AutoCAD  has got a very
wide user network Anything other than AutoCAD  [and] you're almost dependent on
training through the distributor ” (Case 10).
In addition, AutoCAD was found to be the most favoured package by companies with 
strong US business connections (Cases 1, 6 and 10). In the case of Company 1 
AutoCAD was but one of seven CAD systems in use simultaneously; like the other six, 
it was purchased specifically for exchanging design information with certain customers 
who used the same software package. The package was justified on the basis that any 
established customer’s design requirements should be met by adding a compatible 
software as long as it could be afforded. Some larger and companies with greater 
resources purchased more sophisticated but less commonly known packages (e.g. 
CAD-54 and Viewtrack packages in Case 9). Some others purchased some but 
developed most parts of their systems themselves (Case 5). The most self-sufficient of 
the larger and better resourced companies, however, designed and created its own 
brand systems almost completely by itself (Case 4).
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It should be noted that AutoCAD  would not support integration as other more 
sophisticated design packages would because, in essence, it is a drafting package. As 
the Senior Technical Manager of Company 10 put it:
“If you are making a selection for a company-wide package computer integration you would
not probably finish up with AutoCAD  you then start to run into problems of how you
integrate it There will be some people who will say: ‘Oh, you've got AutoCAD, we'll do
something for you, but the chances are .... they will give something which will interface 
AutoCAD to the rest of the system.’” (Case 10).
Nonetheless, CAM systems were found to be much more complex and prone to 
customisation, via customised tool libraries and tailored menus, since each of the 
studied manufacturing systems had virtually unique features which distinguished it 
from the rest: "Everybody [i.e. company] is unique." (Case 6). Therefore, a tailored 
CAM system was justifiable in every case. Unlike CAD in some cases, CAM systems 
were invariably ordered to unique specifications and supplied as a "one-off product to 
a unique user company. System configurations (i.e. the engineering principles 
underlying a system's design) varied considerably from one case to another. In the 
words of the Operations Director of Company 2:
“Even in a larger company the opportunities and the difficulties in getting CIM in operation 
are extremely difficult, and CAM [too]. Computer Aided Design is fairly well established but 
Commuter-Aided Manufacture and its link with CAD is extremely tedious.” (Case 2).
* Purpose o f  Utilisation
The findings revealed that CAD and CAM systems were used for a variety of purposes. 
The vast majority of the companies used CAD for two major purposes: 2D (i.e. two- 
dimensional) mechanical drafting and 2D electronic drafting. CAD was also used for 
design data processing and editing (Case 1). CAE applications were utilised in 
Companies 3, 4, 5 and 9 for design engineering analysis, simulation and modelling.
CAM systems involved electronic, optical and laser beam manufacturing processes 
associated with phototool production in Companies 1 and 8 and population and PCB 
assembly in Companies 2, 3, and 5.
In general, the introduction of computers to the design process changed the means of 
generating drawings and reports on paper, but it did not fundamentally alter the 
methods of sharing data and resources across departmental and corporate boundaries. 
This was much clearer in the secondary cases.
The two main factors contributing to this situation could be summarised as follows:
1) Isolated application-specific software packages with fragmented data models and 
separate file systems prevailed. The means of building representations fell short of
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establishing a common modelling base for the various applications involved in product 
development.
2) Each of the participants in the DEM processes partially described the product from a 
specific point of view and with a particular purpose in mind. Various representations 
were used in different application areas and stages of product development.
Consequently, the use of computers in DEM tended to reinforce, rather than weaken, 
the organisational fragmentation that already existed along functional lines. This could 
be explained as follows:
1) The resulting product information was dispersed over various drawings, technical 
performance calculations, bills of materials and cost estimations.
2) Data redundancies and incompatibilities among partial building representations were 
hard to avoid.
3) Data and knowledge incorporated in previous DEM projects could not be easily 
accessed and were, therefore, not effectively utilised in new projects.
* "Tailored” or  /  and Purchased Systems?
Data-gathering in this connection aimed to find out how much of the implemented 
systems were tailored by unique design and development to match specific company 
requirements and how much of them were bought "off-shelf".
Invariably, all CAM systems were found to be customised, designed, and developed by 
specialist vendors to suit the specific manufacturing requirements of user companies. In 
contrast, only one of the CAD systems in the study was designed and developed totally 
in-house (Case 4). In Case 5 the system's software was developed independently 
inside the company. Companies 4 and 5 could afford to do that because they possessed 
the largest technical skill bases with numerous teams of scientists, engineers, and 
technologists of diverse specialisations. CAD systems in the rest of the cases were 
bought "off-shelf" and used as complete "turn-key" systems.
With regard to integration, no initial consideration whatsoever was given to a possible 
future integration in selecting purchased system components in all the companies except 
in Company 4 (and Company 5 to a lesser extent). However, later stages of consequent 
system upgrading and development included purchases of added system components. 
Then, purchasing was guided by integration trends in the primary cases but not so in 
the secondary cases.
In the case of Company 4 the initial CAD system was developed internally. It was 
designed with a view to integration. A similar approach was adopted in Company 5 
originally, but the company had to redesign its entire CAD, and CAE systems in order
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to create a more integrated collective performance of the user departments. The planned 
CADCAM system was justified mainly on the basis of its advantageous integrating 
potential to the company.
3 )  How do manufacturing companies introduce, maintain and develop  
CAD and CAM  systems?
As shown in Exhibit 6.2, the roots of computerisation in the DEM functions of the 
studied companies could be traced to the early 1970s. Typically, the first experience of 
computerisation at a company level in most of the cases involved either finance 
functions (for payroll accounting purposes), sales (for customer order information) 
and/or production planning (for parts lists and stock control purposes):
“.... they always start with the accounting procedures because they are easy to define, but I 
mean the poor ..... production tools chap, we don’t know what he wants, so that came later 
 " (Case 2).
The 1970s could be conceptualised as the first phase of the computerisation 
phenomenon in an evolutionary process of development. The 1980s (i.e. Phase II) was 
the peak of it in terms of stand alone system apphcations:
“.... We brought the thing in stages; we didn't bring in a big package all at once. We started 
off with a PC and a PC package on it and we, gradually, built up from there as we got 
experience and we added more work stations.” (Case 10).
The 1990s (i.e. Phase III) could be conceptualised as the phase during which the 
relevance of integration has progressively increased as companies have pursued a better 
utilisation of the systems introduced during the last two decades: “It's a continuous
thing It's part of an evolutionary thing. We are always developing. We've got to
keep doing that” (Case 4).
In general, evaluating CAD and CAM systems prior to implementation was a well 
established practice whereby assessing the technical requirements of the company 
concerned and, hence establishing suitability criteria for system selection was achieved 
or at least targeted. Some companies, however, could not exercise choice in system 
selection. For example, in the case of Company 5, a DDM CAD system was imposed 
on it for purposes of compatibility from the point of view of the holding corporation 
whose plants in the USA used it. Company 3 was another example; it did not have to 
purchase a CAD software but was "given" Visula free of charge by another subsidiary 
of the parent organisation which specialises in software development and, thus it was 
left with no choice whatsoever on selecting a system which could have been better 
suited to its own technical requirements.
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Exhibit 6.2
Computerisation in Design, Engineering and Manufacturing: a Historic Pattern of Progress
Primary Cases
Company
Chronology of CAD, CAE and CAM Evolution and Growth
PHASE I: 1970s PHASE H: 1980s PHASE HI: 1990s
Introduction (*) of CAD systems only
Introduction (*), Up-grading(**) or Replacement (***) 
of CAD, CAE and CAM systems
Integration (****) 
of CAD, CAE and CAM systems
1 * * ** *** * * * *
2 * * * * *
3 * *** * * * *
4 * * ** *** * * * *
5 * *** * * * *
Secondary Cases
6 *  * *
7 *  * *
8 *  * *
9 *  * *
10 *  * *  * * *
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In the vast majority of cases, implementing CAD was, essentially, a process of 
imitating other companies' moves towards a used and tried technology:
“Our MD had been reading up magazines and suddenly; ‘CAD is a good thing for design; go
and get CAD!’  One tiling you couldn't miss: the literature that’s coming round suggesting
that this is the best thing since sliced bread that happened in the engineering industry and 
everybody appeared to be doing it.” (Case 10).
However, Companies 4 and 8 stood out as pioneers with regard to the innovative 
application of CAD and CAM technologies respectively. In the instance of Company 8, 
for example, the company's learning experience^ with technological innovation was 
particularly noticeable in the British PCB industry; the company was innovative in 
relation to CAM but imitative in relation to CAD.
Whereas in Companies 6 and 7 no written justification reports were necessary, 
purchasing decisions were much more formal in larger and more bureaucratic 
companies. Though not large enough by any universal standard, Company 4 , a 500- 
employee subsidiary of a giant corporation, is the second largest organisation in this 
study. Some of the company’s middle managers talked extensively about the difficulties 
they faced in justifying investment in new technology in general and CAD CAM 
integration in particular, as will be explained further in Chapter 7 (section 7.4). In this 
case every proposed investment had to be justified on the grounds of a cost-benefit 
analysis as a routine procedure within the corporation’s standard four-year equipment 
depreciation policy. The signature of the corporation's Managing Director was 
necessary for approval every time:
“ We raised a thing called capital application for cost justification It's a document that
you prepare and circulate around senior management in the company and then up the hierarchy 
to the very top of the establishment.” (Case 4).
A similar capital application report had to be signed by six different managers in 
Company 8:
“There is a fairly strict routine of capital application where we fill in documentation requesting 
expenditure and we justify that expenditure and that feeds tlirough the normal formal chains. 
And, yes, we meet with the directors and we do our level best to present to our directors tlie 
need for a change .... but, in general terms, they will only react to .... a desire to get more 
profit.” (Case 8).
Historically, in this case the pioneering CAM project had been delayed by bureaucratic 
procedures: though, according to informants, it was the first manufacturer to 
commission CAM in the British PCB industry, it only managed to be second to 
implement it due to a delay in justification procedures. The other manufapturer who 
won the race was, by contrast, a smaller, privately-owned, and less bureaucratic firm.
^See Bessant et al., (1996); Jones and Hendry (1994); Kim, (1993).
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In examining the factors that influenced how CAD and CAM were introduced, 
developed, and maintained, it should be noted that in most cases only one person, 
usually the person responsible for initiating the purchase, decided upon the organisation 
of work around them. These persons included senior design managers taking charge of 
CAD and senior production managers taking charge of CAM. Such leading individuals 
may have consulted members of a task team which would have been set up especially 
for the purpose of implementation under their supervision. They may have been equally 
influenced by their superiors' wishes or demands. Whatever the circumstances, 
however, the initial decisions tended to be theirs alone. It could be argued therefore 
that, to a large extent, the initial choices made in implementing these technologies 
would have been coloured by these individuals' own biases.
In general, it could not be denied that implementation decision-making processes were 
influenced by objective elements such as the type of products, the existing structure of 
work, and the need to rationalise design, engineering and manufacturing operations. 
However, equally powerful influences appeared to come from the individuals and 
groups involved, and revolved around such factors as values, attitudes, self-interest, 
power and competence. It should be pointed out that these factors were influential in 
making decisions associated with technical change less rational, less stable, and less 
efficient than might have been expected.
Once introduced, CAD and CAM systems had to be maintained and developed. 
“Operationalisation” and development of installed systems were often more challenging 
than initially anticipated, pai ticularly with regard to CAM. For example, the experience 
of Company 8 in this regard could be summarised in what the Senior Production 
Engineer once said:
“We expected the whole system to be efficiently operating within a six-month period of 
installation. That turned out to be untrue. We were still developing the system two years 
down the line from receipt. That was because it was difficult for us to understand Computer-
Aided Manufacturing Systems as applied to the type of systems we put in We didn't
know what we were looking for, the application engineers or the company that supplied it 
didn't know our business, so it took us two years ” (Case 8).
Maintenance would be essential if a system's intended purposes were to be kept viable 
over any given period of time. System development work aimed to look progressively 
into an existing system with the intention of improving its technical performance (e.g. 
Cases 2, 6, 7, and 10) or, by planned orientation, making it more beneficial to the 
strategic direction the of the business in concern (e.g. Cases 4 and 5). In this regard, 
the interfacing of CAD, CAE, CAPE and CAM systems could be conceptualised as a 
significant area of system development since its declared aim was to allow the whole 
organisation to benefit from numerous single stamd alone applications. For example.
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access to CAD-generated information could be made available to all those who needed it 
outside the functional boundaries of design in order to carry out their job tasks or make 
decisions (Cases 4 and 5). Nonetheless, the filed research revealed that such thinking 
was not dominant in the majority of managerial circles in most of the cases. It was 
rather rare due, mainly, to a deeply-rooted culture of functionalism in the majority of 
the companies, which encouraged mangers to think narrowly in terms of their 
immediate departments: “.... the pitfall of that: you can lose the overall vision and the 
optimum use of resources” (Case 5). The use of CAD under such circumstances was 
often viewed by design managers as a strictly departmental matter; CAD to them offered 
“point solutions” to the technical problems encountered in designing a product, rather 
than a source of information which should be made available to other functions so that 
“the guy on the shop floor or the guy in the stores can access the information directly 
from this design information” (Case 4). Invariably, such individuals would need to 
refer to CAD-generated information in carrying out their contributions to the 
manufacturing process.
It would be true to say that departmentally-biased, protective attitudes prevailed in most 
of the companies in the study, particularly in the secondary ones. Those companies 
which moved seriously towards integration. Cases 4 and 5 in particular, were the 
exception since integration, by definition, was motivated by, and incorporated, an 
element of organisational restructuring and a changing of attitudes:
“We are just initiating major changes into the company .... we are Just in the middle now of 
doing some changes to our development processes to make all of our development more 
concurrent. And the thing is now you should be seeing overall processing packages because a 
point solution for an individual manager or an individual process or sub-process does not 
necessarily give you an optimum global processing solution. In fact, it may be detrimental 
 ” (Case 5).
The nature and amount of maintenance and development work varied considerably from 
one company to another and from application area to another. Preventive and repair 
maintenance for CAM systems in all cases was found to be carried out by suppliers. 
Maintenance arrangements for CAD and CAE, however, differed from one company to 
another. It was interesting to find that most of the primary cases (except Company 2) 
maintained their systems independently using skills they had within their organisations, 
whereas all the secondary cases signed maintenance contracts with system vendors and 
were, thus, found to be dependent on external assistance.
Integration in the sense of interfacing of CAD and CAM systems could, again, be 
thought of as a special and perhaps most technically advanced step in a system 
development frame of reference. Such a cognitive inclination was found most clearly 
among integration leaders in Companies 4 and 5.
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4 )  W hat are the outcom es o f  the implementation o f  CAD and CAM  
system s in term s o f  pre-iden tified  objectives ?
An investigation into companies' own assessments in this area revealed that only 
Company 6 admitted that no clearly-defined CAD objectives had been set out prior to 
implementation.
Despite an overwhelming emphasis on productivity improvements in the formal 
justifications given for the introduction of CAD technology in the vast majority of the 
cases, it turned out that CAD did not increase productivity for a new product design 
process, drafting in particular. Iionically, there were complaints that it had even slightly 
prolonged the time involved. This was a common finding across the cases without 
exception. Despite such complaints, CAD remained to be viewed as "a very useful tool" 
(Case 4) for consequent design modification and redesign work whereby existing 
design information could be changed "very quickly" (Case 3); and "it took a fraction of 
the time it took before" (Case 6).
It could be inferred from the findings that CAD was a considerably more useful tool for 
companies whose basic product designs required frequent modifications, such as in 
Cases 1 and 3, than for companies which had a mainly static design process requiring 
minimal changes to existing standardised product designs, such as Cases 6 and 7. In 
general terms, however, it should be stressed that CAD's ability to increase the 
productivity of a design process was not a purely technical issue; legal, organisational 
and commercial considerations played a significant role in determining how productive 
a CAD system was in practice by determining how it had been used in the first place. 
Indeed the whole direction of a professional design practice was not left to the 
discretion of highly-skilled engineers for technical excellence but was usurped by 
senior management in a manner which was perceived to be in the interest of 
profitability:
“ if the legislation changes slightly, if our customer changes his design a little bit, how do
we process changes to keep our product compatible with legislation and the competition?.....
And usually, his [i.e. special customer’s] product is out there. His product is at the leading 
edge of technology and .... [he says to us] : ‘We want a tachograph that can do these things’
.... So we have to take his tachograph apart and find out in more detail what that performance 
specification is. But, of course, you cannot do it the same way, so you are very much 
constrained as an engineer. He chooses the best layouts, if you were to sit down with a blank 
sheet of paper I would think that nine times out of ten you would design the mechanisms ....
in the same way that he has d o n e  you will tend to follow the same avenue as a good
engineering practice, but then again if he's taken [out] a patent of [i.e. for] doing that by that 
method, then you have to achieve the same thing but by an alternative method, and that is 
very, very difficult to do because good design practice tells you to do it that way but you're not 
allowed to do it that way.” (Case 10).
In technical terms, although no doubts were explicitly expressed about the 
appropriateness of such technologies in their particular settings, eight out of the ten
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companies experienced various practical problems with the technology. This would 
indicate that the companies might have benefited by carrying out more rigorous 
assessments of their needs and the equipment available prior to the decision to 
purchase.
Nevertheless, many managers learned lessons about how to deal with similar technical 
problems in managing future technology projects. For example, in the case of 
Company 10 the first CAD system, a CADplus, which was introduced in 1985, 
represented a case of failure and a "costly mistake". Yet, it offered the company a 
significant learning opportunity for the technical managers in charge of innovation.
Given the number of companies who experienced technical problems, it was not 
surprising to find that a significant proportion also had economic problems with the 
implemented technologies. However, not all those who had technical problems also had 
economic ones, and vice versa. Technical problems brought about economic problems 
for a number of the companies. The issue was not simply whether companies benefited 
financially from CAD and CAM technologies. Had the outstanding technical and 
organisational problems been overcome, some could have benefited more. The answer 
had to be that a better financial return on their investments could have been achieved in 
a number of cases.
It should be mentioned that technical and financial problems in the primary cases 
delayed integration, particularly in the less integrating cases (Companies 1, 2 and 3) 
which shared a common characteristic with the non-integrating companies, namely a 
smaller organisational size: "We don't really have the resources to drive the system as
you might expect anyway" (Case 6); " being a small company, money is quite a
factor!" (Case 7). This finding confirmed the proposition that "small firms are generally 
quite slow in adopting ... CIM technology" (Arcelus and Wright, 1994: 411).
5 ) What are the impacts o f the implementation o f CAD and CAM  
systems on manufacturing organisations?
Discussion in this section will focus on four interrelated areas of the organisational 
impacts experienced in the ten cases as a consequence of the implementation of CAD, 
CAE, and CAM systems. These include: (1) employment, recruitment, and training 
implications; (2) the design of jobs associated with these systems; (3) the effects of 
implementation on industrial relations; and (4) impact on inter-functional relationships.
* Employment, Recruitment and Training Implications
Contrary to popular views that computerisation would lead to unemployment, it was
found that only in a single case had the introduction of CAD and CAM systems resulted
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in layoffs^. This exception was found in Company 8 with CAM. Elsewhere, no 
conclusive evidence whatsoever could be found to support a clear-cut relationship 
between such systems and organisational downsizing, Salzman (1989) also found that 
CAD investment decisions were not associated with declines in levels of employment 
and that electronic CAD software did not decrease the need for skilled PCB designers in 
the US firms he studied. The employment levels of drafters were not affected, nor was 
the demand for drafters reduced relative to engineers and other white collar employees.
Even in Case 8, the situation was not a straightforward case of massive replacement of |
human for machine work. Management's intention with regard to CAM, which was j
made explicitly clear, was to use it as a means for increasing control over work through !
a deliberate act of deskilling labour, getting rid of as many workers as possible, and I
thus reducing cost. Managerial philosophy in this case was to counteract the demands i
resulting from increased competition by maintaining complete control over the work 
force. It was dominated by thinking in machine terms only. Human labour was viewed 
from this perspective as a source of problems caused by inefficiency and unreliability.
The main concern here revolved around adopting a long-term view of automating the 
production process, which would go beyond the life span of highly skilled individuals 
in whom knowledge and expertise were trapped.
The position in this case was diametrically opposed to the "human-centred" (or 
"anthropocentric") principles which would call for a greater attention to be given to the 
human element by "putting people into the centre of production" in place of adopting a 
"technocentric approach" to the design of technology and jobs around it (Uden, 1995:
84)^. In contrast to this dominant attitude in Company 8, senior management’s attitude 
in Company 3 was different:
“Within this company we view data bases as being a tool, not to have power in themselves.
 The real power is in the skills of an individual and we try to use the computers to do
things we cannot do by hand and we try to encourage our work force to understand that they are 
in control and not the systems, [to] use their creativity and the system is there to help them 
 The purpose is to allow more use of talents, of unique sk ills  ” (Case 3).
Compulsory training was imposed in Case 8 on the then new system for all shop floor 
workers who used to follow the "traditional method". The individuals worst affected by 
this decision included older people who neither had any computer skills nor were 
prepared to learn them. Older designers were less interested in learning the technology
^Company 5 had a history of downsizing. Staffing levels shrank from 7,000 to 1,400 during the 1970s 
due to dwindling business demand. In spite of this, CAD and CAM systems did not impact 
employment levels in any obvious manner.
^See also Badham (1991) and Brodner (1990) in this connection.
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and had less desire to become regular users. Management selected CAD users who 
were younger by an average of about nine years. These were directed specifically 
towards new design projects. By doing that management selected the path of least 
resistance. It was clearly the case that older people refused compulsory training on the 
then "new system" because this to them meant a loss of job autonomy. Consequently, 
management did not hesitate to "release" them. In return, they were offered vacant or 
newly set-up positions elsewhere in the organisation. Although some of them were 
happy to accept such an offer, others preferred to leave the company and look for a job 
elsewhere, while still others decided to take this opportunity to retire at once. In this 
case no more than 26 workers lost their jobs out of a total of 148 employees.
Youth was, evidently, a significant factor in empowering a new class of designers to 
the detriment of older ones, as could be inferred from a self-told story of a graduate 
engineer in his mid-30s:
“These guys are engineers, 20 years more experienced than me or 20 years older than I am, so 
they have a lot more experience than I have, except when it came to tlie computer and some of 
the mathematical techniques. Most of these guys are /7ND-qualified, although again that was a 
long time [ago], 1950s type HND and they would go many years later for Chartered Engineer 
certificates. I come from a university. I don't have as much practical experience .... although I
think I have a mathematical approach to jobs that they don't have they occasionally come
up against the odd computer problem and ‘there must be a better way to do this on the 
computer and: [naming himself], how would you do this?’. And I think I get asked more 
questions of how I would tackle a piece of work whereas before when we worked on the boards 
I had to ask them the questions because they were much more experienced than I. It's changed 
that aspect ” (Case 10).
In some cases "experts" had to be hired especially to manage system introduction or to 
teach staff how to use newly introduced technology: "We had to create a responsibility 
for CAD" (Case 3). In other cases, there was no need for hiring people from outside. 
Huge systems, such as the CAD systems implemented in Case 5, required the 
appointment of highly qualified CAD specialists who could lead the process of 
implementation, organise work around the system, and provide the required level of 
technical support.
With regard to training, different arrangements were sought by different companies. In 
some cases certain middle managers were concerned that senior management gave due 
attention to training but not to education. As the Training Manager of Company 4 put it:
“.... that's the hardest bit - to educate people very, very difficult to get the message over
about the need to educate I am fearful that that message will not get across adequately and
they [senior management] will be perfectly happy to spend a 100% on the hardware and the 
software, 50% on the training, nothing or 10% on education. I believe that education is even 
more important than training, because if people aien't committed they'll beat the system; they 
will not let a machine beat them. So I’m concerned, I don't know how to get my message 
across better ” (Case 4).
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In Case 5 some technical managers showed concern that the training provided, which 
was aimed mainly at developing operating skills, was necessary but insufficient; they 
believed this should be coupled by specialist training courses in order to develop skills 
associated with managing newly introduced technology as well as transformational 
skills associated with its implementation:
“Obviously we need to have more training, not just [on] the actual use of the system but in
the changes, in the development process too The thing is that it is very, very difficult -
unless you have a very good knowledge of the developing processes on CAD .... - it's very 
difficult to do any evaluation before and after because you are never comparing like with like.
 We need to get training in process changes: why are we changing the process? What are
the benefits of concurrent engineering? What are the benefits of solid modelling? We need to 
train people in those aspects as well.” (Case 5).
Training programs were often provided by leading technology vendors. Company 4 
could afford to be self-sufficient in training without needing external assistance, due to 
a massive technical skill base available at its disposal. Different types of training 
programs were organised to meet skill needs for operators, users, supervisors, 
managers, programmers, and technical support personnel. The introductory training 
programs varied, therefore, according to the intended purpose of training, from basic 2- 
day "hands on" to advanced three-week full-time courses aimed at selected individuals 
with an orientation towards specialist skills.
It should be mentioned that training correlated highly with organisational learning, 
particularly in Cases 4 and 5, the companies with the largest technical skill bases in the 
study. In these cases vendor training on new technology was needed initially but, with 
the passage of time, individual and organisational learning^ allowed them to be self- 
sufficient in providing more advanced baining independently "in-house":
“It was initially [acquired] as part of the capital purchase program and once you get a certain 
amount of learned knowledge in, then we try to use our skills to train, but there are specialist
courses and so o n  There's no way you can take those new tools unless you have the
knowledge.” (Case 4).
“There's the basic training given by the software vendor as part of the installation the
other thing is that we will have a couple of guys as well who will become more skilled 
because they will be the application support group and also they can handle and do ad hoc
training and as they develop extra functionality they can get trained in there once the
environment got bigger and a lot more people got trained then it was a lot easier as other users 
had a lot more experience, so they could relate and learn what not to do.” (Case 5).
* Job D esign Im pacts
Job design impacts of CAD and CAM systems could be discussed at two levels, from 
the points of view of: first, those who supervised and managed technology, and 
second, those who used or operated it. Investigation in this area aimed to understand
^See Atlewell (1992) and Kim (1993).
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how the introduction of such systems affected task complexity, variety and 
interdependence for the individuals involved^.
*^User  /  O perator Jobs
In general, individual system users/operators tended to be initially cautious about new 
technology. This was more true for CAM than CAD cases: ".... if you're going to be a 
mechanical engineer you're going to be a mechanical engineer and CAD comes as a
secondary part of i t  rather than you're a CAD operator" (Case 5). However, those
who had not refused to work with new technology as a matter of principle tended, in 
general, to adapt to it gradually. In Cases, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9, they even tended to ask 
management to introduce more of it:
“We've got into a stage where rather than people saying we don't want machines, they are now 
saying we want more machines .... they became dependent on the system  ” (Case 5).
“Each of the engineers wants to have more automation tools than ... he [already] has in. I have 
constantly had requests for more PCs and more software and more systems requests.” (Case 9).
In human terms, outcomes were mixed: some of the jobs created were good, some bad, 
and some indifferent. The highly subjective nature of job satisfaction assessment was 
evident from different individuals' responses. It should be studied only in terms of the 
personalities of the specific people concerned, as one manager pointed out:
“It depends on what your goals in life are. If further technical understanding is something that 
turns you on then you get more job satisfaction out of it; if it is something that pisses you 
off then you won't get more satisfaction.” (Case 8).
It should be noted that it was not job content alone that increased, or decreased, job 
satisfaction. Other elements, such as pay and bonus, status, industrial relations, and 
informal social relations, also played a role^ *^ . It might have been expected that job 
computerisation would invariably increase employee satisfaction. Surprisingly it had 
the reverse effect in those cases where the change was imposed upon them without 
consultation or because there was insufficient time to provide the necessary additional 
training which would have probably made a difference. Nonetheless, in the majority of
cases increased skill levels correlated with higher job satisfaction: " much more
interesting more productive - you can go home and feel you have produced more,
so achieved more. That in itself is a great achievement" (Case 1 ).
^It was evident that shared commitment, by both user and supervisor groups, was greater when these 
were involved in the introduction process. This was found to be equally true for different functional 
groups when all of them were involved during agenda formation and selection as important decisions 
were made about integration. In line with Scarborough and Corbett's (1992) proposition, it could be 
argued that the higher the degree of involvement, the more likely a shared commitment would be found.
^^See Truman and Keating, 1988.
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* *  M anager  /  Supervisor Jobs
Middle level technical managers in charge of design/engineering, and manufacturing 
functions played a crucial role in promoting technological change; therefore, their role 
should not be neglected in researching the implementation of CADCAM integration (see 
Beatty and Lee, 1992). They were themselves affected in different ways by change. So 
were supervisors and senior designers. CAD made design managers feel that their jobs 
became more challenging (Cases 2, 3, 9 and 10). CAE and CASE^i forced a higher 
level of co-operation amongst previously independent engineering teams (Cases 4 and
5). This encouraged the integration process in these two cases.
No role conflict was found between design supervisors' jobs and emerging CAD 
managers. Supervisors did not feel alienated form their own subordinates who 
happened to be CAD users and now turned to CAD managers for consultation and 
technical support. In general, training was provided for those supervisors who also 
became CAD users and, thus did not have to experience bitter feelings of passing their 
traditional supervisory role to a senior designer assuming a new authority. The only 
exception to this situation was found in Cases 5 and 10 where CAD supervisors were 
extremely critical of senior management’s lack of technical knowledge and interest in 
integration as well:
“Management of the whole system's gone a wee bit astray over the last two-three years It
would make life a bit easier if they were at the same level That's not gonna be easy: to
train managers to be more aware technically ” (Case 5).
“.... They don't know enough about it. I know so much more about i t .... but it's to me and
the Data Processing Manager to do it; it won't come from above  With the MD
personally, of the people now on the Board, he is the only one who can switch a computer on 
and use i t  in the slightest way.” (Case 10).
CAM was found to increase co-operation requirements among system managers, 
operators and programmers (Case 8). Also, it increased supervisors’ job satisfaction 
and managers’ overall control level (Case 8) but made managers' jobs more stressful 
because of the need to learn extra computer skills (Cases 1 and 8).
A general trend could be identified among the larger companies; the production 
planning and control function shrank and became less powerful. Its task domain 
became limited to maintaining CAM, costing, and converting customer orders into 
production orders. On the contrary, CAD gave the design and development function a 
greater role than in the past; it became responsible for the maintenance of CAD in 
addition to its conventional responsibility for product configuration and producing 
design information and plans for general development.
l^In application in Case 4 only.
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* Im pacts on Industria l Relations
In general, employers took the view that it was their right to introduce new technology 
as they saw fit and, hence would not hesitate to take unilateral actions on the matter. 
This triggered fears of worker displacement and unemployment in some cases, 
particularly in low trust environments (see Deery, 1982). As a result, trade unions were 
prepared in some cases to take an aggressive stance to insure long-term employment 
security. However, such action depended highly on the unions’ bargaining power 
which appeared to be rather weak in most of the companies studied. In this regard, the 
findings confirmed Baldry and Connolly's (1986) observation on the remarkable 
absence of formal new technology agreements in seven CAD user firms which he 
studied in Scotland. The craft control traditionally monopolised by unions appeared to 
be greatly weakened.
In general, CAD systems were hardly faced with any kind of organised resistance. On 
the contrary, some groups of engineers were found to demand more technology of their 
managers (Cases 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). The only exception to this was found in Case 5 
where some of the older employees took a unified stance by refusing to co-operate in 
learning computer skills.
Cases of CAM introduction, however, involved less stable industrial relations and a 
less efficient form of work organisation. Indeed, in some companies (e.g. Case 8) 
changes could only be introduced gradually after some months of instability. From the 
outset, unions' concerns revolved around job security, pay and conditions. Organised 
shop floor workers and engineers were "invited to participate" in the process, though 
the extent of involvement differed from one company to another. According to Frohlich 
and Kiieger (1990), the intensity of union involvement in technological change would 
range from full participation to no participation through negotiation, consultation, 
information during planning, selection, implementation and evaluation phases. In the 
cases studied union participation in change revolved around consultation and 
information but fell short of reaching negotiation. For example, senior management’s 
attitude in Case 2 was that: "people are naturally resistant to change. It's the 
Machiavellian approach; people always feel they have more to lose than to gain" (Case 
2 ).
Unions' reaction to CAM technology often began with suspecting management's 
intentions, particularly in those cases where labour cost reduction and increased 
managerial control through deskilling of labour were explicitly set out as the prime 
motive for introducing CAM. Worker-management relationships became extremely 
strained in Case 8 as unions resisted change. Historically, management-union struggles 
resulted in an empowered management position to the detriment of the unions. This
195
situation caused some individuals and groups from amongst union members to 
withdraw because they felt that the union could no longer serve their interests with the 
present balances of power: "they were only interested in our monthly dues" (Case 8). 
They felt that they had more chances for realising their ambitions if they allied with 
management. As Sarfati and Cove (1986) pointed out, international employee 
organisations had campaigned hard to offset the negative aspects of the introduction of 
new technology into the work place. Yet, the unions in the studied companies appeared 
to be largely ineffective in co-steering technological change in a direction which would 
protect their own interests.
It could be said that, in general, the introduction of new technology per se had not 
constituted a serious industrial relations issue in the studied companies over the last 15 
years. However, those larger organisations with poorer management-union relations, 
such as Company 5, were more likely to suffer what Lee (1989) termed a "low trust" 
atmosphere or culture with negative implications for technological change due to 
minimal consultation or an early breakdown of dialogue. In these cases unions would 
be likely to resist but, in the long run, their standing might be considerably weakened 
due to members leaving or rejecting their leadership. This would be likely to leave them 
unable to halt the introduction of proposed systems. A period of hostilities would 
follow during which both management and unions could become losers; management's 
urge for a speedy improvement in productivity would not be achieved and the unions 
would stand to lose their influence in the organisation. Managerial strategies could be 
intentionally formulated so as to exploit technological change as an opportunity to 
reduce union power. By contrast, "high trust" relationships would encourage union 
representatives to be actively involved to create, by virtue of negotiation, an enhanced 
work situation with the new technology (see Clark, 1989; Frohlich and Krieger, 1990; 
Lee, 1989; Sarfati and Cove, 1986).
In general, the findings did not support labour process theorists' a r g u m e n t ^ ^  about 
deskilling in the drawing office, namely that CAD, on introduction, would lead to 
draughtsmen and designers being deskilled (Cooly, 1983). Similarly, the findings did 
not agree with Baldry and Connolly's (1986) proposition that CAD would cause 
fragmentation of the social cohesiveness of the drawing office by giving management a 
greater direct control through a progressive deskilling process involving the storing of 
data in the memory of the computer rather than in the minds of the draughtsmen. On the 
contrary, some draughtsmen, particularly younger ones, said they felt that CAD gave 
them a chance for upskilling. Indeed, some other researchers (e.g. Adler, 1989; Clegg,
After Henry Braverman (1974).
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1990; Forslin et al., 1989; McLoughlin, 1989; Salzman, 1989) took issue with such 
"mechanistic" accounts of analysis based on their critique of the proposed link between 
Taylorisation and the inevitability of technological determinism. The counter-argument 
would be anti-determinism and would revolve around reskilling or upskilling, rather 
than deskilling; CAD changed the skills required to draw but did not transform the 
engineering knowledge and expertise. Additionally, CAD/CAM created an upgrading 
trend in the overall skill requirements of personnel both in individual occupational 
categories and in the balance between occupations and allowed engineers a higher 
mastery of such tools, whereas CAE shifted skill profile and recruiting criteria 
upwards.
To imply that power politics in the context of the organisations studied were confined to 
capital-versus-labour agencies, as the traditional Marxian perspective would stress, 
would be not only be simplistic but also empirically inaccurate. It would neglect, for 
example, the role of strategic choices open to management during implementation, the 
factors influencing such choices, and the effects of such choices on the outcomes of 
change (see Buchanan and Boddy, 1983; McLoughlin and Clark, 1988). At the same 
time, it would give no or little attention to livelier power contests among different 
groups of management, between functional departments, and among groups of workers 
scoring "political points" against each other: "the traditional Marxian conception of the 
politics of production as a zero-sum game is no longer very useful" (Clegg, 1990: 
216). However, although such livelier power contests existed in different forms in the 
researched organisations, they would not seem likely to cause existing structures to 
change radically in the short-term due to the legacy of a long-established management- 
versus-union industrial relations tradition.
* Impacts on Inter-functional Relations
The organisational effects of introducing CAD systems were often confined locally to 
design functions (in Cases 6, 7, 9, and 10) due to a deeply-rooted tradition of 
compartmentalised work organisation. It seemed that the rational basis for this tradition 
had not been subjected to a thorough review since the 1950s and 60s: "They tend to
stick to their [jobs?] It's probably more historical, you know, that's what they've
  always done" (Case 6). Invariably, the introduction of CAD systems affected
design and engineering, or "the front end function" (Case 8) as they were called by 
their manufacturing colleagues. CAM, on the other hand, affected manufacturing and 
production. The effects of what was always perceived as a "departmental concern" only 
rarely transcended the boundaries of the functional department into which a system was 
introduced. This was truer for the secondary cases in general. Indeed, it was found that 
Companies 3, 4 and 5 experienced a pressing need for a closer "bi-directional
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communication" between design and manufacturing managers, as a result of 
implementing CAD and CAE, to facilitate a better understanding of each other's 
contribution to the overall work mission being accomplished,
" we need to have more integration, but certainly greater communication .... Without that
you can't have concurrent engineering " (Case 5).
In some secondary cases managers on the manufacturing side found it necessary to 
complain to the Board, through the directors representing them, about the lack of 
consideration given to the "manufacturability" properties of the products they had to 
produce. "Front end guys" were blamed for this. Designs supplied by engineering 
departments were outstanding had they been judged by criteria of pure technical 
excellence. However, they made manufacturing engineers' jobs difficult because they 
could not produce the parts as designed, either because they could not make them 
within the manufacturing capacity available to them or because they were excessively 
intricate so that they needed longer and more demanding operations which could not be 
done in time for a competitive delivery, due to tight production schedules. Even in 
those cases where such complaints negatively affected inter-departmental relations at a 
managerial level, senior management were rather hesitant in addressing the issue to the
satisfaction of the manufacturing managers: " they're taking the political, easy way
out" (Case 10).
Under existing departmentalised structures manufacturing managers recognised very 
well that the role designated for them was restricted to producing a product according 
the specifications outlined by the "front end guys" but not to interfere in how design 
information was created or changed. As the Senior Production Engineer of Company 8, 
who was assigned overall responsibility for manufacturing operations, put it:
“We get only three or four files out of the whole package. We don't get the full design package 
... so we can't make head or tail of how the board functions; all what we are doing is making 
phototools. It doesn’t tell [us] how the board actually will function electronically; the design
does, but the bits we get don't you go back to [the] design[er] and tell him he has an error
in his design. He has to do it. We don’t understand It's his responsibility that the design of
the board should meet its requirements. If he fails in that responsibility, only he can make a 
decision to change it. We can't go around changing his design because we don't know what 
effect the change we make would have on the functionality of the board. So it's not our 
business [to] start changing designs; he is the only one that knows how that board functions 
or should function. He should've designed it to meet that requirement ” (Case 8).
Such problems were also experienced in the primary cases, particularly in Companies 
3, 4 and 5, but to a lesser extent and compromising solutions were found faster to the 
delight of manufacturing managers.
A similar inter-departmental managerial conflict was found only in Cases 4, 5 and 10. 
Historically, in each of these companies, which happened to be among the three largest
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in the study, a DP (Data Processing) department had been in operation as a management 
support function since the late 1960s and early 70s. Managers of these departments 
became increasingly powerful with the diffusion of the computerisation phenomenon as 
a result of more affordable and more efficient micro-processors. Traditionally, they had 
controlled all the activities associated with computers in these companies under existing 
accounting rules. They had been powerful as far as power had been "implicated in 
authority and constituted by rules" Clegg (1991: 18). As CAD and CAM systems 
became more widely used in industry, however, DP Managers felt their prestigious 
position was being challenged or even undermined increasingly due to competition 
from the "new system managers". In Clegg's (1991: 35) terms, both groups of 
managers were "implicated in circuits of power whether they intend it or not". It could 
be seen that the introduction of such systems threatened to disrupt existing power 
relations in these cases^^.
Such a conflict, which appeared to have originated due to a combination of divergent 
interests of departmental subunits (see Manske and Wolf, 1989) and differences in 
defining organisational reality (see Aldrich, 1979), grew and became more personalised 
with the advent of integration because integration leaders in Cases 4 and 5 looked 
beyond their immediate functional boundaries for integration. In Case 4 particularly the 
integration "champion" exhibited charismatic leadership behaviour through outstanding 
"envisioning", "energising" and "enabling" skills (Nadler and Tushman, 1990: 82)
It was understood by many people in these cases that this would eventually involve the 
entire organisation in question. In Case 10, for example, the finance and data 
processing departments had, rtaditionally, worked closely together. Their strongly 
coupled relationship seemed to have deprived the technical department of considerable 
progress towards integration. Interdepartmental conflicts involved attempts to
suggested by Scarborough and Corbett (1992: 58):
“Even in minor applications, existing power structures would be disturbed by the introduction o f I
new technology and, as a consequence, the implementation process would reproduce (and amplify) |
existing strains and conflicts within the organisation.” |
Indeed, the influence of various interest groups in initiating and exacerbating conflict could not be j
ignored. As Aldrich (1979: 91) put it: Ij“Conflict within organisations is an important source o f  organisational variation, as disintegrative 1
and independence-generating forces cause schism s between members, departments, programs, and I
other subunits  control over resources, and the consequences o f control, makes organisational i
participation a game o f  high stakes. Members seek their proper share o f whatever resources an j
organisation has to confer.” !i
l'usée also Beatty and Gordon (1991) and Howell and Higgins (1990) for conceptions of change j
championship. j
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delegitimise opponents' claims for funding new technology projects by, for example, 
recalling experiences of failed projects. The Technical Manager explained:
“Our finance department, who really had an influence on the data processing department, they 
were responsible for computer purchases, they didn’t want us to go and buy Apollos and SUNs
 so we were pushed really into PC systems. It wouldn't have been my choice .... it was
that our data processing department were very closely linked to [the] finance department and the 
Finance Director at that time was involved in the use of computers wherever they were used 
throughout the company and they knew PCs, they didn't know Apollos and they didn't know
SUN work stations and they pushed for PCs There was a lot of obstruction from the
finance department.... they said : ‘Well, I'm not spending, we're not spending more money,
because - you know - without a return!  How do you know you can make the new one
work?’ There was always the thing: ‘you've never done anything about CAD, you've
never done anything about CAD!’. I said: ‘Well, I have done something about CAD, but 
you're not prepared to spend the money!’ .... When it came up to a little more that £10, 000 
they would be able to put up a barrier to i t  ” (Case 10).
Personalised conflicts were not unexpected since the allocation of resources, income, 
status, and prestige by organisations affected their members' life chances and power in 
the larger society (see Pfeffer, 1977). DP Managers, who regarded themselves as 
guardians of their companies' information systems, regarded this as an expansionist 
behaviour aimed at a territory which had been under their control for a long time. From 
their point of view, senior management should by no means empower integration 
leaders who had a vision of an integrated organisation.^^. It was not surprising, 
therefore, to find that in such organisational contexts the conflict was highly politicised 
and caused an impeding intra-managerial obstacle to in teg ra tionT his was true even 
within separately grouped work teams within a single function, as could be deducted |
from the following remark by the leader of one of the design teams in Company 9: i
“I drew them separately [referring to a hand-drawn organisation chart] because they are separate. |
This side reports to the operations managers, I report to the VP [Vice President] - Engineering, î
who is resident in Florida .... where our headquarters are  There are strong links |
functionally, there are tensions as w e l l  between our departments; our engineers work I
together, they have to!  They mix together, in fact!  So there are strong links but we j
are separately structured ” (Case 9). |
It was apparent that inter-functional conflicts were worse when: (1) dominant |
departments made excessive demands on others, (2) the latter felt particularly unhappy Î
about the role allocated to them, which failed to match their expectations, and/or (3) the |
l^This could be conceptualised as another substantive example of "power stripping" from the point of 
view of DP Managers (see Chapter 7, section 7.4).
 ^^ Support for this point from tlie organisation studies literature could be found. For example, Adrich 
(1979: 97) contended:
“Organisations are not neutral objects, passively responding to .... members' needs, but rather are 
powerful centres o f resources tliat are bound to conflict. Som e conflicts have a purely personal 
referent, as individuals seek to improve their relative standing by gaining access to a larger share o f
organisational resources  Other conflicts, however, involve entire subunits and departments,
partly because organisational differentiation incorporates such conflict into the organisation and 
partly because coalitions o f  vested interests have very different ideas about the uses to which 
organisational resources should be put.”
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latter were dissatisfied with their less advantaged status in the organisation due, for 
example, to differentiated performance criteria and rewards. In this connection, 
organisational structure would be both "a source of control and communication and a 
mechanism generating variation and conflict" since "some properties of organisations 
which give them their strength also contribute to weakening them" Adrich (1979: 93).
Design staff, or "the indirect boys upstairs", were answerable only to the "people 
upstairs [i.e. the Board of Directors]". They often had an advantage over their 
colleagues in manufacturing, "the direct boys downstairs" (Case 10), for a number of 
reasons, including structural and environmental ones, leading to a status of 
differentiated organisational positions:
“.....  There isn’t necessarily a structured route for the design process. There is for
manufacturing, because there has to be for BS 5750, for the manufacturing process to be
structured, but the design process is not structured they tend to respond to particular
design work as a one-off each time. So it depends on what it is, who the customer is, and who 
is doing tlie design, the response will be different.” (Case 6).
6 )  Why does a m anufacturing company seek (or decline) to integrate  
CAD and CAM  system s?
The philosophy of CADCAM interfacing specifically, and integration in general, and its 
implications for individual job design was best summarised by the leading technologist 
in Company 5 in the following words:
“You need to look at your overall global process and if you have to optimise one sub-process
to get overall optimisation then so be i t  but the whole enterprise need to understand that
and the department manager - you know - obviously hasn't got to be penalised.” (Case 5).
In general, it could be said that the principle of integration was taken more seriously in 
the primary than in the secondary cases. However, each of the companies tended to 
define integration in its own way, depending on how it was perceived by its leading 
change agents in the context of their specific production environment. Hence, it was not 
surprising that different companies gave different formal techno-economic rational 
justifications as to why integration was sought. Exhibit 6.3 summarises the reasons 
given in justifying CADCAM integration in the primary cases.
Integrated CADCAM differed radically from stand alone CAD or CAM systems 
because integration "is not an off-the-shelf product; it is a concept" and, thus, "what 
gets integrated with what - and to what level - is very much a local decision related to 
the specific contingencies of that situation". Therefore, the success of an integration 
project would depend on "understanding this and having the necessary strategy to relate 
it to the needs of the business" (Bessant, 1991: 294).
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Exhibit 63
Summary of main reasons given for pursuing CADCAM integration
in primary cases
*'Trovidmg technical support throughout the organisation" (Case 1 )
* "Rationalising utilisation of resources available to company'fCase 2)
* "Allowing manufacturing function a direct access to CAD­
generated database information to eleminating error and
waste in production operations " (Case 3)
^"Achieving a free flow of information among different
disciplines throughout the organisationa through CE" (Case 4)
^"Improving interdepartmental communications" (Case 5)
2 0 2
The findings supported Dean and Snell's (1991) conclusions^ that different 
organisations used different techniques, and used various names for the same 
technique, when integrating job and organisational designs to achieve integrated 
manufacturing. The findings also showed that functional integration was not the only 
axis for assessing an integration project since stage integration and goal integration 
were also important axes for analysis, as will be explained in the following chapter.
Indeed, it could be said that cross-functional CADCAM integration was not the only j
Îtype of integration found; intra-functional applications of integration, such as those j
involving interfacing various computerised systems within a design or engineering 
function (e.g. CAD and CAE in Case 3; and mechanical CAD, electronic CAD, j
assembly design CAD, and technical publications departments in Case 5), were in some j
icases regarded as equally or more important than CADCAM, and thus given priority j
over it: i
“I agree with the principle of integration I think it's probably almost greater within design
than between design and manufacture.” (Case 3).
“Design is the key one and then subsequently we want to link throughout to all the ancillary
o n e s  but the key one obviously is if we can integrate our computers for the design and
then to manufacturing.” (Case 4).
Furthermore, it could be said that cross-company integration was found to be of 
considerable importance to some companies, particularly in Cases 1,4, 8, and 10 due 
to their extremely close collaborative relations with their key customer firms. In Case 
10 in particular it was regarded as being much more important than interfunctional 
integration within the company.
Exhibits 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show Bessant's (1991: 55) models of integration^^. The 
three models have one characteristic in common, namely that they emphasise that 
integration is a long-term, multi-phase undertaking. Exhibit 6.6 represents the various 
levels of integration that could be found in a manufacturing enterprise within an 
evolutionary process of development from level 1 to level 5:
“ it's a very long time ago .... and there's been a steady evolution .... and it evolved into
[a] bigger, more complex system over a period of time We implemented it over a number
of years .... I'm a very strong believer in evolution.” (Case 3)
“We will approach it slowly. It [i.e. the integration process] will take years ..... ” (Case 4).
l^Their study was critically reviewd in Chapter 2.
^^The convergence to CIM model was derived from Kaplinsky (1984).
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Design such 
as integrated 
CAD 
workstation
Exhibit 6.4 
Convergenece to CIM
Integration within areas of activity
Manufacturing 
such as integrated 
ceils, CNC 
machinery
Co-ordination 
such as integrated 
stock control 
MRP.MRP2
Integr^on between 
areas of activity 
such as 
CAD/CAM, FMS
'omputer-integratei 
manufacturing .
Integration moves beyond the 
boundries o f the firm
COMPUTE] [GRATED
-ACTOR
SUPPLIERS DISTRIBUTION
Source: Bessant (1991), derived from Kaplinsky (1984)
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Exhibit 6.5 
Steps-by-step progress towards CIM and beyond
• f
Computer integrated 
manufacturing and beyond
Inter-junction 
automation such 
as CAD/CAM
Integrated automation 
such as FMS
Simple programmable 
automation
Simplify and integrate
Costs and risks
Source: Bessant (1991)
Exhibit 6.6 
Hierarchy for Computer-Integrated Manufacturing
Level 5: Integration of 
manufacturing systems 
with other business systems 
within and beyond the firm
Level 4: Integration of all 
manufacturing activities
Level 3: Interfunctionai links for 
example CAD/CAM
Level 2: Control of Groups of machines 
linked in cells
Level 1: Individual machine control
Source: Bessant (1991)
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AMT in general and CIM in particulai' were often described as a "competitive weapon", 
particularly in larger companies. It should be noted that immense competitive pressures 
were a crucial factor in driving companies towards CIM; it was not purely a matter of 
elective natural evolution that they adopted such technologies.
Awareness about product quality was, in general, on the increase in all the cases; the 
pursuit of responsiveness through flexibility maximisation seemed to outweigh the 
search for efficiency maximisation through a productivity-oriented culture. Product 
quality was not only important to outside customers but also internally. Whatever the 
product being made, it was becoming increasingly important.
Managers looked into their own organisations to make sure they were fit to meet 
customers' expectations and became concerned about improving their quality 
performance, not just in terms of finished products but also in terms of the quality of 
work carried out between departments. Computer managers, for example, had to be 
told to improve the work quality of the systems they were responsible for, because 
these offered a service to other employees who happened to be infoiTnation users.
In this sense, users became regarded as customers in much the same way as external 
customers to whom finished products were sold. The increasing concern about quality, 
often expressed in the shape of a TQM program under a "continuous process 
improvement" slogan (e.g. in Cases 4 and 5), shifted management's attention to the 
significance of the organisational factors by forcing them to intensify inter-functional 
communication and co-operation. The aim was to improve quality of service internally 
and thereby improve the services provided to customers.
Hence, striving to build the concern for quality into departmental work contributions, in 
response to external commercial pressures, would potentially facilitate further 
integration at the organisational level. It could have a greater integrating effect, 
however, had senior management been as enthusiastic about TQM as middle and 
technical management were, for in most of the cases it was the latter who were assigned 
responsibility for quality improvement; they took it happily in order to improve 
operational performance.
The missing link, however, between an improved operational performance and a 
potential strategic advantage could be largely attributed to the view taken by many 
senior managers of quality as a strategic consideration whose translation into a 
profitability gain did not have necessitate personal involvement on their part. They left it 
to middle managers to implement TQM without them getting personally involved in 
implementation and monitoring. Although a TQM program would be, essentially, about
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communication and co-operation among all members of an organisation, the gap of 
communication which existed in larger companies between senior managers on the one 
hand the rest of the organisation on the other could not have narrowed as a result. 
Worse still, some line workers refused to participate in TQM because they believed 
this, like other senior management initiatives, would not work; it was imposed from 
above. Some of the middle managers who were selected to champion TQM complained 
that they neither succeeded in convincing a great number of operators to co-operate nor 
in filling the communication gap at the top of the company.
With regard to the secondary cases, on the other hand, Companies 6 and 7 insisted 
formally that integration was not "relevant" to them; Company 9 believed in it, in 
principle, but admitted it did not take implementation seriously; whereas Companies 8 
and 10 thought about it and discussed it as a potential future direction which would 
have perhaps been tackled more seriously under better market circumstances, but took 
no practical steps towards its implementation.
Therefore, to reiterate what was mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, the secondary cases 
could be differentiated on the basis of their position vis-a-vis technology-induced 
organisational integration. The likelihood of them implementing CADCAM integration 
in the foreseeable future was not generally very great, although they varied 
considerably.
As mentioned above, various justifications were formally given for the lack of 
integration in these cases, as explained in Exhibit 6.7. The obstacles to integration in 
the secondary cases were linked to an intricate set of contingency factors. This point 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter with reference to gi'oups of factors 
influencing integration in the primary cases.
As was explained in Chapter 4 (sections 4.3 and 4.5), the question of whether a 
company should be categorised as a primary case or a secondary one was determined 
completely by its specific stance vis-a-vis CADCAM integration. The categorisation 
was created for the purpose of the present research data analysis. Both types of cases 
were chosen from the same range of the new Scottish electronics industry - both users 
of CAD / CAM for mechanical, electrical, and electronic engineering manufacturing; 
both had used CAD / CAM for more than five years; and both used DEM processes 
capable of being integrated. In essence, the difference between the two categories lay in 
where each company stood in relation to integration: in general, the primary cases 
embarked on integration and moved some distance towards realising its potential 
through an on-going process of transformation whereas the secondaries did neither.
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Exhibit 6.7
Summary of main reasons given for the lack of integration
in secondary cases
*Lack of "functional overlap" between design and 
manufacturing technologies (Case 6)
*The business biased towards manufacturing at the expense 
of design (Case 8)
^Integration costs could not be justified fiancially under 
difficult economic circumstances (Case 8)
*Lack of senior management interest in integration
(Cases 6, 7, 8 and  10)
^Insufficient resources available for integration (Cases 6 and  7)
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Of course, it would be important to address the question of why some companies went 
along the direction of integration whilst others did not. The primary and secondary 
cases could be compared in terms of their respective technical, economic and 
organisational characteristics with a view to addressing the above question. In this 
respect five points could be made:
1) All the primary cases were already users of both CAD and CAM technologies but not 
all the secondaries combined, readily, the use of both technologies. Some of the 
secondaries (e.g. Cases 6 and 7) used only CAD because they were satisfied that CAM 
was unnecessary for producing the types of product they made, although, from a 
purely technical point of view, they were capable of using CAM and integrating it to 
CAD without major difficulties. The presence of both areas of computerised 
applications in the primary cases was a clear advantage to them in that they could 
advance towards integration earlier than the secondary cases. The fact that some of 
them did not have CAM in use would not mean that if they did they would have moved 
instantaneously towards integration. A clear proof of that was the fact that some of the 
secondary cases were already using both application areas but did not embark on 
integrating them, and continued to use them as strictly separate stand alone systems to 
support functional work tasks within an existing structure. In other words, the decision 
to adopt an integration strategy would never be determined entirely by a company's 
technical capability of physically interfacing such application areas and setting up an 
integrated DEM process around them.
2) The vast majority of manufactured products included large numbers of design 
elements, production activities, materials as well as a diversity of complex data 
abstracts. Due to the fragmentary nature of existing DEM processes, each company had 
its own specialised data representation. Developments in the data modelling and 
database management system markets contributed to a greater desire for data integration 
in industry in general. Also, a greater diffusion of CAM technology over the last two 
decades or so and a wish to use data exchange to link CAD and CAM were major 
factors contributing to the development of more sophisticated data exchange systems in 
supply today. Data exchange processes, however, had been a practical reality for only 
about a decade and were not entirely straightforward. Representation and 
communication of design information remained to be unstandardised and complex, thus 
forming a major technical barrier to integration.
Efficient data exchange between applications in a company or across companies would 
be the key factor in integrating design and manufacturing information. The lack of a
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unique set of standards to fulfil the requirements of a complete CIM s y s t e m w a s  a 
major reason why non-integrating companies chose not to take the trouble of adopting 
CIM^o. The primary companies took it upon themselves to challenge such a technical 
barrier with all the other financial and organisational challenges associated with it 
whereas the secondary companies did not.
3) The type of industry in which a company operated and the type of supplier-customer 
relations characteristic of such an industry would affect how the company responded to 
industry-specific standards of quality. In general, the primary cases were under greater 
pressure to integrate because of the nature of their respective products. With regard to 
the probability of integration in the secondary cases in the foreseeable future, the 
competitive and technical pressures on Company 10, for example, were much greater 
than they were on the other non-integrating companies; it would be likely to have to 
respond to them sooner rather than later by adopting an integrating stiategy and linking 
CAD to CAM for an integrated corporate performance.
4) An organisation's size appeared to play a vital initiating role in this; the larger the 
company, the more likely it was to integrate in the near future^\ Despite the managerial 
difficulties large organisational size seemed to create, it appeared to be a significant 
factor in encouraging integration. Results of the analysis of the data on the primary 
cases (see Chapter 7) also suggested a similar pattern. In the context of the present 
research data, a primary company, on average, would be about four times the size of a 
secondary one; on average, a primary company employed up to 521 employees and a 
secondary company up to 136. Companies 6 and 7, the smallest in the study, were the 
least concerned about integration. In both cases only a single technology capable of 
being integrated was found (i.e. CAD). Integration, therefore, had not yet arisen at a 
technical inter-system level. Although the lack of senior management's interest in 
integration was common to the smallest and largest secondary cases, the pressures 
appeared to be greater on larger companies to change. Insufficient resources were the 
common major obstacle in Companies 6 and 7. Their business operations seemed to be
^^See Boubekri et al. (1995).
^^The standards required would cover important areas such as: (1) data communication and networks 
used in computers in manufacturing environments; (2) CAD systems, robots, and CNC; and (3) CIM 
architecture design. From a technical point of view, the implementation of an electronic data exchange 
system could, potentially, facilitate: (1) an increase in the level of inter-functional integration between 
design and manufacturing, (2) integration of various design teams and, thus, of the design process, (3) 
integration of design and manufacturing information, and (4) integration of development and 
maintenance efforts on a manufactured product.
^^With the exception of Company 8 which would have stood a greater chance for integration than 
Company 9 and probably Company 10, too, had it not ceased to exist as a business.
210
well defined and put under a much greater degree of control; their flexible but long- 
established relations with their customers seemed to have resulted in lower pressures, 
given them a greater sense of security, and made them think that integration would not 
be vital, particularly in the case of Company 6 where management expressed their 
doubt explicitly about the mere plausibility of CADCAM integration in industry. Small 
companies' perceived lack of need for technology and prohibitive expensiveness were 
major factors behind their hesitancy to adopt CIM^ .^
5) The social and political forces in the primary cases were more strongly in favour of 
integration, on balance, than they were in the secondary cases. As will be explained in 
the following chapter, the social processes that preceded and accompanied integration in 
the primary companies were an expression of a shift in the balance of power in favour 
of left-wing integrationist forces at the expense of right-wing conservative forces. In 
the secondary cases such processes had not matured yet and the dominance of the 
conservative forces, which held on to existing structure and culture, continued.
The following section concludes answering the tentative research questions by 
addressing the issue of how integration projects were found to be managed in the 
primary cases.
7) Where applicable, how does a manufacturing company manage the
integration o f CAD and CAM systems in the context o f its \
accumulative experiences in this area o f technical change? \
Approaches to the management of integration processes in the primary companies were j
diverse indeed; there was no single method, nor was there any standard course of i
action. Nonetheless, each integration effort involved a long-term process of change j
with CE at its centre. This involved a replacement of a sequential flow of work Iiwhereby each department contiibuted to the DEM process at a certain stage of a product |
development cycle with a different one whereby each department's contribution would !
be made to correspond to other departments' simultaneously:
“Whereas before the drawing or whatever was with the designer, and the guy in manufacturing |
never saw it until he released it. Nowadays if he wants to call up the part that that guy 1
designed and have a look at it and make some form of comment as to whether it is good or bad :
to manufacture. It also changed group set-ups as well where [the] manufacturing [department]
are a lot more involved at the early stages of design. They can make comments whether the
part is easy to manufacture. When we were in the drawing board system that didn't work. That I
was the old ... drawing-over-the wall scenario ” (Case 5) !
One of the major difficulties associated with the fragmented nature of the manufacturing j
companies in the study was the flow of information in all phases of the DEM process. 1
^^See Arcelus and Wright, 1994. ,
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Problems of rapid exchange of information amongst diverse departments and 
organisations were compounded by the many kinds of data needed by each contributor 
to a product development project. Problems became worse in those cases when a strict 
departmental policy on how design information should be managed over the long run 
was adopted, as could be inferred from what a Technical Director once asserted:
“We have agreed with [the] manufacturing [department] now that one year after product launch 
the design will be frozen. And unless there is an external requirement to change based on a 
customer or an external approval agency or the unavailability of a certain component no design 
change will be made even to help manufacturing processes improve. They have one year to get 
it right for themselves, thereafter no changes will be permitted, and that will reduce our 
workload by about 70%.” (Case 3).
The Operations Director, on the other hand, explained his encounter with the attitudes 
of the engineering department when he first joined the company:
“ When I came the quality people reported to the design people, and a week after I came
they reported to me (laughing). We just changed the whole thing All the problems [‘and
manufacturing was blamed?’]. Correct! That's why the Director before me left (laughing).
I don't know the guy .... I believe the saying was: ‘We've designed it, you just've got to build 
it! It's your fault - if you don't build it correctly, it's your problem’ [‘And design was always 
... innocent?’]. Correct! It doesn't always work that way and we had a few discussions on that 
point when I arrived and we gradually got it changed. [‘It was a challenge, wasn't it?’] Oh, 
yeah, yeah ! ” (Case 3).
Integration projects in the primary cases were led by senior board directors in Cases 1, 
2 and 3 and by upper middle managers, who could be described as outstanding 
technologists in their respective organisations, in Cases 4 and 5. Managers on the 
engineering side, as opposed to their colleagues in manufacturing, tended to have the 
final say in decision making processes concerning integration projects. In Cases 1,2,3 
and 5 integration projects were financed jointly by engineering and manufacturing 
departments, though the former's contributions were higher. It was evident that design 
functions were more powerful organisationally. They were conscious that they 
represented the original source of product information generated within their respective 
organisations. This was accepted by people in other functions, who called designers the 
"front-end guys". Manufacturing and other production-related functions depended 
totally on design for information. Ultimate responsibility for integration projects tended 
to lie with design rather than manufacturing.
All the primaiy companies sought to facilitate integration via CE work methods. These 
were the most popular forms of organisational airangements. Company 4 changed its 
structure to a matrix organisation arrangement to facilitate its integration process. 
Organisational problems continued to be experienced during the transitional period. In 
Case I extremely high costs were incurred for integration due to the wide range of CAD 
software applications in use. It was found that in Cases 1, 2 and 3, organisational 
changes in sti'uctural and cultural terms were not formally declared major obstacles to
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integration, as they were in Cases 4 and 5. The largest in the study. Companies 4 and 5 
historically had the most rigid mechanical structures and the most centralised cultures. 
So both companies found themselves in a position where they had to restructure 
themselves, reorganise their information and work flows, and redesign their 
employees' jobs in line with integration. This was found to be clearer in Cases 4 and 5. 
Despite the fact that many employees failed to appreciate the technical significance of 
such changes, no one was found to be more aware of these changes and their 
organisational implications than the integration leaders themselves. Such key 
individuals appreciated, to varying degrees, the essential need for retraining and re­
educating their work forces as part of an organisation-wide program aimed at 
promoting what might be called an "integration-oriented organisational culture".
Such a culture emphasised multi-skilling, flexible specialisation, and innovative 
organisational structure. According to integration leaders, the targeted cultural context 
for integration would aim to change conventional values of extremely specialist skilling, 
narrow division of labour, and rigidly-governed departmentalisation. Integration 
leaders in Case 4 and 5 were outstanding in this respect. Particularly in Case 4, they 
exhibited a remarkably encompassing understanding of the magnitude and facets of 
organisational changes that should be addressed before CADCAM integration (see 
Chapter 7, section 7.4). They subscribed to the notion that integration was an 
organisational process in which technology played the role of a tool capable of 
improving organisational performance.
The integi’ation leaders in Companies 1, 2 and 3, however, continued to conceptualise it 
as a technical process that imposed organisational changes; such changes would be 
necessary if the technology involved was to be “operationalised”. For example, the 
understanding in Case 3 was that:
“.... there's been a change in emphasis the objective [is] to become more effective in the
work we do - not just faster but faster and more accurate .... over that period o f time we've 
changed our own structure We then introduced the team element to the people.” (Case 3).
Indeed, integration leaders in Cases 4 and 5 showed that many of the things they 
wished to see changed about their respective organisations had not been achieved to 
date because of cultural and power balances that dominated the work place. In other 
words, they demonstrated clearly that they knew what should be done to facilitate the 
realisation of their vision of integration but, at the same time, they showed their 
inability to change organisationally-protected value forces which continued to impede 
their initiatives. They were clearly aware of themselves as change agents and, more 
precisely, as representatives of new “left-wing” socio political forces opposed to 
traditionalist, conservative forces.
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In summary, it was found that managing change with integration projects in the primary 
cases was hindered by several outstanding technical, financial, and organisational 
obstacles. These will be explained in more detail in the next chapter.
6 .3  Summary
This chapter addiessed the seven tentative research questions in terms of the case study 
findings. Presentation of the answers was affected by three factors which overlapped 
and interfered with each other. These could be summarised in the following points 
together with the problems that were encountered in addressing the questions:
1) The initial design of the interview schedules, which was influenced by the 
assumptions reflected in, and theoretically linked to, the research questions (as 
explained in Chapters 3 and 4). The schedules proved to be very useful in the earlier 
stages of data-gathering but less so later as gaps were discovered in the data. This 
therefore required a less structured approach to data-gathering with a view to presenting 
cohesive and full answers to the seven questions.
2) The manner in which the field investigation progressed, which contributed to the 
emergence of various substantive theoretical issues and, thus, to restructuring the 
presentation of the answers accordingly. This produced a need for maintaining a 
balance between case-specific issues of importance to the analysis and the theoretical 
themes that emerged from the overall research data.
3) The decision to trace companies' historical experiences of change with CAD and 
CAM as two separate application areas. This doubled the data-gathering effort as two 
lines of investigation, corresponding to both areas under consideration, had to be 
addressed simultaneously for each case. The companies' current experiences of 
integration were then investigated in the light of the two resultant groups of data with a 
view to establishing a better understanding of integration as a process of convergence.
The answers established that variation among manufacturing organisations in terms of 
why and how they acquire, design, introduce, use, maintain, and develop CAD/CAM 
systems is a crucial element in understanding technical change. Dissimilarities among 
the ten cases was explained in terms of the factors that were found to influence change. 
Also, the outcomes of change were discussed and the various aspects of organisational 
impacts of CAD/CAM systems were explained in the same light. The answers to 
questions 6 and 7 proved that the status quo of a given company in terms of how work 
is organised and its production task managed has important implications for addressing 
the issue of why the company would be, or fail to be, interested in integration. These
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answers also affected the issue of how an integration project would be managed in 
integrating companies.
It is clear from the answers to questions 1 to 5 that CAD has inherently different 
properties than CAM. Although, as mentioned above, this made the task of answering 
these questions particularly dichotomous in terms of both application areas, it 
confirmed the finding that CAD and CAM had not only different, but also inherently 
differentiating properties; each of them has its own characteristics when it comes to the 
effect they are likely to have on job design and work organisation. Such differentiating 
properties aie a major factor influencing their integration potential. The different values 
attached to design engineering and manufacturing functions are reflected in how the 
people associated with CAD and CAM in different role capacities are viewed and 
socially stratified, how such individuals and functional groups perceive themselves and 
their role, and how designers' behaviour vis-a-vis manufacturing staff and workers 
(and vice versa) is affected as a result.
In general, the introduction of CAD systems did not present the companies with a 
considerably challenging task in teims of work organisation. CAM, on the other hand, 
did, at least initially. The introduction of CAM systems was found to be more political 
in nature. However, CADCAM integration presented the primaiy companies with a 
much more challenging mission since integration, by definition, threatened to change 
the existing social and political forces in the status quo. It necessarily involved an 
element of structural and cultural change between, as well as within, functional 
boundaries and it was more likely than any previously tried single technology 
application to provoke reorganisation of work throughout these companies.
The findings showed that, despite deciding upon a particular line of action with regard 
to how work around CAD and CAM systems should be organised, once such systems 
had been introduced problems arose which, in most cases, required changes to how 
systems were used or what particular individuals did vis-a-vis them. Five reasons 
behind this were identified;
1) Poor planning of the introduction process, particularly lack of training for those 
involved, which in some cases amounted to incompetence;
2) A realisation that such technologies required greater skill and involvement from their 
operators, users, programmers and managers than had been envisaged;
3) Opposition to, or lack of co-operation with, the original plans from individuals or 
groups within the organisation;
4) A desire to increase management control over the systems in use;
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5) Unforeseen, unplanned (i.e. beyond management control) changes in the external 
business environment, creating new operating conditions and constraints^^.
Four significant points emerged from the examination of the overall impacts of CAD 
and CAM systems on work organisation:
1) The vast majority of "turn-key" CAD systems on the market were predominantly 
concerned with the automation of individual functional areas of design. In using them 
for an economic reward user companies were compelled to reorganise in a way that was 
not necessarily useful or appropriate to the design process itself; in fact, they tended to 
fragment it because they presupposed a pronounced functional structure. CAD systems 
developed internally did not necessarily have the same effect.
2) Economic and technical considerations were not always the main reason why 
changes were made, nor was it the case that the alternatives tried always resulted in 
improved performance. Indeed, it is not too much to say that issues such as 
management control and the need to fit with existing structures and practices proved to 
be more influential in practice than pure economic or technical considerations.
3) Whilst in some cases certain changes were willingly initiated and consciously 
planned by management, in other cases they were initiated by, or informally organised I
between, those technical, supervisory or production staff involved with the systems j
introduced. I
4) The divisions between managing, progiamming, supporting and operating functions i
were not clear-cut and they could, and did, shift over time as circumstances changed. j
Attempts made by some of the companies to make clear-cut divisions between these i
functions were neither practicable nor productive. It would appear to be more useful - if
work tasks were to be divided anyway - if those involved in one function had at least a 
sufficient degree of appreciation of the other functions and the work tasks they j
performed. This point would be consistent with an integration-oriented philosophy of j
work organisation, which was characteristic of the primary cases. j
I
In conclusion, it can be seen from the above discussion that CADCAM integration may |
rightly be viewed as a technical process that involves the interfacing of stand alone j
technology applications that are capable of being integrated. At the same time, however, j
it is an organisational process that involves changing deeply-rooted values, practices, i
23ln Case 9, for example, work around CAD was initially designed for devoted users. However, the 
company’s difficult business circumstances, which eventually resulted in liquidation in 1992, forced 
work around CAD to be redesigned on a self-service basis for a fewer number of users as the company 
diminished in size and could not afford to keep devoted CAD users as it had done in the past.
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structures, procedures and power relationships. Various factors can either facilitate or 
impede integration at any given time. It can also be seen that, at present, the interaction 
of such factors in industry is such that CADCAM integration is either prohibited (e.g. 
in secondary cases) or pursued (e.g. in primary cases), depending on complex and 
overlapping economic, technical, and organisational factors. Indeed, even in the 
primary cases, where integration is pursued, the progress of the integration process is 
subject to the influence of a number of facilitating and impeding factors.
Therefore, the general proposition that the introduction and use of an integrating 
technology will be influenced by a wide range of factors, both internal and external to 
the adopting organisation, was borne out. In particular, the role of prevalent beliefs and 
practices; financial circumstances; the rigidity, or otherwise, of company sti’uctures and 
practices; the limitations imposed by the type of products being manufactured and 
production systems used; and, crucially, the values, attitudes, power and self-interest 
of those involved, emerged, in the cases studied at least, as key factors that influence 
CADCAM integration. Such factors will be analysed in greater detail in Chapter 7 in the 
context of the social and organisational processes associated with integration. 
Hopefully, by exposing what actually happens in organisations a better understanding 
of integration, as a dual technological and organisational change process, will be 
developed. The effects of various factors on CADCAM integration, in terms of either 
stimulating or impeding it, will be discussed in the next chapter in the light of the 
primary companies' experiences.
217
CHAPTER SEVEN
Findings, Data Analysis and Discussion - III; 
A Conceptual Model
7 .1  Introduction
This chapter builds on Chapters 5 and 6 in analysing the field findings through a 
conceptual model especially devised for the purpose. It will begin by introducing the 
model and outlining it in terms of its constituent components. The model will then be 
applied to two examples from the cases: a critical incident from a non-integrating 
company, Case 10; and another from an integrating company, Case 4. By contrasting 
the two example incidents the present chapter aims to provide an explanation of some of 
the crucial forces and factors that prohibit add inhibit CADCAM integration on the one 
hand and those that cause and stimulate it on the other. The emphasis will be on the 
social processes behind the absence of CADCAM integration in Case 10 and its 
presence in Case 4.
The analysis in this chapter will focus primarily on the immediate social environment 
engulfing integration in order to emphasise the significance of the data derived from the 
grounded theory methodology. This will be done in the context of the experiences of 
the primary cases in the study.
A number of outstanding obstacles still hinder the process of change in these cases. 
These will be examined closely in this chapter because of their theoretical relevance to 
the study and their practical importance to those people who are directly involved in the 
change process.
7 .2  The Model
Research in the area of technological change has been dominated by two major 
approaches: economists' "diffusion approach" and sociologists' "impact approach" (see 
Attewell, 1992; Kimble and McLoughlin, 1995; Winch and Twigg, 1993 ). Diffusion 
describes the degree to which an innovation has become integrated into an economy. 
Most technological diffusion models share an assumption that any innovation is 
progressively adopted by a fixed and homogeneous population of potential users with 
fixed and similar objectives (see Attewell, 1992). The diffusion approach tends to 
neglect in its analysis important variations due to organisational specifities because of 
its preoccupation with issues such as profitability, capital availability, and estimates of 
risk. The impact approach, because of its sociological - as opposed to economic -
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orientation, is more sensitive to such specifities but it tends not to give enough attention 
to studying the actual unfolding of change.
Both approaches have been criticised in the literature as being incapable of reflecting 
realistically the challenging nature of technological change (e.g. Pettigrew, 1987; 
Winch and Twigg, 1993). Although their cohesiveness in consistency terms stands to 
credit them with theoretical strength, the credibility of their often claimed universal 
applicability is in question. In particular, they are criticised for failing to illustrate the 
dynamics of change; the difficult practical challenges it raises for management; and the 
role a case-specific context plays in a given change process, its management and its 
outcomes. According to Kimble and McLoughlin (1995), a more "integrationist impact 
model" is required, one that does not portray an impact as a linear outcome but as "a 
complex, interactive and ongoing process ... [that] both shapes future outcomes and is 
shaped itself by what has gone before" (p. 58). As Mahajan and Peterson (1985) point 
out, in both approaches, research at the macroscopic level often proceeds by attempting 
to fit a model of the diffusion process to empirical data. Winch and Twigg (1990:1) 
summarise such criticisms as follows:
“One weakness that these approaches share is that the false starts, dead ends, postponements,
and down right failures associated with technological change tend to be lost from view.
Implicitly, the process is seen as rational, linear, and unproblematic from the point of view of
the management of the adopting organisation,”
Therefore, this study uses an alternative "implementation approach" which concentrates 
on the "change (or integration) process" itselfk Central to this is an emphasis on the 
social processes that are involved, namely the formal and informal activities that breathe 
life into a company's organisational (or social) structure (e.g. ".... there will have to be
a change in the structure the whole process of moving toward this [i.e. integrated
CADCAM] is going to actually change the actual way the organisation looks" [Case 
2]). Such activities may, in the process, cause the structure to change through 
"legitimate" {de jure) authority and/or "illegitimate" {de facto) power.
Indeed, the need to concentrate on the social processes accompanying integration stems 
from the most obvious of obseiwations, namely that people, including those initiating 
and leading an innovation, are social beings and that social life is an inescapable aspect 
of organisational life^. Regardless of their respective positions, individual members of
^This is based on the fundamental assumption that a realistically accurate assessment of the 
"outcomes" of a change process will be very difficult to realise without researching the actual unfolding 
of the process itself (see Chapters 3 and 4). Therefore, a processual model is devised here because it is 
more likely than any other type of model to facilitate tlie kinds of deduction required to generate theory 
from the data.
^The notion of social processes is relevant to the present model of CADCAM as an essentially 
organisational process involving "integration between all the disciplines" (Case 4). The kinds of =
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an organisation cannot lead a totally self-determining organisational life free from the 
social context that engulfs them; their experience of it must be influenced by interaction 
and mutual dependence within their respective organisation as well as with the outside 
environment. Interaction and mutual dependence are important for understanding how 
the past, the present and the future are linked together by continuity as well as how they 
are distinguished by change in the context of a certain case study in the present 
research^.
The study's model draws on another fundamental observation, namely that an 
organisationally-defined division of labour creates socially-differentiated roles for the 
different individuals and groups who assume different roles and initiate different 
actions, interactions and reactions. It would be too simplistic to say that the forces for 
and against change that influence a company's decision regarding whether to adopt or 
reject an integration strategy are restricted only to market pressures or to some 
companies' desire to attain state-of-the-art technology. This would have ignored the 
active social forces that operate inside the organisation at the centre of the change 
process; or it would have at least underestimated the implications of these forces for the 
change process in question‘d.
= social processes that lead, or otherwise, to integration and/or influence the progress of an integration 
project tend to manifest themselves through patterns of behaviour motivated by perceived opportunities 
and threats over an extended period of time.
Since perception plays a major role in how different individuals and groups judge some aspects 
of integration useful and others harmful, it is important to identify the kinds of threats associated with 
CADCAM in the minds of those who feel they have more to lose than to gain from it. Perceived 
opportunities and threats are vital for explaining people's behaviour in the face of change; subsequently, 
actual gains and losses are crucial for explaining their reaction to its outcomes in their experiences.
Perceived utilities should not be defined solely in technical and economic terms. In addition to 
these two obvious dimensions, the findings confirm that a careful analysis of such social processes 
will help a researcher establish how the useful aspects of CADCAM are identified, defined and 
contested as different individuals and groups within a social form of organisation ascribe different 
meanings to integration. Indeed, these include different interpretations of the implied technical and 
economic benefits themselves.
^The following example concerning a participant’s experience confirms this point:
".... The goal o f  continuous improvement is now in everybody's mind. Everybody expects to do it
better all the time Change has been a way o f life: whichever way you do it today, you won't do
it that way tomorrow. You'll continuously change it." (Case 5)
'^The following example from the data on innovation would help illustrate this point:
".... it [i.e. innovation] com es in a number o f  ways: it com es with our R&D people who do know  
where the technology [is] coming from and what will be our [chances?] to be able to achieve it; it 
com es from our marketing people who are telling us what our customers are likely to want; but 
equally [from] inside our organisation .... we do do this and w e look very carefully at it because we 
are coming toward the saturation model!" (Case 1).
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Similarly, the active interaction of this entity with the wider society should not be 
reduced to one which depicts manufacturing companies as abstract economic agencies 
dominated by market mechanisms or as inanimate production systems continuously 
aspiring to technical excellence. Rather, the model takes a wider view of individual and 
group actions inside a changing organisation and how these are influenced by the 
various social, cultural and legal characteristics of the wider society.
Exhibit 7.1 illustrates the present study's conceptual model, incorporating the 
"integration process" as one of its most important components. The model will be 
explained in what follows in terms of its constituent components, each of which 
represents a level of conceptualisation.
* E xternal Context
This component of the model represents the outer environment within which a company 
operates, including, for example, its industrial sector, product market, the educational 
and cultural context at the national level, and the economic, political and legal 
conditions both nationally and internationally^. The model assumes that the kind of 
outer environment in which an organisation operates influences, to a considerable 
extent, the production tasks it undertakes and, in turn, its structural design and choice 
of personnel^.
With regard to CADCAM integi*ation specifically, an external environment would 
influence a company's decision concerning whether to embark on it by virtue of the 
pressures it exerts on the company to change, say, to match the moves of competitors 
or standard-setting giants in the same industrial sector, to adjust itself to changing 
global market conditions, or to respond to new government legislation. Furthermore,
^Whilst the emphasis in the consequent analysis will be on the social processes inside the boundaries 
of the researched companies, it is important to stress here that the role their respective external 
environments play in internal change should not be underestimated (see Lee, 1989; Miller et a l ,  1991; 
Pettigrew, 1985; Stacey, 1993). As Scott (1995: 55) points out, "organisations are penetrated by 
environments in ways not encompassed by earlier theoretical models". However, this should not be 
exaggerated by taking it to the extent suggested by the population ecology model (see Aldrich, 1979) 
which looks at the environment as the determining factor in any innovation. This model depicts change 
as a manifestation of an accident of exploration, occurring as a result of trial and error, chance, luck, 
and opportunities offered by the environment; the population ecology model therefore ignores the role 
that can be, and is, played by managers or leaders of change in influencing the direction, magnitude and 
quality of change through planning and control measures. In addition, it fails to take on board the role 
and outcomes of internal power dynamics between rival managers. In this regard, the population 
ecology model can be described in "environmental determinism" terms.
^It also assumes that organisations interact with their environments in ways which affect them both 
positively and negatively. Environments both affect the companies they subsume and can themselves 
be affected by them; large and powerful companies, for example, may create new conditions leading to 
changes in their respective external environments whereas smaller and weaker companies are likely to 
be continuously subject to environmental pressures for change.
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an external environment would continue to influence an existing integration process 
positively or negatively by creating facilitating and/or impeding factors.
* Internal Context
A  company's boundaries represent a dividing line between the organisational entity 
within which CADCAM integration is adopted and the environment that surrounds such 
an entity. The model conceptualises an internal context as the organisational 
background against which the process of integration is managed in a manufacturing 
company. Such background reflects key structural, cultural and political characteristics 
of the immediate environment through which ideas of change proceed. A thorough 
understanding of an internal context requires an in-depth appreciation of the set of 
conditions under which integration has to be managed in a given case. Such conditions 
are, to a certain extent, structurally-defined but are also shaped by agent actions, 
interactions and reactions as well as by external environment influences.
By identifying the features of an internal context a researcher can answer important 
questions pertaining, for example, to the allocation of responsibilities and formal 
reporting relationships to individuals and departments, the monitoring and assessment 
of performance for reward and punishment pui'poses, and the degree of participation in 
decision making. Having established such background knowledge of an organisation, 
then the reseaicher is better positioned to understand the essential dimensions of a given 
internal context, including, for example, the size of the organisation, its structure, 
culture, ownership, its dependence or otherwise on a parent organisation, the type of 
production system in operation, and its current business performance.
The idea is that such fundamental knowledge will enable the researcher to explain how 
an integration process is influenced by the organised social medium in which it takes 
place, in the midst of actions and reactions by different individuals, groups and 
departments pursuing their own chosen paths within a single organisational setting.
Such actions and interactions are potentially capable of breaking such a collectivity into j
smaller parts, following the opposite path to that of integration. j
*  Strategy Process  j
The model depicts strategy as an active decision making process reflecting preplanned i
intended courses of action. Strategy involves long-term planning, typically with certain |
objectives pertaining to enabling a company to achieve or maintain what is regarded as a I
proper competitive advantage. Two areas of a strategy process are particularly relevant !
for the purpose of the present study: (1) a company's specific manufacturing strategy I
Iand (2) its overall business strategy. The former is directly associated with CADCAM |
as a strategic resource potentially capable of improving the performance of a company's j
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DEM setting through a "strategy-technology alignment" process. The latter is a broader 
strategy concern which subsumes the former.
A strategy process, however, is not conceptualised simply as a series of 
straightforward acts of planning. Rather, it is presented as a problematic process, one 
that involves empowered actions and reactions often justified on a rational or "bounded 
rationality" basis whereby top management seeks to exercise strategic choices under 
changing environmental conditions. Strategic choices are made under different types of 
pressures exerted upon those agents responsible for strategy formulation and 
development in an organisation. Such pressures can start from within the internal 
context of a change process or they can penetrate from the external context^. Regardless 
of the source of such pressures, however, they present strategists with challenging 
constraints which affect their ability to initiate and/or control a strategy process 
associated with a long-term integration project.
* To Intef^rate or N ot to Integrate? Forces for and Against Chanee  
Whether or not to embark on an integration project and commit corporate resources to 
achieve it over a long period of time is essentially an issue of strategy rather than one of 
an operational consideration. The pressures exerted upon those involved in making the 
decision of whether or not to integrate aie conceptualised as forces acting upon them 
and thus influencing the outcome of such a decision. Again, such forces can be either 
internal or external.
The model uses the notion of initiation to conceptualise a company's formal acceptance 
of CADCAM integration in principle and its embarkation upon it in practice; any force 
(internal or external) that is identified to be effective in causing or contributing to initiate 
integration will, therefore, be called a "force for change" (i.e. a force in favour of 
integration). On the other hand, the model uses the notion of prohibition to visualise the 
rejection of CADCAM integration formally; any force (internal or external) that is 
identified to be effective in causing or contributing to initiate prohibition will, therefore, 
be called a "force against change" (i.e. a force against integration).
Using the above terms for the purpose of data analysis in this chapter, one can say that 
the forces against change in the secondary cases were dominant; therefore, the question 
of CADCAM integration did not arise as a viable project, at least not to date. In the
^For example, the nature of a company's product and the intensity of environmental pressures have 
implications for the choices of the strategic pathways followed as well as the relative roles of various 
players in defining those pathways for the introduction of CADCAM (see Adler, 1989). The question 
here is not simply related to management practices per se inside the company, but rather to senior 
management's ability to develop a strategic vision to introduce integration whilst adapting to new 
market conditions.
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primary cases, on the other hand, the forces for change were found to prevail over the 
forces against change; therefore, integration was formally adopted in these cases.
* The Inteforation Process: Facilitating and Impeding Factors
An integration process is an expression of the total courses of action and interaction 
whereby CADCAM integration would be implemented in a company. The dynamics of 
an integration process are attributed to the various actors who participate in the process, 
subject to various factors which either facilitate or impede the process.
The model uses the notion of promotion to refer to the encouragement and advancement 
of an already initiated integration effort; any factor, among others, found to be 
responsible for promotion will therefore be called a "facilitating factor". Similarly, the 
model uses the notion of inhibition to refer to the discouragement of an integration 
effort; any factor, among others, found to be responsible for inhibition will therefore be 
called an "impeding factor".
Without assuming a simplistic relationship between the interaction and possible 
overlapping of internal and external factors, the model depicts both internal and external 
factors. Some of these factors can be traced to the internal context and can therefore be 
described as internally borne whilst others are produced by the environment.
Impeding factors interact with one another and, collectively, against facilitating factors. 
The outcomes of such interaction at a given time will be reflected in what is found to be 
the present state of integiation in a primary company.
*  Outcomes o f  Change
The model classifies the results of an integration process into three broad categories: (1) 
technical (i.e. implications for current production methods whose productivity or 
flexibility, for example, can be improved), (2) economic (i.e. implications for 
profitability and other intangible business rewards that may result from positive 
technical outcomes) and (3) organisational outcomes (i.e. implications for job design 
and work organisation, which will result from the implementation of CADCAM 
through certain integrating mechanisms).
Variations in strategy process, integration process, internal context, and external 
context interact differently in different organisations and under changing conditions in 
an organisation. The specific technical, economic, and organisational results of a certain 
change process would, therefore, represent the total "resultant" of that process, 
corresponding to the "sub-totals" of the particulars of the four elements, at a given time.
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7 .3  Applying the Model - I: A Secondary Company Example
* CASE STUDY TEN: Comnanv 10
* External Context: Kev Relevant Features
* The national economic recession of the early years of the 1990s affected Company 
IQ's business performance in a negative way.
* Until 1993 the company had been a wholly-owned subsidiary to a Washington-based 
business group, but it had operated in a different market environment and enjoyed a 
high degree of autonomy. In 1993 the company was bought out by its British 
Directors. It is now an independent British company marketing its main product 
successfully in Europe. Company 10 has become a rather small independent firm, one 
that is more vulnerable to the dynamics of the free market economies of Western 
Europe. It has found itself in competition with "quite monopolistic" world leaders in 
the tachograph industry. This has made management even more careful about 
controlling expenditure to minimise cost.
* External legal and commercial pressures play a crucial role in maintaining a flexible 
approach to product design within the company in order to please both industry 
regulators and customers who happen to be more powerful automobile and heavy 
vehicle manufacturers.
* Internal Context: Key Relevant Features
* Company 10 is a slow-moving organisation with 370 employees. The history of the 
company has been one of downsizing. The younger and more adaptable people in 
paiticular feel they are a more obvious target for management's redunduncy plans. This 
situation has created tension between senior management and this group of employees 
who resentfully reject management attitudes and feel threatened by them.
* There is a generation gap between the two groups, one that has been described by the 
younger group as creating a "cultural gap" and "mental gap" between themselves and 
the "old fashioned", computer illiterate managers with "1950s type HNDs", who not 
only happen to exercise a greater de facto power but also occupy all the powerful top 
management positions.
* Learning from previous mistakes is a distinctive feature of the younger, pro­
integration group of engineers. This makes many of them eager to use their theoretical 
knowledge as well as the practical skills they gain from experience in improving how 
they plan and manage technology. Some of them do not hide a feeling which many of 
them share, namely that they, in view of the present social atmosphere in the 
organisation, prefer learning by themselves (even by making mistakes) to having skills 
offered to them by management (i.e. through formal training).
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* Industrial relations have deteriorated as the active blue-collar, "hourly paid" trade 
union feels that shop floor workers are made to fear for their jobs, and that the threat of 
redundancy is frequently reinforced.
*  The StratejTv Process: A Summary
The company's strategy process over the last few years has centred around the 
tachograph product line with a strong orientation towards the European market and 
away from the Middle and Far Easts where it still markets some of its petroleum 
measurement products. As explained in Chapter 5, the market demand for tachographs 
has been stimulated by a European legislation that makes their use a legal requirement 
as far as trucks and heavy vehicles are concerned.
With regard to the strategy process on integration specifically, the company’s most 
senior manager stated in 1990: "We have devoted the last several years to implementing 
flexible manufacturing methods - it is now time to optimise customer service through 
integrated manufacturing and distribution". It should be said, however, that the 
experience of those middle managers responsible for studying the feasibility of 
integration has been different. Indeed, it is ironic to find the leading integration 
enthusiast in the company talk critically about Directors as being "the only obstruction" 
to integration.
The strategy process in this organisation is influenced considerably by the tension that 
exists between these two groups. Decision making here is a process in which the pro­
integration group is deliberately marginalised by a more powerful anti-integration 
lobby. This is done in direct and indirect ways. First, directly by preventing them from 
effective participation in decision making on serious issues relating to integration on the 
grounds that they are not senior enough to participate in a strategic decision of this type. 
Second, indirectly by means of advocating an organisational culture that is hostile to 
integration and in favour of maintaining the company's existing structure and culture, 
and justifying that in the name of preserving stability and avoiding radical change which 
is implied by what their opponents advocate.
* To Inteffrate or Not to Inte(frate? Forces for and against Charnue
As far as the technical managers of the engineering function are concerned, CADCAM 
integration would be a positive move: it would be beneficial to the company as a whole 
because it would improve communications with the other departments of the 
organisation and eliminate the need for translation software packages. Such software is 
currently needed to transfer information due to the lack of a common electronic format:
"We've been having discussions on multi-level set-up ..... you obviously involve sales,
manufacturing and engineering as to w hat.... you can do in parallel rather than in series.......
If you are producing - for design use - a parts list, for instance, which you have in the design
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computer and you want to have that parts list put into the mainframe computer then it would 
be ridiculous to have to take a print out from the design computer and then go and type it on 
the mainframe. So, the transfer of information .... [we have] to look at the whole of the
systems within the place and look forward to some integration the reason we didn't go
much further than that is because of the type of organisation that we have!"
In 1990 the company's Chief Design Engineer was nominated by senior management 
for a postgraduate course of study in business administration. He attended the course 
and studied his company's own experience of computerisation with a particular focus 
on the element of human resources management. Consequently, he became extremely 
critical of senior management:
"As a result of doing my MBA .... [I] started to look at the human element of it It opened
up a whole new game .... I became much more critical of some of the decisions that had been 
made. My MBA dissertation .... I never let anybody see it, because if the MD saw it, it was so
critical! The CAD implementation program should never had been carried purely by the
manager of the department. The objective overview had to come from top level Some of
the decisions [that] have been taken, none gave thought to company-wide integration."
With middle-class career development ambitions and self actualisation being uppermost 
in their mind, the pro-integration minority, led by the Chief Design Engineer in this 
case, believe they have a cause worth struggling for. They are disenchanted with the 
present attitudes and values that currently dominate the atmosphere of the organisation 
under its existing power-protected structure. In so doing, however, they are attempting 
to change an organisational culture that has been solidified over several decades (i.e. 
since 1948 when Company 10 was established in Dundee) and, if one goes back to the 
deeper roots of the Dundee subsidiary, by over 150 years of history (i.e. since the 
corporation's founder started the company). Still, they would like to advocate a cultural 
change throughout the organisation as far as they can. However, they find it difficult, 
in effect, to spread their message successfully even within the boundaries of the 
engineering department which is under their immediate span of control because they are 
a minority in the organisation as a whole.
Under the leadership of this distinguished individual, some of the key design engineers 
have turned to their colleagues in the manufacturing and production departments to 
persuade them to overcome their communication differences so as to pave the way for a 
corporate decision on adopting a CE-centred integration strategy but so far to no avail:
"... the problems are that their system, their method of breaking down a bill of materials is 
somewhat different from the way we break down our bills of materials ..... They need the 
information in a slightly different format to the way it comes out of the engineering set-up of 
the line. So you've got to put up an interpreter either in the engineering side to put it into 
their format or in their equipment [, built?] .... and that's what we are working towards, to 
work out how we can do that most readily."
The manufacturing and production functions are rather traditionalist in their work 
methods and attitudes. Both of them (production in particular) are strongly associated
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with the shop floor and widely regarded as being positioned at a lower social level in 
the organisation and often called the "direct boys downstairs" (i.e. mostly 
apprenticeship trained, blue-collar employees) as opposed to the "indirect boys 
upstairs" (i.e. mostly university gi aduates and professional white-collar office staff).
Many people working in the production and manufacturing functions believe that, if the 
company is to adopt an integration strategy in the future, they should know more about 
the integration project and be allowed to participate in making key decisions associated 
with it. They are particularly concerned that if future training is going to be given to 
them, which is inevitable, the trainers should not be appointed from the technical 
department but rather from outside the company (i.e. neutral trainers should be 
sought). This can be understood in the light of a well-established tradition in the 
company whereby all in-house training schemes are planned and controlled by the 
technical (or engineering) department. Since the two main integration enthusiasts, 
namely the company's Technical Director and the Chief Design Engineer, are also the 
two persons formally responsible for training, many people in the production and 
manufacturing functions are not sure that they will receive an objective training. From 
the point of view of these people, the technical department should not be the "only 
route" to training because of fears that it will use its superior computer knowledge and 
discretionary powers to reinforce its advantaged position and deskill them.
To the delight of the traditionalists in manufacturing and production, senior 
management in this case has decided not to adopt an integrating strategy. Furthermore, 
it has made rules to maintain the status quo. These include preventing members of the 
younger group of engineers, who constitute a minority amongst members of staff, 
from contacting outside suppliers directly; they should do so only through traditionalist 
sales engineers who have practised as engineers since the 1950s and identify 
themselves with senior management "due to the politics of it". Senior management 
remains adamant that an integrating strategy is unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable 
future.
In short, the forces for change in this case can be summarised in the following points 
(see Exhibit 7.2):
* Customers pressing for introducing a greater internal integration to improve the 
responsive capability of the company as a whole, not just as a design team, so as to 
improve product quality, shorten production lead-times and increase responsiveness:
"With certain of our customers, certainly Scania and Volvo, we are talking about electronic 
data exchange anyway .... placing orders on a computer-to-computer, doing their scheduling 
on a computer to-computer so tliat they can go straight into our system and they can put their 
order straight into our system. Our system will then take their order and split it down for our
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benefit: how many components we need and when we need to make them. This is something 
the motor industry are getting into .... and will become more and more popular."
* Enthusiasm for integration on the part of a group of young, ambitious and highly 
qualified design engineers who are proud of their professional standing and are open to 
external influences: "engineers by and large are aware of state-of-the-art .... go to 
exhibits, see things [and] get a lot of ideas". These, however, are a small minority in a 
company which seems to be dominated by a group of older and more senior managers 
constituting four out of the company's five Directors:
"We've been trying to work on the principle of integrated manufacture for quite a while. CAD 
helps in some respects but .... if we are going to integrate manufacture you need the 
commitment of the people, if that is what they are wanting to do!"
On the other hand, the forces against change in this case can be summarised in the 
following points (see Exhibit 7.2):
* Resistance to integration on the part of the manufacturing, production and finance 
functions which are managed by traditionalists who are sensitive to change.
"It's historical as far as [naming the company] is concerned .... [The founder] was one of those 
entrepreneurial types .... and from that sort of background the company grew up with this 
background .... We still, to some extent, have this. If we started from scratch I don't know 
whether w e’d do the same thing again. Obviously, a lot of the company depends on its 
inheritance - two generations."
* Lack of interest in integration on the part of the majority of senior managers who hold 
conservative attitudes and thus happen to side, if only by default, with the production 
and manufactuiing functions in their resistance to integration:
"The worst possible scenario is if everybody is trying to do their own thing in their own way
and it will just get into a state of chaos  You've got to be formal in that somebody
somewhere has got just to put a list of headings down as to what has been decided, otherwise 
people go with different ideas. So you've got to have some formality from that point of view."
The Technical Director excluded, senior management lacks a real "paternalistic interest" 
in integration and justifies that on the grounds that the cost of integration is prohibitive 
since an integration project would have "to be done at a budget level appropriate to the 
turnover of the company".
In summary, no decision has yet been made in favour of integration as a future strategic 
direction. It should be noted that the CAD system which is in use in Company 10, 
AutoCAD, is essentially a drafting package and would not have been readily suitable 
for integration. To integrate it successfully some extra interfacing software and 
hardware will be needed at a cost which, according to senior management, cannot be 
justified under the present circumstances of the company.
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Exhibit 7.2Applying the Model to Case 10: A Non-integrating Strategy
CONTEXTEXTERNAL
INTERNAL
CONTEXT
forces
against
change
forces
for
change
No
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* INTERNAL-
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Having applied the model to a critical experience from a secondary company, the next 
section will apply the model to a critical experience from a primary company.
7.4 Applying the Model - II: A Primary Company Example
*  CASE STUDY FOUR: Comnanv 4
*  External Context: Kev Relevant Features
* Company 4 is a subsidiary of a logistics systems division of a giant UK defence 
electronics group which has very strong links with the defence industry in general and 
the British Government in particular (through the MOD [Ministry of Defence]). These 
connections have provided the company with important channels for communication 
with decision making centres of utmost strategic significance in the UK.
* The company's relationship with, and dependency on, its parent organisation is 
extremely strong; essentially, the former is a sub-contractor to the latter. A comparison 
with Company 10 (prior to the 1993 management buy-out), for example, would reveal 
that Company 4 is much more dependent on its parent organisation, although from a 
legal point of view both of them are wholly-owned subsidiaries. This provides 
Company 4 with characteristics both of weakness and strength. On the one hand, it 
limits the company's administrative autonomy to a considerable degree and its potential 
ability to compete in the global electronic product market for civic commercial 
applications. On the other, it provides Company 4 with a sense of protection as an 
otherwise "small fish" in the eyes of its giant competitors in the electronics industry.
* The national economic recession of the early 1990s has had a considerable negative 
effect on the integration process in this company. This is particularly because it is 
dependent on the domestic UK market, rather than on export markets^.
* Internal Context: Kev Relevant Features
* Company 4 is part of a declining industry which is searching for mere survival under 
a "new world order".
* Poor industrial relations in the company, which have deteriorated further due to a 
falling market demand, have created tension between management and the work force^.
^Ironically, financial justification for integration can be hindered by declining business prospects as 
much as it can be facilitated by exactly the same factor. The present example of Case 4 shows that 
where senior management resorts to integration as a means for reviving business prospects in a new 
market, integration, to tlie delight of integrationist forces, can been given a boost. Researchers such as 
Bessant and his colleagues (1985: 285) recognise the plausibility o f such a paradox, namely that 
pressure exerted by recession may "act as the midwife to technological change" in spite of its "general 
effect of reducing profitability and thus the availability of investment funds".
^Passive collective resistance to management plans, which has resulted from the "big g u lf  between 
managers and employees has found expression in the refusal of many shop floor workers to =
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* Many of the company's 500 full-time employees (including 230 qualified engineers 
and technologists as well as scientists of various disciplines) are highly qualified 
professional people who are affiliated to national and international professional groups.
This appears to have increased their awareness of external influences and thus made the 
company as a whole more sensitive to environmental influences in the context of the 
wider society, both nationally and internationally. Openness to external influences 
seems to have enriched the lear ning experience and improved the personal development 
prospects of the key integrationist engineers; it thus had a bearing on the quality of 
leadership of integration internally.
*  The Strateev Process: A Summary
Company 4 had always been a strictly defence electronics concern. The parent 
organisation's orientation towards defence has been subject to reconsideration since the
early 1990s. At that time the company's Training Manager said: " because a lot of
our business is still defence-oriented, we are obviously very sensitive to what is 
happening in the defence field". Strategic rethinking over the last six years, however, 
has focused on commercialising some of the company's facilities to supply civilian 
markets. The first radical change in this direction came into effect in the winter of 1995 
as the company won the first contract with a US leisure aircraft manufacturer.
A co-ordinated effort has developed in this company over the last four years to 
incorporate the integration process into the strategic objectives of the business as a 
whole. Senior management works closely with the Business Computer Systems 
Manager in planning an information strategy in the light of the company's overall j
objectives. CE is introduced as a methodology for implementing organisational change j
to facilitate integration. j
Progress of the integration project in this case has been facilitated by a deliberately 
planned, frequent selection of compatible computer systems since 1986. An integration 
champion has been behind this since he joined the company but he also owes a great 
debt to senior management for his achievements which are deemed important to the 
strategic performance of the business.
= collaborate in implementing a £3m TQM program which has come to be regarded as a failure by 
senior management themselves. Low-trust industrial relations can be illustrated further by the case of 
one technician who
" was sent for a TQM course, a 2-day course, Monday and Tuesday his boss told him: 'you have a
secure future .....  you are important to the company'. He had an appointment to discuss his future
career on Wednesday. At 9.10 am, just 20 minutes earlier they told him; 'you've been sacked!"'
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* To Integrate or Not to Inteirrate? Forces for and Against Change  
Company 4 formally adopted an integration stiategy towards the end of 1991 as a 
Board decision was taken to this effect. Behind the decision were forces (both internal 
and external to the company) acting for change.
The decision to adopt an integration strategy in this case was inspired by a simple idea, 
namely making a better use of the many unco-ordinated computer-aided applications in 
the company:
"One of the areas that I looked at, that I was very concerned about, was the fact that we had a 
high degree of computer-based application tools and resources which were not being fully 
utilised. And what I did was to take an overall picture rather than a narrow view that the people 
are using these tools [might have]. I wanted to see how they could fit the wider world and then 
we became interested in concurrent engineering and this really gave the impetus "
Originally, this idea was proposed by some of the company's "best engineers" who 
saw the potential benefits of integration through their experience of working closely 
with customers seeking solutions to their equipment testing problems: ".... we write 
the design specifications for our customers, they often don't have the time or the 
expertise to do it themselves. Our business is based on our technical ability to solve 
their problems". A more integrated Company 4 was perceived as being synonymous 
with a higher quality of service through improved efficiency and responsiveness. 
Therefore, customer encouragement for this idea strengthened the mentioned engineers' 
confidence that integration would be rewarding, necessary perhaps, from a business 
point of view:
".... it's all down to business and this is an income - you know. The market is dead, income is 
very low, not enough funds available .... but it's a fine line because they have to implement it 
in order to survive in the market place in the future."
Hence, the Business Systems Manager, arguably the company’s most respected 
technologist, presented a case for integration. He emphasised the potential technical 
advantages of interfacing the company's existing CAD, CAE, CASE and CAM 
systems in terms of improving efficiency and quality. His case was based on the 
argument that the anticipated technical gains which would result would translate 
themselves into a more competitive business performance and higher profitability.
He was supported by a number of professional senior engineers of a high social status 
in the organisation. Soon after he had started campaigning for integration he found that 
he was not alone. Another more senior and widely respected manager soon joined him 
in an informal coalition. This was the Training Manger who occupied a position only 
one level below the Board of Directors' and was responsible for meeting all the training 
and education needs of staff and maintaining links with local higher education 
establishments. This important ally joined Company 4 in 1974 from the army where he
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had served as a technician in a technical support unit. Since then he has worked in 
different capacities in the company's engineering, marketing, operations and training 
departments.
Although the Training Manager entered employment with a technician training, he has 
earned the respect of his more senior managers over the past 20 years because of his 
expertise, good conduct and seniority as one of the longest serving managers in the 
company. More importantly, since 1990 he has become a hero to all workers and line 
managers who feel threatened by possible future redundancies, particularly those who 
occupy less senior positions in the hierarchy of the organisation and have a lower social 
status. This is because he won a legal action he had taken against a senior management 
decision to make him redundant - with a number of other workers and white-collar staff 
- as part of a measure to reduce the company's staffing level. Indeed, he was reinstated 
as a result of winning an unfair dismissal case. By his own admission, he had felt 
embarrassed, initially, at having to work with management again after that incident, 
particularly in the face of repetitive references to him by those who argue their 
respective redundancy cases. Later on, however, he became accustomed to the 
consequences of this important development; it enabled him to see "the gap between 
management and the technical staff" and to contend that "one of my tasks is to improve 
the situation".
It seems that the personal support of this "heavyweight" individual for the Business 
Systems Manager in his integration campaign has been significant in strengthening an 
internal force for change. Resistance from within the ranks of the company's 
managers, however, has existed as a force against change but the internal pressures for 
integration in this case were so immense that in 1991 senior management decided it 
would be wisest to integrate despite the organisational difficulties that would lie ahead.
Another major force was behind this, namely that Company 4's parent organisation is 
always keen to acquire state-of-the-art technology because of its nationally sensitive 
position in the UK strategic defence electronics sector. Company 4 is regarded as a 
service company by the parent organisation which has always been prepared to support 
it by all means so as to guarantee a high quality service in return. Being technology-led, 
the parent organisation was in a position to initiate another force for change from 
outside the immediate boundaries of Company 4.
This force was combined with, and exacerbated by, another critical external force, 
namely the decline of the defence electi'onics industry under the post cold war world 
situation. The company responded to the pressures borne out of this decline in a 
positive manner by refomiing its structure in order to be adaptable to the more difficult
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business circumstances which have existed since the start of the present decade. This 
move on the part of the company's senior management coincided with the internal 
pressures for change in favour of integration and, eventually, resulted in adopting an 
integration strategy:
"In all aspects of management, I think, management want confidence as .... they need to go on 
to bid for contracts and win contracts and it makes management want much more confidence in 
what they can do. If there's a system in place and it's very efficient they can meet the time 
scales tliat are there."
In short, the main force against change in this case can be summarised in the following 
points (see Exhibit 7.3[a]):
* Conservative current from amongst management ranks resisting change and insisting 
on maintaining the company's "ways of doing things" in the context of the existing 
structure:
"It [i.e. the company] is still not a mature environment  People talk about all this
integration work but it is still a long way [off]. Maybe in ten years time it will be [achieved]
.... but it doesn't just happen .... and there is too much personalised interest .... each 
[department] has their own personal interest, making their sales, their own profits - you 
know."
On the other hand, the forces for change can be summarised in the following points 
(see Exhibit 7.3[a]):
* Turbulent global environment producing challenging conditions under which the 
company has to operate and prove it can survive as pait of a major UK strategic project.
* Parent organisation/customer demands for greater quality and responsiveness 
pressing the company to take action to adapt to new circumstances in the market place.
* Rapid developments in the technology market where process technology vendors 
continue to offer up-to-date products and services relevant to enhancing the engineering 
and production processes of the company as well as to its competitors.
» A section of management, comprising a power alliance and supported by a wide 
technical knowledge base and a confident leadership, campaigning for integration with 
radical changes in existing organisational structure and culture.
* Senior management responding to external pressures to reform the company in line 
with the developments in the environment and to internal forces for change from within 
management ranks.
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Exhibit 7.3 (a)Applying the Model to Case 4: The Adoption of an Integrating Strategy
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* The Integration Process: Facilitating and Impeditii* Factors  
The process of integration in this case can be described in terms of a long-term 
"evolution rather than a revolution" that aims to establish "the free flow of information 
between oiu disciplines" via CE:
"If the information is made readily available it v i^ll make it [i.e. organisation for integration] a
lot easier Thai's data management: exposure to the right data at the right time, that’s
concurrent engineering methodology The designers are 100% involved right from the
beginning, not in a linear way but it will be exponential and you get manufacturing involved
the other way round We've brought the area of overlap much greater in here What
concurrent engineering does is not only it brings greater involvement but it also reduced time 
dramatically."
The company's Business Computer Systems Manager plays a crucial leadership role in 
the integration process. His instrumental role in “getting the company up and running” 
has enabled him to become a key individual whose job is to ensure that the systems are 
adequately supported and that new applications are investigated, selected, introduced 
and supported. The company's reliance on the technology he masters has made all 
users dependent on him to a considerable extent in performing their respective jobs. 
This has enabled him to reinforce his personal authority throughout an organisation 
where the majority of employees happen to be users as well.
An important feature of his strategy over the last five years is the great emphasis he 
lays on changing the company's culture to one which will accept integration, and the 
organisational changes that come with it, more readily:
".... that’s the nature of human beings We've had engineers who said: 'No, I'm not going
to use it ! ' , because they were scared of it or whatever. We’ve had people who said: 'This is 
great, this makes my job much easier. I will use it’. So there was a cultural problem and there 
was a training problem .... so we took in major training programs, we trained everyone that 
used theses tools. And as a result it's now a company policy that all our designs are done using 
these tools and it's accepted the culture has changed, but that took .... two years to get it 
there."
Furthermore, he has led a reformist current in the company, which aims to restructure 
the organisation along an integrated, project-oriented model. This includes creating 
"specialist teams", comprising six to eight engineers, and self-sufficient "pools of 
resources". According to this current, the existing functional structure is outdated and 
should be scrapped.
On the other hand, the company's Information Systems Manager is leading a 
conservative wing in the company to resist change:
"I see certain resistance .... from right next door .... and there will be a conflict in the future 
.... So you've got this conflict between the engineering systems and the data processing 
system s I would probably need to take control."
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Traditionally, the Information Systems Manager has managed the company's 
information systemic. The system has served to support formal communication 
channels which were set up historically in favour of a bureaucratically-controlled 
organisation. Therefore, any perceived intervention by one interest in the "territory" of 
the other will almost certainly provoke a conflict.
In the case of this company it appears clearly that senior management, under an 
immense pressure to adapt to new market conditions, is more sympathetic to the 
reformist-integrationist current led by the Business Systems Manager. It has apparently 
sided with him. He is the undisputed integration champion who aspires, to the 
detriment of his adversary, to become one day an "IT Manager in the heart of the 
organisation stretching to the Board". Indeed, he himself admits that:
".... senior management are quite serious, they back me up in what I’m doing and they realise 
they have to implement a system such as that to survive. They realise that if they do not 
introduce the system, which will increase efficiency in the end, they won't survive because 
everybody else is, all the big European companies. They all introduce these systems, it makes
them so efficient  So the CAE tools and CAD tools were just the first step point
solutions to problems .... Now we've got to automate the business, that's what it's all about 
and management are behind me on that They recognise that it has to happen."
It is no exaggeration to say that the integration champion represents a distinctive feature 
of Company 4. In fact, he is probably the most skilled, enthusiastic and hard-working 
change leader in all the ten companies in the study. He also enjoys a close relationship 
with senior management and is guided by an exceptionally clear, comprehensive, 
realistic and long-term vision. In addition to his outstanding technical expertise in the 
area of system interfacing, what strengthens his position is his enlightened appreciation 
of the far-reaching organisational implications of the project he leads. For example, 
four positive aspects of such appreciation could be extracted from a single interview 
with him:
First, his radical but clear-sighted view on the organisational implications of change:
"I have to change the whole structure of our company, the whole structure of the business......
I need to .... break up the barriers that are making the problems."
Second, his awareness about organisation-wide structural and cultural transformation 
requirements of the change process:
"I have to change the structure .... It's back to the cultural thing again. It's not just a bunch of 
CAE engineers to change culture, it's everybody to change culture. So that will be the priority. 
That comes back to organisational change."
^^Including a mainframe VAX system, MRP, and a network of PC's.
239
Third, his political and inter-personal management skills. On being asked "how do you 
handle the different kinds of resistance to change?", he replied quickly and sharply:
"Diplomatically! That's a day-to-day management reaction. You have to deal with them person 
by person as they come along. Some people will have to be bulldozed to do a thing, some 
people need persuasion, some people don't budge and you get power struggle and you get 
demarcation problems and all these kinds of problems."
Fourth, his appreciation of the need for closer, co-operative relationships with 
technology suppliers whom he views more as partners in the integration process than 
as vendors in the conventional sense of the word:
"My experience from last year has led me to believe that you need very close links with your ]
suppliers .... you need a very, very close relation [ship] and support long after you [have] got it 1
installed.” 1
Indeed, he realises how much power he needs to gain in order to be able to implement |
his future vision: ".... the only way we can do that is if I'm given power". His |
instrumental role manifests itself most clearly in his problem-solving skills; not only is 
he efficient in solving technical problems with the assistance of his teams of engineers 
but also he uses his outstanding inter-personal skills to settle disputes and find 
compromises to politically sensitive conflicts arising from the allocation of company 
resources in the process of integration. These include questions such as where should 
terminals be installed - together or in clusters throughout the company? How should 
data base and control systems be designed without sacrificing consensus?
Furthermore, what solidifies his position in the company is the present state of the 
defence market. From a senior management's point of view, he should be authorised 
to play the role of a business transformer for adapting to a new environment. Indeed, 
he regards himself as the individual who holds the key technical knowledge the 
company needs to "survive the market place in the future". Although his exceptional 
value to the company should be justified only in this context, he remains proud of that:
"Oh, no doubt, I'm the driving force of all the tools and for getting them together".
The significance of the power factor manifests itself clearly in this case; the integration 
leader has sought power systematically and gained power increasingly to the extent that 
he has begun to compete with some senior managers (who have empowered him in the 
first place) on the exercise of a technocratically-justified authority. This is not normal in 
a bureaucratically-organised company, but has come about in this case largely because 
this distinguished individual has led a strong current resistant to the company's 
established authority. As a result, traditional claims of bureaucratic authority seem to 
have eroded due to persistent pressures from the integrationist current which has 
worked hard to install a technocratic form of rule.
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It can be seen that a process of "power stripping" is unfolding in this case, without 
necessarily full awareness on the part of senior management. The traditionally 
bureaucratic but less technically-knowledgeable forces appear to be in the process of 
loosing power based on formal authority to a new power based on expertise. The 
newly emerging power alliance is increasing its de facto authority to a degiee where it is 
beginning to show (to fellow middle and technical, but not to senior, managers) that it 
is prepared to lead the company; it represents itself as a saviour from a likely closure 
due to a declining business demand. This may involve restructuring formal "legitimate" 
authority relationships within the organisation in its favour and to the detriment of the 
existing bureaucratic power holders
Indeed, power transformation in Case 4 appears to be in favour of the integration 
process since those who are emerging as more powerful aie themselves the practical 
leaders and intellectual theorists of integration. However, even when knowledge, 
sincere intentions and willpower conditions are satisfied, the extent to which integration 
can be achieved will depend on the interaction of a variety of factors, such as the ones 
discussed in this chapter.
In conclusion, the integration process in this case is progressing effectively as 
facilitating factors outweigh impeding ones. The impeding factors in this case can be 
summarised in the following points (see Exhibit 7.3[b]):
* Multiple systems to be interfaced, including more than a single CAD system, a CAE, 
a CASE, and a CAM system that are distributed over the company's three sites: "We've 
got to think about hardware and software. It's happening all the time and managers 
don't like that". The market for interfacing standards (for data base formats and 
information exchange between data bases) offers only costly products and services for
should be noted, however, that the organisational context of this case is in favour of such power 
shift. Four points can be mentioned about the conditions under which this phenomenon is emerging in 
Case 4:
1) The nature of the product development function in this case resembles a technology-intensive R&D 
(Research and Development) centre; the work place environment for all the company's professional 
engineers requires them to work closely with each other and this causes them to mix extensively as a 
social collectivity.
2) The technical knowledge base of the company comprises a larger proportion of the total number of 
professional engineers than in any of the other companies and, hence, it could be ai gued that this has 
helped the cause of technocratic power politics.
3) Because of the reasons outlined above, the integrationist current in this case is empowered, through 
the integration leader personally, by senior management; such empowerment is central to its success.
4) The economic difhculties encountered by the company in a declining industry appears to have 
increasingly weakened the credibility of traditional bureaucratic governance which had dominated during 
the times when business was flourishing, particularly during the "cold war" era. It is likely that the 
business will be further commercialised to supply the civilian market. This move appears to be 
favourable to the emerging technocratic alliance which is better positioned to respond to market 
pressures for higher quality standards and flexibility in the face of changing market demands.
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the complex technical requirement of Company 4 (e.g. standards that can handle 
modelling as well as CAE and CASE information) in a mai'ket dominated by giant 
manufacturers promoting their respective products as standards: "There's no outright 
standard. Standards that are in the market place need a standard!".
* Financial difficulties justifying integration under the current circumstances of the 
business and within existing short-term accounting procedures:
"We have a 4 -year depreciation period  It’s general: any piece of equipment we buy,
whether it be a computer or a filing cabinet, they all depreciate. There's a standard form that
you fill Ideally, I would like to replace half of our CAD systems with new ones I'd
like to do that tomorrow, but I know I couldn't cost-justify it."
* Low-trust and unstable industrial relations:
"We are getting downsized as an organisation, with many lay-offs because of the trauma
within the organisation; we've seen three [waves?] of redundancy over the last three years, 
we've seen the defence industry really bottomed down. Individuals have been concerned or 
began to conceive that there is a lack of commitment on the part of management."
* The relatively large size of the company as only a subsidiary unit of a larger 
corporation with a rigid structure and a bureaucratic culture which is resistant to change:
"Any large organisation is bureaucratic, it has a law of its own, if you step out of it you get
hammered to the floor! And unfortunately the [naming Company 4]'s mentality is that.....
There's too much deparünenlalisation: 'this is my problem, this is your problem' attitude."
On the other hand, the facilitating factors in this case can be summarised in the :
following points (see Exhibit 7.3[b]):
* A clear vision of integration, guiding a process of strategic planning on the issue to |
support overall business strategy. The implementation of this vision is being defended j
fiercely in the face of "totally unavoidable power struggles" to change the existing 
culture to a more "integration-friendly" one: "It's a cultural change; there’s no way you 
can change a culture without major problems".
* A solid and diversified technical skill base and knowledge at the disposal of the 
integrationist forces. The emphasis on stiengthening existing skills and acquiring new 
ones is paramount: "We want a very high degree of skills".
* Special attention being paid to the training and staff development requirements of 
integration and the Training Manager taking a central role in integration alongside the 
integi'ation leader:
"We don't just buy in the hardware, that's only the first part and people can recognise that, but !
we've got to spend a similar sort of money on training, which again people recognise, but on |
education, 'cause we have to change people's concepts on working in a totally different way {
under this sort of arrangement."
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* Outstanding leadership attributes of the change leader in terms of his technical, 
organisational, and interpersonal skills and the support and empowerment given to him 
by senior management.
* A very low-volume type of production system encouraging co-operation among the 
various groups of engineers and scientists whose common focus is on developing a 
one-off, complex product item over an extended period of time.
* Close involvement of the parent organisation, which operates on a technological 
leadership basis, and the company’s suppliers in the CADCAM integration process.
* Intensive economic pressures treated as a challenge, rather than a threat, and thus 
utilised as a facilitating factor in the move towards integration.
* Outcomes o f  Change
Company 4 is one of the most integrated cases in the study in CADCAM terms. 
Judging by the present state of the technical, economic and organisational outcomes of 
its process so far, the integration project in this case seems likely to continue 
developing at a relatively fast and consistent rate.
Technically, the company has the largest number of interfaced multi-work-station 
systems (i.e. CAD, CAE, CASE, CAM) in terms of the cases in the study. Such 
systems used to exist as independent stand alone applications on three different sites. 
Despite the difficulties still being faced in trying to increase the degree of 
interlinkedness, because of the lack of effective affordable standards, the degree of 
electronic communication among these systems is yet unparalleled in any of the other 
companies. High interlinkedness has translated itself into a smoother and more efficient 
information exchange among the different functional departments concerned as well as 
between the various sections of the company’s huge engineering function.
Economically, any achievable financial reward of integration will be rather difficult to 
measure with accuracy dui'ing the period of this study due to three main reasons:
1) A conventional accounting system which was born out of a bureaucratic mode of 
organisation and has survived over the decades in a manner which is incapable of 
taking on board integration cost and benefit accounting.
2) Only a few years have passed since an integration strategy was adopted, and a longer 
time is needed before the true long-term advantages and disadvantages of integration 
can be appreciated or even expressed in financial terms.
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Exhibit 7.3 (b)Applying the Model to Case 4: Factors in the Implementation of
the Change Process
EXTERNAL CONTEXT
INTERNAL
CONTEXT
D e c i s i o n  
t o  i n t e g r a t e  o r  n o t  
t o  i n t e g r a t e
Yes
fIntegrating approach
facmtaung
impeding
INTEGRATION 
PROCESS factorsfactors
OUTCOMES i
Technical^ ^ 9^ ^ ^Organis 
a t i o n a l
c o n o m i c
FACILITATING FACTORS:
* EXTERNAL -
(1): close involvement & support 
by technology-driven parent company
(2): intensive environmental pressures
* INTERNAL-
(A): a strategic vision on integration
(B): strong & wide skill base available
(C): integration-oriented training &
education strategy
(D): outstanding change leadership 
(E): close co-operation among engineers
due to one-off project-oriented 
production system
INTERNAL 
CONTEXT.
** IMPEDING FACTORS:
* INTERNAL - 
(A): numerous systems to 
interface on three different sites
(B): financial difficulties justifying
integration
(C): low-trust & unstable industrial
relations
(D): large organisational size with 
rigid structure & bureaucratic
culture
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3) Under internal and external pressures, other major changes have been introduced 
into the organisation as part of a plan to reform it, which makes it particularly difficult 
to isolate integration as a single factor responsible for the relative improvement in 
performance since the last quarter of 1995.
Organisationally, the integration process in this company has been synonymous with 
radical changes in so far as the existing company structure and culture are concerned. 
Unlike the economic outcomes, the organisational outcomes of integration have already 
been felt throughout the company. Two polarised streams of opinion can be found: one 
in favour of and one against change. In view of the depth and width of the 
organisational changes taking place, it is difficult to find any number of indiviuals or 
groups who are still disinterested.
CE arrangements have been systematically pursued by the integration champion. The 
aim here is to operate on a project basis. Regardless of whoever initiates a project idea, 
the main criterion for acceptance is that the project should be customer-focused. A 
greater degree of co-operation and information sharing between different groups of 
design and product development engineers has been brought about. Such groups used 
to be functionally organised in the old structure which is now being replaced by a CE- 
oriented one in which new specialist teams are set up for the duration of a project’s 
lifetime and then reorganised flexibly for another project. Each task-oriented team 
comprises between three to seven members and is led by a team leader selected by the 
integration champion (with senior management’s blessings) who devotes time for each 
team to co-ordinate their functioning concurrently. Loyalty to the champion, in his 
formal capacity as the Computer Systems Manager, is important given that team leaders 
now have to work closely together from the conception of a new project, with the 
champion as their common reference for technical guidance and “parental” support.
Face-to-face, informal communication is at the centre of this new approach. The idea is 
to continue removing existing individual offices separated by walls and corridors. 
Instead, an open-plan office environment is being constructed, in which everyone 
works in the same physical place and staff move freely to perform their respective 
project-defined work tasks. Old demarcation lines are being gradually phased out in this 
environment which resembles a "paperless office" where everybody is required to have 
access to and use a computer. Of course, staff have not taken to this way of operating 
overnight or fully accepted it yet but the trend is towards a more transparent kind of 
corporate culture in which all aspects of the business are known to everybody in this 
kind of work environment.
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This situation contrasts sharply, and is replacing, the older "them and us" corporate 
culture based on the principle that information should be made available only on a need- 
to-know basis. Central to the strategic thinking behind this shift is an emphasis on 
developing people as the key to achieving a competitive edge, through a learning 
organisation work environment which helps individuals draw ideas from a wide range 
of sources and adapt them to the company's requirements. From an organisational point 
of view, therefore, the result of this has been to transform relationships and working 
practices by replacing the company's traditional structure and culture, though not in 
everybody's mind, with a team-oriented, company-wide approach.
The concentration of power in the hands of the integration champion stems not only 
from his position as a controller of such a vast and diverse skill base which the 
company possesses, but also from the fact that he has offered himself as the only single 
channel for communication between the company's technical base and the company's 
highest level of management, despite the resistance he encounters from some senior 
engineers who are unhappy about the changes. Senior management continues to 
support the empowered champion as long as he is showing that he can improve 
performance and thus attain the company's competitive position.
In conclusion, from what one knows about this case, it seems that integration is likely 
to progress further and bring with it further solidification of the structural changes 
being implemented. The emphasis on an integration culture to replace the existing 
culture is also likely to spread further outside the areas of the organisation controlled by 
the integrationists due to the presence of an integration-enthusiast Training Manager 
who pays special attention to developing a pro-integration human resource management 
strategy. The implications ate that this important ally of the champion co-ordinates his 
department's recruitment, training and education plans (which affect the entire 
company's work force) with those of the integration leader to assist the spread of their 
vision of culture as the existing one is being gradually phased out.
The following two sections will look at the primary cases in the study from a wider 
angle: section 7.5 will summarise the obstacles to integration as experienced in the 
cases and section 7.6 will discuss the organisational aspects of the obstacles in terms of 
the internal contexts in which they are identified.
7.5 An Overview of the Primary Cases: Obstacles to Integration
According to the study's model, a company's decision to adopt an integration strategy 
is likely to be made as a result of the dynamics of the various internal and external 
forces for and forces against change acting within the company's strategic decision­
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making sphere. Similarly, the progress of an integration process is dependent on the 
factors acting upon it from within and outside the company. From the point of view of 
those managers who are associated with integration in the primary cases, the process is 
unfolding but very slowly and problematically. Why is that so? As far as they are 
concerned, there are "obstacles" on the way to full integration, which are responsible 
for the this situation.
The model's conceptualisation of the facilitating and impeding factors influencing an 
integration process and thus its outcomes can be used to explain the identified 
obstacles. In other words, the theoretical groundwork of the model can be used to 
illustrate how the conceptualised facilitating and impeding factors may help trace the 
internal and external roots of the obstacles. In the context of the present model, these 
obstacles can be an expression of the relative prevalence of the magnitude of the 
impeding, over the facilitating, factors
The identified obstacles can be classified and codified into three groups: 1) "E": 
economic, 2 )  " T " :  t e c h n i c a l ^  and 3 )  " O " :  organisational (Exhibits 7 . 4  and 7 . 5 ) .  The 
emphasis in this and the consequent sections will be on analysing the organisational 
obstaclesi"^ which are "probably the most difficult to overcome" because integration 
"challenges the accepted way in which organisations work on a day-to-day basis" 
(Bessant, 1991: 3 0 5 ) .
This reference to the "magnitude" of the factors involved means that the impact of such factors on 
an integration process is not assessed in terms of the number of individual factors acting upon it in 
either direction, but rather in terms of the criticality and force of each factor.
l^The technical obstacles identified include incompatibilities of data structures and programs because 
independent data processing systems were developed separately throughout the 1970s, 80s and early 
90s. The use of translation programs to match up different island programs and data systems and tlien 
combine them is technically possible but rather complicated. It causes a serious barrier to further 
integration by linking existing integrated modules with others.
The market situation in product-related information processing is not supportive of systems 
integration (see, for example, Boubekri et al., 1995); numerous software houses with outstanding 
knowledge of technology are in a good position to supply customised integration modules to small and 
medium sized enterprises but these companies' systems are supplied by larger manufacturers, each of 
whom has their own comprehensive package standards. From the point of view of small and medium 
sized companies, therefore, integration is difficult because they have to construct their own systems 
gradually, depending on various technology vendors due to their constraining investment and product 
diversity levels.
I'^ A^s explained in Chapter 1, a detailed analysis of the technical and economic factors is outside the 
scope of the present study.
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MAINOBSTACLE Distinguishing Characteristics OBSTACLE
as foundinaPrimary
Comnany
Case1 Case2
Case
3
Case4 Case5
FREQUENCY
TECHNICAL
T1 L / m
T2 I
T3 n
T4- H
T5 1 / ' IV
T6
ECONOMIC
El I
ORGANISATIONAL
01 L / n
02 L / V
03 L / n
04 m
05 L / n
06 L / L / L / IV
07 IV
08 in
* T 1
* T 2
* T 3
* T 4
* T 5
*T6
S y s t e m  i n t e r f a c i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  d u e  t o  
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s
D i f f i c u l t i e s  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  n e w  C A E  p a c k a g e  
D i f f c u l t i e s  r e p l a c i n g  e x i s t i n g  C A D  s y s t e m  f o r  
i n t e g r a t i o n  p u r p o s e s
T o o  m a n y  i s o l a t e d  " I s l a n d s  o f  a u t o m a t i o n "  
L a c k  o f  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  C A D C A M  
s u p p l y  m a r k e t
L a c k  o f  t e c h n i c a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h i n  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y  a n d  a m o n g  
c o m p a n i e s  a n d  e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  
r e s e a r c h  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
* E 1  F i n a n c i a l  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
d i f f c u l t i e s
KEY TO CODED OBSTACLES USED IN TABLE BELOW
♦ 0 1  L a c k  o f  s e n i o r
m a n a g e m e n t  s u p p o r t  
♦ 0 2  P r o t e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n a l  
m a n a g e r s  
♦ 0 3  C h a n g i n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  
♦ 0 4  C h a n g i n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
c u l t u r e  
♦ 0 5  L a c k  o f  c u s t o m e r  
i n v o l v e m e n t  
♦ 0 6  L a c k  o f  s u p p l i e r  
i n v o l v e m e n t  
♦ 0 7  I n a d e q u a t e  i n c e n t i v e  
a n d  r e w a r d  p o l i c i e s  
♦ 0 8  E m p l o y e e  r e s i s t a n c e  
b e h a v i u o r
Exhibit 7.5: Main Coded Obstacles as Found in the Primay Companies
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7 .6  Organisational Obstacles: An Internal Context Perspective
Building on the social processes perspective of the present model, one can extend the 
basic argument about the need to take a closer look at the social structure of an internal 
context of change with a view to identifying the reasons why the integration process in 
the studied primary cases does not seem to progress as speedily as it might do^^. No 
attempt is made here to reduce the obstacles that integration encounter into social 
relations per se. By the same token, however, it cannot be said that such obstacles are 
restricted to technical and economic limitations alone.
Socially-explainable "centrifugal tendencies" (see Child, 1977) that may be found in 
any organisation (due to the various and conflicting paths chosen by the many different 
individuals and groups who are affiliated to it in different capacities) are an important 
factor in explaining the nature of such obstacles. This is because such tendencies not 
only point directly to straightfoiward organisational obstacles but they can also help one 
explain possible organisational causes to what appear to be obstacles of a purely 
technical or economic nature. For example, one can argue that system interfacing 
difficulties due to incompatibility (i.e. "T l" in Exhibit 7.5) is, partly, a result of 
excessive departmentalisation in the first place, with each department going its own 
way in computerising its operations without co-ordination with other departments 
through a common corporate vision of integration. Also, financial justification 
difficulties (i.e. "El" in Exhibit 7.5) can be traced, in pait, to accounting systems that 
reflect an organisational culture dominated by short-term financial gain values and a 
highly bureaucratic structure.
In examining obstacles to integration in the five primary case studies in the light of the 
evidence from Chapters 5 and 6, a number of points can be made. First, it is obvious 
that the design, engineering, and manufacturing tasks carried out in each company are 
dependent on the company's product a ttribu tesand  production system attributes'^.
^^This study's emphasis on the internal social processes affecting integration does not mean that 
external influences are, or should be, ignored. On the contrary, as the two case examples (sections 7.3 
and 7.4) clearly show, these play a significant role in causing and directing change; it is the present 
study's orientation, objectives, and design that lend themselves to an internal focus since a detailed 
analysis of external factors is beyond the study's scope.
^^Such as the number of levels of product structure, the number of components and subcomponents in 
a typical product, the percentage of standard versus special parts, the degree of customisation versus 
design freedom, raw materials lead-times and product life cycles.
l^Such as type of production system (e.g. jobbing, batch or process); whether capital or labour 
intensive; whether low, medium or high level of operations; type of layout (e.g. functional or CM); 
availability of labour and machinery; degree of on-site assembly; level of skills; percentage of cost on 
design, manufacturing, assembly and commissioning; and inventory and stock control system data 
structure, MRP scheduling, CAFF and JIT practices.
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They also depend on product range^^. Given that each company in the study has its 
distinctive production system which is reflected in the structure and processual 
dynamics of the work tasks of its DEM functions, each CADCAM integration project 
draws directly on the nature of the technical core of its host manufacturing company.
Second, key individual "champions of change" in the companies studied appear clearly 
to have influenced both the process of change and its outcomes through their power, 
values, interests, tacit knowledge and relations with external constituencies of 
technology suppliers and capital providers (see Greiner and Schein, 1988; Howell and 
Higgins, 1990; Scarborough and Corbett, 1992). Transformational leadership 
behaviour (e.g. in Cases 4 and, to a lesser extent, 5) manifests itself in terms of 
intellectual stimulation to integration team members (see Nadler and Tushman, 1990). 
Although communication skills of the more successful leaders are an important factor in 
winning the involvement of many employees, a leader's ability to "turn words into 
actions" (Case 2) is even more important from the followers’ point of view.
The "socio-political context of change" (Lee, 1989) in an organisation is of a cential 
importance in understanding how the integration process unfolds, where more 
powerful individuals and groups are likely to influence decision making 
considerably^^. Integration leaders in the reseai’ched organisations tend to belong to 
technically-oriented middle management ranks. Some of them remain restricted by, and 
content with, their existing share of power. Their power positions aie protected by theii* 
immediate senior managers who, in most cases, occupy positions at a Board level. 
Under the leadership of such powerful individual "sponsors", integration leaders 
concern themselves mainly with the technical aspects of change in the majority of cases 
(e.g. in Cases 1, 2 and 3). Others, however, are not content at all and seek to support 
their manoeuvres by reinforcing their "individual power bases" via increasing, among 
other things, their infoiTnation, expertise, professional credibility, reputation, and staff 
support^o (see Greiner and Schein, 1988).
Cases 2 and 3, for example, the variety of wide-ranging design projects commissioned is identified 
as a significant barrier to further development of the original CAD systems and their integration within 
a CADCAM arrangement.
^^As Clegg (1994: 164) puts it, "the experience of power is inescapable whenever there is effective 
organisation, binding independent agents together, yoking them to the pursuit of a purpose made 
common". Power - in its various forms or "dimensions" (derived from resources, processes and 
meanings [see Frost and Egri, 1991; Lukes 1974]) - is therefore sought by change agents in order to 
drive CADCAM in a desired direction (see Greiner and Schein, 1988; Hardy, 1994).
^^Whatever power share integration leaders may be able to earn, it should be stressed, nonetheless, that 
their role should not be exaggerated to the extent that organisational change is viewed as solely the 
product of far-sighted action by champions willing to take risky decisions. The context within which 
transformational leadership is exercised, the extent to which personal leadership attributes match the 
logistical requirements of a situation, and tlie hierarchical position of the leader within the formal =
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Third, an organisation’s size^  ^ is a significant factor in integration (see Arceius and 
Wright, 1994; Thong and Yap, 1995). Smaller size is associated with more flexible 
organisational structure, more efficient communications, less social stratification, and 
less formal working relations. Such characteristics are potentially capable of facilitating 
integration in smaller companies, provided that it is economically feasible and 
technically advantageous in the first place. These two conditions, however, could rarely 
be found in the smaller companies studied.
On the other hand, larger companies tend to have more formal procedures, more 
specialists, better qualified staff, wider horizontal and longer vertical spans of control, 
and decentralisation of operational, but not strategic, decisions. Due to more 
standardised procedures, decision making on CADCAM integration tends to take longer 
in larger and more bureaucratic organisations. Vertical and horizontal communications 
are slower: ’’even in a larger company the opportunities and difficulties in getting 
CADCAM in operation are extremely difficult" (Case 2). However, the most expensive 
and advanced integrating technology is to be found in these companies. This confirms 
the proposition that lai'ger, more resourced companies are more likely to take the lead in 
new technology investment because of their greater enabling resources whereas smaller 
ones tend to obseiwe the change process and then follow suit (see Arceius and Wright, 
1994; Currie’s, 1989; Truman and Keating, 1988).
"We are not in the business like IBM where we throw a couple of million dollars and say:
'Well, that was a good idea but it didn't work!' .... when we do things they have to work!"
(Case 3).
Fourth, the findings suggest that an organisation’s size and structure^^ are closely 
interlinked. The larger an organisation, the more likely that its informal mechanisms for 
the direction, co-ordination and control of activities will break down as the number of 
linkages multiplies beyond the limits manageable by individuals. Bureaucratic 
processes are then introduced to control increasingly decentralised operational 
decisions. This phenomenon is clear in lai'ger companies (e.g. Cases 4 and 5) where
= organisational structure (i.e. de jure authority predicament) and actual (i.e. de facto  ) power position 
are crucial factors that constrain a leader's ability to change.
 ^Variations in size can be reflected in several organisational attributes, such as the number of levels of 
management in a hierarchical organisation and the number of employees reporting to a specific 
manager. In this regard, the findings support the proposition that size is closely associated with 
bureaucracy (see Weber, 1947). The findings also support those of subsequent studies in the Aston 
tradition, proposing that an organisation's size is a major determinant of structure (Child, 1973; Pugh 
and Hickson, 1976; Pugh and Hinings, 1976).
22An organisation's structure represents the background or relative constancy against which a 
CADCAM integration process has to be managed (see Pettigrew, 1985). Therefore, key properties of 
such background (e.g. communication patterns, networks and roles) influence, positively or negatively, 
the progress of integration and its outcomes in any case.
252
more formalised, standardised, and lengthy procedures are the norm. Case study 
evidence supports the proposition that organisational size correlates with the formality 
of organisational structure (see Burns and Waterhouse, 1975)23. It is evident from the 
findings that formal decision making based on departmental budgetary systems in some 
cases can become a ritualistic management activity which does not serve the cause of 
integration.
As far as size is concerned, larger organisations tend to have more mechanic structures, 
whilst organic types of structures are associated with smaller organisations (see Bums 
and Stalker, 1 9 6 8 )24 . Given that larger organisations tend to use more complex process 
technology, it is tempting initially to deduct on such grounds that they will have greater 
chances of integrating their CAD and CAM systems. However, the findings do not 
support such a proposition. Organically-structured companies, by definition, are prone 
to integration. Mechanistic types of organisation, on the other hand, are so rigidly 
fragmented that any form of organisational change will be resisted by many individuals 
and groups whose social identities have been shaped over the years around a strong 
departmentalised division of labour: ".... they [i.e. managers] always see they are 
going to [i.e. protecting the interests of] their [own] departments" (Case 5)25.
It can be argued that such a situation represents a dichotomy. On the one hand, smaller 
companies with less complex technology enjoy a more organic structure which may
23The characteristics of an organisation's budgetary control system represent a function of the general 
level of bureaucracy (see Burns and Waterhouse, 1975). Management in more bureaucratic companies 
might be expected to have developed reliance on formal budgeting systems which are perceived to be a 
necessary part of the procedures by which decentralised operations are planned and controlled. When 
viewed from another point of view, however, budgeting systems increase the degree of bureaucracy as a 
strategy for control by adding to the number of formal documents and procedures, to the number of 
qualified specialists, and to the spans of control in certain parts of the organisation. Indeed, more 
bureaucratic organisations are more likely to introduce budgeting and, in doing so, they are likely to 
become even more bureaucratic. Financial justification documents also serve a legitimising function in 
larger bureaucracies where various competing rationalities are defended by various groups - formal and 
informal alike. |I
24xhe main characteristics of mechanic organisations are: (1) specialised differentiation of functional j
tasks, (2) tightly and precisely defined functional roles, (3) control via the hierarchy, (4) a hierarchical !
structure which protects secrecy about what happens on the top of the pyramid, (5) interaction tending |
to be between superior and subordinate, (6) operations and working behaviour governed by supervisors, {
(7) loyalty and obedience highly valued, and (8) greater importance attached to knowledge of the !
company’s ways of working rather than general knowledge, experience and skill. On the other hand, the I
main characteristics of organic organisations include: (1) the contributing nature of special knowledge {
to the common task, (2) the adjustment of individual tasks through interaction with others, (3) the 
spread of commitment to the concern beyond the technical definition, (4) a network structure of 
control, authority and communication, (5) a lateral rather than vertical pattern of communication, (6) a 
content of communication consisting of advice and information, rather than instructions, (7) 
importance attached to affiliations and expertise which had validity outside the narrow environment of 
the firm.
25Informal interest and alliance groups, which are invisible on a formal organisation chart, are also 
likely to stand against organisational change if they feel it will diminish their influence.
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potentially facilitate integration. Yet, integration is not likely to be as feasible 
economically nor is it likely to be supported as well technically in smaller companies. 
On the other hand, the technical conditions for integration are reasonably satisfied in the 
majority of the larger companies. Yet, integration experiences in such organisations are 
a massive challenge because existing structures were not only initially designed for a 
fragmented and highly differentiated approach to technological development, but also 
have protected individual, departmental, and group distinctions that have accumulated 
over a long period of time. If one was to imagine an ideal situation with optimal 
conditions for integration, it would be one that combined the organisational strengths of 
smaller companies and the technical and economic advantages of the larger ones.
Fifth, the findings show that an organisation’s culture^^ has implications for either 
stimulating or discouraging CADCAM integi'ation. This corresponds to the general 
point discussed in the innovation literature, concerning the role of culture in terms of 
how supportive it is of change (e.g. Currie, 1989; Kanter, 1983; Robey and Azevedo, 
1995). Culture can either facilitate or hinder an integration process because it 
establishes a degree of order in social life above and beyond that order suggested by a 
formal structure; it influences individuals' behaviours, especially at those times of 
uncertainty which will surround any significant change. This explains, in part, why the 
most instrumental integi'ation leaders in the researched companies regard organisational 
culture as something that is more difficult to manage than the integrating technology 
itself. In Case 4, for example, culture is presented as the number one obstacle.
It is important to stress, however, that several sub-cultures can, and do, coexist within 
an organisation, particularly in larger organisations (see Gregory, 1983). Therefore, 
any notion of ’’company culture’’ (see, for example, Adler, 1989) should not be taken 
for granted as implying a necessarily homogeneous culture throughout an organisation. 
Intra-organisational cultural variations tend to be based on functional, professional and 
occupational divisions. A typical example of cultural differences among different 
functions within a company are those found between design and manufacturing; such 
differences contribute to a high degree of differentiation along formal departmental 
lines.
2^The earliest explicit reference to the concept of "organisational culture" is attributed to Pettigrew 
(Robey and Azevedo, 1995). Pettigiew (1979: 574) defines an organisational culture as a system of
" publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a given group at a given time". Thus, it
represents shared subjective interpretations of shared experience. The role a collective experience plays 
in forming a culture is illustrated in its ability to mould learning, validation, sharing and transmission 
of such meanings into a set of recognisable explanations related to an organisation’s on-going attempts 
to maintain itself (Schein, 1990).
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The presence of more than a single sub-culture gives rise to the question of dominance 
and its implications for an integration process; in most of the researched companies 
design or engineering departments' tend to dominate. The professional influence of so- 
called "front-end" designers, responsible for providing the rest of the organisation with 
the information needed for the manufacturing operations, is apparent in most cases. 
This is so even in those companies where designers are a minority (e.g. Cases 1 and
3). Senior management often sides with white-collar, professionally-oriented design 
sub-cultures at the expense of the manufacturing and production sub-cultures^^. This 
helps one explain why the leaders of integration projects were invariably from the 
design department, even though the computerised manufacturing technology involved 
in integration is invariably a more expensive investment than CAD. It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find that integration is conceptualised and directed from a design culture 
point of view. Most of the members of staff who are demanding more integration, and 
thus representing a progressive force for change inside their respective organisations 
are from engineering or design rather than manufacturing or production (as shown, for 
example, in the critical incident case examples in sections 7.3 and 7.4).
Sixth, the lack of CADCAM knowledge by many executive managers, partly due to 
their underestimation of the magnitude of moving to full integration, represents a 
serious problem in some cases (e.g. Cases 1 and 2). Training for CADCAM involves 
substantial expenditures that are not always anticipated beforehand. Senior managers 
tend to expect fast and effective results without paying too much attention to the 
quantity and quality of training given to users, operators, programmers, and managers. 
The thinking is that, given time, these people will learn on the job. However, this 
situation often amounts to an "incomplete organisational learning" process (see Kim, 
1993; March and Olsen, 1975). This occurs when a learning cycle fails to develop 
properly as a result of flaws such as learning under ambiguity, situational learning, and 
fragmented learning. There is, seemingly, an implicit belief that hardware will fix 
things and that one does not have to worry overtly about the human element: "We 
created problems for ourselves .... and those are the things that are not gonna happen 
again" (Case 5).
27it can be said that this reflects the social reality of the two functional areas as it is perceived by many 
members of the studied organisations, including people from production and manufacturing themselves. 
A greater degree of prestige is attached to engineering positions, most of whose occupants tend to be 
university graduates who aie aware about their professional and, thus, social standing; Üiey also tend to 
earn higher salaries. This applies to draughtsmen as well, who are also classified as white-collar staff 
witli office-based jobs, although to a lesser degree. On the other hand, the majority of manufacturing 
and production staff, excluding a top few managerial and technical positions, tend to be blue-collar, 
hourly-waged employees who entered employment through apprenticeship schemes.
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It is evident that senior management's reluctance to invest in training is a major barrier 
to a more effective utilisation of CADCAM. Not surprisingly, middle technical 
managers, who are always held responsible for integration in terms of operational 
gearing, tend to be much more concerned about training; they tend to have a more 
realistic understanding of the challenges of integration and the training issues it 
raises28. Their demands for broader and better formal training arrangements can be 
seen as a way of expressing their concern about the performance of newly introduced 
technology. Training is a politically sensitive issues; it is often used in self-defence if 
and when senior management accuses them of failing to accomplish set objectives.
Seventh, protective behaviour by many functional managers is a common denominator 
amongst the five cases, particularly in larger companies with a more dynamic power 
politics context. It manifests itself most clearly in the strict control which functional 
managers exercise with regard to releasing and sharing what they regard as 
"departmental information": ".... it's the departmental manager that causes the problem" 
(Case 2). The traditional separation of responsibilities (particularly in larger, more 
structured bureaucratic organisations) has created extremely differentiated conditions 
which work against integration at the procedural, structural, and cultural levels: "We've 
always done it like that" (Case 5). It is difficult to see how integration can be brought 
about without developing sufficient training, education and social support capacities to 
facilitate a greater emphasis on openness, knowledge distribution, communication, 
participative decision making, and discipline (see Possum, 1986).
Eighth, the findings on the budgetary process show that many engineering managers 
are unhappy about traditional approaches to capital budgeting for integration, because 
of their short-termism^^. Although they believe that senior management should still be
2^For example, leading technical managers find that CADCAM integration requires a shift from a 
situation where employees have a single skill tied to a single function, towards multi-skilling and 
flexible disposition of these skills. They also find that a greater attention should be given to senior 
management’s training and development to stimulate their commitment to, and participation in, 
integration as a strategic process (see Bessant, 1991).
29\vhereas in the past stand alone systems could be more easily justified on the basis of quantifiable 
operational gains, CADCAM now requires a justification mechanism capable of calculating its 
potential strategic benefits (see Gunson and Boddy, 1989). Short-term financial justification practices 
might have supported isolated stand alone applications such as CAD or CAM; however, they represent 
a serious obstacle to integration projects.
Financial justification of CADCAM is particularly difficult because it involves an initial 
commitment of very high capital and subsequent amounts for further integration. The groundwork to 
prepare human and infrastructural resources to establish acceptability of CADCAM must also be paid 
for (see Mohanty, 1993).
Parker and Lettes (1991) suggest that companies should develop new techniques which would 
require a surge in outlays that accounting conventions treated as a current expense on the basis of the 
primary cost elements in CIM. Such elements should be driven by decisions concerning: (1) capital 
equipment, (2) product technology, (3) computer software, (4) production operations, and (5) factory 
overheads.
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in control of capital expenditure, they are helpless to change the procedures whereby a 
great degree of control is exercised by accountants. Technical managers find themselves 
stuck between senior managers who hold them responsible for achieving the promised 
benefits of technology and financial controllers whose short-termism often prevents a 
comprehensive illustration of the strategic benefits that cannot be based on a 
straightforward payback evaluation (see Currie, 1989; Dodgson, 1988). CADCAM in 
particular is not suited to short-term approaches because of the long gestation period 
required to make the system fully operational and the high uncertainty and risk 
associated with estimation of expected monetaiy returns over a long period of time^o.
"Main Board Directors of any PLC are driven by the share price .... by the shareholders 
wanting return on their investment.... by the pension funds, the big institutions wanting the 
money for their people either in share growth or in profit. So it's all take, take, take - all the
time You get these guys sitting on the Board, if they don't perform somebody takes them
over. They will pressure the company to get the maximum output in financial terms and tend 
not to take the risk on the longer term lane .... they have certain financial constraints in front 
of them to meet the wishes of the City." (Case 3).
In the face of their unhappiniess about existing accounting rules, integration leaders in 
some cases (e.g. Cases 3, 4 and 5) are tempted to ally with other high-ranking 
managers, particularly those with a technical background, who happen to be 
sympathetic to the cause of integration. Through such alliances, they aim to work out 
how to make integration investment proposals more presentable. Besides forming 
political alliances to increase pressure on the finance department, they also attempt to 
take the cost of training out of the technical budget and add it onto other budgets to 
make the proposed integration project look more appealing.
7 .7  Summary
This chapter has presented the third and concluding part of the analysis and discussion 
of the findings from the field research. It has introduced the conceptual model used to 
depict the crucial elements of CADCAM integration as a technology-induced 
organisational change. Two examples have been given of how the model could be used 
to explain a critical experience in a non-integrating company (i.e. the "cultural or mental 
gap" example in Case 10) and another in an integrating company (i.e. the "power- 
stripping" example in Case 4).
3^As Primrose and Leonard (1986: 27) point out, "despite the condemnation in accountancy literature 
of non-discounting techniques, such as payback or accounting rate return (ARR), many UK companies 
still use these techniques because they are easier to apply". By comparison,
".... they take a longer term, industry-wide view  in Japan If you look at the motorbike industry
and the ship-building industry .... where they came with 50 cc and stripped the industry totally o ff  
this country. They didn't crucify the British motorbike industry overnight; .... they took a long­
term view  o f  where they wanted to go and dominated the market .... and somebody had to finance all 
that. It's the same in electronics, they dominate it, but they were prepared to do it." (Case 3).
257
In spite of the high accumulative integration costs incurred in Case 4 (due to intricate 
system interfacing requirements), these were justified because of the support the 
company received from its parent organisation. As explained earlier, the situation in 
Case 10 was different; unless stronger external pressures were to be exerted on the 
company (e.g. from customers, industry regulators and/or government) senior 
management in Case 10 would seem unlikely to change its current position and adopt 
an integrating strategy as demanded by a group of the company's technical middle 
managers. In Case 4 internal and external forces acted collectively and simultaneously 
upon management and pressed it to adopt an integration strategy in a manner which had 
not happened to the same degree of intensity in Case 10. In Case 4 senior 
management's support for integration as a likely ingredient of a formula to reform the 
company had led to it develop a sympathetic attitude to the pro-integration group within 
the organisation. This group, in turn, made the best possible use of the favourable 
environmental conditions to campaign for, and empower, the cause of integration.
In general, it can be said that when a business is in decline the issue of technological 
progress becomes less of a priority. However, in some cases (e.g. Case 4) 
management's reaction to immense external pressures may take the form of revising 
organisational practices to attain maximum efficiency. To the integrationists (most of 
whom are "anti-establishment"), this is a long-awaited opportunity to seize in order to 
transform the company, as far as they can, into a more integrated organisation.
It can be said therefore that a flourishing business performance may encourage 
management to think more seriously about CADCAM integration but it is not sufficient, 
on its own, to make managers take practical steps towards its implementation, unless 
there are also strong pressures for change from within the organisation. By the same 
token, integration may be sought as a way out of decline if management thinks that the 
technical advantages inherent in it will help save the company as a viable business; 
evidence from Case 4 supports this proposition.
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, a technical rationality approach would not have 
encompassed the effect social processes have on the progress and outcomes of 
integration, since it would have represented CADCAM as a universally desirable profit- 
maximisation technology whose implementation would have been simply a matter of 
investment justification and straightforward, rational managerial decision making. This 
chapter has shown that by using an implementation model a researcher can focus on the 
social processes that emerge in organisational life (in whose context integration takes, 
or fails to take, place), and thus develop a picture of change which is grounded in its 
true social environment. The resulting picture is therefore much more likely to reflect 
the active social and political forces that make this environment a dynamic one.
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By focusing on the internal context of change the foregoing grounded analysis aimed to 
stress the importance of the dynamics of an organisation's social processes for 
understanding the link between the internal and external forces and factors that 
influence integration. To neglect the dynamic nature of this link means to give way to 
more deterministic tendencies in explaining technological change in terms of a straight- 
line progressive pursuit of technological advancement, a pursuit that is motivated only 
by profit maximisation or other desirable financial objectives. Whilst such obvious 
influences should be sufficiently accounted for, due attention should also be given to 
the internal context of the adopting organisation, where the existing and potential 
energies of social processes are capable of making a difference to the process of change 
and its outcomes.
At any rate, just as the argument for environmental determinism is rejected because it 
exaggerates the role of environment in in-company technological change, the 
suggestion that mere scientific knowledge is the only prerequisite for a successful 
innovative process cannot be accepted. This is because, in order for an innovation to 
work effectively, more is required than the mere production of technology that 
improves or replaces, for example, an existing work method on a factory floor and 
therefore yields economic advantages. Essentially, it should also (1) fit the social 
context in which it is supposed to function and (2) be enlightened by knowledge of the 
social processes that the innovative process is likely to induce. Without satisfying these 
two conditions an innovation would not be likely to realise its full potential.
This chapter has focused predominantly on the integration process in the primary cases, 
summarised the impeding and facilitating factors, and analysed the problematic areas 
which had been identified during the field research as being outstanding obstacles. It is 
not sufficient merely to understand what factors influence the integration process. It is 
also necessary to understand how this process can be improved for the sake of 
developing a balanced socio-technical organisational system, both from the view point 
of management and those in the organisation who have to live with the outcomes of 
change.
Planning and commitment are needed in order to optimise the organisation of work 
around integrated CADCAM through a comprehensive consideration of the human, 
organisational, technical, and financial resources that are available. This can be 
facilitated by involving different functional groups during agenda formation and 
technology selection when important decisions are made. It is of paramount importance 
to pay special attention to the internal context of change and the social processes that are 
likely to influence its progress and thus its outcomes.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Theoretical Propositions and Hypotheses
8.1 Introduction
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 provided a framework for theory development in the context of the 
study's theoretical and methodological approaches explained in Chapters 3 and 4. The 
aim of this chapter is to present the theory resulting from the study; it summarise the 
research's substantive and formal theoretical propositions and hypotheses which follow 
from the three phases of data analysis and discussion presented in the previous three 
chapters
The substantive propositions draw on the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 
7 and are based on concrete conceptual elements derived from the substantive cases 
studied. The foimal theoretical propositions include abstract conceptual elements which 
are derived from, and correspond to, the substantive propositions, as explained in 
Chapter 3. Finally, the chapter presents the research's formal hypotheses which are, in 
turn, derived from the formal propositions.
8 .2  Underlying Conceptual Assumptions
Before presenting the theoretical conclusions of the study it is important to clarify the 
basic conceptual assumptions underlying them. These can be summarised in five points 
which are crucial to the derivation of the propositions and hypotheses in terms of 
defining what constitutes a constant, an independent, and an dependent variable:
1) The content of change -as  a process under investigation - is held constant for the 
purpose of the present study: it is CAD/CAM and integration. In another study, 
however, a different technical or organisational change process can be the subject of 
investigation. The content of change may vary therefore according to other studies’ 
specifities relating to subject matter, research design and/or objectives.
2) The technical, economic, and organisational outcomes of the process are considered 
variables dependent on the unfolding of the process.
3) The process is itself deemed a variable, one that is dependent on the internal and 
external contexts or environments of change.
4) An internal context of change is deemed a variable also, one that is dependent on its 
external context. It is highly likely for a process in any of the studied companies to 
influence its internal context in a direct and considerable manner in the long run, but it 
is less likely for such an influence to impact its external context in the type of
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companies studied. Therefore, to avoid a dialectical argument over the different 
possible conceptualisations of the relationship between an organisation and its 
environment, it is assumed that, for the purpose of the cases in the study, the former is 
dependent on the latter.
5) Facilitating and impeding factors - as illustrated in the conceptual model (Chapter 7) - 
are subsumed, each within its respective variable category. These can be internal or 
external. The idea that each of these factors, within a variable, interacts with other 
factors and also across variable boundaries, is central to the model. Nonetheless, to 
avoid another dialectical interpretation of what is a complex and dynamic network of 
relationships between such factors, which could oversimplify such relationships, it is 
assumed that each factor is subsumed into its respective variable category and 
addressed as a point of emphasis within it.
8 .3  Substantive Theoretical Propositions
The decision to present the substantive theory resulting from the study in a separate, 
concise chapter was a matter of choosing the most appropriate layout from amongst 
other alternatives that had also been tried. The question of presentation is important for 
any thesis; it should be addressed in terms of the specific objectives and methods 
adopted. In a multiple case study research such as this certain theoretical inferences 
concerning particular concepts, categories, and properties of categories are likely to be 
grounded in more than a single case. Indeed, they are likely, in terms of their theoretical 
linkages, to be derived from more than a single case.
In the context of a research carried out in a grounded theory frame of reference, as a 
researcher attempts to ground the substantive theory resulting from his/her analysis 
exactly where the theory's categories and properties occur in the data (across the cases), 
he/she is bound to face the challenging task relating to how the theory as a whole can 
best be presented. The question that arises then is: how to lay out the theory such that it 
relates to the different points of interpretation of the cases without sacrificing the 
comparative element of the analysis, which requires theoretical inferences to be 
contextual!sed in terms of the individual distinctive characteristics of each case. This 
question was encountered in this thesis. Alternative ways of laying out the substantive 
theory had been tried before the decision to present it in a separate, concise chapter was 
made.
Therefore, this subsection summaiises the substantive theoretical propositions arising 
from the substantive case findings. These propositions represent the overall theoretical 
conclusions derived from the data analyses and discussions presented in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7, using the analytical techniques explained in Chapters 3 and 4. This subsection
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brings together, in what follows, the substantive propositioms from where they are, 
respectively, contextualised in the thesis.
PROPOSITION (11: On the Conditions for Optimisation of CADCAM Integration
• Maximisation of the technical and economic benefits o f CAD and CAM systems is 
facilitated by a vision for integration which incorporates customisation o f the 
technology and development of the organisation so that mutual conformance is 
achievable by design.
(see p. 150 [paras. 3-4]; p. 154 [paras. 3-6]; p. 187 [paras. 2-3]; p. 201 [para. 5]; 
p. 234 [para. 3]; p. 238 [para. 2]; p. 239 [paras. 4-8] - p. 240 [paras. 1-2]; and 
p. 242 [paras. 11-12]).
PROPOSITION (2): On Managerial Learning
• Managers learn from past experiences of failure and success in introducing and 
managing stand alone systems and may use learned lessons in managing 
CADICAM andior integration.
(see p. 149 [paras. 6-7]; p. 154 [paras. 3-6]; p. 163 [paras. 6-7] - p. 164 [pars. 1-
3]; p. 170 [para. 8] - p. 171 [paras. 1-2]; p. 172 [paras. 6-7]; p. 183 [paras. 5- 
6]; p.239 [para. 4]; and p. 255 [para. 2]).
PROPOSITION 131: On Inhibition of Optimum Technical Practice
• Technically achievable optimum engineering practice is difficult to attain in 
CADICAM andior integration because o f economic, legal, commercial and 
organisational constraints.
(see p. 140 [paras. 2-3]; p.143 [para. 5-6]; p. 146 [para. 5]; and p. 188 [paras. 3-
4]).
PROPOSITION (41: On Formal Management Justification
• Formal management justifications of CADICAM andior integration highlight desired 
potential technical and economic advantages of the technology over traditional work 
methods.
(see p. 138 [para. 4]; p. 150 [paras. 3-4]; p. 153 [para. 9]; p. 171 [paras. 3-4]; 
p. 177 [para. 1]; p. 179; and p. 202).
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PROPOSITION (5): On Technical and Senior Management View on Justification
• Technical management justifies CAD/CAM based primarily on its operational 
performance benefits, whereas more senior management justifies it in terms o f 
supporting overall business goals.
(seep. 137 [paras. 3-4]; p. 139 [para. 1]; p. 153 [para. 3]; p. 162 [para. 2]; p. 163 
[para. 4]; p. 176 [para. 6-7] - p. 177 [para. 1]; and p. 239 [para. 3]).
PROPOSITION 161: On the Individuality of Companies' Experiences in Designing and 
Using CADCAM
• Different organisations design and use CADICAM andior intergation differently 
depending on their respective technical, economic and organisational specifities.
(see p. 135 [paras. 5-6]; p. 157 [paras. 1-2]; and p. 181 [paras. 3-4]).
PROPOSITION (7]: On the Individuality of Companies' Experiences in Organisational 
Adaptation to CADCAM
• In implementing CADICAM andior integration different organisations devise 
different methods for work reorganisation and job redesign depending on their 
respective technical, economic and organisational specifities.
(see p. 135 [para. 7] - p. 136 [ paras. 1-2]; p. 156 [paras. 6-7] - p. 158 [paras. 1-2; 
and p. 190 [paras. 3-4]).
PROPOSITION (81: On the Scope of CADCAM Integration as a Change Process
• CADCAM integration involves a complex and lengthy process o f change whose 
effects are highly likely to be felt at the technical, economic, and organisational 
levels of a manufacturing company's functioning. This includes the introduction of 
the technology: investment o f resources in anticipation for economic reward; and 
reorganisation of structure to accommodate the technology being introduced.
(see p. 144 [paras. 1-2]; p. 192 [paras. 2 & 4-6]; p. 211 [paras. 4-5]; and p. 238 
[paras. 2 & 4-6]).
PROPOSITION 191: On the Technology Base Background to CADCAM Integration
• The state o f existing intigrateable CAD and CAM systems affects the speed, 
magnitude, duration, scope and depth o f the technical, economic, and 
organisational sub-processes and outcomes of CADCAM integration (or lack of it).
(see p. 144 [paras. 6-7]; p. 152 [paras. 5-6]; p. 158 [paras. 8-10]; and p. 170 
[paras. 1-5]).
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PROPOSITION (10): On Duration of CADCAM Integration Process
• Long-term technical and economic benefits o f CADCAM integration can be 
expected to materialise only after an integration process commences and becomes 
well established over a number of years.
(see p. 140 [paras. 4-5]; p. 141 [para. 3]; p. 183 [para. 6]; p. 203 [paras. 7-8]; and 
p. 236 [para. 5]).
PROPOSITION n i l :  On Managerial Control Over CADCAM Integration Process
• The technical and economic outcomes of CADICAM andior integration are 
influenced by a mixture o f management designiutilisation decisions and 
uncontrollable environmental elements.
(see p. 146 [paras. 4-5]; p. 157 [paras. 1-3]; p. 165 [paras. 5-9] - p. 166 [paras. 1-
5]; p. 168 [paras. 6-7]; and p. 186 [paras. 3-4]).
PROPOSITION (12): On the complexity of Internal and External Environment 
Influences
• Technical, economic, and organisational sub-processes associated with CADICAM 
andior integration and their outcomes, are influenced by a complex interaction of 
factors from within and outside the organisational boundaries of the manufacturing 
company accommodating the integration process.
(see p. 163 [para. 4]; p. 230 [paras. 2-3]; and p. 239 [paras. 2-8] - p. 241 [paras. 
1-2]).
PROPOSITION (131: On the Partial Dependency of the Outcomes of CADCAM 
Integration on the Process of Change
• A CADCAM integration project and its outcomes are influenced by how supportive 
or impeding are the factors associated with the process o f change itself.
(see p. 141 [para. 4-5] ; p. 192 [paras. 1-2]; p. 203 [paras. 7-8]; and p. 239 
[paras. 2-8] - p. 241 [paras. 1-2]).
PROPOSITION (14): On the Partial Dependency of the Outcomes of CADCAM 
Integration on Internal Organisational Context
• A CADCAM integration process and its outcomes are influenced by how supportive 
or impeding are the factors associated with the internal organisational context of the 
manufacturing company in which it is managed.
(see p. 140 [paras. 2-3 ]; p. 144 [paras. 6-7]; p. 152 [paras. 5-6]; and p. 165 
[para. 9] - p. 166 [paras. 1-4]).
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PROPOSITION (15): On the Partial Dependency of the Outcomes of CADCAM 
Integration on External Environment
• A CADCAM integration process and its outcomes will be influenced by how 
supportive or impeding are the factors associated with the external environment of 
the manufacturing company in which it is managed.
(see p. 140 [paras. 4-5]; p. 229 [paras. 5-6] - p. 230 [para. 1]; p. 233 [para. 2]; 
and p.257 [para. 2]).
PROPOSITION (16): On Managerial Perceptions of CADCAM
• Different managers attach different values to CADCAM integration by virtue of 
differences in personality, ideology, interests, power, social status, functional 
background, and formal position and responsibilities.
(see p. 149 [paras. 6-7]; p. 191 [paras. 5-6]; p. 199 [para. 2] - p. 200 [paras. 1-2]; 
p. 236 [para. 5]; and p. 238 [paras. 7-8] - p. 239 [para. 1]).
PROPOSITION (171: On Functional Differences in Responding to CADCAM 
Integration
• Different functional departments respond differently to cross-functional CADCAM 
integration depending on functional specifities and perceived gains and losses 
arising from change.
(see p. 140 [paras. 6-8]; p. 141 [paras. 2-5]; p. 145 [paras. 4-5]; p. 154 [paras. 2- 
6]; p. 165 [para. 9] - p. 166 [paras. 1-4]; p. 197 [para. 3] - p. 201 [paras. 1-3]; 
p. 212 [paras. 1-4]; p. 236 [para. 5]; p. 238 [paras. 7-8] - p. 239 [para. 1]; and 
p. 256 [para. 2]).
PROPOSITION 08): On the Minimisation of Obstacles to CADCAM Integration
• Organisational obstacles to CADCAM integration are minimised if and when a 
CADCAM system is customised to support a manufacturing company's technical 
task in line with a managed process o f organisational change based on consensus, 
participation and learning.
(see p. 149 [paras. 4-7]; p. 152 [paras. 2-4]; p. 172 [paras. 6-7]; p. 192 [paras. 4-
6]; and p. 198 [para. 2]).
PROPOSITION Q9>: On the Role of Size in CADCAM Integration
• A manufacturing company's size plays a dual and dichotomous role in CADICAM 
andior integration by simultaneously offering a set o f facilitating and another of 
impeding organisational properties. A larger company size is likely to facilitate 
integration by making available greater resources and a larger skill base; a smaller
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size is likely to be associated with work procedures, structure and culture which are 
much more supportive of CADCAM integration.
(seep. 140 [para. 3]; p. 157 [paras. 1-2]; p. 159 [paras. 1-2]; p. 189 [para. 4]; and 
p. 242 [paras. 6-7]).
PROPOSITION [201: On the Relationship Between Environmental Pressures. 
Business Continuitv. and CADCAM Integration
• Under intensive environmental pressures the question of survival overshadows 
technical advancement, unless CADICAM andior integration is pursued as a 
means for survival within a strategic adaptation vision.
(see p. 163 [paras. 3-4]; p. 165 [paras. 5-8]; p. 234 [paras. 4-5]; p. 235 [para. 4] 
- p. 236 [paras. 1-2]; p. 239 [paras. 2-3]; and p. 252 [paras. 1-3]).
8 .4  Formal Theoretical Propositions
Substantive theory is grounded in research in a specific substantive area - CAD/CAM 
and integration in the case of this research. Thus, its relevance remains limited to this 
specific area unless it is developed further into a formal theory^, as was explained in 
Chapter 3. This subsection presents, in what follows, the formal theoretical 
propositions derived from the above substantive theoretical propositions.
PROPOSITION (I): On the Need for a Vision for change
• An encompassing, long-term vision for change is very important as a middle 
ground for resolving competition between differently biased conceptions and 
conflicting partial courses of action.
PROPOSITION 12): On Change as a Learning Process
• Change agents are likely to recall their past learning experiences and act upon them 
in managing future change.
PROPOSITION (3): On Inhibition of Technical Excellence
• The incorporation of technical excellence standards into a technological change 
process may be inhibited by non-technical constraints
Ijn this respect, Glaser and Strauss (1967: 79) state:
“ ....... substantive theory is a strategic link in the formulation and generation o f  grounded formal
theory  although formal theory can be generated directly from data, it is m ost desirable, and
usually necessary, to start the formal theory from a substantive one. The latter not only provides a 
stimulus to ‘good’ idea, but it also gives an initial direction in developing relevant categories and 
properties and in choosing possible modes o f integration. Indeed, it is difficult to find a grounded 
formal theory that was not in som e way stimulated by a substantive theory.”
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PROPOSITION (4): On Formal Justification of A Change Project
• To appear credibly justifiable, an organisational change tends to be presented 
publicly on rational grounds that emphasise a potential result more advantageous 
than maintaining the status quo.
PROPOSITION (51: On the Contingency of Change Viewing upon Formal Positional 
Role
• The level o f an individuaTs or group's position in an organisation's formal 
hierarchical structure affects their perception of, reaction to, and role in an 
organisational change.
PROPOSITION (~6k On the Uniqueness of a Generic Change Content in Substantive 
Organisations
• The generic content o f an organisational change varies from one substantive 
situation to another and takes a specific form in any substantive organisational 
setting depending on contextual specifities.
PROPOSITION (ly. On the Situational Uniqueness of Organisational Adaptation to 
Change
• An organisational setting's response to change is highly influenced by its own 
properties and contextual specifities.
PROPOSITION (8): On the Nature of Technology-Induced Integration as a Change 
Process
• Technology-induced integration involves a process of change whose ejfects are to 
be felt technically, economically, and organisationally: introduction of an integrating 
technology; investment o f resources in anticipation for economic reward; and 
adaptation of organisation to accommodate the technology being introduced.
PROPOSITION (91: On the Impact of A Change Content Background on the Process 
of Change and its Results
• The content o f a change affects the specific properties o f the process whereby it 
unfolds and its end results.
PROPOSITION (10k On the Duration of a Strategic Change Process
• Measurable and verifiable results o f a strategic change are likely to appear only over 
the medium and long term.
PROPOSITION Q U: On the Manageability of a Change Process
• The results of a change process are open to the influence o f both planned and 
controllable action as well as to unplanned and uncontrollable environmental 
elements.
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PROPOSITION (121: On the complexity of Internal and External Environment 
Influences
• Desirable results of a change process are likely to materialise if and when it is 
supported by a facilitating internal context, and the latter supported by a facilitating 
external environment.
PROPOSITION (13): On the Partial Contingency of the Outcomes of a Change on the 
Unfolding of the Process
• A change process and its end results are influenced by how supportive or impeding 
are the set of factors associated with the unfolding of the process itself.
PROPOSITION (141: On the Partial Contingency of the Results of a Change Process 
on Internal Organisational Context
• A change process and its end results are influenced by how supportive or impeding 
are the set of factors associated with the immediate or inner environment.
PROPOSITION (151: On the Partial Contingency of the Outcomes of a Change Process 
on External Environment
• A change process and its end results are influenced by how supportive or impeding 
are the set of factors associated with the outer or external environment.
PROPOSITION (16): On a Change Agent's Perception of a Change Process
• Different agents ascribe different subjective and objective meanings to an 
organisational change because of natural and acquired differences amongst them.
PROPOSITION (17k On Subjective and Objective Differences in Responding to a 
Change Process
• The speciality o f an individuaTs or group's position in an organisation's functional 
division o f labour affects their perception of, reaction to, and role in an 
organisational change.
PROPOSITION (18): On the Minimisation of Barriers to a Change Process
• Challenging barriers to integration are likely to be minimised via customisation o f 
an integrating technology to support a clear set o f consensual objectives in line with 
a process o f change managed on the basis of consensus, participation and learning.
PROPOSITION (19k On the Role of Organisational Size in Change
• Organisational size plays a dual and dichotomous role in change by offering both 
facilitating and impeding organisational properties.
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PROPOSITION (20): On the Relationship Between Environmental Pressures. 
Survival, and Change
• Organisational change is subject to environmental pressures which have a 
potentially detrimental inhibiting impact on it but can be turned effectively in its 
favour.
8 .5  Form al Hypotheses
The term "hypothesis" has a somehow specific significance when used in the context of 
a grounded theory research. It is conceptualised differently from other logico-deductive 
approaches aimed at the formulation of theory for testing purposes. The fundamental 
philosophy underlying hypothesis formulation in a grounded theory research can be 
summarised as follows (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 39-40):
“The comparison of differences and similarities among groups not only generates categories,
but also .... generates generalised relations among th em  multiple hypotheses .... are
pursued over long periods of time because their generation and verification are linked with
developing social events  Generating hypotheses requires evidence enough only to
establish a suggestion - not an excessive piling up of evidence to establish a proof, and the 
consequent hindering of the generation of new hypotheses. In field work, however, general 
relations are often discovered in vivo; that is, the field worker literally sees them occur. This 
aspect of the ‘real life’ character of field work .... is an important dividend in generating
theory In the beginning, one's hypotheses may seem unrelated, but as categories and
properties emerge, develop in abstraction, and become related, their accumulating 
interrelationships form an integrated central theoretical framework - the core of the emerging 
theory. The core becomes a theoretical guide to further collection and analysis of data."
This subsection builds on the previous one by formalising some of the key substantive 
theoretical propositions in a hypothesis form, as explained in Chapter 3. This study’s 
formal hypotheses are as follows:
HYPOTHESIS (I):
A) The more integrating and pervasive a technology is, the wider and deeper are its 
organisational implications.
B) The less integrating and pervasive a technology is, the narrower and shallower are 
its organisational implications.
HYPOTHESIS (2Y
A) The more an organisational change is presented on rational grounds emphasising a 
potential result that is more advantageous than the status quo, the more likely it is to 
appear credibly justifiable in public.
B) The less an organisational change is presented on rational grounds emphasising a 
potential result that is more advantageous than the status quo, the less likely it is to 
appear credibly justifiable in public.
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HYPOTHESIS (3):
A) The greater the non-technical constraints surrounding a technological change, the 
smaller the chances for possible technical excellence to be achieved.
B) The lesser the non-technical constraints surrounding a change process, the greater 
the chances for possible technical excellence to be achieved.
HYPOTHESIS
A) The more an organisational change process is tailored to support technically sound 
and organisationally manageable consensual objectives, the less challenging its 
implementation is likely to be.
B) The less an organisational change process is tailored to support technically sound 
and organisationally manageable consensual objectives, the more challenging its 
implementation is likely to be.
HYPOTHESIS (5):
A) The greater the degree o f achievable control and planning of a change process is, 
the greater the chances for its intended results to be attained.
B) The lesser the degree of achievable control and planning o f a change process is, the 
smaller the chances for its intended results to be attained. I
HYPOTHESIS |
A) The longer the time passing after a strategic change, the more likely that the ;
change's positive or negative results will become verifiable and measurable.
B) The shorter the time passing after a strategic change, the less likely that the change's ;
positive or negative results will become verifiable and measurable. \
HYPOTHESIS (lY \
A) The more favourable to change an immediate organisational change's environment 
is, the more likely that the unfolding of the process will be facilitated.
B) The less favourable to change an immediate organisational change's environment is, j
the less likely that the unfolding of the process will be facilitated. |
HYPOTHESIS ŒY. \
A) The more favourable to change an outer organisational change's environment is, the I
more likely that the unfolding of the process will be facilitated.
B) The less favourable to change an outer organisational change's environment is, the ;
less likely that the unfolding of the process will be facilitated. |
HYPOTHESIS (9): j
A) The more supportive internal and external contexts of change are and the more an !
organisational change process is tailored to support consensual targeted and |
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managed objectives, the less challenging its implementation and the more desirable 
its end results are likely to be.
B) The more inhibiting internal and external contexts o f change are and the less an 
organisational change process is tailored to support consensual targeted and 
managed objectives, the more challenging its implementation and the less desirable 
its end results are likely to be.
HYPOTHESIS (lOy.
A) The more consistent the unfolding of a change process with its consensual planned 
and managed objectives, the more likely that such objectives will be met efficiently.
B) The less consistent the unfolding of a change process with its consensual planned 
and managed objectives, the less likely that such objectives will be met efficiently.
HYPOTHESIS a n :
A) The more a change agent is capable o f learning from practical experience and 
drawing on learned lessons, the more successful helshe is likely to be in managing 
future change encounters and avoiding repetition of past mistakes.
B) The less a change agent is capable o f learning from practical experience and 
drawing on learned lessons, the less successful helshe is likely to be in managing 
future change encounters and avoiding repetition of past mistakes.
HYPOTHESIS (\T)\
A} The greater the natural and acquired differences among different agents, the greater 
the differences among the meanings they respectively ascribe to change.
B) The lesser the natural and acquired differences among different agents, the lesser 
the differences among the meanings they respectively ascribe to change.
HYPOTHESIS (13):
A ) The larger an organisation's size, the more likely it is to facilitate change technically 
at an affordable cost but impede it in terms of organisational adaptation .
B } The smaller an organisations size, the more likely it is to impede change technically 
at an affordable cost but facilitate it in terms of organisational adaptation.
HYPOTHESIS (U):
A) The greater the environmental pressures, the more threatening and likely to demand 
action they are.
B) The lesser the environmental pressures, the less threatening and likely to demand 
action they are.
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8 .6  Summary
This chapter has presented the theoretical conclusions of the study on the basis of the 
theoretical concepts, components, categories, and properties resulting from the open, 
selective, and axial coding of the research data. The analysis and discussion of the 
findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have been used as the basis for presenting the study’s 
substantive and formal propositions. The chapter's concluding part has summarised the 
study’s formal hypotheses on a theoretical integration basis. It can be said that the 
hypotheses represent the climax of the refining and integration of the theoretical 
revelations resulting from the research.
Hopefully, this chapter, in line with the purpose of the study outlined in Chapter 1 and 
the theoretical and methodological assumptions explained in Chapters 3 and 4, has 
succeeded in contributing to the development of theory substantive to CAD/CAM and 
integration and in formalising the substantive theoretical propositions so as to help 
develop a better understanding of technology-induced organisational change specifically 
and organisational change in general.
The next chapter is the final and concluding chapter of the thesis. Therefore, it provides 
an overall concluding summary of the study and the lessons learned from it.
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CHAPTER NINE 
Concluding Summary and Implications
9 .1  The Nature of CADCAM Integration as a Change Process
It is apparent that what may be initially viewed as a purely technical change related to 
the introduction of a CAD or CAM system may have implications for job design and 
work organisation. Such implications, though, are likely to be felt locally at a 
departmental level under a strictly compartmentalised functional structure. The more ;
differentiated a company's structure is, the more likely it is that islands of automation or I
computerisation will prevail. Under dominant Tayloristic/Fordistic organisational |
cultures isolated computerised applications are a normal practice. As Lee (1989) rightly j
argues, "direct control" strategies are likely to result in selective training and a |
traditional work organisation, whereas "responsible autonomy" is likely to result in j
general training leading to flexibility in work organisation.
Any functional department will be tempted to maximise its own operational 
performance. Such a practice is likely to be detrimental to the functioning of the entire 
company as an organised socio-technical system with presumably uniform objectives.
From a strategy point of view, this means that different departments' operational 
objectives are likely to be, at best, incompatible with one other and, at worst, 
conflicting and competing at the expense of corporate strategic performance. Indeed, 
conflicts due to a differentiated formal organisational structure are not the only thing 
that affects strategy formulation and implementation; informal organisation's conflicts 
and contests are likely be as impeding, if not more so, to the instrumentality of strategic 
plans.
One relevant point to make regarding the subject matter of this study is that under a 
divisive organisational structure and culture the introduction of a stand alone CAD or 
CAM system is likely to be a low-key, departmental issue. It is unlikely to have 
organisation-wide implications, particularly when each functional department sets out to 
computerise its work without paying enough attention to the implications of this for 
other individuals' or functions' work outsides its boundaries. In this respect, a strictly 
functional, Tayloristic organisational stmcture, and a parallel organisational culture 
which strongly promotes its worth, can be viewed as a context that helps reinforce 
compartmentalisation of technological progress along departmental lines. In fact, under 
such circumstances technology in general, and stand alone CAD and CAM specifically, 
is likely to become both a cause and effect for strengthening compartmentalisation.
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With CAD or CAM alone, manufacturing companies did not have to be particularly 
concerned about organisational adaptation to accommodate such systems. This was the 
case with many manufacturing companies during the 1970s and 80s. With the advent of 
integrating technologies such as CADCAM, however, some leading companies have 
begun to feel the need for interfacing the isolated islands of automation that had 
developed during the past two or three decades. However, any move towards 
interfacing isolated systems requires such islands to be physically connected with one 
another, common or compatible data structures to be developed and data base 
management systems to be designed so as to facilitate communication among various 
information architectures and software systems. These can be challenging because this 
covers a wide and multi-disciplined area of technical expertise; multiple vendors, 
consultants and subcontractors may, indeed, be needed in the process. Yet, this 
remains a technically achievable mission. The more serious challenges lie in how to 
manage this change process in an organisational setting.
As competitive performance becomes more critical and the need for a more effective use 
of technology (as a strategic resource) in the current competition age increases, 
integrated CADCAM is likely to be a serious issue for the 1990s and beyond. This 
thesis showed that the barriers to achieving CADCAM lay not so much in technical 
difficulties but more in organisational and managerial obstacles.
Of course, technical expertise is needed but good knowledge of organisations and how 
they function is no less important for the management of a successful CADCAM 
project. CIM should be seen broadly mainly as a business concept and as a 
methodology for work organisation rather than as a mere system of technology. It is 
accepted that the success of an integration project depends "on understanding this and 
having the necessary strategy to relate it to the needs of the business" (Bessant, 1991:
294). However, it should be borne in mind that to rely exclusively on an adopted i
"strategic perspective" on CIM by management change agents would be an ;
unnecessarily restrictive and almost dogmatic stance. Other plausible perspectives (such I
as the sociological, organisational development and technical perspectives), should not !
be ignored, at least theoretically, nor ruled out in the formation of a "composite" vision j
on CADCAM as a technology-induced organisational change (see Forrester et al., i
1995). I
In order to introduce CADCAM and make it work effectively as a cross-functional !
system, work tasks need to be redesigned at the individual level and the organisation of |
work as whole needs to be reviewed and changed at the corporate level. Compatibility |
between CADCAM and work organisation is important. This means that organisational j
change is inevitable, regardless of how minimum, unplanned, or problematic it turns
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out to be. In this respect, CADCAM is both a technical change and an organisational 
change too, two processes of change that should have important implications for the 
company in concern as a profit-making enterprise.
9.2 The Tentative Questions of the Research
This thesis answered the seven tentative research questions in temis of the case study 
findings. It established that variation among manufacturing organisations in terms of 
why and how they acquire, design, introduce, use, maintain, and develop CAD/CAM 
systems is a crucial element in understanding technical change. Dissimilarities between 
organisations were explained in terms of the factors that were found to influence change 
in the substantive cases researched. The outcomes of change in technical and financial 
terms were also discussed and the various aspects of organisational impacts of 
CAD/CAM systems were explained in the same light. The organisational background to 
an integration project would have serious implications for a CADCAM integration 
process. Therefore, the last two tentative questions addressed the issue of why a 
manufacturing company would be, or would fail to be, interested in integration and the 
issue of how an integration project would be managed in adopting companies.
It compared the ten case studies and highlighted, through theoretical sampling, the 
issues that emerged from the field investigation. It is clear from the foregoing attempt to 
answer questions 1 to 5 that CAD has different properties than CAM, and that such 
inherently different properties made the task of answering these questions particularly 
dichotomous in terms of both application areas. The specific content of an application 
(i.e. either CAD or CAM) set up a specific context for answering each of the questions; 
the difficulty arose when two contexts were maintained simultaneously within the 
framework used for answering the questions. However, it has to be noted that the 
differentiating characteristics of CAD and CAM are a major factor influencing their 
integration potential in terms of the values attached to each of them. This is because of 
organisationally-explainable differences between design engineering and manufacturing 
functions.
Such differences can be presented in terms of six criteria (see Winch, Voss and Twigg, 
1991):
1) Functional input and output: the nature of work carried out in design/engineering 
tends to be "one-offs" despite redesign and modification tasks that are carried out from 
time to time, whereas manufacturing work tends to be inherently repetitive, particularly 
in mass production situations.
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2) Nature of skills: the former requires mainly elective intellectual skills, whereas the 
latter requires more action-oriented skills.
3) Level of task uncertainty: the former is associated with inherently unspecified work 
tasks, whereas the latter is dependent on the former and cannot start production until the 
tasks involved have been specified in the form of drawings and other design 
information.
4) Capital intensitv: labour cost is by far larger in the former, whereas the latter tends to 
be more capital-intensive.
5) Organisational structuring: the former tends to be professionally-oriented through 
member affiliations to various professional bodies whereas the latter's organisation 
depends more on practical apprenticeship training.
6) Labour market: the growth of specialisation in the engineering labour market 
contrasts with a decline in mass production and trade union power.
It is important to further explain such differentiating characteristics in terms of 
innovation theory which has attracted the interest of many researchers in the area of 
organisational studies (Frost and Egri, 1991). This is necessary for developing a better 
understanding of the effect of such differentiating characteristics on the adoption, and 
subsequent integration, of CAD and CAM. Five criteria can be used for this purpose 
(see Rogers, 1983):
1) Relative advantage: the degree to which the innovation is perceived to be better than 
that which it is to replace. Both CAD and CAM are perceived to be better from a 
techno-economic rationality point of view.
2) Complexitv: the degree to which the innovation is understandable to the user. CAM 
is by far more complex than CAD in the majority of the cases.
3) Observeabilitv: the degree to which the improvements can be seen or demonstrated. 
This is clearer in CAD cases prior to implementation. Invariably, CAM systems have to 
be made to order and user companies have to rely on the manufacturers' promise that 
their particular requirements will be met whereas CAD vendors tend to be prepared to 
approach potential customers and offer them a demonstration on their own data. After a 
successful implementation, however, CAM may, arguably, demonstrate a greater 
observeability.
4) Triability: the degree to which the potential user can try out the innovation before 
making a full commitment to it. This is much easier in CAD cases.
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5) Compatibility: the degree to which the innovation fits with the context in which it has 
to operate. This criterion is perhaps the least considered in both CAD and CAM cases 
due to the types of structures, cultures and work organisation philosophies which 
dominate the organisations in the study. Apart from Cases 4 and 5, most of the other 
companies did not seriously consider compatibility as a constraining factor when 
selecting CAD and CAM systems alike.
Under an integrated CADCAM arrangement, information flows both within and 
between human, physical and technological resource areas. An electronic exchange of 
information is involved^. Employees of different functional disciplines and at different 
levels of authority will communicate more efficiently throughout the organisation.
Integration means that departmental information systems are likely to be linked to a 
common source of information in order to capture information and act upon it. By 
reaching out to end users, information processing systems are likely to become a 
repository of cuiTent and historical information to support the operation and 
management of the business as a whole.
It can be seen from the above discussion that CADCAM integration may, rightly, be 
viewed as a technical process involving the interfacing of integrateable stand alone 
technology applications but it is, at the same time, an organisational process which also 
involves changing deeply-rooted values, practices, structures, procedures and power Jrelationships. Various influences can either facilitate or impede integration at any given ]
time. It can also be seen that, at present, the interaction of such factors in industry is j
such that CADCAM integration is either prohibited (e.g. in secondary cases) or pursued j
(e.g. in primary cases), depending on a set of complex and overlapping economic, j
technical, and organisational factors. To use Lewin's (1952) three-stage model of |
change ("unfreezing, "moving" and "freezing"), the situation in the secondary |
1companies can be described as one that has not yet been unfrozen and moved in the 1
direction of integration. Indeed, even in the primary cases, where integration is j
pursued, the progress of the integration process is subject to the influence of a number j
of facilitating and impeding factors. I
1 Creating open system environments has become increasingly achievable in response to pressing user 
demands. The European unity, the rise of standards bodies, and the foresight of leading vendors have 
combined to make open systems a feasible concept (Tapscott and Catson, 1993). Yet, achieving an 
open system remains a difficult challenge due to insufficient software “portability” and system 
“interoperatability” across the entire spectrum of the IT market for the CADCAM and CIM 
requirements at present. This relates, for example, to common operating environments, cross-systems 
communications, shared and distributed databases, common user interfaces, and cross-system 
development environments. Further development and availability of standards is vital for the cause of 
integration in areas such as: operating systems, communication services, database, user interface, 
software development tools, and systems management services.
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Therefore, the general proposition that the introduction and use of an integrating 
technology will be influenced by a wide range of factors, both internal and external to 
the adopting organisation, was borne out. In particular, the role of prevalent beliefs and 
practices, financial circumstances, the rigidity, or otherwise, of company structures and 
practices, the limitations imposed by the type of products being manufactured and 
production systems used, and, crucially, the values, attitudes, power and self-interest 
of those involved, emerged as key factors that influence integration as an organisational 
process. Such factors were analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
This research demonstrated that only by creating jobs which embodied skill, variety, 
and autonomy and, thus, establishing a stable and well-motivated work force, could 
organisations obtain the full technical and economic benefits of new technology. 
Without developing flexible job design and work organisation structures that truly 
support a company-wide integration project, it is difficult to see how the organisational 
adjustments required to accommodate integration could be implemented.
Hopefully, by exposing what actually happens in organisations a better understanding 
of integration, as a dual technological and organisational change process, can be 
developed. This is an alternative to relying blindly on some of the existing literature 
where assumptions of linearity and rationality often deform the reality of change 
processes (Pettigrew, 1985). The effects of various factors on CADCAM integration, 
in terms of either stimulating or impeding it, were discussed in this thesis in the light of 
the primary companies' experiences. Hopefully, the result of such an analysis will be 
beneficial to the practical management of the integration process.
9 .3  Modelling Change: Theoretical and Methodological Conclusions
It is clear that one of the theoretical difficulties facing researchers of organisational 
change is the lack of a consistent terminology to define, for example, a change, the 
degree of change, the pace and shape of change and the process by which the change 
unfolds (Nutley, 1991). This makes any attempt to model organisational change prone 
to conceptual vagueness unless due attention is given to defining clearly the terms used 
in any attempt as they are intended by the modeller.
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) carried out a study aimed at explaining processes of 
change in organisations. Four basic ideal type theories were identified as the "building 
blocks" for their explanation: life cycle (symbolising organic growth), teleology 
(symbolising purposeful co-operation) dialectics (symbolising conflict and opposition), 
and evolution (symbolising competitive survival). These represented various schools of 
thought modelled from about 20 different process theories that varied in substance 
across disciplines. However, research into real complex change processes in an
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organisation, such as the present one and those associated with integration through 
CIM, could not, and arguably should not, confine itself to a single theoretical 
perspective since, as the authors themselves confess, "observed change and 
development processes in organisations often are more complex than any one of these 
theories suggests because conditions may exist to trigger inter-play among several 
change motors and produce interdependent cycles of change" (p. 534). Even at a purely 
theoretical level of analysis, most specific theories of organisational change are more 
comphcated than ideal types of theory.
In terms of the methodological approach used in the present research, this confirms the 
role intervening conditions play in influencing action, reaction and interaction of actors 
in the specific context of a researched reality. It also supports the argument that a 
qualitative, longitudinal understanding of change is needed to account for the 
“processual dynamics of changing", without claiming universal conclusions from 
studying one or few isolated "change episodes" (Pettigrew, 1985: 10). In this research, 
therefore, a greater emphasis was given to discovering how embedded change was in 
its natural context in order to take account of the intervening conditions in line with the 
researcher's ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions outlined in 
Chapter 3. The chosen methodology and theoretical approaches were consistent with 
the study's ultimate objective of developing a better understanding of CADCAM 
integration as a technology-induced organisational process.
The findings demonstrated that CADCAM integration could be equally described as an 
evolutionary and revolutionary kind of change. On the one hand, it is evolutionary 
because it involves long-term, continuous development and improvement of 
implemented technology. On the other, it is evolutionary in that it requires a radical 
change of deeply-rooted organisational practices, structure, and culture.
“Evolutionary change means keeping the existing process in place, looking for flaws, 
difficulties and inefficiencies, and fixing the problems one at a time as they are discovered.
This approach is called by a variety of names, including continuous process improvement.
 Revolutionary change means a complete redesign of a business process from the ground
up. It means discarding all your previous notions about what things should be done, how they
should be done, and who should do them it is difficult, expensive and disruptive.......
Evolution is always easier, less expensive, and more pleasant than revolution. If evolution
will do what you need done, use it. If not, revolution may be your only choice ” (Hoffman,
1994: 87-88).
Of course, the degree to which a change process could be managed depends on the 
degree to which management could exercise its planning, control, monitoring and 
directing functions over change by shaping its direction and influencing its outcomes 
(Plant, 1995). The thesis did not develop a deterministic view on change as a 
completely controllable process, neither did it deny the role of external environmental 
pressures and internal power factors in constraining management's ability to control
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change. The role of contextual contingencies, which the research design aimed 
specifically to take on board, is again implicated.
9.4 The Conceptual Model of The Research
A conceptual model was developed for the purpose of the current research and 
presented in Chapter 7. Central to this process were simultaneous developments at four 
levels of conceptualisation:
1) pursuing "system-building" at the level of interfacing various hardware components;
2) solving software and communication problems among various systems;
3) solving database and architecture problems related to the electronic format for 
information;
4) preparing the organisation for a radical but piecemeal change of formal structure and 
culture for integration;
5) changing a financial system's practices, procedures and underlying values so as to 
be more sympathetic to the cause of integration.
The model developed in this study incorporated the outcomes of a change process and 
assumed that these would be interacting cyclically with the process itself as well as with 
its internal and external contexts. The term “change process” was used in this thesis to 
refere specifically to a CADCAM integration process or project which would proceed 
once the forces for change outweighed the forces against change in a given company.
Furthermore, the change process itself was conceptualised, in relation to its outcomes, 
in terms of technical, economic and organisational sub-processes. The findings of the 
study demonstrated that these sub-processes and their respective outcomes at any given 
time during a lengthy integration project would be influenced by a complex interaction 
of impeding and facilitating factors from within and outside the organisational 
boundaries of the manufacturing company at the centre of change.
The results of a CADCAM integration project are likely to be evaluated on the basis of 
some key attributes of the change process itself - technically, economically, and 
organisationally. Four major criteria for evaluation can be used (see Exhibit 9.1):
1) Scope: the geographic extent of an integrated CADCAM system and the total number 
of people who have access to it and depend on it as a vital source of information for 
their respective job tasks.
2) Domain: The extent to which the information produced by an integrated CADCAM 
system is shared across other DEM, AMT and IT systems across hierarchical levels and 
also across the organisational boundaries of the host business unit or company.
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Exhibit 9.1Main Attributes Influencing the Quality of an Integration Process
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3) Depth: the extent to which information penetrates various business activities and 
processes, not just in design and manufacturing but throughout the organisation.
4) Flexibilitv: the ability of an integrated CADCAM system to respond to environmental 
challenges requiring changes in business plans and development of the technology and 
work methods in current use.
9 .5  The Need for an Appropriate Strategic Vision for Integration
It is clear that integration requires a new way of thinking about how to do business 
based on a strategic vision in the context of a manufacturing enterprise. Indeed, strategy 
can be defined in the context of a vision as "a coherent or consistent stream of actions 
which an organisation takes to move towards its vision" (Burnes, 1996: 328). To 
manage a business in an integrated context, management needs to change its traditional 
point solution approach where it introduces a CAD system solely to solve the problem 
of mechanical drawing as a functional concern or CAE to solve the problem of circuit 
diagram design calculations or a simulator to simulate an object.
A change towards CADCAM involves a new way of universal thinking in which these 
stand alone tools or point solutions could still be used in this limited sense to solve 
particular local problems, but they should be designed and developed in such a way that 
they contribute, within a planned organisation-wide program, to addressing the 
business's entire mission. Far-reaching organisational implications are therefore 
inescapable since this is no longer a purely technical issue of local functional 
significance, as was the case with CAD or CAM only, but rather a universal matter that 
affects the entire organisation.
Under integration, numerous individuals and departments will have access to product 
and design information made available to them by the design office. This situation was 
not possible before under point solution approaches. This will depend, though, to a 
considerable extent, on how an integrated CADCAM or CIM system is designed and 
used by virtue of the ideology, values, interests and power of those who are 
responsible for making key decisions associated with planning, implementing and 
steering such a major project. Another significant factor is their ability to learn from 
experience and develop better strategic practices in the future, both as individuals and as 
facilitators of collective organisational learning.
In this respect, strategy can be viewed as a "learning process" (Starkey, 1996) in the 
context of a "knowledge-creating company" (Nonaka, 1996). Planning, in general, can 
also be viewed as “learning" (De Geus, 1966). Indeed, CADCAM strategy formulation 
and implementation is conceptualised, in the light of the present study’s assumptions
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and results, in a broader and less linear, and thus less positivistic and deterministic, 
frame of reference than would have been the case had a "purely" rational perspective 
(typically associated with classic strategy paradigms) been adopted. In this regard, the 
present study's view of strategy is consistent with Peters and Waterman's (1996) 
"beyond the rational model" perspective; it shares the proposition that "though it may 
seem to drive the engine of business today, the conventional business rationality simply 
does not explain most of what makes the excellent companies work" (p. 37).
Therefore, due attention should be given to non-rational and non-linear subjective 
practices associated with managerial decision making behaviours which are inevitably 
constrained by virtue of human limitations^.
As shown in Exhibit 9.2, a CADCAM strategy can be viewed as part of a wider 
business strategy, in which a more generic IT strategy occupies a central position in a 
manufacturing company’s strategic thinking. It is important for management to evaluate 
the implementation of a CADCAM strategy from time to time during its different stages 
of progress in order to influence its direction, and also hopefully, its outcome, as much 
as possible. Where necessary, integration leaders would need to take corrective action, 
within existing constraints, in their capacity as managers responsible for the results of 
change. In this respect, the importance of senior managers in promoting integration 
should be emphasised. However, as Beatty and Lee (1992) rightly argue, this should 
not be done in a manner that underestimates in any way the crucial role played by 
middle technical managers in implementing technological change and, thus, influencing 
its outcome.
9 .6  Managing Resistance and Organisational Change with CADCAM
The diffusion of new technology has received increased attention in the literature over 
the past two decades and has been studied from different perspectives and for different 
purposes. The organisational perspective is concerned with the interaction between 
technical change and organisation. The socio-technical approach to the organisational 
design, which was developed in the 1960's by Emery and Trist (1960), Rice (1963) 
and Kast and Rosenzweig (1970) at the Tavistock Human Relations Institute, was a 
distinguished milestone in the history of the organisational perspective.
2por example, numerous contingency factors can make strategy formulation and implementation a 
mixture of a rational and irrational process but still continue to support the continuity of a business 
concern as a soci-economic enterprise operating within a societal framework. These factors can be traced 
to personal contingencies (e.g. personality, emotional sensitivity, moral values, family up-bringing 
and social institutionalisation); situational contingencies (e.g. formal position in hierarchy, skills, and 
qualifications); intentional contingencies (e.g. interests and power ambitions) and environmental 
contingencies (e.g. intervening conditions as well as culture, customs and traditions, law and order and 
social acceptability).
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It appears that interest in the interaction between technology and organisation will grow 
and become more important as more sophisticated, pervasive and integrating 
technology is introduced into the work place in the future. The introduction of a new 
technology demands a dynamic process of mutual adaptation between the technology 
and the organisation, because a "turn-key" technology almost never fits into the specific 
organisational context of a user company. Integration requires even more customisation 
of the integrating technology in concern so as to fit into the accommodating 
organisation and vice versa. Misalignments may be corrected or adjusted by altering the 
technology or the changing organisation or both, by means of "cycles of adaptation" 
(Susman and Chase, 1986).
Reactions to a technological change, and whether a new technology is perceived by end 
users as an improvement or deterioration in their work environment, depends on the 
individual's backgiound and also on the way the change process is managed. A major 
factor in success with implementing new technology is when managers consider 
carefully the organisational and social structure of the workplace. That way it would be 
more likely to achieve its intended objectives (Ettlie, 1988; Majchrzak, 1988). 
According to the socio-technical perspective, the outcome of a technical or 
organisational change process corresponds to the shaping of the process itself (Chern, 
1976).
This study confirmed Adler's (1989: 215) argument that "the challenge of CAD/CAM 
goes to the core of our conception of the firm". It also proved the truth of the 
suggestion that CAD CAM integration would call for "a subtle change in the whole 
fabric of the organisation, away from a conception of the organisation as a production 
system and toward a new conception of the organisation as a system with a dual 
objective of both production and learning" (p. 214). At the same time, it argued, in line 
with one of Lee’s study's (1991) main findings, that the change process would be 
highly influenced by the specific societal and organisational cultural contexts 
surrounding it and so too would be its outcome.
Given the magnitude of change involved in CAD CAM integration, it would be 
reasonable to expect resistance to it by some individuals and groups who feel that they 
would loose more than they would gain from change. Resistance has to be addressed 
seriously and skilfully. Human beings tend to resist change either because of 
"systemic" factors which operate in the cognitive domain or/and "behavioural" factors 
which operate in the emotional domain (Plant, 1995). Systemic factors (e.g. lack of 
information, skills, support, reward) can be identified and addiessed relatively easily. 
Behavioural factors (e.g. anxiety, threats to status, threats to power, fear of failure, 
reluctance to experiment, lack of trust, and culture and norms), on the other hand, are
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more difficult to identify and deal with. Therefore, careful attention has to be paid to 
diagnosing and treating behavioural resistance factors through a greater emphasis on 
better communication, employee participation, wider and multi-skilling training, 
encouraging collective problem-solving, and adopting a learning organisation 
philosophy: "organisations as learning systems" (Nevis, 1995; Nevis etal., 1995).
Central to the notion of organisations as learning systems is a sustained and systematic 
effort to change organisational culture such that it is made more sympathetic to 
integration as a common goal. A company's "learning style" or "orientation" (as 
influenced by its history, culture and core competencies) should be adjusted towards a 
learning-oriented organisation. A few key questions should be asked (e.g. What 
promotes learning? Are there best practices that should be adopted? What are the 
common processes or structures that will support learning?). A number of appropriate 
measures should be taken, evaluated, and assessed periodically to support a 
longitudinal and challenging transformation process.
9 .7  Change Leaders' Role
Integration leaders should seek to promote effective communication between the 
different functions involved in CADCAM integration, across professional disciplines 
both horizontally and vertically, and, most importantly, between technical and senior 
managers. As explained in Chapter 7, the integration leader in Case 4 provided a good 
example in this respect. It is clear from this study that the more "envisioning", 
"enabling" and "energising" an integration leader, the more likely that his/her leadership 
of integration will be effective (Nadler and Tushman, 1990).
IT professionals in general and integration leaders in particular have to be as 
instrumental as possible by assuming new roles not only in designing systems but also 
in getting more involved in the business process. They need to know how best to 
support it and develop a greater awareness about the organisational context in which the 
acquired technology is supposed to meet its set objectives. Without interpersonal skills 
to support his/her technical skills, an integration leader is likely to be technically 
efficient but incapable of much of the social manoeuvring required in managing the 
politics of change. Knowledge and vision are necessary but insufficient; in order to be a 
"driving force" he/she need to: (1) be highly empowered or occupy a formal position of 
power, (2) maintain and increase his/her share of power, (3) use this power as 
diplomatically as possible to facilitate change. An integration leader has also to play a 
leading role in envisioning, enabling and energising employees in general and his/her 
management team in particular with regard to participating in change as a learning 
process (Senge, 1996).
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If a change leader happens to occupy the position of a senior manager, then the chances 
for a rapid and effective progress on integration will be given an upward thrust. If not, 
then it is vital that he/she is empowered such that he/she is able of assuming a 
challenging leadership role.
Strategic, organisation-wide initiatives, such as a TQM program, can be utilised not 
only as a measure for improving competitiveness in the market place but also as a 
gradual approach to developing better communications among change leaders 
themselves, on the one hand, and between them and the rest of the organisation, on the 
other. Change leaders can utilise improved communications in favour of the change 
process in concern. This is particularly important in larger organisations which may be 
well resourced in financial and technical terms but less capable, as a collectivity, of 
responding to a change leader's invitation to participate in a culture-shaking change. 
This is supported by the proposition that larger companies are more likely to be 
competitive in terms of their respective competitive resources whereas smaller firms are 
more likely to be in a position to transform themselves more readily from inside in 
adapting to environmental changes. In doing so, however, smaller films' response to 
the need for change is likely to be influenced by what Lee and Oakes (1996) term 
"templates of change" (e.g. "world-class manufacturing", "TQM", and "business 
process re-engineering"), which originate in giant corporations' cultural symbolism. 
(Such templates are both produced and consumed, principally, in larger firms).
This thesis identified size as one of the most significant factors in technological change 
(Chapters 6 and 7). In this respect, the research's conclusions are consistent with Lee 
and Oakes's (1995) recent study of the implementation of TQM in the experiences of 
selected smaller firms. That is, small company environments can be propitious for 
introducing many of the major tenets of TQM relating to human resources. The success 
of these principles depends on change leaders' ability to effectively manipulate human 
resources, motivate employees to communicate better for the sake of a purpose made 
common to all of them, and involve the work force in building a new quality culture or, 
in the case of CADCAM, a new integration culture. In short, it can be said that a change 
leader's role in envisioning, enabling and energising a change process is of critical 
importance but, at the same time, it should be understood in the light of the contextual 
specifities of the organisation in which it is assumed.
9 .8  Senior Managers' Role
Given the strategic nature of CADCAM, the role of senior management in facilitating 
change towards integration is crucial. The thesis showed that the lack of support for 
integration at a Board of Directors level could be a major barrier to integration. Worse
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still is when key senior managers resist integration in principle and fail to see its 
relevance. Therefore, the extent of what Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996) termed 
"headquarters level change" or "transformation" should not be ignored as a crucial 
factor in facilitating, or delaying, organisation-wide change action because of the power 
invariably inherent "in and around the board room" (Pettigrew and McNutly, 1995).
Moral or symbolic senior management’s support is vital but insufficient on its own. It 
is important for senior managers to be personally involved in implementing a strategic 
vision of integration and not delegate that completely to middle managers. Strategic 
business objectives should match operational and control objectives and strategic 
performance should be assessed and managed vis-a-vis operational performance and 
vice versa. Senior management's direct involvement in implementing a stiategic 
CADCAM vision will hopefully fill any gaps that are otherwise likely to develop 
between these sets of objectives.
9 .9  Middle Managers' Role
Change may start at the top but it cannot progress if it is sustained only at the top; top 
executives can only run organisations with the permission of those they think they 
control. Middle managers are unlikely to be preoccupied with their technical role to the 
extent that they abandon their legitimatory role which incorporates administrative 
powers and sociological vision. They can assume both roles to facilitate or hinder 
change. Middle management are not powerless; they can change things in their own 
departments and, hence develop an influence throughout the organisation (Block, 
1988).
As Beatty and Lee (1992) rightly argue, the role of middle level technical managers in 
implementing a technological change is vital. The impact, positive or negative, of 
leadership by technical managers on the technical, business and organisational 
outcomes of a technology-induced change, such as CADCAM integration, should not 
be underestimated. This study demonstrated that the role of middle managers in 
promoting and facilitating CADCAM integration should be given due attention. It also 
showed that some middle managers could resist it strongly if they perceived it to be a 
threat to their privileged status and, in so doing, they would become yet another barrier 
to integration (Chapters 6 and 7).
When middle managers run their respective departments as if these were independent 
business units, thus creating semi-independent organisations of their own choosing, 
their local shares of power may become a source of fragmentation and reinforcement of 
multiple power centres under a Taylorist mode of organisation. By insisting on doing 
things their own way, middle managers are likely to carry out a political act, an example
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of powerfulness to influence the whole organisation. Subject to the level of power they 
have reached, they can potentially act against outside constraints; they can be influential 
without formal authority (Kotter, 1985). For example, a middle manager can manage 
his/her boss by creating good working relations, by knowing his goals, pressures, 
strengths, weaknesses and working style and matching these to his own.
Middle technical managers in particular are supposed to assume a key role in 
technological change. Therefore, it is important that their role in change is clarified and 
that they are empowered and motivated enough to play it effectively in favour of set 
integration objectives. It is essential that their commitment is such that it may work as a 
facilitating rather than an impeding factor.
9 .1 0  Supervisors' Role
In order to encourage integration, a more positive view of supervision has to be 
propagated whereby the role of a supervisor is redefined as one of assisting 
subordinates to trust their own instincts and take their own responsibility for success. 
Power should be used in a non-coercive manner such that they feel empowered 
themselves (Block, 1988). Somehow, a balance should be struck whereby this could 
be achieved within the framework of a strategic vision of integration. It is important that 
people's creative energies, potential for hard work, and willpower are stimulated in 
such a way that serves to facilitate change as much as possible or else it would be likely 
to manifest itself in behaviour which resists change.
'.... while machines, materials, and vehicles have change imposed upon them, they will not 
answer back. They are passive recipients of change. But people do and will answer back, and 
none of the changes brought about in relation to things and materials can happen without 
people playing their part.” (Wille and Hodgson 1991,82-83).
At any rate, a responsible autonomy approach is much more likely to stimulate interest 
in training and flexibility than a Taylorist-oriented direct control approach which 
emphasises selective training and a traditional highly compartmentalised work 
organisation (see Currie, 1989).
9 .1 1  Integration as a Learning Process
CADCAM integration may well be described as a process of development when viewed 
from a technical point of view. Arguably, it can be viewed as a process of 
organisational development, too. Integrating organisations would need to move beyond 
their traditional models of learning towards newer, more encompassing ones which 
encourage members to challenge norms and values that have dominated the workplace 
for a long time. The higher degree of uncertainty and the demand for greater 
participation, which characterise the emerging work environment in manufacturing,
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necessitate new "continuous improvement" approaches to organisational learning. This 
approach should encourage participants to detect and correct an error when it occurs in 
ways which involve the modification of an organisation's underlying norms (see 
Argyris and Schon, 1970). The negative aspects of bureaucracy, which may indeed 
hinder learning, must be addressed since errors in a bureaucratic organisation are 
extremely difficult to correct in a manner which involves a corrective action on 
behaviour (Crozier, 1964). This is because relative long-term stability is an underlying 
assumption of bureaucracy through its "variable tendencies" such as hiérarchisation, 
stratification, formalisation, standardisation, centralisation, legitimisation, 
officialisation, and impersonalisation (Clegg, 1990: 33-40). To solidify to any 
considerable extent, and thus become an established norm, these tendencies require 
time but are, at the same time, reinforced by becoming long-standing traditions.
A "learning organisation"^ would facilitate the transition towards CADCAM integration 
through knowledge acquisition, sharing and utilisation, which concentrate on the 
development of core competencies, the promotion of an attitude that supports 
continuous improvement, and the encouragement of the ability to continuously 
revitalise itself.
An organisation can be viewed, therefore, as a "learning system" (Nevis et aL, 1995). 
Self-development and action learning play a role of crucial importance in managing a 
learning system (Jones and Hendry, 1994).
“The Teaming organisation’ is a metaphor, with its roots in the vision of and the search for a 
strategy to promote individual self-development within a continuously self-transforming 
organisation. Learning is associated with the capacity for continuous transformation, based 
upon individual and organisational development. The subject of individual learning has 
received much attention in psychology but organisational learning, which draws upon the 
integration of the sum of individuals' learning to create a whole that is greater than the sum of 
its parts, is far less understood. In the learning organisation human resource development 
strategy is central to strategic management. Excellent organisations, we increasingly realise, 
depend upon the commitment of their people in a context where constraints require that the 
human resource is utilised to its fullest capacity.” (Starkey, 1996: 2).
To reiterate what was said in section 9.5, even strategy can be viewed as a fluidity and 
learning process when practised within a learning organisation philosophy. It may
^The concept of a "learning organisation" has become increasingly used in the literature by many 
researchers (e.g. Jones and Hendry, 1994; Senge, 1996; Starkey, 1996; Wille and Hodgson, 1991). 
Wille and Hodgson (1991) define learning organisations as:
“.....  networks o f  cooperatioon and idea-sharing, and they buy into other external networks to
enhance the learning process  Learning organisations are inspired by a vision , a sense o f
purpose and meaning . They have role models and mentors from whom they may learn. They are not 
status conscious. A ll can learn from each. A ll are colleagues and fellow-leam ers.” (p.172-173).
“The essence o f a learning organisation lies in the doing o f things. It learns as it proceeds, as the 
teams comprising it act, in the practical carrying out o f the purposes for which they have com e 
together.” (p. 166).
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potentially lead to a source of competitive advantage in the long mn (Mintzberg, 1979; 
Starkey, 1996). As Bessant et al. (1996) argue technological innovation itself offers an 
opportunity for "learning to learn", whose accumulative utilisation over time provides a 
solid base for stiategic technology management. The 1988 OECD report stresses the 
need for such a shift:
“ the effective implementation of technological change requires a strong commitment by
management to deepen the involvement of those affected by new products, processes and
systems this m eans a shift from "Talyloristic" patterns of organisation, with their
fragmentation of work tasks and layers of supervising management, towards multi-skilling and 
the devolution of responsibility. Such change will require the retraining both of managers and 
workers. It also means a trend towards the "horizontal" integration of depiutmental functions 
within the enterprise, and the interchange of infonnation throughout the enterprise, from the
earliest stages We believe that the more radical the nature of technological change the
more profound and complex the social interaction it generates, and the more innovative 
institutional changes it necessitates.” (OECD, 1988: Introduction).
As Bessant (1991: 345) put it, the proposed learning organisation vision is a new "way 
of looking at organisations ... as a living system, interacting with their environment and 
trying to survive and develop". This would place greater pressures on a manufacturing 
company to constantly adapt or close down.
“ any failure to appreciate the emerging realities of the highly competitive and turbulent
environment may lead to a loss of competitiveness and possible death of the enterprise - as
other leaner, fitter and more agile competitors adapt better there is a need to build in a
system of continuous improvement, of constant responsiveness to the environment coupled
with sufficient internal stability to maintain the organisation This highlights the point
about the total organisation. If - as many now argue - we aie moving from an era of capital 
intensity to one in which knowledge and problem-solving ability becomes as important a 
feature as fixed capital equipment, then the ability to become a learning organisation, 
constantly developing and improving this knowledge, becomes critical.” (Bessant, 1991: 346).
Apart from formal training, a learning organisation will facilitate the learning of all its 
members and continuously transform itself by creating a climate where all the 
individuals are encouraged to learn and develop their full potential beyond mere 
competence (Jones and Hendry, 1994; Kim, 1993). Learning also extends to all 
stakeholders. An appropriate human resource development strategy is central to the 
management of CADCAM integration, one that promotes positive employee relations, 
trust and respect. A greater emphasis is laid on skills of understanding with a view to 
discovering and solving problems, rather than on "fact-oriented" knowledge (Lowstedt, 
1988X
This research demonstrated that successful management is as much about the utilisation 
of resources as it is about the mobilisation of relationships. People should not be dealt 
with like any other "static" resource to be managed, because they are not powerless. As 
one of the participants in the study put it, "people are naturally resistant to change" 
(Case 2); a different participant commented: “if people aren't committed they'll beat the 
system; they will not let a machine beat them” (Case 4); and yet another participant
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explained: “if we are going to integrate manufacture you need the commitment of the 
people, if that is what they are wanting to do!" (Case 10). Hence, the management of 
human resources requires special communication skills on the part of change leaders:
“ It's the need to actually keep people informed of what actually you are doing, why you're
doing it, where they figure in this, what part do they have to play in it, how it's going to 
change the way they do their jobs, the rewards for the job, the way they're expected to 
participate in the whole organisation.” (Case 2).
Apart from formal working communications, people acquire informal and social 
relationships in the workplace. A successful manager should mobilise such 
relationships to develop a process of learning out of the implementation of CADCAM. 
The importance of such vision lies in treating an organisation like a learning being who 
receives the formal training offered to him/her whilst looking for satisfying his/her 
psychological and social needs through work relationships; "it is the subtlety of these 
relationships which is the cement that binds people together into an organisation, rather 
than them being just a crowd (Wille and Hodgson, 1991, 164).
People can potentially learn both from experiences of failure and success in a 
harmonious group working atmosphere in such a balanced manner that maintains the 
individual creativity and the entrepreneurial spirit without an excessive reliance on 
system and bureaucratic methods of control. The introduction of such controls however 
may become necessary for avoiding descent into anarchy in certain situations where 
interrelationships become impossible to link otherwise. As Wille and Hodgson (1991) 
contend:
“There is something about a collective organisation of people which has an existence 
analogous to that of the individual. So real is this that we speak of the heart of the 
organisation, the spirit of the organisation, its soul, its values, its vision, its mission, its 
thought, its actions. When we do this we are not just talking of the spirit, heart, actions of 
the chief executive or any one member of the organisation, but we are envisaging it as a 
whole, in which the whole is greater than the parts. We use the word ‘synergy’ to describe this 
power of the whole.” (p. 166).
“The individual is a learning organism. When individuals get together to act in concert, they 
become a learning organisation. The way in which they operate is a kind of expansion of the
individual learning organism It is this something bigger tlian we mean when we refer to
the ‘learning organisation’. Yes, the individual learns, but the team learns more on the basis 
of its synergy, where 1+1=3 or more."(pp. 163-166).
In short, it is clear that the notion of organisational integration is consistent with 
CADCAM interfacing. It is also consistent with the emphasis placed on the collective 
personality of an integrating or learning organisation. Indeed, one way of 
conceptualising an integrating organisation is in terms of the wealth of learning 
opportunities and experiences which will have accumulated during the course of a 
lengthy integration project. In particular, the central learning role that may be assumed 
by an integration leader personally is important, as well as his/her part in advocating
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organisational learning as a means for developing work team identity and improving 
collective problem-solving for integration purposes. Lessons resulting from individual 
and organisational learning can therefore be incorporated into future strategy 
formulation and implementation to improve the management of the overall project 
technically, organisationally and, hopefully, economically too. Hence, it can be said 
that a successfully led integrating organisation should have learning as one of its key 
characteristics.
Indeed, the likelihood is that a "holistic"^ approach to organisational design and 
development will be favourable to the progress of CADCAM integration, because "it 
acknowledges and takes advantage of the fact that the whole of a business process is 
more than merely the sum of its parts" (Hoffman, 1994: 94).
9 .1 2  Implications of the Study
In addition to the theoretical and practical importance of the study, which was explained 
in Chapter 1 (section 1.7), the thesis has several implications for managers, 
consultants, trade union leaders, and researchers. First, the conclusions of the study 
should help guide future practical management of CADCAM integration in general and 
technological change in particular. The same forces that require managers to make 
radical changes to production methods and business processes require them to make 
radical changes in the way work is organised around newly introduced techniques and 
systems. Where an integrating technology is introduced organisation-wide changes are 
inescapable and, thus need to be managed as carefully as possible. This may start with 
the basic ideas and tools of earlier technology and business planning methods, but it 
should make important additions and modifications in the way an investment is justified 
and implementation is carried out in line with the distinctive nature of an integrating 
technology. For example, this may mean that the proposed approach:
1) Recognises the concept of breaking a production process into component parts, but 
rejects the idea that every process must be divided into the most elementary possible 
operations.
2) Recognises the work flow diagrams as tools that are useful for work analysis 
purposes, but makes use of other important analysis criteria pertaining to, for example, 
information and material flows, informal organisation, and de facto power distribution.
3) Recognises the idea of technological advancement being driven by business needs, 
but defines those needs in terms external to the business (e.g. serving customers) rather 
than in terms internal to the organisation (e.g. accounting rules).
^According to Hoffman (1994: 94), "holism is the name of a philosophic viewpoint that asserts tliat 
every entity, animate or inanimate, has reality of its own in addition to the realities of its 
components."
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4) Recognises the important role of regulatory systems, methods and rules of 
organisational control but takes account of the more important role dominant 
organisational cultures and managerial philosophies and traditions play in shaping and 
maintaining them.
5) Recognises that the introduction of a new technology necessarily involves a kind of 
technical change at the level of the adopting organisation, but rejects the idea that every 
technical change is necessarily an innovation process and draws on other organisations' 
experiences of change with a tried technology.
6) Recognises the important role of rational techno-economic thinking in the acquisition 
and utilisation of a new technology but rejects the proposition that technological change 
is governed solely by objective, value-free rules of behaviour.
Second, the conclusions of the study should be of interest to senior mangers and 
strategists in general. It can be argued that the desired success of a corporate strategy 
depends, among other things, on a sound technology strategy which supports business 
objectives and takes account of the organisational modifications needed to facilitate its 
implementation. A clear and dynamic strategic vision on CADCAM and other 
technology-led integration projects (including mission, valued outcomes, valued 
conditions and mid-point goals) is vital to the instrumentality of the overall strategic 
vision. This should be done in a strategy formulation framework which links 
integration strategy to manufacturing strategy to corporate business strategy. Senior 
management’s direct involvement in the implementation of these interlinked strategies is 
crucial.
Third, management practitioners who are made responsible for leading change, and 
consultants who may support them in decision making, should find the study's 
conclusion useful in several ways:
1) Despite the highly influential potential advantages of computerisation/automation, 
human resources are in fact the key element in organisational design and development. 
Encouraging human beings to use their own knowledge and judgement about how the 
business should operate is likely to contribute to creating the conditions for a successful 
organisational change, provided that :
a) what is deemed a successful change is sufficiently publicised;
b) they are made aware of the pressure for change;
c) their legitimate fears and concerns are carefully understood and addressed;
d) they are given sufficient information about business objectives and current 
performance; and
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e) they have the information necessary to assess the consequences of their actions in 
a learning organisation frame of reference which encourages communication and 
employee involvement in change.
2) The needs of users should not be the only requirements taken into account during a 
process/technology phase of implementation, all stakeholders' needs should be 
addressed;
3) The technical, organisational and business considerations of a proposed technology 
should be assessed simultaneously right from the outset by assessing the need for 
change, clarifying the problem or opportunity, investigating alternative solutions, 
gaining feedback, and recommending the best possible course of action. This may 
involve prototyping (using computer simulation techniques whenever possible) an 
integrated organisational system on the basis of a customised CIM reference 
architecture which addresses the identified problems. This may be done in order to 
assist participation in decision making in the light of a specific integration strategy 
suitable to the requirements of the company in question. Such assessments should be 
reviewed regularly thereafter to take account of changing circumstances; and
5) The right culture for change should be created and top management's commitment 
should be stimulated. Newcomers in particular should be "initiated" and encouraged to 
adopt such culture so as to sustain the momentum.
Fourth, the analysis and discussion of case study findings should be of interest to trade 
union leaders who are required to play a more positive role in technological change. 
Trade unions should not expect management "invite" them to take part in change 
without them changing themselves from inside. By reviewing their traditional concerns 
about pay and conditions and adopting a more proactive point of view on the 
technological change they are likely to make themselves more presentable as a collective 
source of power and influence. By seeking to assume new roles which make them 
appear more as partners in change rather than victims of it, they are likely to allay their 
members' fears about what they perceive to be threatening effects of new technology. 
The more they develop expert knowledge of new technology and promote it among 
their members, the more likely that trade unions will be able to negotiate participation in 
managerial decision making and, thus be more successful in assuming new roles.
Fifth, commentators on the societal impacts of technology would find the conclusions 
of interest in that they demonstrate the important roles human intention, change agent 
action and contextual contingencies play in shaping the outcomes of a technological 
change. The universality of botli technological deteiiuinism and labour process theory 
perspectives could be rightly questioned
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Finally, the thesis introduced innovative features into the research design, which, 
hopefully, may enhance future research in this increasingly important area of academic 
concern. The implications of the study for researchers can be summarised in the 
following points:
1) Integrating technologies have wider and more serious organisational implications 
than stand alone new technology applications and, thus, research in this area requires 
new approaches in order to establish the present and potential extent of such 
implications. Further research could also identify the issues of relevance, develop 
suitable methodologies to study them best, address their practical significance to the 
individuals and different groups concerned, and propose remedies to help managers 
overcome obstacles to integration.
2) The theoretical and methodological frameworks (including the conceptual model) 
developed for the purpose of this research could be applied, with slight modifications 
perhaps, to studies concerning other integrating technologies (e.g. MRP - II).
3) A greater emphasis should be placed in future research on the dynamics of change 
rather than on investigating the results of change under the assumption that these are 
static and will easily fall under the researcher's control.
4) Combining a grounded theory methodology with longitudinality in a research based 
on case study approach will help the researcher not only answer the research's initial 
questions but also develop substantive theory on the phenomenon under investigation, 
which can then be formalised and presented in a more theoretically abstract form.
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APPENDIX A 
First Correspondence
u n i v e r s i t y  o f  S T .  A N D R E W S
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT  
KINNESSBURN 
KENNEDY GARDENS 
ST. ANDREWS 
FIFE KY16 9DJ 
SCOTLAND U.K.
Tdephone: St. Andrews (0334) 76161 ext: S102
Telex: 76213
Donald Hardie, Esq,
Institute of Directors,
13 Great Stuart Street,
EDINBURGH, EH3 7TP
17th January 1990
Dear Donald,
I wonder if you could be of assistance to me in my 
membership capacity? I have a very able Ph.D. student, in 
Management, Mr Tarek Tantoush, who has a manufacturing 
management background. Currently he is researching a doctorate 
in "The Management of Technological Change" under the joint 
supervision of myself and Fiona Wilson.
In particular, he is interested in Robotics and CAD (Computer 
Aided Design). Do you have any member firms whose activities 
include such change, where he might visit the company and gain 
some insight, (and offer some, I hope) into the issues involved? 
Perhaps you might have some contacts he could approach?
He is a very bright and charming young man, whom one 
would have no hesitation in introducing to senior executives.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Stewart R. Clegg 
C hairm an of Oeoartm_e_nt
c.c. Dr. Fiona Wilson
Mr Tarek Tantoush 297
lOD
Instituts ot Directors
SCOTTISH DIVISION
Chairman
S i r  G e r a l d  E l l i o tDirectorDonald Hardie. QBE
Professor Stewart: R. Clegg, Chairman,Department of Management University of St. Andrews, Kinnessbnm Kennedy Gardens,ST. ANDREWS KY16 9DJ 12 February, 1991
I have not overlooked your letter of 17 January about Tarek Tantoush. I am waiting for replies from one or two members who might have suggestions to make. I, myself, do not know of any relevant companies but as soon as I hear of any I will write you again.
/
J.D.M. HARDIE, Director
Institute of D irectors 13 Great Stuart Street. Edinburgh EH3 7T? 
 T e i^ h o n e  (031) 225 3101. Fax (031) 226 4SS2
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SCOTTISH DIVISION
i l  1 1 1  ChairmanJ L  sir Gerald EHiot, _ Directorinstitute oi Directors Donald Hardie. QBE
Professor Stewart R. Clegg,Chairman of Department,Department of Management,University of St. AndrewsKinnesshumKennedy Gardens,ST.. ANDREWS KY16 9DJ 12 March, 1991
I have not had much luck in fixing Tarek Tantoush. I  am sure you will appreciate how difficult it is for me trying to help members with enquiries such as yours when I  do not really know what all our members do.
No one has told me of any Brazilian trade connections. I suggest you try to contact to contact Colin Camie who is some sort of South American contact for a variety of companies. You can find him care of the Scottish Council (Development and Industry), 23 Chester Street, Edinburghalthough he works in Glasgow. You might also contact Hamish Morrison, Chief Executive of the Scottish Council. One of his roles is to encourage overseas initiatives.
As far as Tantoush is concerned, you might try Findlay Mackenzie at Hewlett Packard Ltd., South Queensferry or Keiichi Shimakura of NEC, Livingston or Alan Simmons, Digital or Derek Bumpsteed at Exacta Circuits in Selkirk.
J.D.M. HARDIE, Director
Institute of Directors !3 Great Stuarr Street, Edinburgh EH3 TTP 
T eiech o n e  ,'03:. 335 3101 Fax (031) 226 4552
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APPENDIX B 
Company Invitation Questionnaire & Covering Letter
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  S T .  A N D R E W S
D EPA R TM EN T OF M A N A G E M E N T  
h g l B g l j  K IN N E S S B U R N
K EN N ED Y  G A R D E N S  
ST. A N D R E W S  
FIFE KYI6 9D J  
S C O T L A N D  U.K.
T eleph one: St. A ndrew s (0334) 76161 ext: 8102
T elex: 76213
To whom it may concern
I am w riting  on behalf of Mr. Tarek Tantoush, a graduate s tu d en t in 
M anagem ent at the U niversity  of St. A ndrew s. Mr. T an toush  is 
researching the im plications of new technology as part of his doctoral 
degree in m anagem ent at the University. I would be grateful if you were 
able to facilitate his study, by offering him whatever assistance you are able 
to give. In the future, Mr. Tantoush would be only too willing to discuss 
w ith your O rganization any relevant findings from the overall research 
project.
Sound research  in M anagem ent depends upon cooperation betw een 
m anagem ent in industry, m anagem ent in both public and private sector 
organizations and departm ents of the universities such as ours. I do hope 
that you are able to use this opportun ity  to facilitate the fu rth e r 
developm ent of m anagem ent as a soundly researched enterprise.
Professor Stéwarc RJ 
C hairm an of
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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  S T .  A N D R E W S DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT 
KINNESSBURN 
KENNEDY GARDENS 
ST. ANDREWS 
FIFE KYI69DJ 
SCOTLAND U.K.
Telephone: St. .Andrews (0334) 76161 e.xt: 8102
Telex: 76213
20th. March 1991
Dear
I would like to introduce myself: My name is Tarek Tantoush and I am 
a postgraduate student in the Department of Management at the 
University of St Andrews. I am researching different organizations' 
experiences of technological change in manufacturing industry for my PhD.
The project is being jointly supervised by Professor Stewart Clegg and Dr 
Fiona Wilson. Under their supervision I am seeking to establish some 
basic information which you can help me by providing. If it is not too 
much trouble, I would be grateful if you could complete and return the accompanying form,
Yours sincerely
Tarek Tantoush
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IMPACT OF M T r R o w r .F r r a (w r s  
ON JO B DESIGX AND QRGANT2ATTON
your compaiiY recsndy (dnring' :he last 3-5 years ) been invoiced in 
projects z a  imniemenc. forms o f microelectronics- based %cnnoio§y, for 
example CAD/CAM* RobocicSr MHP?
C j Yes CU No
I f  yes wMca o f !±ie above technologies has been introduced?
Yes I would Hkf» to have the opportunity to discuss the experience of my 
organization in introducing and implementing technological change.
CU Yes 
O  No
Nam e and position of respondent:, 
Marne and address of company:—
Is your company a suhsid iary or parent company?
CU Suhsid lary  cm Parent
I f  a subsidiary, what is the name of the parent company?
Approximaca number of employees on your site:...... ..................
N ature oc the business:.......................................................................
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
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APPENDIX C 
Interview  Schedule (I) 
IN TERV IEW  SCHEDULE ( 1 )
SECTION (I): BASIC BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Personal Interviewee Details
01) Name:
02) Job title:
03) Tasks and responsibilities vis-a-vis everyday work:
04) Tasks and responsibilities in relation to technological change project(s):
05) Approximate Age (?):
06) Length of employment in the company:
07) Previous work history and experience :
Company Details
01) Name:
02) Address and telephone number:
03) Ownership:
04) Legal status of the organisation (please tick as applicable):
Independent..................................................................................................... CU
Subsidiary of another company.....................................................................  C d
Division of another company..........................................................................  I I
Company branch.............................................................................................. I „ I
Company head office....................................................................................... I— I
Only company s ite ......................................................................................
05) Histoiy:
06) Structure:
□
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07) Employees on your site:07.1) Approximate number ?07.2) Composition in terms of categories of functional specialisations (with approximate numbers of employees in each functional areti/depaitment )?07.3) Approximate blue collar employees / direct labour to white collar 
employees/indirect labour ratio?07.4) Approximate overall gender ratio and distribution in terms of company 
structure?
08) Nature of business, products and markets:
09) Main manufacturing / production process(es) and structure of production system:
10) Production planning / scheduling, management and control system:
*************
SECTION (II): IDENTIFYING A TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH DESIGN
11) Has your company recently (over the last few yeais) been involved in projects to implement foims of micro-electronics based technology?
Y e s ..................................................................................................................... □
N o ................................................. []
11.1) If yes, in which area(s) of the following have they been? [please tick opposite the applicable area(s) and specify application(s)]:* Production planning and control [ e.g. material requirements planning (MRP)
system, just in time (JIT) stock control system, etc.]......................  EZI
* Design / engineering / R & D [ e.g. Computer aided design (CAD),etc.] " " Ed* Shop floor equipment / processes / systems :
** Manufacturing .........................................................................  I I
** Assembly ................................................................................. I J
** Quality control /  inspection ........................................................ I I
** Materials handing.........................................................................  I  I
* Any other area(s) [please specify] ............................................................. Ed11.2) If No, is the company planning to do so in the near future ?
12.1) Has the company been involved in projects to plan the integration of specific computerised systems or the implementation of integrated advanced 
manufacturing technology systems [e.g. CAD / CAM integration, flexible manufacturing systems $FMS), computer integrated manufacturing (CIM), etc.]? 
[please specify and explain]
Yes...................................................................................................................... E l]
No................................................. O
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*13) Would you say that the company at the moment is more concerned with ^implementing various forms of new technology in various areas /  depattmentsimprove performance [e.g. CAD in design and engineering, CNC in
manufacturing, etc.], ....................................................................  E dor interfacing already existing computerised systems / equipment [e.g. by
integrating CAD with CAM, etc.] ...................................................  I— I* ür planning / implementing integrated technologies [e.g. CAD / CAM,__
FMS, CIM, etc.] ................................................................................... L ]
14) With regard to the current technological changes happening now in the
organisation, for how long has the implementation project been going on, 
considering the start of the planning phase as its starting day ?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SECTION (III): IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES ENCOUNTERED IN COMPANIES' EXPERIENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE FOR RESEARCH DESIGN
15) What have been the company's objectives in implementing the technology ?
16) In your company’s experience of technological change what kinds of technical issues/challenges/obstacles have been encountered [e.g. system selection, specifications, etc.]?16.1) To what extent have they been overcome ?16.2) Any plans / measures to overcome them and facilitate a smootherchange process?
17) In your company's experience of technological change what kinds of 
organisational / managerial issues / challenges / obstacles have been encountered [e.g. job redesign, new co-ordination requirements, industiial relations difficulties, etc.] ?
17.1) To what extent have they been overcome ?17.2) Any plans / measures to overcome them and facilitate a smootherchange process?
18) In your company's experience of technological change what kinds of financial/ accounting/investment management issues/challenges/obstacles have been encountered [ e.g. investment appraisal, strategic/ financial justification of project, etc.]? 18.1) To what extent have they been overcome ?18.1) Any plans / measures to overcome them and facilitate a smoother change process?
19) What has the impact of technological change been on jobs :19.1) Employment level ?
19.2) Design of jobs associated with the new technology ?19.3) Nature of other jobs not directly associated with the new technology ?
20) What has the impact of technological change been on the existing company structure? and what restructuring arrangements have been necessary ?
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21) Is there any organised trade unions in the company?21.1) Have they participated in the change process and how? and what has thereresponse been to the process ?21.2) What has been the impact of technological change on industrial relations ?
22) How has the management / co-ordination of the technological change process been organised in relation with the existing company management structure? and has it been handled entirely internally or with the assistance of external consultants?- Delegation- Teamwork- Pm ticipation and involvement: by whom and how- Sense of belonging / ownership of new systems / new technology.
23) What has been the effect of the economic recession in the UK upon the 
business ?
24) From your / the company's point of view are there any other issues of importance and concern to the company, which the interview has not addressed ? What ai'e such issues which you feel the company would be more interested to discuss than others, possibly with various departments / people ?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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APPENDIX D 
Interview Schedule (II) 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (ID
SECTION (I): CAD/CAM AS AN INVESTMENT PROJECT
01) When was the initial purchase of CAD/CAM made?
02) There are vai'ious CAD/CAM systems on the market. Which CAD/CAM systems did you choose in this company?Regarding this system, can you tell me something about:02.1) Hardware (e.g. make, supplier, how many workstations, etc.)02.2) Software (e.g. package capabilities: drafting, drawing, modelling, o r/
and analysis )02.3) System capacity.
03) Approximately, how much did it cost as an overall investment package?*Less than £10,000
^Between £10,000 and £20,000 ^Between £21,000 and £50,000 *Over £51,000Cost element details : (hardware, software, training, consultation, others):Total: £.. ..............
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SECTION (II): CAD/CAM MANAGERIAL AND ORGANISATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
04) In general terms, how would you describe the process of product design and manufacture in the company?
05. In the year prior to the introduction of CAD/CAM how many people on average had worked in the design/manufacturing functions / departments?
06) What had been their functional specialisations?
07) Approximately, how many people had been associated with each of these specialisations?
08) Has the introduction of CAD/CAM affected the work and organisation situation in your company?*Yes*No JfNo, go to question 09 or else Can you tell me how?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SECTION (III): THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: 
METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION
09) What has been your involvement with CAD/CAM?09.1) Prior to implementation?09.2) During implementation?09.3) After implementation?
10) How did the original idea to use CAD/CAM come about in the company?
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11) Was there a consensus?
12) Once the adoption of CAD/CAM had been decided what process of assessment / recommendation was followed?
13) How was the decision to purchase CAD/CAM made in the organisation?
14) Were there any tireas of resistance in the company? Please comment.*Yes*No I f  No, go to Question 15 or else14.1) From within management?
14.2) From within other white collar staff groups?14.3) From non-unionised workers in the design/manufacturingfunctions / departments?14.4) From non-unionised workers in other departments than design?
15) What do you think were the main objectives in deciding to purchase a CAD/CAM system at first ?
16) How were these objectives formulated in the organisation? (e.g. task force / committee foimation, meetings, seminars, infomial discussions, vendor demonstrations, etc.- please explain)
17) Have these objectives changed with time?17.1) Prior to implementation :*Yes*No I f No, go to 172 or else Can you explain how?17.2) During implementation:
*Yes*No I f  No, go to 173 or else Can you explain how?17.3) After implementation :*Yes
*No I f  No, go to question 18 or else Can you explain how?
18) Was a fomial justification of purchase carried out?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 19 or elseIs it possible to review the justification document(s)?
19) Have all the initial problems in running the system been resolved?*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 20 or elseApproximately, how long did it take to bring the system under full operational control ?* ..........  days* ..........  weeks* ..........  months* ..........  years.
20) What do you think were the main issues that arose in the implementation phase? Can you tell me about them in terms of the following aieas:
20.1) Technical issues?
20.2) Financial issues?
20.3) Personnel issues?20.4) Organisational /  social issues?
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21) Did any problems arise subsequently in operating the system?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 22 or elseCan you tell me about them?
22) Has the original system ever been changed (e.g. expanded, upgraded, or /  and replaced) subsequently after it had been first installed?*Yes
*No I f No, go to question 25 or else21.1) How many times did changes take place?21.2) What kinds of changes were these (each time)?21.3) How was / were the decision(s) to carry out theses changes madein the organisation?
23) Approximately, how long did it take for subsequent changes to the system to be brought under full operational control ? *........... days *........... weeks *........... months *..........  years
24) Did any problems arise when implementing subsequent additions / changes, workstations, or packages ?*Yes*No If No, go to question 25 or else Can you tell me about them?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SECTION (IV)THE IMPACT OF CAD/CAM ON WORK ORGANISATION, EMPLOYMENT, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
25) Did the introduction of CAD/CAM present the company with a need to change the number of employees in design, drafting, or engineering / manufacturing?*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 26 or else25.1 ) Did it lead to hiring extra people to cope with the new system's requirements?*Yes*No I f No, go to 25.2
25.1.1) How many of them had to be hired?25.1.2) For what positions were they hired vis-a-visCAD/CAM (e.g. managers, supervisors, operators, support staff, etc.) ?25.1.3) What was the impact of this on operating costs?25.2) Did it lead to laying off some of the existing staff?*Yes*No I f No, go to question 26 or else25.2.1) How many of them had to be laid off?25.2.2) Which worker groups did the lay offs affect 
(e.g. draughtsmen, designers, engineers, etc.) ?25.2.3) What was the impact of this on operating costs?
26) How was work organised around CAD/CAM when it was introduced at first in terms of arranging the CAD/CAM-associated jobs?26.1) System managers' /  supervisors' work?26.2) System operators' work? (Question continued next page)
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26.3) System services / support / maintenance staffs work?
27) Have these work organisation arrangements changed with time?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 28 or else27.1) What have been the reasons for change?27.2) How is work organised around CAD/CAM at present?
28) What kind of effect has CAD/CAM had on other areas / departments in the company?
29) How were staff selected for CAD/CAM work?29.1) From within the organisation?29.2) From outside the organisation?
30) Did the company have to employ new people to operate, supervise, or support CAD/CAM?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 32 or elseHow many of them and for what positions vis-a-vis CAD/CAM?
31) How did the company recruit them?
32) Have there been any staff changes among those involved with CAD/CAM since it was first introduced in terms of:32.1) staffing levels?*Yes*No If No, go to 322 or else Please explain?32.2) Turnover rate?
*Yes*No I f No, go to question 33 or else Please explain?
33) Generally speaking, what expectations did staff have of the CAD/CAM system?
34) What effect has CAD/CAM had on employee morale so far?
35) Did staff who worked on CAD/CAM receive any training for the system?*Yes*No If No, go to question 36 or else35.1) What kind of training did they receive?
35.2) How useful was the training for them vis-a-vis everyday work?
SECTION (Y)THE IMPACT OF CAD/CAM ON JOB DESIGN
36) How has the introduction of CAD/CAM affected your job?For instance, do you find that CAD/CAM has :36.1 ) Made your job generally easier or harder ?- Very much easier- Somewhat easier
- No significant change- Somewhat harder- Very much harder
In what ways? (Question continued next page)
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36.2) Increased or decreased your control over your job?- Highly increased- Somewhat increased- No significant change- Somewhat decreased- Highly decreasedIn what ways?
36.3) Made your job more or less demanding due to new technical knowledge requirements?- Much more demanding- Somewhat more demanding- No significant change
- Somewhat less demanding- Much less demanding
In what ways?
36.4) Increased or decreased the need for a broader understanding of the entire
design function?- Highly increased- Somewhat increased- No significant change- Somewhat decreased- Highly decreasedIn what ways?
36.5) Increased or decreased the requirements for people management skills ?- Highly increased- Somewhat increased
- No significant change- Somewhat decreased- Highly decreasedIn what ways?
36.6) Made the experience of your job more interesting or boring?- Much more interesting- Somewhat more interesting- No significant change- Somewhat more boring- Much more boring
In what ways ?
36.7) Increased or decreased the level of your overall job satisfaction?- Highly increased- Somewhat increased- No significant difference- Somewhat decreased- Highly decreasedIn what ways ?
37) Do you find that the introduction of CAD/CAM has changed your relations with fellow managers?*Yes
*No I f  No, go to question 38 or else
Can you explain in what ways have they changed ?
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SECTION (VI)THE IMPACT OF CAD/CAM ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: TRADE UNION AND EMPLOYEE RESPONSES TO CAD/CAM
38) Do you have trade unions in the company?
*Yes*No I f No, go to question 41 or else38.1) What trade unions are active in the company?38.2) Which sections of the work force do they organise?
39) What has been the fomial union attitude to CAD/CAM?
40) To what extent has the union been involved with CAD/CAM?
41) Has CAD/CAM affected management-worker relations ?*Yes*No I f No, go to question 42 or elseIn what ways has it affected them?
SECTION (VII)EVALUATION OF CAD/CAM INVESTMENT PROJECTS
42) To what extent have the original objectives in buying CAD/CAM been met?
43) Have any unanticipated advantages or disadvantages emerged?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 44 or else Please explain ?
44) Do you think the company is getting the full potential of the CAD/CAM system? *Yes*NoPlease explain ? (e.g. to what extent does the system meet the criteria laid down prior to implementation in terms of cost, deadline, performance, and productivity and quality gains ?)
45) To what extent have you personally been convinced about the need to buy CAD/CAM?
46) Have your views about the usefulness of CAD/CAM changed with time?*Yes*NoPlease explain ?
47) Do you believe CAD/CAM has been a success?
*Yes*NoI f No, what do you think have been the main reasons for the lack of success? or elseWhat do you think have been the main achievements of CAD/CAM?
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SECTION (VIII)CADCAM INTEGRATION AND INTEGRATEABILITY
48) It is widely believed that system compatibility is a factor which would help achieve interdepartmental computer integration, as for example the case of design computers being able to communicate with those of the manufacturing department.Was system compatibility taken into account in selecting the system that was purchased?*Yes*No I f  No, why was it not considered ? or else Why was it considered?
49) When considering CAD/CAM did the company have in mind any specific areas of integration such as CAD/CAE, CAD/CAM, CIM or MRP-II for example?*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 51 or elseCan you explain about what the company had in mind?
50) How have these integration plans changed with time?
51) What is the company's position regarding future integration planning at present?
52) Are the current systems suitable for interfacing with other systems in the company?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 53 or else
Which other functions / departments can it communicate with?
53) How has your experience of CAD/CAM implementation affected your view of integration?
54) Do you as a company have any forms of inter-functional computer integration at present?*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 56 or elsein which areas is integration operational and is CADCAM included?
55) The literature on computer integration identifies a number of major difficulties films encounter in their efforts to implement interdepartmental integration in, for instance, the technical, financial and organisational areas.
Did you encounter any problems in implementing integration?*Yes*No I f  No, go to question 56 or else
Can you tell me what these major areas of difficulty have been, illustrating with examples as much as possible?
56) Does the company have any plans for future integration:56.1) in the immediate future?*Yes*No I f  No, go to 56.2 or else What are they?56.2) over the inteimediate term (up to 5 yeai'S ahead)?
*Yes*No I f  No, go to 56.3 or else What are they ?56.3) over the long term (over 5 years ahead) ?
*Yes*No I f No, go to question 58 or else (Question continued next page)
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What are they ?
57) Do you foresee any likely obstacles towards achieving greater progress on future computer integration?
*Yes*No I f No, go to question 59 or else What me these obstacles?
58) Personally, how convinced are you about the need for integration by expanding onto CAD/CAM?
59) How optimistic or pessimistic me you that the obstacles to integration can be overcome? Please comment and give reasons and examples as much as possible.
60) What would be the best possible scenario you could think of in terms of future computerised integration in this organisation?
61) What would be the worst possible scenario you could think of in temis of future computerised integration in this organisation?
SECTION (IX) PERSONAL INTERVIEWEE DETAILS
62) Just for the convenience of keeping correct records can you confirm the following 
personal details?Name:Approximate age (?):
Tasks and responsibilities:Length of employment in the company:Previous work experience:
*
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